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Förord 
Hösten 2008 flyttade jag från min kära hemby Pensala till, vad som 
numera är känt som ”Nordens energihuvudstad”, Vasa. Då hade jag 
aldrig trott att jag ännu 2019 skulle bo kvar här i staden, och ännu 
mindre att jag skulle ha skrivit en doktorsavhandling i statskunskap. 
Men se så blev det. Den process som har tagit mig till denna punkt i 
livet har varit långt ifrån rak, men åtminstone sedan jag blev antagen 
som doktorand hösten 2014 har målsättningen varit klar. Jag skulle bli 
doktor i statskunskap. Kring detta rådde det för min egen del aldrig 
några tvivel.  
Detta skulle dock aldrig ha blivit fallet om det inte vore för min 
huvudhandledare, docent Kim Strandberg. Jag är evigt tacksam för all 
den uppmuntran och hjälp som du har gett mig genom hela denna 
process. Din dörr har alltid varit öppen, för alla typer av ärenden, och 
du har lärt mig vad som både förväntas och krävs för att kunna bli en 
god statsvetare. Du har även inkluderat mig i flera projekt och 
därigenom öppnat dörrar för mig som annars skulle varit stängda.  
Ett stort tack går även till min andra handledare, professor Kimmo 
Grönlund. Stort tack för att jag fått vara en del av både Samforsk och 
Contre, och för att du trott på mig till den grad att jag 2017 fick 
anställning inom doktorandnätverket Citizens and Democracy – Doctoral 
Network in Public Opinion and Political Behavior (PoBe). Utan denna 
möjlighet har jag svårt att se att jag skulle haft ekonomiska möjligheter 
att färdigställa denna avhandling. Stort tack till er båda för att ni både 
har tagit hand om mig och för att ni har visat mig förtroende.  
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Denna avhandling skulle aldrig ha blivit vad den blev utan all den 
ovärderliga hjälp som docent Peter Söderlund har bidragit med under 
hela processen. Ditt sätt att verkligen sätta dig in i andras arbete för att 
komma med tips kring förbättringar är något som jag tänker försöka 
anamma i framtiden. Du är ett föredöme för oss doktorander.  
Jag vill även tacka avhandlingens förhandsgranskare, docent Lisa 
Dellmuth från Stockholms universitet och professor Jonas Linde vid 
Universitetet i Bergen, för era värdefulla kommentarer. Tack även för 
att ni valde att sätta dyrbar tid på att läsa avhandlingen. Stort tack även 
till språkgranskare Paul Wilkinson som bidragit till att språket i 
avhandlingen håller nivån. Ett stort tack riktas även till alla kollegor i 
forskarkonsortiet Contre, den finlandssvenska forskarskolan, Samforsk 
och alla ni på B4. Att ha fått vara en del av dessa helheter har varit både 
intressant och utvecklande, både på ett yrkesmässigt och, inte minst, på 
ett personligt plan.  
Jag vill även speciellt tacka tre stycken kollegor, PD Claus Stolpe, PD 
Janne Berg och PD Jenny Lindholm. Utan Claus inspirerande 
föreläsningar under mitt första studieår skulle jag troligtvis inte ha 
stannat kvar vid Åbo Akademi, och som kollega uppskattar jag att du 
tar dig tid för att diskutera stort som smått. Utan Janne skulle jag 
troligtvis aldrig kommit på tanken på att börja doktorera, men att 
dagligen under många år gå förbi Jannes fönster och se honom jobba 
intensivt på sin egen avhandling väckte en nyfikenhet för denna bana 
som utmynnade i detta resultat. Jennys bidrag till både verksamheten 
och trivseln här på B4 går heller inte att överskatta, och du förtjänar ett 
stort tack för all den uppmuntran som du gett när det känts kämpigt.  
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Jag vill även passa på att tacka mina föräldrar. Ni har knappast haft 
det helt lätt genom åren, men ni har trots det alltid sett till att jag har 
det jag behöver och även stöttat mig i vått och torrt. Stort tack även till 
min sambo Charlotta Väisänen, som utan tvekan är den som fått stå ut 
med mest under alla dessa år. Tack för att du trots allt har orkat med 
mig och visat förståelse för hur jag har prioriterat. Förhoppningsvis 
lugnar livet ner sig efter att man har disputerat, men jag är långt ifrån 
säker baserat på vad jag har hört från mina kära kollegor.  
Avslutningsvis vill jag även tacka två personer som inte längre finns 
bland oss, min morfar Lars Strandwall och min före detta lärare och 
fullmäktigekollega Bo Kronqvist. Denna bok tillägnas ert minne.   
*** 
Till sist vill jag påpeka att arbetet med denna avhandling har 
möjliggjorts genom ekonomiskt stöd från Högskolestiftelsen i 
Österbotten, Harry Schaumans Stiftelse, Svensk-Österbottniska 
Samfundet, Åbo Akademi och Kulturfonden för Sverige och Finland. 
Ett ödmjukt tack för ert stöd och förtroende.  
 
Nykarleby den 5 juli 2019 
Thomas Lars Wilhelm Karv 
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Abstract 
Public attitudes towards the European Union (EU) have become 
increasingly important over time. This especially since the process of 
European integration has become widely considered as a political 
process affected by attitudinal fluctuations. Higher levels of public 
support contribute to the democratic legitimisation of the EU, as the 
European public should be considered as the only source of democratic 
legitimacy. The EU as an object should not, however, be empirically 
approached as a singular entity, hence guidelines from system support 
theory are used to approach the EU as a multidimensional political 
object divided into separate system important elements, towards which 
public attitudes are directed. This approach considers the common 
understanding that the European public differs in their evaluations of 
the different elements of the EU. Despite the vast amount of literature 
that has focused on individual-level determinants of EU attitudes, there 
is still a lack of macro-level studies including both a longitudinal and 
cross-sectional perspective. The research problem that this study seeks 
to answer, therefore, centres on explaining the varied levels of public 
support for the EU within the EU area. This study identifies the 
underlying national contextual-level determinants for the variations in 
public support for the EU within and between countries over time.  
The research problem is approached by deploying both descriptive 
and statistical analyses. Survey data provided by Eurobarometer is 
used to measure country levels of public support, while Eurostat 
provides the main part of the national contextual-level factors used to 
explain country-level variations. In this study, the effects on public 
support from several different types of contextual-level factors are 
accounted for, including economic performance, democratic culture, 
external pressure and the EU-relation of the 28 member states. Eight 
different system elements of the EU were also identified as being of 
importance for the system persistence capabilities of the EU, divided 
into three main system components. Hence, this study analyses the 
determinants of public support for European integration policies, the 
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EU regime and the European political community. Furthermore, this 
study shows that the within countries variations in public support are 
predicted, to a large extent, by the economic performance of countries, 
while the variations between countries are more related to cultural and 
demographic differences across the EU area.  
 Public attitudes towards the EU vary extensively both within 
countries as well as across the EU area. Connecting country levels of 
public support to national level circumstances confirms the argument 
that public attitudes towards the EU are formed within the national 
level contexts. Therefore, what the European public thinks about the 
EU does not appear to be directly related to what the EU is actually 
doing. The understanding that the country levels of public support are 
prone to fluctuation over time, based on national circumstances, 
contributes to an unstable foundation for the future of European 
integration. As the EU has been considered to have been in an almost 
constant state of crisis since the start of the global recession in 2008, this 
should be regarding as a worrying sign for the future system 
persistence capabilities of the EU.  
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1. Introduction 
Some day historians will probably rank Europe's peaceful integration 
achieved in half a century of sustained efforts among mankind's major 
achievements.   
      Rothacher, 2005, p. 1 
What the European public think about the European Union (EU) has 
become increasingly important as more and more national decision-
making powers are transferred to the European political institutions. 
Simultaneously, public attitudes towards the EU have been shown to 
vary significantly both within and between the member states. 
Therefore, the main research problem that this thesis intends to answer 
focuses on why public attitudes towards the EU vary within and 
between the member states of the EU over time. The research interest 
of this thesis centres around the kind of attitudes that reflect support 
for the EU, as sufficient levels of public support are considered to 
provide the EU with enough democratic legitimacy for its existence not 
to be questioned during system crises. The growing importance of 
sufficient levels of public support for the EU can be traced back to the 
general transformation from a European common market into 
something starting more to resemble a semi-political Union, as this 
transformation has also changed the public perceptions of the EU 
(Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996). It is therefore argued here that 
sufficient levels of public support for the EU should be considered to 
be of existential importance for both the system persistence capabilities 
and for the future development of the EU. This is not a new argument, 
however, as Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) already argued that as the 
EU grows, it will become more dependent on public support for 
legitimising its existence.    
The possibility for a member state to actually leave the EU was 
previously considered merely as an abstract possibility, yet the Brexit 
vote in June 2016 showed that an abstract vision can turn into a political 
reality when the public is given a direct choice. According to De Vries 
(2018, p. 3), the outcome of the Brexit referendum provide a clear 
13 
 
 
indication of what may lie ahead. Over time, the EU in particular, and 
European integration in general, have become politicised issues within 
most of the member states, and not only in the United Kingdom. As 
politicised issues, the future development of the EU will not only be 
determined by the preferences of the political elites but also by the 
preferences of the European public (Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Statham & 
Trenz, 2015; Kriesi, 2016). Over time, the EU has created an 
economically, socially and politically interconnected political 
community, and hence the political decisions of one member state also 
have direct consequences for the rest. Therefore, it is argued here that 
it is crucial for researchers to differentiate between countries when 
analysing public support. It can be directly misleading to treat the EU 
area as a single entity without taking national variations into 
consideration. Therefore, the research aim of this thesis is to identify 
the kinds of national contextual-level factors that explain the variations 
in public support for the EU within and between countries over time. 
As such, this thesis seeks to provide explanations for the varying levels 
of public support at two analytical levels, while simultaneously 
empirically approaching the EU as a multidimensional political object.   
Scholars have argued that a one-dimensional approach to analysing 
public support for the EU is insufficient, and instead many agree on the 
need to distinguish between different elements of the EU when 
analysing public attitudes towards it (Gabel, 1998; McLaren, 2002; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Boomgaarden, Schunk, Elenbaas & De Vreese, 
2011; Hobolt & Brouard, 2011). As the European public is capable of 
differentiating between different aspects of the EU, this also needs to 
be accounted for within empirical research. The theoretical guidelines 
of the thesis are therefore based on a theoretical framework developed 
by Easton (1965; 1975), who developed the system support theory in 
order to analyse the system persistence capabilities of a political 
system. In his framework, he divided a political system into three 
separate but interrelated system components, towards which public 
attitudes were primarily directed, while also differentiating between 
two kinds of supportive public attitudes, specific and diffuse support.  
14 
 
 
Hence, public support for the EU is in this thesis not treated as 
something directed towards something vaguely defined as the EU, but 
instead primarily towards one of the three main system components 
that are argued here to be of system importance for the EU from a long-
term system persistence perspective: European integration policies, the 
EU regime and the European political community. These three system 
components together constitute the main components of system 
importance for the EU as a political system. Therefore, in order to 
obtain a comprehensive overview regarding public support for the EU 
the most sufficient way is by approaching it through system support 
theory, and thereby scrutinising separately what the European public 
thinks about the three main system components. In this study, the 
concept of public support for the EU is therefore perceived as a 
multidimensional analytical concept. As Angela Merkel noted, the 
future of the euro, the EU and Europe are undeniably intertwined.1 In 
this respect, it has become important for researchers to differentiate 
between what the European public think about these system 
components, in order to be able to forecast what the European public 
think about the whole European political system. 
The concept of public attitudes generally reflects how the general 
public respond in a specific way, either negatively or positively, 
towards some political object (Tourangeau & Galesic, 2008, pp. 141–
142). The concept of public support within this study, however, refers 
to an overall positive assessment of a political object (Niedermayer & 
Westle, 1995, p. 47), and the research focus of this thesis is on the 
country-specific levels of public support for the different system 
important elements of the EU, which are deemed of importance for the 
system persistence capabilities and future development of the EU seen 
from a system perspective. In the following section, the main 
arguments as to why this kind of research should be considered of both 
academic and political significance are presented. 
                                                     
1 In reference to her statement: “If the euro fails, Europe fails”. Stated during the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party summit in Leipzig, Germany, 2011.  
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1.1 The European Union under pressure 
Gone are the days where national leaders could decide Europe’s future 
behind closed doors without worrying about public opinion. 
Hobolt, 2012, p. 100   
At least since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the 
European integration process has been considered a political process 
directly affected by public sentiments (Gabel & Whitten, 1997, p. 81). 2 
According to Vasilopoulou (2013, p. 7), the Maastricht Treaty was the 
first time when the European political elites openly showed their 
willingness to transfer decision-making powers from the national to the 
EU arena also in other than market-related policy areas, which had an 
significant effect on public attitudes towards European integration. 
Since then, the EU and European integration have started to become 
increasingly politicised issues within domestic politics, signaling that 
the European public have become increasingly divided towards further 
European integration and towards the EU in general. Hoeglinger (2016, 
p. 13) argued that “the presence of diverging attitudes among different 
social groups or political actors is a necessary precondition of political 
conflict”. The politicisation process thereby contributes to making 
previously non-political issues political (Zurn, Binder & Ecker-
Ehrhardt, 2012, p. 73), as has been the case with the EU. It should not, 
however, be considered as a surprise that as “European integration has 
grown in scope and depth, it has proved ripe for politicization” 
(Hooghe & Marks 2008, p. 18).3 The extent of this politicisation process, 
however, varies across the EU area (Grande & Kriesi, 2016).  
Politicisation is defined by Grande and Hutter (2016, p. 7) as “the 
expansion of the scope of conflict within a political system”. Therefore, 
                                                     
2 The treaty that transformed the European Community (EC) into the European Union 
(EU) and marked the beginning of “a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe”. 
3 This occurred even though Martin Schulz, the former leader of the then second largest 
party in Germany (SPD), as late as in December 2017 openly called for the creation of a 
United States of Europe by 2025.  
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as the “scope of conflict” regarding European integration has 
expanded, more actors have become important for the outcomes. This 
has contributed to widespread political debates within the EU area 
regarding the future development of European integration (De Wilde, 
2011; Hurrelmann, Gora & Wagner, 2015). As a result, the future of 
European integration is not only determined by the explicit preferences 
of the political elites, but increasingly also by public preferences. As a 
political process also directly affected by public attitudes, the future 
development of the European integration process has now become 
“increasingly susceptible to swings in public mood” (Kaina & 
Karolewski, 2013, p. 6).  
The political effects of public attitudes towards European 
integration are, however, twofold, as public attitudes should be seen 
as a driver both for and against deeper European integration (Ioannou, 
Leblond & Niemann, 2015, p. 170). According to Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs (2016, pp. 52–53), the European public can therefore 
either be perceived as a source of demand for integration or as an 
obstacle to integration. However, the national referendums regarding 
the approval of the Maastricht Treaty already showed that the 
European public does have both the ability, and sometimes also the 
willingness, to forestall deeper European integration (Anderson, 1998, 
p. 570). Since then it has been established that what the public within 
the different member states thinks about the EU has real political 
implications for the future of the EU as a whole. 4 This assumption is 
not either constrained to a particular kind of member state, as 
“European integration appears to be significantly influenced, or 
constrained, by public opinion in both the core and the periphery” 
(Bolstad, 2015, p. 23). In relation to this, it has also become widely 
assumed that “no elite decision-maker is going to push integration if it 
means a domestic backlash that could push them from office” 
                                                     
4 The Maastricht Treaty was first voted down in a popular referendum in Denmark, 
although in a second referendum it was accepted after Denmark received some 
exceptions from the treaty. It was also close to be voted down in France, where only 
50.8 per cent of the voters voted in favour.  
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(Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996, p. 176). Over time, that general 
assumption has therefore increasingly “put public support for the EU, 
its institutions and its policies high on the scholarly agenda” 
(Harteveld, van der Meer & De Vries, 2013, p. 543).   
The EU’s official motto since 2000 is unity in diversity, although the 
history of European integration is almost as much about failure as it is 
about success (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015, p. 115). With regard to the EU in 
particular, and European integration in general, the recent decade has 
also been described as a “decade of crises” (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 
969). During this period, the Brexit vote on the 23rd of June 2016 should 
be regarded as constituting the most directly threatening of these crises 
from a system persistence perspective, as it undoubtedly set an 
example for other countries to consider. Even though Brexit could, and 
should, be regarded as the most significant single crisis the EU has 
faced, it is just the latest in a long history of EU crises. Jean Monnet, one 
of the founding fathers of the EU, even noted in his memoirs that 
Europe would be built through crises and that it would be the sum of 
their solutions (1978, p. 46). The failed referendums on the 
implementation of the European Constitution (2005), the Eurocrisis 
(2010) and the migration crisis (2015) could all be deemed as serious EU 
crises, just to mention a few of the most recent ones. Taken together, 
these crises have affected both the media narrative and the public 
perception of the EU to such an extent that the EU’s future existence 
has become more questioned for every new crisis. Some have even 
ventured as far as arguing that because of the results of these crises “the 
European Union faces an existential challenge” (Hobolt & De Vries, 
2016a, p. 414).  
The developments during the last decade have therefore resulted in 
a shift of focus with regard to European integration, as the political 
debate has now inevitably moved from “what Europe” to “whether 
Europe” (Franklin & Hobolt, 2014, p. 415). According to both Tömmel 
(2014, p. 335) and McCormick (2014, p. 218), this is mainly because more 
and more Europeans have started to perceive the EU as the source for 
many of the national problems instead of the solution to problems that 
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cannot be fixed at the national level. It has, however, already for some 
time been the common procedure of national politicians to blame the 
implementation of necessary, but unpopular, decisions on Brussels 
(Obradovic, 1996, p. 202), and as a result increasing numbers of 
Europeans “no longer associate the EU with greater freedom and 
opportunity; instead, they blame it for financial pain, prolonged 
joblessness, and a lack of democratic choice” (Matthijs & Keleman, 
2015, p. 97).  
From a broad perspective the concept of public support for the EU 
is usually used to reflect country-level “support for the constitutional 
settlement of the European Union as laid down in the various treaties, 
including support for the membership of the Union” (Hobolt & De 
Vries, 2016a, pp. 415–416). Hence, within the European integration 
literature, the theoretical concept of public support for the EU has 
mostly been used as a sum indicator for EU-related public attitudes, 
mixing together attitudes towards specific European integration 
policies, such as the Euro, with attitudes towards the democratic 
performance of the EU and towards EU level political institutions 
(Hobolt & De Vries, 2016a). A sufficient level of public support for the 
EU is therefore assumed to democratically legitimise the EU as a 
political system, thereby simultaneously legitimising the political 
authority of the EU regime and the European integration process 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2008). A sufficient level of public support for the EU 
within the member states is therefore considered as “the political 
foundation for integration” (Gabel, 1998, p. 333), and many scholars 
now agree that the European public plays an important role in 
determining the future of the European integration process (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2008; Hix & Hoyland, 2013; Armingeon & Ceka, 2014).  
Schmitt and Thomassen (1999, p. 9) “somewhat loosely” defined 
democratic legitimacy as the idea that the existing political system is 
acceptable according to the public, which led them to ask philosophical 
questions regarding what actually is meant by the concept of a political 
system and which elements of it should be deemed acceptable by the 
public for the political system to be democratically legitimised. 
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According to them, there are two ways to assess the legitimacy of a 
political system, the first being if the system conforms to certain 
normative criteria, and the second being the extent to which the 
political system is acceptable according to the members participating in 
the political system. As a political system based on the member states’ 
voluntary compliance, the EU is therefore assumed to be dependent on 
a minimal level of public support to be democratically legitimated. 
Hence, the concept of democratic legitimacy within this study is 
defined as the idea that the existing political system of the EU is 
acceptable according to the European public.  
According to Dogan (1994, p. 302), legitimacy is, however, 
something that comes in degrees and is a theoretical concept that can 
also be empirically measured. In this thesis, it is suggested that the most 
appropriate way to measure the extent of the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy is to measure the levels of public support for the three main 
system components of importance for the system persistence 
capabilities of the EU as a political system. There are many aspects of 
the EU that the public generally approve of, while the public might 
generally disapprove of other aspects simultaneously. All aspects are 
not, however, of equal importance from a system persistence 
perspective. Therefore this kind of differentiation of the EU as a 
political system into different evaluable elements should be considered 
essential within empirical research focusing on EU attitudes.  
The political relevance of studying public support in the form of 
public attitudes towards the EU is derived from the understanding that 
“politicians in democratic societies generally follow voters’ 
preferences” (Fligstein, Polyakova & Sandholtz, 2012, p. 118). 
Fluctuations in public support therefore force political parties to adapt 
their positions on the EU based on the public preferences (Toshkov, 
2011, p. 171). Easton (1965, p. 154) suggested that every significant 
development within a political community affects how different 
aspects of the political system are being evaluated by the members 
participating in the shared political community. However, “as long as 
European integration did not cause too much harm, no one was 
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concerned about its development (Obradovic, 1996, p. 192). This 
presumption has, undoubtedly and irreversibly, changed during the 
last decade.  
Starting in 2008, the EU experienced an unprecedented economic 
and financial crisis, referred to by Piketty (2014, p. 472) as being “the 
worst crisis to hit capitalism since 1929”. The origin of the global 
financial crisis, hereafter referred to as the global recession, can be 
traced back to the American real-estate crisis and the collapse of 
Lehmann Brothers in 2008. The global recession continued in Europe 
with the start of the Eurocrisis, or the sovereign-debt crisis, in 2010 that 
forced 8 out of 28 EU member states to apply for financial bailouts from 
the European Central Bank (ECB), The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the European Commission (EC), together commonly 
referred to as “the Troika” (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016b, p. 1).5 
Schimmelfennig (2017, p. 23) went as far as suggesting that the 
“eurozone crisis has been the deepest in European integration”. If the 
economic challenges were not enough, the Arab spring, the rise of ISIS, 
the war in eastern Ukraine and the civil wars in Syria, Libya and Iraq 
contributed to creating a migration crisis that placed further pressure 
on the EU’s internal stability and cohesion. During the peak of the 
migration crisis in 2015, intra-EU border controls between member 
states such as Denmark and Sweden were established for the first time 
since the 1950’s, something which were deemed almost unthinkable 
before the start of the migration crisis. These crises, together with 
earlier crises such as the failure to ratify a European Constitution in 
2005, have inevitably placed the future of the EU and the benefits of 
European integration into serious political, academic and public 
questioning. As a result of the recent crises, the fragile political and 
social stability achieved through almost 70 years of institutional 
integration in Europe is being increasingly challenged from within.6  
                                                     
5 The countries that received bail-outs from the Troika were the Republic of Cyprus, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Spain. 
6 For similar argumentation see also Zielonka, 2014; Copelovitch, Frieden and Walter, 
2016; Jones, Keleman and Meunier, 2015; Majone, 2016; Piketty, 2014; Hobolt and 
Wratil, 2015; Schmidt, 2015 and Hobolt and De Vries, 2016a. 
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Simultaneously, as the EU has been affected by both internal and 
external crises, the political leverage of the EU has increased 
significantly at the global stage. The EU area is, when seen as a cohesive 
political entity, the second largest economy in the world as well as both 
the largest exporter and importer of goods and services (Aldcroft & 
Morewood, 2013, p. 349), not to mention the fact that the EU represents 
a shared population reaching over 500 million citizens divided into 28 
member states (7.1% of the world’s total population in 2018). As a 
supranational political system in Europe, created through voluntary 
compliance and the pooling of resources, the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy has ultimately thus been derived from the public perception 
of shared benefits for the participating member states. Furthermore, the 
EU, with all its undeniable flaws and shortcomings, is to date globally, 
as well as historically, by far the most successful example of voluntarily 
transferring of decision-making powers from the national to a 
supranational arena. The EU has therefore also functioned as a role 
model for other similar projects worldwide, such as Mercosur7 and the 
African Union.  
In an increasingly interconnected, digitised and globalised world, 
there are also those who have even argued that the concept of nation 
states should soon be regarded as an outworn political structure.8 
However, when the perceived benefits of dismantling nation states are 
not as clear to the public as they are for the political elites, there is 
always the possibility of “taking back control”.9 Why is it then, that 
after more than 60 years of mostly successful European integration 
under the guidance of the EU, that the public within many member 
states are again seemingly starting to embrace nationalism and 
                                                     
7 Mercosur includes the five South American countries Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Colombia and Venezuela. It should also be noted that Venezuela was suspended from 
the organisation in 2016.  
8 Among these are the former Danish Prime Minister Paul Schluter who, in 1998, 
called the nation-state the twin of the industrial society and, therefore an outworn 
structure soon to be extinct, and former President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel 
has also stated that national sovereignty is an outmoded concept in European politics 
(in Citrin & Sides, 2004, p. 41).  
9 One of many slogans used by “Brexiteers” during the referendum campaign in 2016. 
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protectionism and turning against European solidarity and 
cooperation?  
The institutional development of the EU, for the purpose of the 
institutional fulfilment of European integration policies, has 
historically been achieved through political compromises, based on the 
rule of “lowest common denominator” between the member state 
political elites (Jones, Keleman & Meunier, 2015, p. 5). A commonly 
used argument is that these compromises were rendered possible by 
what Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) famously have referred to as a 
“permissive consensus” provided by the European public towards 
European integration policies. The long period of “permissive 
consensus” from the European public is, however, now widely 
considered to be over (Zurn, 2016, p. 164), and instead the public has 
over time started to express, something referred to as, “constraining 
dissensus” towards further European integration policies (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2008), rejecting more “integration by stealth” (Ross, 2008, p. 
410). According to Klingeren, Boomgaarden and De Vreese (2013, p. 
690), negative attitudes towards the EU might thereby “induce 
stagnation, standstill and ultimately the implosion of European 
integration,” and could therefore be considered as a system threating 
development. After the events during the last decade, there are many 
who argue that the EU lacks a clear vision for the future when the 
original, and since then mostly prevailing, vision of a future “United 
States of Europe” has fallen out of grace. Hence, De Vries (2018, p. 43) 
argues that the lack of an elite and public consensus about the future 
direction of the EU constitutes an existential challenge to the European 
project.  
The increasing public expressions of opposition, and even hostility, 
towards the EU signal that a significant number of Europeans oppose 
further integration under the current circumstances, signals that the 
political elites are no longer able to ignore (De Wilde, 2015, p. 3). The 
lack of a clear vision for the EU, the failure with the creation of a 
European constitution, the global recession, the Eurocrisis and the 
migration crisis have all contributed to the rise of public opposition 
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towards the EU, something broadly referred to as Euroscepticism. The 
concept of Euroscepticism is broadly defined as opposition to the EU 
(Vasilopoulou, 2018, p. 123), but it can also relate to “opposition 
towards a specific policy or integration effort” (Boomgaarden et al., 
2011, p. 242). As EU attitudes have been growing increasingly negative 
in many of the member states, the future development of the EU and 
European integration policies have become widely discussed topics 
during national level elections. Euroscepticism has been described as 
an inevitable “grit in the system” (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 2), and 
increased opposition towards the EU and European integration should 
have been expected when the EU developed in a more integrationist 
direction (McCormick, 2014, p. 101). This development is something 
which populist parties especially have been able to capitalise on during 
elections (Kneuer, 2019). Euroscepticism thereby constitutes the 
opposite perspective when it comes to EU attitudes, and as such needs 
further elaboration.  
Euroscepticism could be understood as an element of public 
discourse opposing the legitimacy of the EU (De Wilde & Trenz, 2012, 
p. 4) and the concept of Euroscepticism is widely used when both 
academics and journalists try to describe public sentiments towards the 
EU. According to Mair (2007), any political system that does not allow 
for policy-specific opposition will create opposition against the political 
system itself, which might explain why any kind of opposition towards 
any aspect of the EU sometimes is perceived as opposition towards the 
political system of the EU as a whole. In relation to this, Taggart and 
Szczerbiak (2002) and Kopecky and Mudde (2002) suggests that 
Euroscepticism, as a multidimensional concept, indicates one of two 
separate but interrelated public sentiments. It may indicate public 
opposition towards a specific policy and/or the current workings of the 
EU (soft Euroscepticism/specific opposition) or it might indicate public 
opposition towards European integration as an idea (hard 
Euroscepticism/diffuse opposition). This is a crucial distinction.  
Almost 50 years ago, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, p. 270) 
speculated on three future possibilities for the development of the EU 
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and European integration. These scenarios are arguably still relevant in 
2019. (1) The EU could develop into an “equilibrium state” where 
policies are implemented through mutual agreements between the 
member states. (2) The EU could develop into a fully federal European 
super-state with the member states independently having no say in the 
larger European issues. (3) The EU could suffer crises that would lead 
to the decision-making powers being transferred back to the national 
arenas, which in the end could lead to the complete dissolution of the 
EU. Furthermore, according to the “bicycle-theory,” the EU must keep 
moving forward, especially during crises, not to fall (Majone, 2016, p. 
2). If one agrees with these hypotheses, there are two possibilities for 
the EU: keep moving forward towards a fully federal European super-
state or start transferring decision-making powers back to the member 
states, which might over time lead to the complete dissolution of the 
EU. Whichever way, this process is expected to be both indirectly and 
directly affected by the preferences of the public within the constituting 
member states (Hobolt, 2015, p. 238).  
Caldeira and Gibson (1995) also suggested that because of the 
lacking law enforcement mechanisms, except the possibility of shaming 
sinning countries into compliance, the EU ultimately depends on 
sufficient levels of public support for its continued existence. This 
statement, over time, has become even more valid considering the 
political developments during the last decade within a number of 
member states. As De Vries (2018, p. 217) also points out when 
suggesting that “at a time when Eurosceptic sentiment is rising, the 
Union relies more on public approval than ever before”. After this 
introduction to the larger developments related to the EU and why this 
is a phenomenon that needs to be studied more extensively, the 
following section presents the more explicit research purpose of this 
thesis.   
 
 
 
25 
 
 
1.1.1 Research interest and general research questions 
It is not enough any longer to say that the Union, in its current or earlier 
versions, has created peace in Europe.  
Giddens, 2007, p. 204 
This section will present the general guidelines for how this study is to 
be conducted and also present the general research questions that will 
guide this thesis. Like many other scholars interested in public attitudes 
towards the EU, the research contribution with this study is connected 
to the growing literature on what Hobolt and De Vries (2016a, p. 414) 
argue is the core question in the extensive European integration 
literature: what explains variation in public attitudes towards 
European integration? The study of public attitudes lies at the centre 
when researchers want to understand how the public relate to political, 
economic and social developments, and according to De Vreese, Azrout 
and Boomgaarden (2018, p. 2) public attitudes towards the EU “are at 
the heart of the political, societal and scientific debates regarding the 
future of European integration”. Public opinion surveys are what make 
this kind of research possible, and surveys are hence a valuable 
instrument for academics and politicians alike. The purpose of this 
thesis is hence to contribute to this already extensive literature by 
focusing on member state variations in public support for the three 
main system components of the EU as a political system: European 
integration policies, the EU regime and the European political 
community.  
This thesis differs from similar studies in four specific ways. First of 
all, the research focus lies solely on aggregated country levels of public 
support, hence all 28 member states are treated equally within the 
statistical analyses. Furthermore, the empirical part of the thesis differs 
between eight different elements of the EU as a political system, 
towards which the public attitudes are directed. Moreover, the 
empirical research focus is also solely on the effects of national 
contextual-level factors on country levels of public support, and 
therefore individual level data will not be included in the statistical 
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analyses. This is mainly because a significant amount of empirical 
research have already been conducted explaining the individual level 
predictors of EU attitudes, predictors that do not appear to have been 
changing much over time. However, there is arguably still much to be 
studied about the effects of national contextual-level factors on the 
macro-level variations in public support, especially from a longitudinal 
perspective as country levels of public support have been shown to 
fluctuate significantly.  
Finally, the thesis will also hence include a time component, as there 
have been significant developments in public support for the EU over 
time that need to be accounted for. As there is comparative data only 
available from 2004 onwards, including all of the current 28 member 
states of the EU, 2004 will constitute the departure point for the 
empirical parts of this thesis. As 2017 will constitute the end point for 
the empirical part, the statistical analyses will be able to account for all 
of the crises that have been shown to have affected EU attitudes during 
this period. The longitudinal overview presented in chapter six will 
also clearly show that the member state levels of public support for the 
EU are more stable in some member states, while the levels of public 
support fluctuate heavily within others, and also that there are 
apparent variations between the system components towards which 
the public attitudes are directed. In order to narrow down the research 
puzzle, the three general research questions of this thesis are here 
presented:  
1. How have the member state levels of public support for the 
different system components of the EU as a political system 
developed over time?  
 
2. To what extent can contextual-level factors explain the 
variations within countries in public support for the different 
system components of the EU as a political system? 
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3. To what extent can contextual-level factors explain the 
variations between countries in public support for the different 
system components of the EU as a political system?   
These three research questions will be more thoroughly presented in 
the following sections.  
Trends in public support for the EU 
The end of what Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) referred to as the 
“permissive consensus” amongst the European public towards 
European integration has attracted a large amount of attention among 
researchers during the last decade. However, already prior to the start 
of the global recession, Mair (2007, p. 2) suggested that “there is neither 
consensus nor much that is permissive” in relation to EU attitudes. 
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that public support for the EU 
and European integration have been in almost constant decline within 
the EU area since the Maastricht Treaty (1992), something that has been 
described as “the post-Maastricht Blues” (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). 
Nevertheless, this development has been considered to have 
accelerated after the start of the global recession, and more specifically 
after the start of the Eurocrisis. Therefore, there has been a plethora of 
studies trying to identify the underlying reasons that are able to explain 
why public support for the EU has been declining. However, an 
obvious limitation with many of these studies is that they only choose 
to focus on one indicator measuring public support for the EU, and 
hence most studies do not provide the full picture regarding the 
development of EU attitudes. 
Even though it is apparent that public support for some elements of 
the EU has undoubtedly declined, the picture becomes more complex 
when studying the EU from a system support perspective. This 
complexity becomes especially apparent when looking at the 28 
member states separately, and there are also significant variations 
within countries between the levels of public support towards the 
system important elements of the EU identified in this study. For this 
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purpose, country-specific longitudinal trends in public support for the 
EU as a political system during 2004–2017, divided into three main 
system components, European integration policies, the EU regime and 
the European political community, will be initially presented in the 
empirical part to answer this descriptive research question.  
Variations in public support within countries over time 
In this thesis, fluctuations in country levels of public support are argued 
to have real political implications for the system persistence capabilities 
of the EU as a political system. It has, however, already been argued for 
some time that it is “critically important to understand the factors that 
drive public opinion toward the integration process and the European 
Union” (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996, p. 192). Hence, 
“understanding how public opinion changes, its moods, cycles, and 
dynamics, has become one of the biggest problems in public opinion 
research today” (Bishop, 2005, p. 91). Furthermore, Zurn (2016, p. 173) 
also argues that “within-EU comparisons between different member 
states have improved our understanding of politicization. They 
undeniably show that it is extremely important to compare and to 
account for variation”. The developments within the EU area since 2008 
also seem to have placed the perceived national level benefits of EU 
membership, and European integration policies, into increased 
questioning by the European public and the political elites alike.  
It has also become widely assumed that the variations in public 
support within countries are mainly derived from contextual-level 
factors at the national levels, which are used as proxies when forming 
EU attitudes. There is, however, still no agreement regarding the kind 
of contextual-level factors that the public use as proxies when forming 
their EU attitudes, and how the effects differ between the different 
system important elements of the EU as a political system. Using a 
comparative research design, this study intends to answer this research 
question by showing how the variations in public support within 
countries over time can be explained by similar contextual-level 
developments across the EU area.   
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Variations in public support between countries  
Many studies have tried to explain why public support for the EU 
differs between countries, providing a wide range of explanations 
usually derived from the economic, social, cultural or political contexts 
of the countries. However, most studies only choose to focus on one 
indicator of public support, and there is still a lack of more overarching 
studies regarding the between-country variations in different types of 
EU attitudes within the literature. Therefore, this study intends to show 
to what extent the same contextual-level factors used for explaining the 
within countries variations in public support are also able to account 
for the variations between countries in public support. It should be 
considered of both political and academic concern to account for 
differences between countries to provide explanations on why different 
system components of the EU as a political system are evaluated 
differently between the countries in the EU area. This thinking is in line 
with Marsh (1999, p. 92), who pointed out the understanding “that 
countries vary is not simply a fact of academic interest”.  
     These three research questions will guide the rest of the thesis, and 
this study will contribute to provide an overarching understanding 
regarding the country-level variations in public support for different 
system important elements of the EU as a political system. In the 
following section the disposition of this thesis is presented. 
1.1.2 Disposition of the thesis  
This initial part, Introduction, comprised three sections that outlined the 
main research problem, the guiding research questions and provided a 
general introduction into the subject. The second chapter, European 
integration – Introducing the research field, begins with a historical 
overview regarding European integration and presents the three grand 
theories of European integration that have been used to understand the 
success and failures of European integration. As one of the main 
arguments of this thesis is that EU attitudes matter for the future 
development of the EU, it differs from the two main theories of 
European integration: neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. As 
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such, the study is argued to fall theoretically under the 
postfunctionalistic umbrella, which emphasises the increasing role of 
the European public in the European integration process (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2008). Chapter three, The conceptual framework of EU support, 
begins with a theoretical discussion regarding the usefulness of the 
system support theory and its defining concepts. The chapter also 
presents the three main system components of the EU, towards which 
EU attitudes are directed: European integration policies, the EU regime 
and the European political community. Chapter four, Explanations for 
EU support, presents the main contributions from previous research 
regarding how the country-level variations in public support have been 
explained.  
Starting from chapter five, Research method, the more empirical part 
of the thesis begins. Here, the empirical research design is presented, as 
well as the research method and statistical method used for obtaining 
the results. In chapter six, Results, the main results are presented and 
discussed. This chapter will begin with an extensive descriptive 
overview regarding country-level developments in EU support during 
the period of 2004–2017. Thereafter, the results from the statistical 
analyses are presented together with the analytical limitations of the 
statistical method. In the final chapter, Conclusions, the results are 
summed up together with a discussion regarding the main 
contributions and limitations of this study. In the final section, the 
findings will also be related to earlier findings within the EU literature, 
as well as to the future development prospects for the EU.   
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2. European integration – Introducing the 
research field 
In seeking to understand the process of the internationalization of 
governance and its prospects, political culture, public opinion, and 
political legitimacy can neither be taken for granted nor ignored.   
Sinnott, 1995, p. 31 
This chapter places this thesis within the grand theories that have been 
used to understand the progress of European integration; a process by 
which the modern form of the EU is the result. This in order to show 
how the political importance of public attitudes is something that has 
seemingly grown over time as the European integration process has 
proceeded and evolved. In its present form, the EU is also 
unrecognisable from the original European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) founded in 1952, and therefore this chapter will also include a 
short historical overview regarding the institutional development of 
the EU until present time. This in order to place this thesis in its rightful 
historical context.  
First and foremost, the political implementations of European 
integration policies have been made possible by the institutional 
framework of the EU. It is therefore insufficient to separate the process 
of European integration from the EU as an object of empirical interest, 
as these two are inseparable within this context. The EU has developed 
into its current form through an integration process that has proceeded 
stepwise through a challenging political process, spanning almost 70 
years. During this period, the EU has been transformed from a 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to a European 
Community (EC), and since 1993 into a European Union. However, this 
process of European integration has been anything but 
straightforward. A great amount of research has therefore focused on 
explaining the political processes that have enabled the progress of 
European integration, which has been conducted through a continuing 
development of the institutional framework of the EU. However, as the 
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EU has transformed, the practical usefulness of using the theoretical 
guidelines provided by the grand theories have also changed.  
It also needs to be clearly stated that no theoretical lens is able to 
explain everything when it comes to European integration, as there are 
always multiple processes taking place within different arenas. In other 
words, a great number of events have directly had an impact on the 
European integration process (Ruggie, Katzenstein, Keohane & 
Schmitter, 2005, p. 280). Nevertheless, historically two grand theories 
have been used to understand how European integration proceeds: 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (Jones et al., 2015). 
However, as the issue of European integration has become increasingly 
politicised within the EU area, the so-called post-functionalistic 
approach during the last decade has developed into a third theory, or 
theoretical lens, within the literature that takes this growing 
importance of public opinion into account (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). In 
this chapter, these three main theoretical lenses used to understand and 
explain the development of the EU through the European integration 
process are briefly presented. This in order to place this thesis within 
the larger theoretical schools of thought. Following a short historical 
overview of the European integration process, these three theories are 
presented stepwise in the remaining parts of this chapter.  
2.1 Historical development 
The historical development towards institutionalised European 
integration started as a direct consequence of the Industrial Revolution 
in Europe during the nineteenth century. According to Archer (2015), 
one of the main results of the Industrial Revolution was that it 
contributed to an improvement in intra-European communications. 
Through the improvement of common links within Europe, these 
changes underlined the need for increased co-ordination within 
Europe, as well as more political arenas enabling direct communication 
between the country leaderships. During the end of the nineteenth 
century, the countries of Europe were also, out of necessity, searching 
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for new ways to cooperate over crucial issues such as European-wide 
peace and trade.  
Although these discussions were briefly interrupted during the 
Great War (1914–1918), afterwards, during the inter-war period of 
1918–1939, the so-called Pan-European Union movement, under the 
leadership of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, was among the first to 
suggest the creation of something at least resembling a supranational 
political, economic and cultural European community. Coudenhove-
Kalergi (1931, p. 638) argued that “between the “national” period of 
humanity and the period that will come one day of the organization of 
the whole world as a single federation of states, we must pass through 
a “continental” period, a time when narrow national patriotism 
changes into patriotism for large areas of the world”. Coudenhove-
Kalergi furthermore presented three main arguments for the necessity 
of creating a European community. The main argument was to prevent 
war in Europe, the second to prevent economic ruin and the third to 
defend Europe from the Bolshevik danger. Before this could became 
more than a vision, an all-inclusive European war broke out again. 
Further delaying the process of European integration to take off 
voluntarily.  
Nevertheless, after the end of the Second World War (1939–45), the 
precursor of the EU at last emerged from the ashes of war. Suddenly it 
became clearer to the leading West-European politicians that “if the 
competition among nation-states had led to “total war” twice within 
the first half of the twentieth century, then European cooperation 
suggested itself as an appropriate theme for the future” (Lindberg & 
Scheingold, 1970, pp. 2–3). Seemingly wiser from the developments in 
Europe during the inter-war period, the common understanding 
among the West-European political leadership was that explicit 
nationalism, and German military power, needed to be contained for 
history not to repeat itself (Scharpf, 1999, p. 44). The original goal for 
Schumann, Monnet and the other founding fathers of the EU was 
therefore originally to create a European Defence Union that over time 
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would transform into a federal political union.10 That in turn would 
help to “overcome the antagonistic attitudes of states” (Saurugger, 
2013, p. 16). The idea was that the creation of a Defence Union between 
France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, the so-called European Defence Community (EDC), 
together with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
founded in 1951, would lay the groundwork for further integration 
within other policy areas.  
The original plan, however, failed when the French Parliament 
failed to ratify the EDC in 1954. According to Majone (2006, p. 610), the 
so-called European Political Community (EPC) was also “supposed to 
provide a pre-federal democratic framework” for the EDC and the 
ECSC, albeit the EPC also collapsed together with the EDC. Instead, out 
of necessity, the ECSC became the institutional arena from which the 
European integration project was born.11 This directly established a 
peacekeeping mechanism in disguise that could prevent war between 
the participating member states, by pooling the resources necessary for 
the war-industry under a supranational structure (Karolewski, 2016, p. 
23).12 A regional European supranational cooperation arena, that would 
lay the groundwork for further European integration, was then finally 
institutionalised.  
There is a widespread agreement within EU literature that “the 
underlying motive behind European integration has always been 
peace” (Olsen & McCormick, 2016, p. 17). Even though “the process 
itself has focused on economics, the overriding goal of European 
integration has been to prevent war on the European continent – to 
reduce nationalism in order to provide long-term peace” (McLaren, 
2004, p. 896). Therefore, “the engine of European integration has 
ultimately been the economy” (Olsen & McCormick, 2016, p. 238). In 
                                                     
10 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) merged with the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1967 and was renamed the European Union in the 
Maastricht Treaty. References will be to the EU if nothing else is mentioned.  
11 This occurred even though the EDC agreement was approved by all six foreign 
ministers and already ratified by four of the six national parliaments.  
12 France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and West Germany. 
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the preamble to the first Treaty of Paris 1951 (the treaty that established 
the ECSC) it was stated that “the merging of essential interests would 
be a substitute for age-old rivalries; to create, by establishing an 
economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community 
among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts”. However, the 
economic integration of Europe first began with the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 that created the European Economic Community (EEC) (Deflem 
& Pampel, 1996, p. 119). Since then, the “economic integration bore the 
burden of building a polity” (Laffan, 1996, p. 92). The transformation of 
the EEC into the current EU started with the Single European Act (1986) 
and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). With these two EU treaties, the EU 
started its institutional transformation from a mainly economic 
cooperation project between European countries into a semi-political 
European Union with increased supranational authority over the 
decision-making processes (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996). Especially 
the Maastricht Treaty is considered to have constituted “a landmark in 
European integration” (Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter & Streeck, 1996, p. 
342). The supranational character of the EU since the Maastricht Treaty 
has further increased with every new EU treaty (Mair, 2007, p. 15).13  
The most extensive effort to increase the problem-solving 
capabilities of the EU, in order to adapt to the global developments, was 
to create a European Constitution that would have replaced all of the 
previous EU treaties. The process officially started in 2001, but after the 
European Constitution was rejected in popular referendums in France 
and the Netherlands in 2005, motivated by fears related to globalisation 
and EU enlargements (Wood & Quassier, 2008, p. 193), the EU 
bureaucrats and the national political leaderships were forced to 
reconsider.14 Already Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, p. 277) had 
suggested that the permissive consensus might not withstand a major 
transfer of power from the national to the European level, and Franklin, 
Marsh and McLaren (1994) suggested that even the Maastricht Treaty 
                                                     
13 These are the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, the Treaty of Nice 2001 and the Treaty of 
Lisbon 2007.  
14 See Appendix Table 3 page 312 for an overview of EU-related national referendums.  
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was a step too far in the European integration process. Therefore, it was 
just a matter of time before the public within some member states 
would start to directly alter the direction of European integration and 
the “use of referendums on European integration underscores the 
importance of public opinion to the success of the European project” 
(Banducci, Karp & Loedel, 2009, p. 565). Nevertheless, after a brief 
“period of reflection,” the new idea was to keep the old EU treaties as 
a compromise, but instead amend them with a new one.  
Hence, instead of a new European Constitution, the EU presented 
something of a compromise, or a “reform treaty”. The reform treaty, 
more widely known as the Lisbon Treaty (2007), was also approved by 
all the national parliaments. However, in the only member state where 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty demanded an authorisation from 
the public through a referendum, Ireland, it was first rejected. 
However, after a second referendum along with a significant charm-
offensive by the Irish pro-EU political parties, it passed with an 
overwhelming majority of 67% in favour, in comparison with 47% in 
the first referendum (Piris, 2010). This were similar to the process of 
approving the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, which also demanded 
two referendums, as well as exceptions to the Treaty for Denmark (the 
Edinburgh agreement), before finally being approved.15   
Even though the Lisbon Treaty in many ways might have reformed 
the institutional capabilities of the EU to the better, according to Piris 
(2010, p. 48), it was the first time that the integrationists had been 
obliged to retreat in a visible way. They had also been forced to accept 
the disappearance of any word or symbol in the Lisbon Treaty that 
would have signalled the EU having even more characteristics in 
common with a federal state. The EU area is still undoubtedly 
politically more integrated after the Lisbon Treaty than before 
(Fabbrini, 2015, p. 267), but on the other hand, the member states 
themselves have since become more internally divided. All member 
                                                     
15 It should, furthermore, be noted that less than 51% of the voters approved of ratifying 
the Maastricht Treaty in France during a referendum (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996, 
p. 176).   
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states also still have the possibility of veto over the most important 
legislations of national concern at the EU level, as well as the possibility 
of withdrawing from the EU completely by activating article 50 in the 
Lisbon Treaty. As the memories of the horrors of the Second World War 
have slowly faded, Europe has also witnessed a re-emergence of 
widespread nationalism and protectionism, a development that Robert 
Schuman, one of the founding fathers, already warned about.16 It has 
been suggested that this development is connected to an almost 
constant series of crises that have hit the EU area during the last decade. 
For the European public, it might even appear that the EU is in an 
almost constant state of crisis (Jones et al., 2015, p. 19), and this 
especially since the start of the Eurocrisis.  
During the course of the EU’s still relatively short history, the EU 
has to date for the most part come strengthened through crises. This is 
because many of the crises seems to have actualised the need for more 
supranational decision-making in order for the EU to become more 
effective in fulfilling its purpose. This is also a development suggested 
by neofunctionalist theory (Haas, 1958). What separates the latest crisis 
from earlier crises is the fact that when European integration was 
largely perceived as a “non-issue” amongst the European public, many 
of the crises could be solved by compromises reached between the EU-
friendly political elites within the member state countries (van 
Ingelgom, 2014, p. 1). As the issue of European integration has become 
politicised to an unprecedented extent, this is no longer a political 
possibility. Therefore, the compromise-seeking nature within the EU’s 
decision-making processes could be considered as constituting the root 
to the EU’s current dysfunctionality and lack of political leverage. 
Hence, at least the problems created by the Eurocrisis can also be 
directly traced back to the fact that the political elites created the EU’s 
dysfunctionality when the EU was transformed into an almost full 
                                                     
16 “World peace cannot be safeguarded if constructive efforts are not made 
commensurate with the dangers that threaten it. An organized and revitalized Europe 
can make a contribution to civilization which is indispensable for maintaining such 
peaceful relations” (The Schuman Declaration, 9th May 1950).  
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economic union without simultaneously creating a full political union 
to steer it (Zimmermann, 2016).  
The concept of a Union was formally used for the first time in the 
preamble to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC). In this preamble, the signatory states 
expressed their goal “to lay the foundation of an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe” (Fabbrini, 2015, p. xxi). With the 
Maastricht Treaty, the name also changed from Community to Union, 
and the name change in itself could be perceived as a “system 
transforming event that dramatically altered the nature of the 
integration process” (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, p. 132). This name 
change also further accelerated the process towards the politicisation of 
European integration.17 Since the Lisbon Treaty, the symbols of a 
political Union are now even more present within the EU area. As an 
example, EU law became superior to national laws within most policy 
areas, which gives EU citizens the right to litigate against their own 
countries if their rights provided by EU law are being violated (Eriksen, 
2011, p. 74; Romaniuk & Stivachtis, 2015, p. 188).  
The EU is, however, still to date guided by a series of treaties, which 
in practice functions as a supplement for a constitution when placed 
together. In chronological order they are: Paris (1952), two treaties of 
Rome (1958), the Single European Act (1987), Maastricht (1992), 
Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon (2009). The treaties are 
legally binding for all member states, and EU law, in theory, thereby 
represents a supranational constitutional legal order (McCormick, 
2014, pp. 73-74). According to Habermas (2012, p. 30), these treaties 
have therefore become the foundation of a European political 
community, albeit with a European constitution yet to be implemented 
in practice. These treaties are summarised in Table 1 (see page 39). 
 
                                                     
17 However, according to De Wilde et al. (2016, p. 5), a “first episode of politicization 
could already be observed in 1954 during the failed ratification of the European 
Defence Community in the French parliament”. 
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Table 1. Summary of the institutional development of the EU. 
 
As already mentioned, there have traditionally been two grand 
theories used within EU literature to explain and understand the 
progress of the European integration process, neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. However, as the European public’s role in the 
European integration processes and the governing of the EU have been 
growing for every treaty, a new theoretical lens that also accounts for 
the European public’s role in the European integration process has been 
suggested, postfunctionalism. Each of these three lenses provides 
different perspectives from which to understand the nature and 
Treaty Signed Into force Purpose Main changes
The European Coal and 
Steel Community 
(ECSC)
1951 1952 To create interdependence in coal and steel 
so that one country could no longer mobilise 
its armed forces without others knowing. 
This eased distrust and tensions after WWII. 
The ECSC treaty expired in 2002.
European Economic 
Community (EEC)
1957 1958 To set up the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom).
Extension of European integration to include 
general economic cooperation.
The European Atomic 
Energy Community 
(Euratom)
1957 1958
Merger Treaty - Brussels 
Treaty
1965 1967 To streamline the European institutions. Creation of a single Commission and a single 
Council to serve the then three European 
Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC). 
Repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Single European Act 1986 1987 To reform the institutions in preparation for 
Portugal and Spain's membership and speed 
up decision-making in preparation for the 
single market.
Extension of qualified majority voting in the 
Council (making it harder for a single 
country to veto proposed legislation), 
creation of the cooperation and assent 
procedures, giving Parliament more 
influence.
Treaty on European 
Union - Maastricht 
Treaty
1992 1993 To prepare for European Monetary Union 
and introduce elements of a political union 
(citizenship, common foreign and internal 
affairs policy).
Establishment of the European Union and 
introduction of the co-decision procedure, 
giving Parliament more say in decision-
making. New forms of cooperation between 
EU governments – for example on defence 
and justice and home affairs.
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 1999 To reform the EU institutions in preparation 
for the arrival of future member countries.
Amendment, renumbering and consolidation 
of EU and EEC treaties. More transparent 
decision-making (increased use of 
the ordinary legislative procedure).
Treaty of Nice 2001 2003 To reform the institutions so that the EU 
could function efficiently after reaching 25 
member countries.
Methods for changing the composition of the 
Commission and redefining the voting 
system in the Council.
Treaty of Lisbon 2007 2009 To make the EU more democratic, more 
efficient and better able to address global 
problems, such as climate change, with one 
voice.
More power for the European Parliament, 
change of voting procedures in the 
Council,citizens' initiative, a permanent 
president of the European Council, a new 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs, a 
new EU diplomatic service.
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outcomes of European integration developments. These three 
theoretical lenses will be briefly presented in the following sections in 
order to place this study within the larger framework of European 
integration studies, starting with neofunctionalism. 
2.1.1 Neofunctionalism 
The most widely used theoretical approach to understand the 
European integration process during the first decades of European 
integration was neofunctionalism, which is considered as “the 
founding theory of European integration” (Saurugger, 2013, p. 35). The 
essence of neofunctionalism is that the extent of European integration 
is determined by the success of earlier European integration policies, 
which breeds integration within other areas. The concept of 
neofunctionalism was originally developed by Haas (1958) with the 
publication of The Uniting of Europe, which according to Ruggie et al. 
(2005, p. 277) also invented the academic field of European integration 
studies. After that, neofunctionalism became the leading theory used to 
understand the European integration process until the 1970’s.18 The 
essence of Haas’ idea of neofunctionalism was that European 
integration would, over time, inevitably be achieved stepwise, through 
what Haas referred to as the “spillover-effect” of earlier integration 
processes. Successful integration in one field would increase the 
attractiveness of further integration within other policy-fields, which 
therefore would make further integration the rational choice to make 
for the participating member states. Hence, as more powers were 
transferred from the national to the EU level institutions, these 
institutions would, over time, take over the decision-making process 
and become the main political arenas for the governing of the European 
political community. According to Olsen and McCormick (2016), the 
idea behind neofunctionalism was that by promoting European 
integration in non-controversial areas, such as the harmonisation of 
technical issues such as weights and measures, it would, over time, 
                                                     
18 “The Uniting of Europe” was also selected by the journal Foreign Affairs in 1997 as 
one of the most important international relations books of the twentieth century.  
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contribute to more of the national decision-making powers being 
transferred to the supranational European level also within more 
politically sensitive policy areas. This would be mainly to smoothen the 
policy-making processes, which would inevitably, over time, also lead 
to the creation of something at least resembling a European federal 
state.  
Haas (1976) himself later dismissed neofunctionalism as a usable 
theoretical lens for understanding the European integration process, 
mostly as a result of the then French President Charles de Gaulle’s 
“empty-chair” politics during the 1960’s. The irrational behaviour of de 
Gaulle seemed to prove the limitations of neofunctionalism, as the 
success achieved through earlier European integration processes did 
not transform into an increased political willingness among political 
leaders to proceed with integration also within other policy-fields 
(Saurugger, 2013, p. 34). Neofunctionalism still experienced a 
renaissance during the 1980’s, when European integration picked up 
pace again after Greece, Spain and Portugal became both democracies 
and EU member states. Some researchers have therefore suggested that 
“Haas turned out to be wrong about being wrong” (Ruggie et al., 2005, 
p. 280). However, as Sinnott (1995, p. 31) noted, “the exclusive 
emphasis on élites and the dismissal of public opinion associated with 
early neo-functionalist theory does not reflect the real thrust of 
integration theory” and does therefore not provide a sufficient 
theoretical lens to understand the recent developments of European 
integration. In the following section, the other grand theory of 
European integration will be presented, intergovernmentalism.    
2.1.2 Intergovernmentalism 
The other main theoretical approach towards European integration is 
commonly referred to as intergovernmentalism. The essence of 
intergovernmentalism is that the progress and extent of European 
integration is determined by the specific needs of the member states, 
and hence that national interests will always prevail (Hoffmann, 1966). 
Consequently, it is the national governments that ultimately determine 
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the success and extent of European integration policies, and the 
discussion taking place within the political institutions at the EU level 
are hence largely unimportant. Hence, instead of focusing on the 
political processes taking place within the EU institutions, researchers 
should focus on the inter-state bargaining processes taking place to 
understand the process and progress of European integration. 
According to Haas (1958, p. 9), intergovernmentalism is therefore more 
related to the specific policy-process and it occurs when “decisions are 
made by instructed national delegates, usually on the basis of 
unanimity, aided by a central secretariat with minimal powers and 
many commissions of technical experts, recruited nationally and 
regionally”. Hence, according to the theoretical guidelines provided by 
intergovernmentalism, further European integration is only preferable 
for the member states when the country-specific needs are being 
accounted for. Therefore, member states’ governments are only able to 
reach a consensus when enough concrete national level benefits are 
secured for all of the participating member states, according to their 
national preferences.  
During the 1990’s, a variation of intergovernmentalism, referred to 
as liberal intergovernmentalism, also emerged within the literature 
(Olsen & McCormick, 2016, p. 23). Proponents of liberal 
intergovernmentalism combine the neofunctionalist approach while 
focusing on the importance of member states, and the main argument 
is that European integration proceeds as a result of intergovernmental 
bargaining but within the EU level institutions (Majone, 1998). 
Therefore, European integration, by liberal intergovernmentalist 
theory, is expected when “the member states share a preference for 
avoiding welfare losses caused by negative interdependence” (Börzel 
& Risse, 2018, p. 92). According to Moravscik (2002), perhaps the most 
influential proponent of liberal intergovernmentalism, it is therefore 
not relevant to look at the political institutions responsible for 
promoting the EU-wide interests (European Parliament, European 
Commission) because all of the important political decisions for 
European integration are being determined in the political institutions 
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functioning through intergovernmental principles (the Council of the 
European Union, the European Council). Hobolt and Wratil (2015, p. 
239) therefore suggested that the proponents of intergovernmentalism 
focuses on the importance of national political and economic interests, 
as the national interests shape the member states position towards the 
EU and European integration policies. However, none of these two 
grand theories sees the European public as an important actor within 
the European integration process, and as a result of the politicisation of 
European integration these two grand theories need to be adapted to 
understand the current developments of European integration and the 
EU. In the following section, postfunctionalism as a theoretical lens will 
be presented.  
2.1.3 Postfunctionalism 
The most recent theoretical lens developed to understand and analyse 
the European integration process is referred to as postfunctionalism. 
Grande and Kriesi (2016, p. 300) even referred to it as “the most 
promising theoretical platform to advance integration theory”. The 
essence of postfunctionalism, and what differs this theory from the 
previous, is that it accounts for the effect of the changing public 
preferences towards European integration. If neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism perceives European integration as a cooperative 
process, postfunctionalism by contrast perceives European integration 
as a conflictual process (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 5). The main reason 
for the academic interest in postfunctionalism is basically because the 
“grand theories have largely neglected the role of public opinion” 
(Hobolt & Wratil, 2015, p. 239). Proponents of postfunctionalism argue 
that as the European public, over time, has started to play a more 
important role in determining the pace and width of European 
integration, as a result of the increased politicisation of European 
integration, the public preferences regarding European integration 
cannot be neglected. More precisely, Hooghe and Marks (2008) argue 
that identity considerations should, over time, become increasingly 
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important as a determinant of EU attitudes, as a result of European 
integration becoming politicised.  
The importance of this approach has become apparent after the so-
called “permissive consensus,” provided by the European public 
towards European integration policies, has been declared over 
(Mitchell, 2014, p. 603; De Wilde, Leopold & Schmidtke, 2016, p. 14). 
The “permissive consensus” was based on widespread belief that the 
reduction of national borders, both physical and financial, within the 
EU area would contribute to a mutual prosperity among all of the 
participating countries (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011, p. 5). That 
widespread belief has become severely tarnished over time, which has 
contributed to the democratic legitimacy of the EU becoming 
increasingly questioned. As De Wilde and Trenz (2012, p. 12) further 
argue, questioning the “principle of integration undermine, by its very 
nature, the legitimacy of the currently existing EU polity”. 
Since 2008, the mostly EU-friendly traditional political parties have 
instead started to face “constraining dissensus” from the public when 
making decisions on European integration. This has directly forced the 
political parties to adapt their positions on Europe in accordance with 
public preferences (Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Schimmelfennig, 2014), or 
risk being voted out of office during elections. This development was 
also to some extent predicted by Karp and Bowler (2006, p. 370), who 
argued that “as integration moves into policy areas such as a single 
European currency and seeks to allow many more countries into the 
club, the EU is no longer of low salience. At this point, the passive 
permission of voters may grow into opposition”. Hence, the EU and 
European integration policies are no longer perceived to be of no 
concern for the European public, and the EU should no longer be 
perceived as mainly an elite project with no real-life consequences for 
the ordinary Europeans. This is a transformation that some have 
argued started with the Maastricht Treaty (Gabel & Palmer, 1995, p. 3), 
while others suggest that it started already during the 1970’s and that 
“politicization is certainly not a post-Maastricht phenomenon” (Grande 
& Kriesi, 2016, p. 281).  
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Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, which both focused 
on “the functional, efficiency-based rationale for regional integration, 
economic preferences and bargaining between interest groups” 
(Schimmelfennig, 2014, pp. 321–322), are, therefore, no longer sufficient 
to explain the European integration processes occurring during the last 
decade. However, the postfunctionalist approach could also be 
perceived to be an evolution of the neofunctionalist approach 
(Schmitter, 2009). According to postfunctionalist theory, the European 
public should be perceived as a force for or against European 
integration that has gained in importance over time as a result of the 
politicisation of European integration. Therefore, the European public 
is likely to play a part in determining the future direction of European 
integration. As the EU has also, arguably, become more transparent 
and democratised, over time, the European public has also become 
more directly involved in the EU decision-making processes (Hooghe 
& Marks, 2008). Therefore, “domestic and European politics have 
become more tightly coupled as governments have become responsive 
to public pressures on European integration” (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, 
p. 2). As European integration has become a politicised issue over 
which national elections are contested, public opinion, electoral choices 
and party politics have become focus areas for European integration 
researchers. Schimmelfennig (2014, p. 322) explicitly referred to the 
Eurocrisis as a “postfunctionalist moment in the history of European 
integration,” because the Eurocrisis, together with the global recession, 
triggered an unprecedented politicisation of European integration as 
the cost of European integration suddenly became apparent. As 
evidence, Schimmelfennig (2014, p. 323) suggested that at the height of 
the Eurocrisis between March of 2011 and March of 2013, every single 
European election was predominantly about the response to the 
Eurocrisis, and in only 2 out of 15 elections the incumbent government 
was re-elected.  
Similar to the concept of public support, the concept of 
Euroscepticism is also considered as a multi-level attitudinal 
phenomenon (Wessels, 2007). The end of the “permissive consensus” 
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and the birth of postfunctionalism naturally coincides with the 
academic interest in the concept of Euroscepticism. According to 
Taggart (1998), Euroscepticism incorporates at least two different 
positions towards the EU. First of all, there are those who oppose the 
idea of European integration and as a consequence oppose the 
European political system created by the EU regime. Furthermore, 
there are those who are not against European integration, in principle, 
but are sceptical towards how it is being implemented through the 
current EU framework. This division of scepticism and opposition has 
later been divided by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) for analytical 
purposes into soft Euroscepticism and hard Euroscepticism. Public 
opposition defined as soft Euroscepticism occurs when there is not a 
principled objection to European integration or EU membership, but 
where concerns regarding one or several policy issues lead to the 
expression of public opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 
there is a mismatch between national- and European interests. Public 
opposition defined as hard Euroscepticism occurs when there is a more 
principled opposition to European integration as an idea and the EU 
specifically as an embodiment of that idea. Such argumentation is used 
by political parties who believe that their countries should withdraw 
completely from the EU. This division of Euroscepticism into two 
different types is widely used to categorise political positions towards 
the EU and European integration within the literature.19  
Political parties on both fringes of the ideological spectrum have, 
however, not been late to seize the political opportunities created by 
the rising public sentiments of Euroscepticism, and in that sense it 
might be perceived as a logical consequence of the politicisation of 
European integration (De Wilde & Trenz, 2012, p. 14). When the 
European public started to express Eurosceptic tendencies more 
openly, the EU and European integration became politicised issues and, 
as a result, transferred directly into the agendas of political parties 
                                                     
19 Kopecky and Mudde (2002, p. 300) used the concepts of diffuse opposition, to 
describe opposition towards the idea of European integration, and specific opposition, 
to describe opposition towards the EU as the current embodiment of that idea. 
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(Crespy & Verschueren, 2009, p. 378). With regards to political parties, 
Euroscepticism is also not confined to any particular value or belief 
system but changes and adapts according to the national contexts in 
which the political parties are located (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 2). For 
political parties situated on the radical left of the political spectrum, 
Euroscepticism is mostly driven by opposition to specific issues, such 
as opposition towards the increasingly neoliberal character of the EU. 
Examples of such types of Eurosceptic parties are Syriza in Greece and 
Podemos in Spain. For political parties situated on the radical right of 
the political spectrum, Euroscepticism is much more culturally driven. 
Those on the radical left can actually support, or in some cases demand, 
more integration in some areas such as economic redistributions, while 
those on the radical right are more prone to categorically reject any 
form of European-wide cooperation beyond a bare minimum (van 
Elsas, Hakhverdian & van der Brug, 2016, p. 20). Examples of such 
types of Eurosceptic parties are the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands 
and Rassemblement National in France (formerly known as Front 
National). The determinants of Eurosceptic sentiments might be rooted 
in the perception of European integration constituting a threat to 
national sovereignty (Sorensen, 2007), perceptions that European 
integration threatens the national identity and culture (Carey, 2002) 
and from utilitarian considerations regarding the cost-benefits of 
European integration policies (Karp & Bowler, 2006). More recent 
studies have also focused on the perceived threat to jobs that the EU 
poses through open market policies (Grauel, Heine & Lahusen, 2013) 
and perceived threats to social welfare (Baute, Meuluman, Abts & 
Swyngedouw, 2018).  
Prior to the start of the global recession, the national political 
leadership and the EU bureaucrats were worried about how little 
public interest there was in the workings of the EU, but post-2008 many 
pro-EU politicians would perhaps agree that the less that is written 
about the EU the better. For researchers interested in understanding the 
development and process of European integration, postfunctionalism 
is likely to be the prevailing theoretical lens in the years to come. That 
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the European public would become an important actor within the 
European integration process is nothing sensational, but it is something 
that have been expected. Already in the mid-1990’s Deflem and Pampel 
(1996, p. 120) argued that “movement toward unification requires more 
than the treaties and policies negotiated by the members of various EC 
councils, administrative units, and national representatives. The 
success of Europe’s unification depends to no small extent on the 
support it receives from the citizens of the members of the European 
Community”. Even though this study is not concerned with the specific 
political processes of European integration within the EU machinery, 
this study contributes to this line of theory by seeking to explain why 
the country levels of public support differ over time. If one agrees with 
the presumption that it matters what the European public thinks about 
European integration, it also becomes valid to empirically identify the 
determinants of public support.  
Börzel and Risse (2018, p. 93) suggest that “the constraining 
dissensus and the ensuing politicization driven by Eurosceptical 
parties, particularly on the right, explain why the member states’ 
governments have not been able to find a common solution and why 
they continue to renege on measures agreed upon in the Council of 
Ministers and during European summits”. However, taking the most 
recent developments into consideration, they also argue that 
“postfunctionalism has a hard time explaining why member states and 
the EU Commission were able to successfully shield their decisions on 
deepening integration during the Eurocrisis from the constraining 
dissensus”. Hence, no theoretical lens is able to account for everything 
that occurs within the EU area related to European integration. 
Nevertheless, by focusing on the varied country levels of public 
support for different system components of the EU as a political system, 
this study is placed within this postfunctionalist line of theory, 
emphasising that it actually matters what the European public thinks 
about the EU. The main characteristics of these three grand theories are 
summarised in Table 2 (see page 49). 
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Table 2. Summary of the main European integration theories. 
 
Chapter summary  
This chapter has placed this thesis within the larger literature of grand 
theories used to understand the underlying processes responsible for 
determining the development of the EU. The main purpose with this 
chapter has been to argue that as the issue of European integration has 
now become irreversibly politicised, the preferences expressed by the 
European public will alter the direction of European integration. This 
is illustrated by the fact that after the start of the global recession in 
2008, national elections are now being directly contested over positions 
on the EU. Therefore, political parties’ need to take into account EU 
attitudes within their respective countries when deciding on policies 
related to European integration and adapt their policies on the EU in 
accordance with the current national mood. Hence, EU attitudes need 
to be accounted for when taking decisions on the EU and European 
integration. This study is related to the postfunctionalist theory of 
thought and will hopefully contribute to this line of theory by showing 
how the country levels of public support for the EU vary and are 
determined by contextual-level factors. In the following chapter, the 
conceptual framework is presented that will function as a theoretical 
base for developing the overarching research design of this thesis.   
 
Neofunctionalism Intergovernmentalism Postfunctionalism
Focus on the: Supranational level National level Citizen level
Based on the: Interplay between EU and 
national interest
National interests Public interests
In short: The success of European 
integration is determined 
by the "spillover-effects"  
through earlier integration 
policies
The success of European 
integration is determined 
by an inter-state bargaining 
process, that considers the 
national interests of all 
member states 
The success of European 
integration is, in addition 
to European and national 
interests, determined by 
the preferences of the 
European public
Main academic 
proponents:
Haas Moravcsik Hooghe & Marks
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3. The conceptual framework of EU support 
Why is it that today in political theory we must turn to the past in 
order to find inspiration and genuine freshness?  
Easton, 1951, p. 36 
In the following chapter, the conceptual and theoretical framework of 
this thesis is presented. This chapter also presents the main theoretical 
guidelines, as well as conceptual definitions regarding the main 
concepts that are used. The chapter begins with a theoretical overview 
of the system support theory and its theoretical resourcefulness for 
understanding the importance of sufficient levels of public support for 
a political system. Thereafter, the two types of public support of system 
importance, specific and diffuse, are presented and discussed. After 
presenting the arguments for why sufficient levels of public support 
should be considered of essential importance from a long-term system 
persistence perspective, the discussion shifts from the general system 
level to the more concrete EU level.  
     The second section of this chapter thus focuses on how to 
conceptually define the EU as a political system, and how to adapt the 
guidelines provided by the system support theory to a supranational 
political system such as the EU, that is also still under construction. 
Based on the guidelines from the system support theory, any kind of 
political system should be divided into different system components 
that are being evaluated separately by the members participating in the 
political community, as a political system, is too complex to be 
evaluated in its entirety. Hence, the EU as a political system will be 
divided into three main system components of system importance: 
European integration policies, the EU regime and the European 
political community. In the following section, this chapter will start 
with a discussion regarding the usefulness of using the system support 
theory as an analytical tool for analysing the system persistence 
capabilities of a supranational political system, such as the EU.  
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3.1 The system support theory 
The first thing that needs to be clearly stated about the system support 
theory developed by David Easton (1965) is that it is a very general in 
character. Nevertheless, the system support theory is used in this thesis 
as a conceptual starting point in order to emphasise the societal 
importance of sufficient levels of public support for a political system, 
as well as the connection between public attitudes and political 
outcomes. Easton has been attributed as being responsible for 
introducing the concept of political systems into political science (Bang, 
1998, p. 281), and it has also been argued that Easton pioneered the 
research subject of public support studies (De Vries, 2018, p. 42). 
Therefore, Easton’s system support theory has become a natural place 
for researchers interested in public support to start from. The system 
support theory was Easton’s contribution to developing a general 
theory that would be able to explain the inner working, functioning and 
status of something as abstract as a political system. According to 
Easton, public attitudes towards the political system were considered 
of vital importance for the system persistence capabilities of any 
political system. However, for Easton himself, a theory was not a claim 
about what exists but a device with which to access it (Gunnell, 2013, 
p. 202). According to Easton (1965, p. 8), a grand theory is “a type of 
casual theory that differs from singular generalizations and partial 
theories, in scope at least, by virtue of its presumed application to the 
whole of a field of inquiry. In politics, it seeks to illuminate the 
functioning of political systems in their entirety”. Easton (1965, p. 15) 
developed his version of a system support theory to be able to provide 
answers to the, strictly speaking, empirically unanswerable research 
question, “how can any political system ever persist whether the world 
be one of stability or of change?” 
 Even though there will probably never be a clear and verifiable 
answer to Easton’s question, the system support theory provides the 
original reference point for researchers interested in how any kind of 
political system is affected by periods of “stability or of change” within 
its political environment. According to Easton (1965, pp. 21–22), the 
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long-term persistence capabilities of a political system are primarily 
determined by the fulfilment of two important system functions. The 
first being related to the ability of a political system to allocate values 
for a society, and the other being the ability to induce most members of 
the political community to accept these allocations as legally binding, 
at least most of the time, within the political system. In this light, Easton 
(1965, p. 24) argued that “the allocations of values for a society and the 
relative frequency of compliance with them are the essential variables 
of political life”.  
Easton’s understanding of the functioning of any political system 
was derived from the idea that a political system is embedded within 
an environment that always threatens the functioning and viability of 
the political system. How the public reacts to the events within the 
environment (economic recessions, corruption scandals etc.) is then 
measured by the public attitudes directed towards different elements 
within the political system. When there are declining levels of public 
support, this development is traced to events and developments within 
the environment that could be attributed to be the cause of pressure or 
stress on the political system. If a political system is not able to counter 
or stop the declining levels of public support, the democratic legitimacy 
and, hence, long-term viability of the political system is increasingly 
challenged. Hence, “to persist, the system must be capable of 
responding with measures that are successful in alleviating the stress 
so created” (Easton, 1965, p. 33).  
According to this logic of the system support theory, the stability 
and long-term persistence within a political system is achieved through 
balancing the inputs to with the outputs from the political system. 
According to Easton (1965, p. 26), the inputs of a political system 
function as sum variables that concentrate and mirror everything in the 
physical, biological, social and psychological environment that is 
relevant to the political system. Easton (1965, p. 22) further 
distinguishes between two types of environment, the intra-societal and 
the extra-societal. The intra-societal environment consists of systems 
within the same community, such as the economic, cultural and social 
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structures. The extra-societal environment includes systems outside the 
given community itself, such as international political, economic or 
cultural systems. Together these two classes of system, perceived to lie 
outside the political system of interest (in this context that of the EU), 
may be described as the total environment of the political system. The 
sources of stress, or threats to a political system, can thereby be traced 
to the events within the total environment.  
According to Anckar (1974, p. 8), political science has always 
focused on trying to describe the inner workings and structures of 
political systems. Therefore, it is important to note that even though 
Easton himself did not empirically prove the validity of his analytical 
model, Easton’s model has still been described as “the most elaborate 
analytical scheme towards an empirical general theory of politics” 
(Ransom, 1968, p. 355; in Anckar, 1974, p. 83). It has also been further 
described as “an immense and incalculable contribution to accurate 
assessment and understanding of this process of change” (Nicholson & 
Reynolds, 1967, p. 31). Figure 1 (see page 54) presents an overview 
regarding how Easton chose to illustrate the functioning of a political 
system in the broadest possible terms. Easton (1965, p. 32) describes the 
different parts of his simplified model of the workings of a political 
system as the following:  
“The broken lines in the box labelled “The political system” suggest 
that, through the return flow of demands and support, the 
authorities obtain information about these possible consequences of 
their previous behaviour. This puts the authorities in a position to 
take advantage of the information that has been fed back and to 
correct or adjust their behavior for the achievement of their goals. It 
is the fact that there can be such a continuous flow of effects and 
information between system and environment, we shall see, that 
ultimately accounts for the capacity of a political system to persist in 
a world even of violently fluctuating changes. Without feedback and 
the capacity to respond to it, no system could survive for long, except 
by accident”. 
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Figure 1. Easton’s simplified model of the inner workings of a political system 
(1965, p. 32). 
Even though there are many aspects of the inner workings of a 
political system that would be possible to analyse more extensively, it 
is important at this point to note that this study’s sole research purpose 
is to focus on the concept of public support for the EU as a political 
system. Hence, the actual demands from the European public, and the 
public response to the political decisions taken by the EU regime, are of 
secondary importance within this thesis. However, as these concepts 
are important for understanding the functioning of a political system 
from Easton’s perspective, they will be briefly presented.  
Starting with the concept of demands, which Easton identified as one 
of the major sources of stress on a political system. According to Easton 
(1965, pp. 38–39), “a demand may be defined as an expression of 
opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular 
subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for 
doing so”. As such, a demand may be quite narrow, specific, and simple 
in nature, as when grievances and discontents, relevant to a given 
experience, are directly expressed. In short, political demands by the 
general public are expected to push the political system in the direction 
that the members of the political community wants it to move. The 
other input variable is support, described by Easton (1965, p. 156) as “the 
major summary variable linking a system to its environment,” and the 
main variable of concern within this conceptual framework. Something 
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also needs to be said about the outputs from the political system, 
decisions and actions. According to Easton (1965, p. 345), “outputs serve 
to conceptualize the ways in which the system acts back upon the 
environment and indirectly, therefore, upon itself, by modifying, at 
times, succeeding inputs of support and demands”. The connection 
between the outputs and the inputs of a political system Easton (1965, 
p. 345) identifies as taking place through the feedback loop, through 
“which inputs and outputs each directly or indirectly affect each other 
and together, the rest of the political system and its environment”. The 
outputs are important because they have, according to Easton (1965, p. 
363), the “ability to affect the persistence or change of a system through 
the influence they wield over the level of support”. The mechanism 
linking the inputs with information about the outputs is referred by 
Easton as feedback, intimately connected with the feedback loop.  
As Easton himself argued, it is not relevant to speak of public 
support as being something directed towards the political system as a 
singular entity, and he explicitly stated that “it is impossible to speak 
meaningfully for a system as a whole” (1965, p. 165). Instead he 
proposed that attitudes reflecting public support should be regarded as 
something directed towards the different main system components that 
together constitutes the main pillars of a political system. These 
components in the context of the EU as a political system will be further 
elaborated on later in this chapter, but in the general terms of the 
functioning of a political system, the meaning of these system 
components needs some clarification. Easton argued that a political 
system, as a theoretical concept, should be divided into three different 
political objects (in this study referred to as system components) 
towards which public attitudes are primarily directed. Easton classified 
these three system components as the authorities, the regime and the 
political community. These three system important components of a 
political system could be placed in the political system-box in Figure 1 
(see page 54). Even though the relationship between these three system 
components has not been clearly established within empirical research, 
“it is generally believed that these objects of support are mutually 
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related” (Norris, 1999, p. 74). This division of the political system into 
separate assessable system components also makes it easier to 
analytically and empirically approach the study of political systems 
and how public support relates to the long-term functioning and 
persistence of a political system. 
The three main system important political objects that Easton 
suggested need some further elaboration. The authorities refers to the 
occupants of the authority roles within the regime, hence the political 
authorities. According to Easton, there is “little likelihood that a system 
could survive if it failed to support occupants for these authority roles” 
(1965, p. 212). The regime is widely defined as the constitutional order 
of a political system, hence the structure of authority or the political 
order. According to Easton (1965, p. 191), it is impossible for a political 
system to function without a minimal level of public support for the 
regime responsible for the governing within the political system. When 
measuring public support for the regime, Easton argued that the 
regime should be broken down further into three separate regime 
elements of system importance: the values, norms and structure of 
authority of the regime. The political community, consisting of the 
“members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political 
division of labour” (Easton, 1965, p. 177), refers to the population living 
inside a geographically defined area, over which the political regime 
has a political jurisdiction. Hence, public attitudes towards the 
authorities and the political community, over time, affects the 
governing capabilities of the regime, but when the regime collapses 
there is no longer any need of political authorities in connection to the 
regime, nor is there any longer a political community in which the 
members of the political community are participating in a shared 
division of labour.  
According to both Almond (1965, p. 186) and Easton (1965), political 
systems should be perceived as functioning at different levels, and 
therefore public attitudes towards each separate system component, to 
some extent, have an effect on the levels of public support towards the 
political system as a whole. As Norris (1999, pp. 74–75) suggested, “the 
57 
 
 
erosion of trust in politicians may eventually undermine confidence in 
the parliament and general elections; and deficient regime support in 
the long run may even affect the evaluation of the political 
community”. According to Miller (1971, p. 200), “the fundamental goal 
of the political system is to insure its own survival or persistence,” and 
there are theoretically two ways that a political system’s long-term 
survival and persistence can be ensured. It can either be ensured 
through creating sufficient levels of public support from the members 
participating in the shared political community (the general public) 
which contributes to democratically legitimising the authority of the 
political system, or by coercion. Since this section has focused on the 
general system support theory, the following section will focus more 
explicitly on the dependent variable of this thesis, public support. 
3.1.1 Conceptual definition and system relevance  
This section will discuss public support as a concept, as defining the 
core concept of the study is the first step towards empirical 
measurement (Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis, 1999, p. 60). In the 
most general terms, the concept of system support, in this thesis 
referred to as public support, is at the individual level interpreted as 
“an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either 
favourably or unfavourably, positively or negatively” (Easton, 1975, p. 
436). In its aggregated form, for example, country levels of public 
support for a political system are measured by attitudinal indicators 
reflecting support towards the system components of the political 
system. Easton (1965, p. 156) described the concept of system support 
as “the major summary variable linking a system to its environment,” 
and the country levels of public support could thereby be used to 
measure how the political regime is perceived by the population 
participating in the shared political community. The fact that the 
political regime enjoys sufficient levels of public support is therefore of 
vital importance for any political system based on voluntarily 
compliance, because sufficient levels of public support should be 
considered to democratically legitimise the authority of the regime 
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responsible for governing. Therefore, both the direction and long-term 
system persistence capabilities of a political system, in what is 
commonly referred to as democratic societies, are affected by varying 
public attitudes and preferences. As Easton (1965, p. 165) also argued, 
“support is a function not only of actions or intensities of feelings, pro 
or con, but of the number of members who hold these feelings”. 
Sufficient levels of public support thereby function as a stamp of 
approval for any political regime to operate without the need of 
coercion, hence providing the political regime with enough democratic 
legitimacy to not become questioned during periods of system pressure 
derived from somewhere within the systems total environment.  
The main system component of a political system is the political 
regime, because if the political regime fails, the political system 
inevitably also fails. According to Inglehart (1967), democratic 
legitimacy for a political regime is achieved through a socialisation 
process, a process that occurs over time, if ever. Scharpf (1997, p. 20) 
also argued that the possibility for a regime to create enough 
democratic legitimacy also depends on a pre-existing sense of 
community, which according to Scharpf cannot be created by “mere 
fiat”. In relation to that, Miller (1971, pp. 201–202) argues that the 
cleavages within a political community, arising from differences in 
public attitudes or from conflicts among groups within the political 
community, could erode the democratic legitimacy of a regime. He also 
argues that a regime without the capacity to cope with such kinds of 
conflicts derived from the cleavages will eventually dissolve under 
periods of increased system pressure. Norris (2011, p. 110), Rothschield 
(1977, p. 488) and Obradovic (1996, p. 194) provide similar 
argumentation, and agree on the presumption that a political regime 
which fails to meet the public expectations over longer periods of time 
will lose its democratic legitimacy. That scenario is something 
particularly risky for younger democracies that have not yet developed 
enough public support in order to endure longer periods of system 
pressure. Obradovic (1996, pp. 194–195) suggests that any kind of 
political regime with a system of governance that is based on 
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voluntarily compliance by its members is dependent on public support 
from the members participating in the political community for 
democratic legitimisation, because the citizens within the political 
community are the only legitimate source of power.  
According to Obradovic (1996, p. 195), “legitimacy is a concept 
founded on the premises of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, that 
the people may be the only legitimate source of power since they 
represent ultimate authority”. Legitimacy for a political regime is hence 
derived in the form of public support, but is thus “anything but a 
univocal concept” (van Ingelgom, 2014, pp. 4–5). There is also no exact 
threshold for how high the levels of public support should be in order 
to be considered as sufficiently high for a political regime to be 
perceived as democratically legitimised. Few, if any, political concepts 
are therefore as widely debated as democratic legitimacy, and studies 
about democratic legitimacy can be traced back to Aristotle, who is 
attributed to have stated that “political power elicits compliance by the 
use of force, by the distribution of rewards, by education, or by some 
combination of these three procedures” (in Rothschield, 1977, p. 488). It 
is not within the scope of this thesis to conduct a deeper theoretical 
discussion regarding the concept of democratic legitimacy, and hence 
this thesis settles for a wide definition of democratic legitimacy suitable 
for the context of democratic legitimacy for the EU. As a strictly 
theoretical concept, democratic legitimacy is therefore within this thesis 
defined as the “acceptance of political power by the citizens who are 
subject to it” (van Ingelgom, 2014, p. 9). Hence, directly connecting 
public attitudes with democratic legitimacy.  
Easton (1965) argues that there are two ways for a political system, 
based on the voluntarily participation of its members, to create the 
sufficient levels of democratic legitimacy necessary to be able to 
withstand periods of system pressure: this can be provided either by 
efficiency or by affection. The perception of a political regime as 
democratically legitimated should therefore be considered as 
something derived from both evaluative and affective considerations 
(Lipset, 1959, pp. 86–87), and both types of considerations are of critical 
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importance for the long-term system persistence capabilities of any 
political regime. Many researchers therefore suggest that there are two 
kinds of legitimising mechanisms, input legitimisation and output 
legitimisation. According to Scharpf (1997), input legitimisation is 
based on the notion of government by the people, while output 
legitimisation is based on the notion of government for the people. The 
extent of output legitimisation is, therefore, derived from the outputs, 
or effectiveness, of a political regime, and is divided further by Scharpf 
into two kinds of performance criteria: systemic performance and 
democratic performance.  
The systemic performance describes the capabilities of any political 
regime to achieve the general public demands, such as security and 
prosperity, while democratic performance is based on the notion that 
public preferences result in political outputs. As earlier noted, there is 
no clear answer to the amount and scope of public support required as 
an input in the political system in order for enabling the regime to 
convert public demands into political decisions, because the conversion 
rate is always determined by the circumstances of each specific demand 
(Easton, 1965, p. 394). The importance of sufficient levels of public 
support for the system persistence capabilities of a political system are 
perhaps best illustrated by Easton (1957, p. 399) himself, who stated 
that “support resting on a sense of the legitimacy of a government and 
regime provides a necessary reserve if the system is to weather those 
frequent storms when the more obvious outputs of the system seem to 
impose greater hardships than rewards”. These storms that Easton 
refers to are expected to transform into stress on the political system. 
Easton (1965, p. 24) suggested that:  
“Stress will be said to occur when there is a danger that the essential 
variables will be pushed beyond what we may designate as their 
critical range. What this means is that something may be happening 
in the environment – the system suffers total defeat at the hands of 
an enemy, or widespread disorganization in and dissatisfaction from 
the system is aroused by a severe economic crisis. Let us say that as 
a result, the authorities are consistently unable to make decisions or 
if they strive to do so, the decisions are no longer regularly accepted 
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as binding. Under these conditions, authoritative allocations of 
values are no longer possible and the society would collapse for want 
of a system of behavior to fulfill one of its vital functions”. 
Therefore, sufficient levels of public support are crucial for any 
political system in order to withstand longer periods of stress. As 
previously mentioned, Easton further distinguished between two 
different types of public support of system importance: specific and 
diffuse. These two theoretical concepts are, however, highly 
problematic and should be used with caution, as the meaning of the 
concepts varies depending on how they have been used.  
Theoretically speaking, these two types of public support could be 
directed towards each system component directly, as Easton suggests, 
for example, that longer periods of specific support for the regime 
transfers into diffuse support for the regime. Hence, public attitudes 
towards the regime could theoretically reflect both the specific and the 
diffuse kinds of support. Easton, however, argued that it is more likely 
that the public attitudes directed towards the political authorities 
reflect the specific kind of support, as public attitudes towards the 
political authorities are the most likely to fluctuate during periods of 
system stress. However, public attitudes towards the regime should be 
more likely to remain stable, even during periods of system stress, 
hence, public attitudes towards the regime are more likely to be of the 
more diffuse kind of support. Nevertheless, public support for the 
regime should not be expected to remain stable no matter what occurs 
within the total environment of the political system. Public attitudes 
towards the political community should, however, remain stable 
almost no matter what kind of system stress occurs. Hence public 
attitudes directed towards the political community are most likely to 
reflect the diffuse kind of support.  
Unfortunately, within the post-Easton public support literature, 
these concepts have caused a great amount of frustration. Norris (2011) 
has therefore instead suggested that public support should be 
perceived as something ranging on a support continuum, from the 
most specific to the most diffuse kind of support. Norris herself 
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suggested that specific support should be considered to reflect public 
support for the “less” system important elements and that diffuse 
support be used to reflect public support for the “more” system 
important elements of a political system. As this way of using these two 
main types of public support facilitates their usability, that is also how 
these two concepts will be used within this thesis. 
In short, the system persistence capabilities of any political system 
are determined by the interplay between these two kinds of public 
support (van Ingelgom, 2014, p. 6). It is also the division of the concept 
of system support into the more output-related specific support and the 
more input-related diffuse support that has resulted in Easton’s work 
being widely cited and adopted by researchers (Niedermeyer & Westle, 
1995, p. 36). The levels of specific support for a system component are 
basically determined by the attitudes of the members participating in 
the political community, and based on utilitarian considerations 
whether their demands are being fulfilled by the system component 
that is being evaluated. The levels of diffuse support, on the other hand, 
are based on deeper held attitudes, sentiments of loyalty and 
attachment towards a system component, and thereby constitute a 
more general attachment towards a system component for what it is, 
not for what it does. As Niedermayer and Westle (1995, p. 36) 
suggested, “diffuse support denotes a generalized evaluation, whereas 
specific support means an output-directed evaluation”. De Vries (2018, 
p. 43) also suggested that “specific support serves very much like a 
mental tally that fluctuates according to the regime’s performance, 
while diffuse support is more affective in nature”.  
Easton (1965, p. 343) suggested that, at least theoretically, “each kind 
of support will spill over to the other and influence it”. Therefore, at 
least theoretically, specific and diffuse support are perceived to be 
causally related, implying, for example, that longer periods of positive 
experiences with the political authorities will nurture higher levels of 
support for the regime, and, over time, result in higher levels of public 
attachment with the political community. This process should be 
considered to provide the authorities with the necessary levels of public 
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support that enables them to also implement unpopular political 
policies (Wessels, 2007, p. 289). These two theoretical concepts need 
further clarification, and in the following section the defining 
characteristics of the specific kind of support will be discussed.  
3.1.1.1 Specific support 
Easton (1965, p. 268) suggested that “wherever the input of support can 
be closely associated with the satisfactions obtained from specific 
classes of output, I shall designate it as specific support,” and public 
attitudes closely related to the fulfilment of demands by the members 
of the political community could thereby be considered to reflect the 
more specific kind of support. According to Easton, the levels of 
specific support hence reflect how the political demands from the 
members of the political community are being fulfilled by the particular 
system element that is being evaluated. In this way, the levels of specific 
support are expected to fluctuate according to the perceived and/or 
actual performance and benefits derived from the system element that 
is evaluated. Easton (1975, p. 439) further argued that the uniqueness 
of specific support lies in its direct relationship to how the members of 
the political community evaluate the perceived outputs and benefits of 
a system element, and that “this kind of support varies with the 
perceived benefits or satisfactions”.  
Following Scharpf (1997), the specific kind of support is expected to 
provide the political system with output legitimisation. The levels of 
the specific kind of support, as an evaluative and performance-based 
kind of support, are therefore expected to fluctuate according to the 
performance and perceived benefits derived from the system element 
being evaluated by the public. Using this interpretation of the concept, 
the levels of specific support are determined by how the public relates 
to the results and benefits “for the people” that the system element 
enables. The specific kind of support also closely resembles the 
utilitarian type of support (Karp & Bowler, 2006), indicating that the 
levels of specific support result from a rationally based cost-benefit 
analysis. Therefore, when the costs of public support are perceived to 
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exceed the benefits, the specific kind of support is also expected to 
fluctuate. Hence, specific support is also the kind of support that is 
directed towards specific policy-issues. Likewise, public support for 
policy-issues is also expected to remain stable over time if the perceived 
benefits of a policy are not affected by the events within the total 
environment of the political system. In the following section, the 
defining characteristics of the more system important kind of support, 
i.e. diffuse support, are discussed.  
3.1.1.2 Diffuse support 
Political regimes are able to withstand longer periods of system 
pressure even though the performance of the regime is far from 
sufficient. In light of this, Easton (1965, p. 176) suggested that 
“underlying the functioning of all systems, there must be some 
cohesive cement – a sense of feeling of community amongst the 
members. Unless such identity emerges, the political system itself may 
never take shape or if it does, it may not survive”. This “cohesive 
cement” could be conceptualised as diffuse support or as system affect 
(Almond & Verba, 1963). Sufficient levels of the diffuse kind of support 
should therefore be considered of vital importance for the long-term 
system persistence capabilities of any political system. According to 
Easton, prolonged periods of positive regime performance should 
nurture a great amount of specific support, which over time should be 
“transformed” into the more diffuse, or affective, kind of support 
directed towards the political community. Hence, democratic 
legitimisation provided through political efficiency or performance is 
theoretically easier for a political regime to create, but also easier to 
forfeit than the more diffuse kind of support (Linde & Ekman, 2003, p. 
400).  
Within political communities based on voluntarily compliance, the 
members of the political community are therefore able to tolerate 
longer periods of frustration with the political processes of the political 
regime without the minimal levels of public support falling under the 
crucial threshold leading to system collapse. Therefore, Easton argues 
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that there must be another type of support that enables the members of 
the political community to continue supporting the foundations of the 
prevailing political regime, even though they are not at all satisfied 
with the current state of affairs. According to Easton, the defining 
characteristic of this kind of support is that it constitutes a reservoir of 
favourable public attitudes that helps the members of the political 
community tolerate political decisions or political directions that they 
are in principle opposed to. Except in the long-run, the more diffuse 
kind of support is not affected by the daily workings within the regime 
because it constitutes a general attachment towards a system element 
for its own sake and is not directly determined by how the element 
performs or what it provides. Easton (1975, p. 444) described diffuse 
support as a concept based on what a system component is or 
represents, and as such diffuse support constitutes a kind of 
generalised attachment towards the system element. The diffuse kind 
of support is therefore also more difficult to create but also difficult to 
weaken once it is strong. Diffuse support should therefore be 
considered to provide a political system with the necessary legitimacy 
reserve that is crucial when the regime faces system pressure, and could 
thereby also be described as constituting a “reservoir of institutional 
goodwill” (Bowler & Karp, 2004, p. 272). 
According to Miller (1971, p. 204), a “political system has several 
ways of coping with support stress. The most immediate response is 
likely to be an effort to generate specific support through allocative 
outputs which meet the current demands of the members or anticipate 
and abort possible future demands”. Miller therefore suggests that “the 
political system might seek a long-range solution to support stress by 
acting to create diffuse support”. The levels of diffuse support are then 
primarily based on loyalty to the principles and institutions within the 
system of governance for what they represent, rather than based on 
performance or benefits (Citrin, McClosky, Shanks & Verney, 1975). 
According to Easton (1965, pp. 325–327), the most effective way for the 
political regime to create the more diffuse kind of support was by 
promoting some kind of “sense of political community” or “mutual 
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political identification” within the political community. The concept of 
“sense of community” was however first introduced by Deutsch (1953), 
and he defined the concept as a matter of mutual loyalty and loyalties 
by the members within a political community. Easton (1965, p. 332), 
developing Deutsch’s original conceptualisation, describes the sense of 
political community as the existence of a “we-feeling” among a group 
of people not just as a group but also as “a political entity that works 
together and will likely share a common political fate and destiny”. 
Easton (1965, p. 325) further argued that when “their sense of 
community is high, we can say that they are putting in considerable 
support for the political community. Where it is low, the level of 
support deteriorates accordingly”. It has since been assumed that a 
political system can function effectively only within political 
communities where antagonism among the members of the community 
is not too great (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p. 26).  
According to Scharpf (1997), diffuse support provides the political 
system with input legitimisation. Hence, it is more related to the 
concept of “by the people”. However, this is not to be confused with 
Easton’s use of the term “inputs” with regards to a political system. 
Within national settings, the country levels of the diffuse kind of 
support could be measured using indicators of the most affective public 
attitudes, such as national pride, willingness to fight for one’s country 
or mutual identification (Norris, 2011). Therefore, the diffuse kind of 
support is considered to represent “an enduring bond that enables 
subjects of rule to oppose the incumbents of offices and their policies 
and yet retain support for the offices and institutions” (Gronau & 
Schmidtke, 2016, p. 541). Hence, the best way for any regime to prepare 
for the inevitable system crises, when the performance of the regime 
does not match the political demands by the members of the political 
community (the public), is by creating the more diffuse kind of support 
(Miller, 1971, p. 204). It is therefore assumed that within political 
communities based on voluntarily compliance, public support from the 
citizens participating in the political community democratically 
legitimises the superiority and political mandate of the regime, 
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constituting the main political authority. For the context of measuring 
country levels of diffuse support, levels of nationalism are the most 
logical reflection of diffuse support in the Eastonian sense (Easton, 
1965, p. 181). In the following section, the causal relationship between 
these two kinds of public support will be more thoroughly discussed.  
3.1.1.3 The causal relationship  
What I am suggesting here is that support resting on a sense of the 
legitimacy of a government and regime provides a necessary reserve if the 
system is to weather those frequent storms when the more obvious outputs 
of the system seem to impose greater hardships than rewards. 
Easton, 1957, p. 399 
As presented, the specific and diffuse kinds of support are the two 
types of public support used to theoretically distinguish between two 
types of public attitudes, both being of importance for the system 
persistence capabilities of a political system. They are, however, 
analytically separable and have different defining characteristics. Still, 
as Niedermayer and Westle (1995, p. 37) noted “the distinction between 
the modes of support is somewhat problematic”. Nevertheless, as 
Dalton (2014, p. 258) suggested, the “distinction between diffuse and 
specific support is important in understanding the significance of 
different aspects of political support. A democratic political system 
must ensure the support of its members if the system is to remain viable 
because it rules by the consent of the governed”. Easton (1965, p. 343) 
further suggested that the theoretical concepts of specific and diffuse 
support are closely interrelated, and also that “each kind of support 
will spill over to the other and influence it”. The creation of a diffuse 
kind of support is therefore assumed to be based on a history of high 
levels of specific support, and hence “successful political and economic 
development generates a reservoir of goodwill (diffuse support) that 
can be used to cover up minor or temporal setbacks in the system’s 
ability to produce outputs” (Linde & Ekman, 2003, p. 406). How these 
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two concepts are perceived in relation to the general workings of a 
political system is summarised in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Public attitudes as a reflection of the system persistence capabilities 
of a political system. 
However, Easton (1965, p. 312) argued that “if the feeling were to 
prevail that the regime itself militated against the public interest, in 
time continued acceptance of the regime as right and proper could not 
be taken for granted”. That is mainly because a “decline of support at 
the regime level, if it persists for a long enough period, readily spills 
over into the community and adversely affects attachment to it” 
(Easton, 1965, p. 321). In short, the public should be more likely to 
accept longer periods of dissatisfaction with regime performance if the 
diffuse support is strong. According to Easton (1965, p. 275), there are 
also ways for a political regime to nurture public support before crises 
emerge, and if “it is recognized that discontent with the regime or 
community is increasing, the first, easiest, and most direct response 
which may be taken to cope with the situation is to make some effort to 
improve the adequacy of the outputs”. Hence, at least theoretically, it 
could be expected that “direct satisfaction for demands will at least 
generate specific support; and the longer such satisfactions are felt, the 
more likely it is that a higher level of political good will can develop” 
(Easton, 1965, p. 275). Therefore, Wessels (2007, p. 289) argues that 
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longer periods of public satisfaction with the performance of the regime 
will also create more diffuse support for the regime. On the other hand, 
as Dalton (2014, p. 257) argues, a “decline in regime support might 
provoke a basic challenge to political institutions or calls for reform in 
government procedures”. Dalton further suggests that “weakening ties 
to the political community might foretell eventual revolution, civil war, 
or the loss of legitimacy”.  
Many researchers focusing on public attitudes towards the EU have 
therefore regularly chosen to take their theoretical starting point from 
Easton’s (1965) conceptual framework.20 Through this, they are 
theoretically able to connect the developments in the country levels of 
public support for the EU, within the EU area, into the larger and more 
important question regarding the system persistence capabilities of the 
EU as a political system. Because as Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, p. 
111) suggested, “the systems analysis approach helps us to identify the 
most essential political processes in a simple and economical fashion 
and hence leads us to ask the most relevant kinds of questions about 
any system of behavior”. Even though Easton did not develop the 
system support theory solely for the context of international political 
systems, Easton (1965, p. 486) himself suggested that an international 
or regional political system is just a system on another level of 
abstraction, and he argued that international political systems in every 
aspect, expect one, are equivalent to the political systems within the 
nation states. International political systems only differ from those of 
nation states because they are composed of units of large and powerful 
subsystems instead of citizens. In the EU area, these units are the 28 
member states voluntarily choosing to participate in the shared 
European political community, created by the EU regime over time 
through European integration policies.  
                                                     
20 Easton’s system support theory has also been widely used within similar studies, 
such as Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), Kopecky and Mudde (2002), Risse (2005), 
Wessels (2007), Kohler-Koch (2011), Boomgaarden et al. (2011), Cram (2012), 
Armingeon and Ceka (2014), Richardson and Mazey (2004), van Ingelgom (2014), Dotti 
Sani and Magistro (2016), Kaina (2016) and Roose (2016), to mention a few. 
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It has even been suggested that the empirical resourcefulness of the 
system support theory might be most directly tested with international 
political systems (Kaplan, 1968, p. 38; Anckar, 1974, p. 64). As Scharpf 
(2010, p. 69) also stated, “the institutional capacity and legitimacy of 
Europeanized governing should be evaluated by reference to the same 
normative criteria that we generally use for the evaluation of governing 
institutions”. Nevertheless, as Ares, Ceka and Kriesi (2017) suggested, 
the relationship between specific and diffuse support becomes even 
more complicated within a multilevel governance system like the EU. 
Furthermore, Gronau and Schmitdke (2016, pp. 536–537) argue that 
international political systems seek “legitimacy not only from member 
states, but also from civil servants working for international institutions 
and from the broader public”. As Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, p. 
262) also argued, “the legitimacy of the Community is likely to be 
related to the nature of the system and more specifically to the extent 
that it corresponds to the expectations of various groups”.  
Before shifting focus to the different system components of the EU 
as a political system, something needs to be noted regarding the 
critique that Easton and the system support theory have received 
during the last five decades. There has been no lack of critique towards 
Easton’s system support theory, as was to be expected when trying to 
create a grand theory of something as abstract as the concept of system 
support and the functioning of political systems (Bang, 1998). Kaplan 
(1968, p. 30), for instance, pointed out that the first thing to be said 
about Easton’s system support theory is that it is not a theory. Kaplan 
further argued that no propositions of relevance about the real world 
can be derived from it, and that it is merely a tool for achieving a 
middle-level range of generalisation about political or social 
macrostructures. Peters (1998, p. 112) referred to system support 
theories as the most general of political theories, while Anckar (1974) 
and Reading (1972), in particular, criticised the use of the system 
persistence concept, as it is strictly speaking impossible to validate. 
According to Anckar (1974, p. 87), the political system described by 
Easton could not cease to exist even if it wanted to. Reading (1972, p. 
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262) further criticised the degree of abstraction with the political 
system, because it is, according to him, impossible to identify a system 
on the verge of system collapse using Easton’s guidelines. Reading 
further criticised Easton’s conceptualisation of diffuse support, and 
especially how diffuse support could come to the rescue of a system 
during periods of system pressure, and how the interactions between 
specific and diffuse support actually works. Others were more frank 
with their critique, such as Astin (1972, pp. 730–731) who stated that “it 
is impossible to see how Easton can call this primitive nomenclature a 
contribution to empirical sciences”. Astin (1972, p. 737) also stated that 
“Easton proceeds as though mechanism, organisms, and individualism 
could be comfortably incorporated in a single scheme is evidence of a 
genuinely hospitable if somewhat uncritical intellect”.21  
Nevertheless, as Kaplan (1968) also suggested, Easton’s system 
support theory should be perceived as providing theoretical guidelines 
that can be adapted, depending on the context, for understanding how 
real-world events might affect the political system instead of being 
regarded as some kind of conventional wisdom in itself. It is also 
possible to argue that it is in the general adaptability that the system 
support theory’s usefulness lies, as this theory was “designed to be 
sufficiently general to be applicable to almost all political systems” 
(Peters, 1998, p. 112). Peters (1998) further suggested that even though 
there were several weaknesses with the system support theory, Easton 
made a number of important contributions to comparative politics and 
managed to provide a very general perspective of something as 
complex as political life. Most importantly, the theory also pinpointed 
the significance of feedback by establishing the importance for 
governments to consider the public response to previous actions when 
discussing policies. Hence, the validity of the system support theory is 
not something that can actually be empirically directly tested within 
this, or any, study. It does, however, provide important theoretical 
guidelines for understanding the greater political importance of public 
                                                     
21 Nettl (1966, p. 314) further suggested that researchers focusing on political systems 
think of themselves as “participating in an intellectual consensus of pioneers”. 
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support, and the probable underlying causes behind why different 
types of public support fluctuate within and between countries.  
Furthermore, the underlying causes that might lead to system 
collapse could be traced to the events within the political system (intra-
societal environment) or outside the political system (extra-societal 
environment). It is also the understanding that a political system is not 
something definitive nor eternal that makes the long-term persistence 
capabilities of political systems of interest to study. That is why 
Easton’s framework is especially relevant with regard to the system 
persistence capabilities of relatively new international political 
systems, especially because the more affective kind of diffuse support 
is assumed to be in a lower supply in the context of international 
systems than in the context of nation states. This simultaneously makes 
international political systems, such as the EU, more receptive of 
system stress and hence more dependent on public support from, and 
within, the participating member states. As De Winter and 
Swyngedouw (1999, p. 66) also suggested, “international governance, 
like national or regional government, can only gain legitimacy when 
the public agrees with the rules of the game”. Therefore, the argument 
for using country levels of public support as measurements for the 
health, status and stability of a political system, such as the EU, are 
derived from the understanding that a political system can actually 
cease to exist. This has been proven over and over again throughout 
history, both with regard to national level political regimes 
(Czechoslovakia 1918–1993) and international political organisations 
(League of Nations 1920–1946). 
Although Dalton (2014, p. 256) noted that “support is a term with 
many possible meanings,” within this thesis, sufficient country levels 
of public support for the system important elements of the EU are 
assumed to provide the EU with enough democratic legitimacy. 
Thereby simultaneously legitimising European integration as 
something generally desirable for the members participating in the 
European political community. As with the multidimensionality of the 
concept of public support, Euroscepticism should also be considered as 
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a multidimensional concept. As Vasilopoulou (2013, p. 3) suggested, 
Eurosceptic sentiments can be directed specifically towards the EU as a 
political system as a whole, to the institutional design of the EU regime, 
or towards specific European integration policies such as enlargement 
or the single European currency.  
In this introduction to system support theory, it has been described 
how public support provides a political system with democratic 
legitimacy, and that there are different kinds of public support for 
system importance that are internally related. However, as Easton and 
many others have argued, a political system needs to be divided into 
different system components and component elements towards which 
the public support is directed. After a short summary regarding the 
main points presented in this subchapter, the following subchapter will 
present the three main system components of the EU as a political 
system, together with eight specific component related elements, which 
are in this thesis considered to be of importance for the future 
development and system persistence capabilities of the EU.  
Summary  
This subchapter has discussed and presented the general guidelines 
derived from the system support theory and the reason why this 
particular theory constitutes a valid point of departure for this thesis. It 
has been argued in this subchapter that the division of a political system 
into component parts, towards which public support is directed, is 
crucial in order to study empirically such a complex object of interest 
as a political system. By dividing the EU as a political system into 
system components, and later into component elements, it is possible 
to account for the multidimensionality of the concept of public support 
as well as the varied importance of the different elements of the EU 
from a system persistence perspective. It has also been argued that 
there are two types of public support that are directed towards the 
system components, i.e. specific and diffuse support. Specific support 
is more utilitarian in nature. As it is based on cost-benefit calculations, 
it fluctuates according to the perceived benefits. Diffuse support, on the 
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other hand, is perceived as the more affective kind of support, and is 
based on deeper held loyalties and affection towards a system 
component for what it represents. Therefore, diffuse support is 
expected to remain more stable over time.  
In the following subchapter, the EU is first of all presented and 
discussed from a system perspective, focusing on why the EU is such a 
complex political system to study empirically. Thereafter the three 
main system importance components: European integration policies, 
the EU regime and the European political community are presented 
stepwise.  
3.2 The EU as a political system 
If we select political systems for special study, we do so because we 
believe that they have characteristically important consequences for 
society.  
Easton, 1957, p. 385  
In this subchapter, the defining characteristics of the EU from a system 
perspective and the main system elements of relevance for the system 
persistence capabilities and the future development of the EU as a 
political system are presented. This subchapter will also present and 
define the three main system important components of the EU, from a 
system support perspective, of relevance for the system persistence 
capabilities of the EU and discuss how the country levels of public 
support towards these system components are internally related. These 
three, very broad, system components are European integration 
policies, the EU regime and the European political community. In the 
following section, the EU as a political system will be defined as a 
supranational political system in Europe that has been developed by 
the EU regime during more than 60 years of voluntarily 
implementation of European integration policies by the participating 
member states.  
First of all, it needs to be clearly stated that the modern version of 
the EU does not resemble anything like the original European Coal and 
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Steel Community (ECSC) of 1952. However, the original political 
purpose has not changed even though the EU as a political entity has. 
The original political purpose with the emergence of supranational 
governance at the European level was to achieve cross-sectional 
benefits by coordinating human activity within Europe (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2008, p. 2); and to contain German military power for history 
not to repeat itself (Scharpf, 1999, p. 44). These overarching goals still 
remains, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, it has been suggested 
that the EU has evolved over time from something resembling a 
“would be polity” into a supranational system of governance (Follesdal 
& Hix, 2006; Fligstein, 2008; Mitchell, 2016). At any rate, at least since 
the Maastricht Treaty, the EU could be considered as constituting a 
semi political European political system, which is however governed 
by both supranational and intergovernmental principles (Hix, 2005; 
Fabbrini, 2015). The modern version of the EU is, furthermore, a unique 
example of a multilevel system of governance (Kenealy, Peterson & 
Corbett, 2015, p. 233), in which the different levels interact to different 
extents to govern over a shared European political community (Marks 
et al., 1996, p. 373; Kenealy et al., 2015, p. 239). However, since there is 
no consensus whatsoever regarding the theoretical status of the EU 
itself, and how it should be conceptualised and theoretically 
approached within academic studies, every researcher focusing on the 
EU as an object of interest needs to start by deciding how the EU is to 
be perceived in the study (Kenealy et al. 2015, p. 11).  
According to Tömmel (2014, p. 309), the scholarly debate regarding 
the institutional status of the EU has centred on two opposing views: is 
it better to compare the EU to a federal state or to an international 
organisation? The EU has been struggling to adapt itself as a 
simultaneously supranational and intergovernmental political system, 
which has created uncertainty regarding the status of the EU, mixed 
together with a complicated and slow decision-making process within 
the EU bureaucracy. These are exactly the kinds of problems that the 
two core countries of the Union, France and Germany, wanted to avoid 
(Huntington, 1996, p. 157). Still, the best way of understanding and 
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theoretically approaching the EU as a research object is through 
comparison with the political systems of its incumbent member states 
(Macmillan, 2014, p. 2; McCormick, 2014, p. 2). Therefore, also Eriksen 
(2011, p. 82) suggests that the EU should no longer be defined by the 
perceived limitations within its institutional structure.  
Rosamond (2000) further argues that there are a number of ways of 
approaching and defining the EU as a researcher, depending on the 
purpose. First of all, it is possible to study and understand the EU as 
just another international organisation. Furthermore, the EU could be 
studied as an example of regional integration and be compared with 
the institutional features of other regional economic cooperation 
forums, such as NAFTA or Mercosur. Finally, the EU could be studied 
as a unique organisation that has been built and developed through a 
unique set of circumstances. Olsen and McCormick (2016, p. 15), 
furthermore, suggest that there is also another possibility, namely “to 
understand the EU as a political system in its own right and compare 
its structures and operating principles with those of conventional 
national political systems”. That should also be considered as the most 
appropriate approach, based on the EU’s current, and ever-evolving, 
institutional structure and political mandates. 
According to Easton (1965, p. 153), a “political system may be 
described in any one of a number of ways depending upon the 
particular kind of emphasis we wish to give it”. In many ways, it would 
also be easier to conclude, as a political system, what the EU is not, 
rather than what it actually is. First and foremost, the EU cannot be 
considered as a European federation nor as a European super-state. The 
EU is not either simply another regional European organisation, such 
as the Nordic Council, to take just one example. In other words, it is 
insufficient to compare the EU directly with anything but itself. 
According to Richardson and Mazey (2014, p. 11), the confusion 
regarding the EU’s status, which has been changing more or less 
regularly, makes it difficult to formulate adequate terminology to 
describe the EU. McCormick (2014, p. 2), for instance, refers to the EU 
as a confederal system with some federal qualities, mainly because 
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some powers have been transferred to the Union where cooperation is 
most sensible, but where many of the decisions are still being 
determined more through intergovernmental than by supranational 
processes.  
The EU could, in addition, also be regarded as a club with associates 
of common interests (Wood & Quaisser, 2008, p. 18), a “post-national 
type of political system” (Tömmel, 2014, p. 25), as a regulatory state 
(Majone, 1998), empire (Zielonka, 2005), “hybrid multilevel political 
system” (De Vries, 2018, p. 43) or as the world’s most “authoritative 
general purpose international organization” (Hooghe, Marks, Lenz, 
Bezujien, Ceka & Derderyan, 2017, p. 563). Another sufficient 
description could be as an “experiment in motion” (Kenealy et al., 2015, 
p. 17), mainly because of the ever-changing development of the EU, or 
the even more vague definition of “a very special multi-level system” 
(Jachtenfuchs, 2010, p. 210). As should be clear by this short summary, 
the question regarding how to define the EU has therefore become a 
never-ending academic and political debate, and therefore the most 
suiting description is perhaps still the one provided by the former 
Commission president Jacques Delors: it is simply an unidentified 
political object (McCormick, 2014, p. 1). There are not any expectations 
that an agreement amongst researchers can be reached on this issue 
within a foreseeable future.    
Nevertheless, there seems to be some kind of an agreement amongst 
researchers that the EU as a political system over time has increasingly 
started to resemble a supranational version of the political systems 
within its constituting member states.22 The similar characteristics 
between the EU and its member states have been elegantly illustrated 
by Jachtenfuchs (2010, p. 204):  
                                                     
22 The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, part six) specifies the 
powers of the respective EU institutions and the EU’s system of checks and balances, 
which manifests itself in a relatively rigid separation of power system; not only are 
powers to propose and adopt legislation divided among the EU institutions – the 
Commission, the EP, and the Council – legislation has to be transposed by national 
parliaments and requires the support of national administrations and agencies at the 
implementation stage. 
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“The EU has a clearly defined territory in which decisions taken by 
the EU bodies are collectively binding. This territory is the sum of 
the territories of its member states. In this territory, nature protection 
provisions, banking regulations or product standards are equally 
binding. These rules are adopted by a single set of institutions which 
covers all policy issues alike. In the standard version of the law-
making process, the Commission submits a legislative proposal on 
which the Council and the European Parliament jointly decide. 
Complaints can be addressed to the European Court of Justice”. 
According to Eriksen (2011), the supranationalistic character of the 
EU originally started with the acceptance of the constitutional reading 
of the founding treaties in the 1950’s, but further developed explicitly 
in the 1960’s. This development has, according to Eriksen (2011), 
transformed the European Economic Community from an international 
organisation into a quasi-federal legal system based on higher law-
constitutionalism. It has been suggested that the most important 
individual event during this transformation phase was when the 
supremacy of EU law was determined, which stated that national 
norms must give way to community laws if a conflict arises within the 
scope of the application of the treaties (Eriksen, 2011, p. 74). Therefore, 
according to Eriksen (2011, p. 82), the EU has over time evolved into a 
supranational political order that, however, still recognises the 
difference of its constituent parties, the member states. According to 
Rittberger (2014) and Dinan (2014), there is also an agreement within 
the EU literature that the EU treaties contain key features of a liberal 
democratic state. According to Zurn (2000, p. 183), however, if the EU 
as a country were to apply for membership in the EU, it would not 
qualify because of the inadequate content of the guiding EU-treaties. 
Neyer and Wiener (2011, p. 170) argue that the EU, furthermore, 
lacks all the political competences that are central to the governance 
capabilities of any democratic state: the powers to tax, to enforce 
sanctions by means of coercion and to provide security against foreign 
powers. Scharpf (2012, pp. 15–16) also further argues that the EU does 
not conform to democratic standards of political interaction, although 
that should only be perceived to be a problem if the EU is considered 
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as constituting a liberal democracy in the traditional representative 
sense of the term.23 Wiener (2011, p. 214) also suggests that the EU, as a 
treaty-based organisation, differs from all other similar supranational 
organisations due to the multitude of political institutions, ranging 
from legislative (European Parliament), judicative (European Court of 
Justice) to the executive (European Council and the Council of 
Ministers). Another important distinction from other similar 
organisations is the pronounced promotion by the EU of the core 
democratic and liberal constitutional principles of modern statehood, 
such as respect for human rights, democracy and political equality, the 
rule of law and minority rights. To summarise, the purpose of this 
section has been to present some of the ongoing academic discussion 
regarding the institutional status of the EU, but not to go any deeper 
into a research area that resembles something of a conceptual jungle. In 
line with the argument proposed by Lelieveldt and Princen (2015, p. 
41), that although “the EU’s nature and character fall short of that of 
sovereign nation-states, it nevertheless can be considered a political 
system in its own right,” it is how the EU is perceived in this thesis. 
According to Dogan (1994), single indicators are misleading when 
measuring complex phenomena; likewise, this chapter will show why 
it is not sufficient to use only a single indicator to measure public 
support for the EU as a political system. One of the main arguments in 
this thesis is that when using the concept of public support towards a 
supranational political system, it is essential to differentiate with regard 
to the component of the political system that the public attitudes are 
directed towards. Niedermeyer and Westle (1995, pp. 33–50), based on 
Easton’s original framework, differed in their “typology of 
orientations”-chapter between a number of system components of the 
EU towards which public attitudes are directed. These system 
components they divided into the broad categories of the political 
                                                     
23 Piketty (2014, p. 560) describes the workings within the European Council in the 
following way: “They meet in secret, do not engage in open public debate, and 
regularly end their meetings with triumphal midnight communiqués announcing that 
Europe has been saved, even though the participants themselves do not always seem 
to be sure about what they have decided”. 
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collectivity, the political order, the political authorities and the political 
policies. Political collectivity refers to the political community, but they 
changed the concept of community to collectivity, even though the 
meaning remains the same. The political order refers to the 
organisation of the collectivity, consisting of the political philosophy 
and the institutional structure of the political order. The political 
authorities refers to the occupants of the political roles at the 
international level. The policies component consists of “the substantive 
dimension of international governance” directly implying orientations 
towards the policies that are dealt with at the international level. In 
reference to Easton’s original conceptualisation of a political system as 
constituting three main political objects of system importance, and 
Niedermeyer and Westles (1995, p. 50) adaption of Easton’s framework 
to the EU context, the categorisation of the most important system 
components of the EU as a political system that have been used in this 
thesis will be presented in the following three sections. These broad 
categories of system components will be referred to as European 
integration policies, the EU regime and the European political community.  
However, before moving on to the European integration policies 
section, a few reflections are in order regarding why the political 
authorities will not be included as a system important component of 
the EU in this study. This is mainly due to two reasons. First of all, there 
is a lack of country level comparative data, as there is no survey data 
available that has included survey items that could be used to measure 
country levels of public attitudes towards the political authorities 
responsible for the governing of the EU. That was also the main reason 
why both Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and Niedermayer and 
Westle (1995) chose to focus solely on public attitudes towards the EU 
regime and the European political community in the empirical parts of 
their respective studies. Besides that, who would these political 
authorities of system importance actually be at the EU level? As Schmitt 
and Thomassen (1999, p. 13) also argued, “it is one of the very 
characteristics of a democratic system that negative support for the 
incumbent leaders and their policies should lead to “throwing the 
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rascals out” rather than adopting a different political regime”. The 
political authorities of relevance for the EU’s functioning and efficiency 
are still the political authorities active at the country levels, even though 
the EU-commission under Jean-Claude Juncker and the European 
Council under Donald Tusk definitely tried to increase the status and 
public awareness of EU level politicians during the period of 2014–
2019.24 However, as the EU could possibly transform into an even more 
state-like political entity in the future, the political authorities at the EU 
level might also become a relevant system component to include within 
future similar studies. This especially if the EU develops into an even 
more federal direction in the future.  
Schmitt and Thomassen (1999, p. 11) argue that “if we rely on the 
subjective judgments of the members of the political system, we still 
need to decide for which aspects of the political system their 
judgements are relevant”. In this thesis, country levels of public 
support are considered to be directed primarily towards separate 
elements within these three main system components of the EU. The 
country levels of public support for these system components are 
thereafter used to measure and compare the extent of the specific and 
diffuse kind of support for the EU from a system perspective. Public 
attitudes towards the EU are perceived as constituting a support 
continuum, ranging from the most specific to the most diffuse kind of 
support. The basic logic is as follows: if a system component is specific 
in character, the kind of support directed towards it is also considered 
to reflect the more specific kind of support, and if a system component 
is more diffuse in character, the kind of support that is directed towards 
it is considered to reflect the more diffuse kind of support. The country 
levels of public support are used to determine how the different 
elements of the EU are perceived within the 28 member states, which 
over time is considered to ultimately determine the EU’s future 
                                                     
24 This might change over time if the European Commission is granted more 
governmental-like powers, the European Parliament is provided more parliamentary 
powers or the position as the Head-Commissioner develops into a more presidential-
like role similar to that of France or the USA. 
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development and system persistence capabilities during the inevitable 
times of increased system pressure on the EU. This argumentation is 
broadly illustrated by Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Simplified model of the functioning of public support for the EU as 
a political system. 
In the three following sections, the three main system components 
of the EU as a political system, towards which the country levels of 
public support are directed, will be presented and described more 
thoroughly. These three main system components will be further 
divided into separate component elements, together constituting the 
more directly evaluable elements of a system component. The 
following sections further include presentations regarding why it is 
relevant from a system persistence and development perspective to 
focus on the country levels of public support towards these separate 
elements, with the focus being on the defining characteristics that 
differentiate these elements from each other.   
3.2.1 European integration policies 
Why should we pursue the project of an “ever-closer Union” any 
further at all? 
Habermas, 2001, p. 6 
In this thesis, the concept of European integration is considered as the 
political process that has enabled the EU’s institutional development, 
and also the political process that will determine what the EU will 
develop into in the future. According to Hobolt and De Vries (2016a, p. 
Public attitudes System components System status
Diffuse support The European political community
P
u
bl
ic
 s
u
pp
or
t
The EU regime The political system of the EU
Specific support European integration policies
83 
 
 
416), policy support refers to support “for the content of collective 
decisions and actions taken by EU actors,” and De Wilde and Trenz 
(2012) further suggest that it is necessary to distinguish between policy 
support and regime support in the context of EU attitudes. In this 
section, three different types of European integration policies are 
presented as three separate elements of the broader system component 
of European integration policies towards which the public attitudes are 
directed. The theoretical assumption is that it matters what the 
European public think about different types of European integration 
policies from a system persistence perspective, but also in particular 
from the perspective of the future development of the EU. After a 
general discussion regarding the concept of European integration, this 
section will focus on three types of European integration policy of 
varying importance for the EU. The first European integration policy is 
related to the widening of the EU area, the second is related to the 
deepening of the EU area and the third is related to the securing of an 
already, partially, implemented European integration policy within the 
main part of the EU area. Without sufficient country levels of public 
support for European integration policies, already implemented as well 
as under discussion for future implementation, the necessity of the EU 
regime directly, and hence the European political community 
indirectly, might also over time become questioned.  
First and foremost, European integration is here used as a reference 
to the political process through which the EU has developed, but there 
are constantly smaller integration processes taking place within, and 
outside, the framework of the EU. The EU is originally developed from 
the implementation of different European integration policies within a 
wide range of policy areas, starting with the pooling of coal and steel 
production within the ECSC in 1952. Over time, the continuing 
transference of decision-making powers from the national to the 
European level has resulted in a wide amount of policy areas coming 
under the EU’s jurisdiction, as predicted by the so-called 
neofunctionalist approach to European integration (Haas, 1958). Earlier 
European integration processes were, however, conducted mainly by 
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the political elites, and at least indirectly supported by the “permissive 
consensus” provided by the European public (Lindberg & Scheingold, 
1970). However, post-Maastricht European integration within almost 
every policy area has become increasingly politicised within the 
member states, and the outcome of proposed European integration 
policies has therefore become more susceptible to swings in public 
attitudes. Mitchell (2016, p. 178) therefore argued that “in the absence 
of permissive consensus favoring integration, public opposition has on 
numerous occasions stalled or reshaped European developments”. 
Niedermayer and Westle (1995, p. 44) also suggested that because there 
is a weak empirical link between attitudes towards the EU in general 
and European integration policies specifically, they “would not feel 
comfortable” placing the European integration policies as constituting 
just another element of the EU regime. They also therefore chose to 
categorise European integration policies as a separate system 
component of wider system importance. Within their categorisation 
they also differed between public attitudes towards already 
implemented European integration policies as well as public attitudes 
towards different types of policy proposals.  
Political integration was defined by Haas (1968, p. 16) as “the 
process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities 
toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national states”. Furthermore, according to 
Keating (2004, p. 368), European integration in general could also be 
regarded as a “part of a wider process of state transformation as well 
as the unique process of polity building”. Theoretically speaking, the 
political authorities within the member states should be less hesitant to 
proceed with the process of polity building, through implementing 
European integration proposals, if they feel that public opinion is 
relatively in favour of that specific integration proposal. However, the 
general public might as well perceive European integration, in general, 
as a threatening process, “leading to a general fear of integration” 
(Baute et al., 2018, p. 3). That is why there are not many European 
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politicians or political parties that are prepared to proceed with 
unpopular European integration policies if they believe it might cause 
a political backlash during the national elections. The self-awareness of 
politicians is far too great, as illustrated by the President of the 
European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker in relation to how the 
Eurocrisis could be solved: “We all know what to do, we just don’t 
know how to get re-elected after we’ve done it”.25 That is perhaps also 
why there has not been any significant high-level political discussion 
regarding a new European constitution after the last attempt were 
voted down in popular referendums in the Netherlands and France in 
2005.26  
A number of studies have shown that the European public are 
conflicted regarding different types of European integration policies 
(Stoeckel, 2012; De Vries, 2013). Therefore, there has been a growing 
scholarly interest in issue-specific kinds of attitudes, which are 
attributed to an increased awareness that the European public can now 
be directly mobilised against specific integration policies. One such 
issue was the stalled Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) negotiations, where public opposition, especially in Germany, 
was attributed to have contributed to the outcome that the negotiations 
were later stalled at the EU level (Buonanno, 2017).27 When official 
negotiations between the EU and USA started in 2013, few would then 
have anticipated that the trade negotiations would lead to 
“unprecedented debate within Europe” (EU Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström 2015, quoted in De Ville & Siles-Brugge, 2017, p. 1491). This 
“unprecedented debate” more or less forced the negotiators on both 
sides to reconsider whether it was worth proceeding with the 
negotiations. According to De Ville and Siles-Brugge (2017), the TTIP-
negotiations showed that the EU leadership will have to take the 
                                                     
25 Quoted in The Economist (2007), "The Quest for Prosperity", March 15th. 
26 However, the European constitution was approved in popular referendums in both 
Spain (76% approval) and Luxembourg (57% approval).  
27 Another recent example is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the EU that almost stalled because of the public 
opposition to the agreement in Wallonia, Belgium. 
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opinions of the European public into account also regarding such 
highly technical issues as trade policies. De Ville and Siles-Brugge 
(2017, p. 1501) therefore stated that “actors in trade policy (which 
increasingly also means voters) do not simply make a rational 
calculation of their economic interest in a particular trade policy (which 
are also very difficult to know a priori), but also take into account the 
potential or perceived effects of agreements on other public policy 
objectives as well as on the autonomy of their national (or local level of) 
government”. However, deeper European integration policies can also 
be achieved without public consent, or even public awareness, as 
occurred with the introduction of the Fiscal Compact during the height 
of the eurozone crisis as a mechanism that “motored economic 
integration ahead in the eurozone” (De Vries, 2017, p. 204) showed.  
Kanthak and Spies (2017, p. 18) also showed by analysing public 
support for three specific policy proposals related to European 
integration (TTIP, Eurobonds and an EU financial transaction tax) that 
“while factors associated with general attitudes towards the EU are also 
helpful in explaining specific EU policy support, the nature and size of 
their impact depends significantly on their policy-specific 
characteristics”. As the most concrete system component of the political 
system of the EU, public evaluation of implemented European 
integration policies and policy proposals could be regarded as an 
indicator for what the EU can develop into without risking public 
opposition. Especially in the wake of the TTIP-negotiations, the EU-
bureaucrats have become more aware of the possibility that the 
European public can be mobilised against European integration 
proposals if deemed necessary. As such, public attitudes cannot any 
longer be ignored when there are discussions in Brussels about 
significant European integration policies. Theoretically, the European 
public could, over time, also become mobilised in favour of specific 
policy proposals and not only function as a constraint on the European 
integration process. However, “the drivers of policy support may vary 
in their impact across policies” (Kanthak & Spies, 2017, p. 2). 
Nevertheless, as Hobolt and De Vries (2016a, p. 416) argue, policy-
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specific levels of support should be analysed in a multilevel context and 
not as an isolated phenomenon. Hence, in the following sections, three 
types of separate European integration policies of concern for the future 
development, and for the long-term system persistence capabilities of, 
the EU from a system perspective, will be presented stepwise. Starting 
with the possibility of a future widening of the EU area.  
Widening 
The future prospect of a further widening of the EU area refers directly 
to the issue of EU enlargement. This would contribute to the widening 
of the European integration project, a process that “has often been seen 
to go hand-in-hand with the process of “deepening” integration by 
transferring more powers to the Union” (Hobolt, 2014, p. 664). The 
issue of further enlargement is constantly on the EU agenda, as there 
are still a number of candidate countries seeking EU membership. After 
the great enlargement of 2004, Jacques Delors, the former president of 
the European Commission, estimated that there was a 50 per cent 
chance that the EU area would start to disintegrate as a result of the 
enlargement (Vollaard, 2008, p. 1). That, however, has still not 
happened. Nevertheless, according to Grande and Hutter (2016, p. 15), 
“the conflict about whether a country fits into the EU is no longer 
fought within an accession state only, it has moved to the centre of the 
Community.” Since 2004, three more countries have been granted EU 
membership, and the latest member state to be granted EU membership 
was Croatia as late as 1.7.2013. On the other hand, Delhey (2005, p. 3) 
suggested that the enlargements of 2004 turned the EU into a pan-
European project, while simultaneously making the EU area more 
socio-economically, politically and culturally diverse, thus creating a 
new set of challenges. During the 2010’s, the discussions regarding 
possible EU memberships have centred on the Balkan states not yet 
members, and Turkey (Azrout, Joost & De Vreese, 2013).  
However, based on political developments in Turkey during the last 
decade, and other political events within the middle-east region, the 
serious discussions regarding a possible EU membership for Turkey 
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have now more or less been frozen for the foreseeable future.28 
However, according to an EU strategy document for the Western 
Balkans (European Commission, 2018), both Serbia and Montenegro 
should be ready to become members by 2025. In the case of Serbia, a 
possible EU membership will also be affected by whether a solution to 
the Kosovo question can be reached. Regarding North Macedonia and 
Albania there is to date no timeframe for their memberships. There is 
also the specific case of Kosovo, which by the European Commission 
has to date only been granted the lesser status of a “possible candidate 
country,” indicating that Kosovo has been “promised the prospect of 
joining when they are ready”.29 A summary of the countries that have 
applied for EU membership is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. List of countries that have applied for EU membership.  
 
                                                     
28 According to the Freedom House Index (2018), the level of political freedom in 
Turkey has declined from 65 in 2008 to 32 in 2018, with 100 indicating full political 
freedom.  
29 This according to the European Commission’s European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations (2018) summary. 
Country Applied Granted
Albania 2009 2014
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 Under negotiations
Iceland 2009 Frozen 
North Macedonia 2004 2005
Montenegro 2008 2010
Morocco 1987 Rejected
Norway 1962 Frozen
Serbia 2009 2012
Switzerland 1992 Withdrawn 2016
Turkey 1987 1999
89 
 
 
Not much has been written regarding country-level variations in 
public support for future enlargements of the EU area, but on the 
individual level Karp and Bowler (2006) however showed that pro-
European sentiments were correlated with public support for both the 
enlargement and deepening of the EU. Durovic, Bigovic and Milovic 
(2017) also showed in their study that there are significant differences 
between the old EU-15 and the new EU-13 member states regarding the 
country levels of public support for future enlargement. Durovic et al. 
showed that within the EU-15 area, the proposal was opposed by more 
than half of the population, while within the EU-13 it was supported 
by more than half of the population. Tömmel (2014, p. 334) has also 
suggested that the EU suffers from a lack of support from its citizens 
towards further enlargements, but the issue of enlargement should also 
be more country-specific. Presumably the European public could be in 
favour of, for example, Iceland or Switzerland joining the EU, 
simultaneously as they might oppose, for example, Turkey joining. At 
least theoretically, it could presumably be expected that it might be 
easier for the European public to accept a new member state that would 
become a net-contributor to the EU-budget (Iceland, Switzerland) than 
a country that would become a net-receiver from the EU-budget 
(Turkey).  
Hoeglinger (2016, p. 22) suggested that “enlargement is the politico-
cultural counterpart to market making”. Although, Hoeglinger further 
argues that the issue of enlargements is not only about the geographic 
boundaries of the EU area, but also about the cultural and social 
boundaries, issues closely connected to questions of group 
identification and social belonging. However, in the Lisbon Treaty (§ 
49) it is stated that “Any European country which respects the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to become a 
member of the Union. The Treaty on European Union sets out the 
conditions”. Even so, there are apparent risks with enlarging the EU 
area without a stamp of approval provided by the European public. 
Another important aspect to consider is that the larger the EU area 
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grows, the more challenging it will become to reach agreements within 
the EU machinery under the current rules of procedure.  
As Ross (2008, p. 393) suggested the previous EU enlargements have 
“multiplied differences between member states in the goals that they 
seek from the EU”. Future enlargements might therefore contribute to 
the EU becoming even more internally dysfunctional. That is also one 
of the main arguments within the political debate regarding the 
prospect of further enlargements, as many countries would rather see 
efforts towards deepening before widening. Furthermore, according to 
Majone (2006), many of the EU’s legitimacy problems could be solved 
by limiting, instead of expanding, the jurisdiction of the EU. There is, 
however, a valid argument as to why enlargements might be necessary, 
as the EU will have a possibility to safeguard the political 
developments within the countries that are accepted as members to a 
larger extent. Hence, by granting a country an EU membership, that 
country could be kept directly within the EU’s sphere of influence, 
which might, over time, become crucial, based on possible geopolitical 
developments within Europe. That is why the widening of the EU area 
is included as a specific element of the European integration policies 
component. 
Deepening 
The future prospect of a further deepening of European integration 
within the EU area refers directly to the possibility of transferring more 
decision powers from the national to the European level. According to 
Hoeglinger (2016, p. 22), the element of “deepening contributes to the 
strengthening of the new supranational center. It consists of non-
economic policies that shift competencies from the national to the 
European level, including issues that further develop the European 
Union’s institutional framework. Examples includes democratic 
participation, the strengthening of the European Parliament, policies to 
enhance judicial and police cooperation, a common foreign and 
security policy, and the various aspects of the constitutional treaty”. 
Furthermore, Schoen (2008, p. 7) also suggests that “establishing 
common policies clearly implies advancing European integration,” and 
91 
 
 
in that context it becomes valid to look at issue-specific levels of public 
support for such proposals. Starting with the Maastricht Treaty, a large 
number of new European integration policies were introduced within 
the then three-pillar structure of the EU regime.30 In the Maastricht 
Treaty, three policy specific goals for future European integration were 
also introduced for the first time. These were the creation of a common 
European defence policy, the creation of a common European foreign 
policy and the creation of a single European currency. In this section, 
the focus will be on the future prospect of deeper defence cooperation 
within the EU area.  
According to Olsen and McCormick (2016, p. 299), common defence 
policies were latecomers to the European integration agenda, since the 
collapse of the EDC in 1954 seemed to have put deeper European 
integration within defence- and security matters on hold.31 However, 
the Maastricht Treaty reintroduced this process with the establishment 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which represented 
a stronger European commitment to a common security policy. In 1999, 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was also launched as 
an integral part of the CFSP. Still, the fact that the EU has still not 
developed either a shared foreign or defence policy is perceived by 
                                                     
30 “The first pillar consists of the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and Euratom and concerns the domains in which the Member 
States share their sovereignty via the Community institutions. The process known as 
the Community method applies in this connection, i.e. a proposal by the European 
Commission, its adoption by the Council and the European Parliament and the 
monitoring of compliance with Community law by the Court of Justice. The second 
pillar establishes common foreign and security policy (CFSP), enshrined in Title V of 
the Treaty on European Union. This replaces the provisions of the Single European Act 
and allows Member States to take joint action in the field of foreign policy. This pillar 
involves an intergovernmental decision-making process which largely relies on 
unanimity. The Commission and Parliament play a modest role and the Court of Justice 
has no say in this area. The third pillar concerns cooperation in the field of justice and 
home affairs (JHA), provided for in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. The 
Union is expected to undertake joint action so as to offer European citizens a high level 
of protection in the area of freedom, security and justice. The decision-making process 
is also intergovernmental”. EUR-Lex.  
31 Probably as a result of the failed attempts with creating a European Defence 
Community (EDC) in 1954.  
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many EU scholars as an obstacle for the EU to become an influential 
real world power (Olsen & McCormick, 2016, p. 297). However, 
Kenealy et al. (2015, p. 239) suggest that security considerations, 
together with peace and prosperity, remain one of the cornerstones of 
European integration. As there have been ongoing political discussions 
regarding increased European integration within defence policies 
during the 2010’s, public attitudes towards increased EU cooperation 
within defence policies represent a concrete policy issue related to the 
deepening of European integration within this thesis. 
According to Genna and Justwan (2019, p. 1), a common European 
defence policy “could secure member states from external threats, 
develop a significant role in peace-keeping, and prevent conflict 
through the adoption of a single European voice”. However, Schoen 
(2008) argues that when it comes to deeper European integration within 
either foreign- or defence policies, the European political elites have not 
been at odds with public attitudes. This, he argues, is because there has 
been a large majority in favour of transferring more national decision-
making powers within these areas to the EU level, simultaneously as 
the European political elites have seemed reluctant to do so. It should 
also be noted that, only during the 2010’s, there have to date been seven 
referendums within the EU area directly related to European 
integration.32 Of those, two have been about EU membership (Croatia 
2012; United Kingdom 2016), while the other five have been about more 
specific policy issues related to the relation between the member state 
and the EU. In two of the referendums, the public voted in a pro-EU 
direction (Ireland 2012; Denmark 2014), while the public in the 
remaining referendums voted in an anti-EU direction (Denmark 2015; 
Greece 2015; Netherlands 2016). The outcomes of the referendums 
suggest, what already Anderson (1998) argued in the wake of the 
Maastricht-referendums, that the European public, when given the 
                                                     
32 See Appendix Table 3 on page 312 for an overview regarding EU-related national 
level referendums 1972–2016. The overview shows that of the eleven latest 
referendums, only one has been about joining the EU (Croatia 2012) and the remaining 
part has been about specific issues such as, for instance, EU treaties, trade-agreements 
and policy-issues.  
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opportunity, have both the willingness and ability to determine the 
direction of European integration.  
Nowadays the European public is being asked to form an opinion 
regarding such issues like increased police co-operation (Denmark 
2015) and trade-agreements (the Netherlands), policy issues that can be 
highly complex even for the most seasoned politicians to understand 
and form an opinion on. It is therefore not that unthinkable that there 
could be referendums regarding the creation of a common European 
defence in the near future, which would constitute a crossroads for the 
EU in terms of the future development of the EU. Majone (2016, p. 14) 
even suggested that “in the hope of speeding up the integration 
process, all efforts should concentrate on what Europe needs most if it 
is still to play a significant role internationally: a truly common foreign 
and security policy. This would transform the present European Union 
into something like a confederation”. That is why the prospect of 
deepening within an important policy area is included in the European 
integration policies component as a separate element of system 
importance.  
Securing 
The future prospect of securing the achieved level of European 
integration refers here to the safeguarding of an already implemented 
European integration policy. It is argued here that public support for 
already implemented European integration policies are more 
important than public support for the future widening or the 
deepening of European integration. This is mainly because failed 
attempts with European integration within a specific policy area, which 
might result in the transferring back of the decision-making powers to 
the national-levels, could contribute to more and more decision-
making powers being transferred back to the national level also within 
other policy areas. As already mentioned, the Maastricht Treaty 
introduced three policy specific goals for future European integration, 
of which the creation of a single European currency, the euro, is the one 
that has had the largest impact on the everyday lives of the European 
public.  
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The euro was officially introduced as an electronic currency in 1999 
when the new European Central Bank (ECB) began overseeing 
monetary policies within the eurozone.33 In 2002 the national currencies 
within the eurozone were also replaced with euro coins and notes. 
According to Olsen and McCormick (2016, p. 436), it was a 
“momentous event,” because never in history had a group of sovereign 
nation states voluntarily chosen to give up their national currencies and 
adopt a common currency. Castells, Bouin, Caraca, Cardoso, 
Thompson and Wieviorka (2017, p. 20) further argued that “every 
major step of economic and institutional integration has been 
conducted “to make irreversible the process of European unification, 
with the creation of the common currency, the euro, being the most 
blatant expression of this strategy”. Furthermore, “monetary policy is 
an area of policy that holds significant symbolic value because a 
country's money is a symbol of its sovereignty” (Kaltenthaler & 
Anderson, 2001, p. 141).  
Roth, Jonung and Nowak-Lehmann (2016, p. 945) suggested that 
“public support plays a crucial role in determining the sustainability of 
the euro. The glue that holds a monetary union together is the political 
will to maintain a single currency. The costs and benefits of the euro as 
perceived by the public are reflected in their support for the currency”. 
However, the policy issue that has caused most discussions within the 
EU during the last two decades is therefore probably the introduction 
of the single European currency, the euro. Even though public “support 
for European economic governance is not the same as support for 
European integration” (Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014, p. 636), it has been an 
issue that has come to divide the European public, perhaps even more 
than any other policy-issue. The implementation of the euro as a single 
currency within the eurozone undoubtedly directly rendered in the EU 
becoming an integral part of the day-to-day life of ordinary Europeans. 
This was in a way that the implementation of more abstract policies, 
such as the creation of an EU citizenship and EU passports, did not. 
                                                     
33 Constituting the 19 EU member states that are also using the euro as a national 
currency.  
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Also, institutionally the creation of the single European currency 
contributed to intra-EU divisions, as it firmly established a multi-speed 
Europe.34 The euro is widely opposed by the public within member 
states such as the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, while on the 
other hand Greece tried to do everything to not become ejected from 
the eurozone during the most severe part of the Eurocrisis. The 
Eurocrisis also contributed to one of the EU’s most significant 
challenges, as it showed quite clearly the negative consequences of 
monetary integration and as a result “threatened the very survival of 
the new currency” (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015, p. 251).  
In the midst of the Eurocrisis in 2011, the German chancellor Angela 
Merkel (26.10.2011) argued that “if the euro fails, Europe fails”. The 
now famous prophecy is here used to illustrate the importance of 
concrete European integration policies for the system persistence 
capabilities of the EU. Even though the euro is used by no more than 19 
member states (together constituting the eurozone), only Denmark and 
the United Kingdom have been granted exceptions regarding replacing 
their national currencies with the euro over time.35 However, Schmitt 
and Thomassen (1999, p. 261) have also suggested that the 
implementation of European integration policies that turn out 
successfully should lead to higher levels of specific support, which in 
turn, over time, should also be expected to strengthen feelings of 
identification with Europe, which in this framework could be 
translated into more diffuse support for the EU. More on that later on. 
This illustrates the importance of public support for concrete European 
integration policies also from a system persistence perspective. As 
Angela Merkel (12.1.2010) also argued, “the Euro is our common fate, 
and Europe is our common future,” and the single European currency 
should thereby naturally be included as a concrete element of interest 
in this type of study. Furthermore, Banducci, Karp and Loedel (2003) 
                                                     
34 Referring to the existence of the varied member state levels of European integration 
within the EU area.  
35 The euro is also used by non-EU countries as a national currency: Andorra, Monaco, 
San Marino, Vatican City, Kosovo and Montenegro.  
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and Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) also suggested that public 
support for the single European currency is critical for the future 
development of the EU, as public support functions as an indication for 
whether the member states will be willing to transfer even more 
decision-making powers to the EU. Therefore, the securing of an 
already implemented high-level European integration policy is deemed 
of system importance for the EU as a political system. 
Summary 
Within these three sections, the three separate elements of the European 
integration policies component of interest for the purpose of this study 
have been presented and discussed in relation to their respective 
system importance. The main purpose has been to place the system 
component of European integration policies into the larger framework 
of the EU as a political system, and more directly as a vital system 
component related to the development capabilities of the EU. The 
theoretical assumption is that sufficient country levels of public 
support towards concrete European integration policies are essential 
for democratically legitimising these particular European integration 
policies, as well as the greater process of European integration. 
However, the public differ in their attitudes towards these three 
European integration elements, which needs to be accounted for. These 
three elements are also not of equal importance from a system 
persistence perspective.  
It has been argued here that the country levels of public support for 
the widening of the EU area, through further enlargements, is the least 
system important of these three European integration policies. 
Nevertheless, sufficient levels of public support for future widening are 
still important as the widening of the EU area might prove to be a 
geopolitical necessity in the future. Enlargements without public 
consent might contribute to increased levels of public dissatisfaction 
also with other aspects of the EU. It has also been argued here that 
country levels of public support for the deepening of are more 
important than support for the widening, as deepening results in the 
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transferring of more national decision-making powers to the EU 
without any assurance that it will actually benefit the European public. 
Finally, it has also been argued that public support for the securing of 
an already implemented European integration policy is the most 
important of these three. The main argument is that if the euro fails it 
would undoubtedly affect how the EU is perceived by the European 
public, with potentially irreversible consequences for the EU.  
On the other hand, high levels of public support for specific 
European integration policies might presumably also force the 
European political authorities to implement policies in that direction, 
otherwise the people could presumably elect someone who does. 
Hence, public support for these European integration policies is also of 
importance for the future development and direction of the EU. 
Leaving the question regarding the kind of EU that the European public 
prefers, it is difficult to imagine anyone being in favour of, say, a single 
European currency without also supporting some kind of 
supranational European regime having responsibility over it. It is not 
as difficult to imagine, however, that someone opposing a single 
European currency also opposes other things supranational within 
Europe. Still, it is far from uncommon to oppose specific policy 
proposals towards deeper European integration while still supporting 
the larger institutional framework of the EU for what it has contributed 
to within Europe.  
In the following sections, the EU regime as a system component will 
be presented and discussed. In this framework, the EU regime will, 
following Norris (1999), be further divided into three separate elements 
in order to differentiate between three kinds of system important 
elements of the EU regime. This division of the EU regime follows the 
same theoretical reasoning as with the three types of European 
integration policies, as public support towards these three elements is 
not considered to be of equal importance from a system persistence 
perspective. The theoretical assumption, therefore, is that longer 
periods of public dissatisfaction with the most specific elements of the 
EU regime will over time transfer into public dissatisfaction with also 
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the more diffuse elements of the EU regime. The following section 
starts with a general discussion regarding the EU regime before shifting 
focus to the three separate system elements.   
3.2.2 The EU regime 
Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe? 
Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State36 
In this section, the EU regime is presented as a system component of 
the EU from a system perspective, towards which public attitudes are 
directed. As EU membership is voluntary for the participating member 
states, the country levels of public support for the EU regime reflect 
whether EU membership is perceived as a democratically legitimate 
policy for the member states to proceed with. Therefore, a member state 
can choose to leave the EU regime if EU membership is no longer 
perceived to be supported by the public. As there are only 28 member 
states in the EU (before Brexit), the country levels of public support for 
the EU regime within every member state are of direct relevance for the 
system persistence capabilities of the EU as a whole, although this is 
not, practically speaking, of equal importance, as it would be a more 
system threatening event if Germany, for instance, suddenly chose to 
leave the EU than if Malta did. From a system persistence perspective, 
it could therefore be argued that sufficient country levels of public 
support for the EU regime are essential, as countries can voluntarily 
chose to leave without the EU regime having any legal mandate of 
stopping the process. Therefore, sufficient levels of public support 
within the member states participating in rule-based supranational 
regimes are of existential importance for these particular regimes. As 
Franck (1988, p. 706) argued, in “a community organized around rules, 
compliance is secured – to whatever degree it is – at least in part by 
perception of a rule as legitimate by those whom it is addressed. Their 
perception if legitimacy will vary in degree from rule to rule and time 
                                                     
36 Quoted in Giddens (2014, p. 33). 
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to time. It becomes a crucial factor, however, in the capacity of any rule 
to secure compliance when, as in the international systems, there are no 
other compliance-inducing mechanisms”. Therefore, as has been earlier 
mentioned, the system support theory might be most directly tested 
with systems at the supranational level (Kaplan, 1968, p. 38; Anckar, 
1974, p. 64). 
According to Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, p. 40), the concept of 
regime “refers to the nature of the political system and, therefore, 
directs us to such issues as the extent of supranational authority and 
the division of power among the institutions of the Community”. In the 
linguistic sense, the term “regime” has a quite negative undertone, 
implying a dictatorial or military system of governance. Therefore, the 
concept that Niedermayer and Westle (1995) used, political order, 
could also have been used to avoid misinterpretations. However, since 
the Eastonian concept of regime is the most widely used term by 
scholars, the term will also be used to describe this system component 
in this thesis. Hence, within this framework, the EU regime is broadly 
used in reference to the governance structure of the EU as a political 
system, created through European integration policies within the 
European political community. The problem with the EU regime from 
a system persistence perspective is that when the EU regime is 
threatened with stress through cleavages or output failures, the EU 
regime’s possibilities to cope or adapt by modifying the regime 
structures and norms as devices to battle these cleavages, or to 
compensate for negative performance, are still limited based on the 
multilevel governing structure of the EU regime. For a national level 
regime, it is easier to cope with system stress through short-term 
improvements in the qualities of the outputs along with the hope of 
increasing levels of public support through popular decisions.  
Even though the EU regime is still far from being considered a 
federal state, it has more institutional similarities with federal states 
than with other international organisations. For example, there are over 
56 000 people working for some of the EU institutions and over 62 000 
national bureaucrats regularly travelling to Brussels to coordinate 
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European with national level policies (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016, 
p. 45). The EU regime’s structure of authority as a way of making 
binding EU-wide political decisions has been institutionalised through 
the creation of both supranational and intergovernmental political 
institutions (article 13 in the Treaty of the European Union, 2007).37 In 
addition to these, there are also the so-called interinstitutional political 
institutions.38 Therefore, according to Tömmel (2014, pp. 319–331), the 
essential function of the EU regime has been to mediate between 
general European interest and the specific interests of its member 
states. On that account, Tömmel argues that the way the EU regime is 
currently governed is based on a unique combination of two governing 
principles that arise out of two different types of governing structures, 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. According to Tömmel, 
the European Commission (EC), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the European Parliament (EP) represent European institutional 
supranationalism, and the Council of the European Union and the 
European Council represent European intergovernmentalism. The EU 
regime’s broader priorities and visions are determined by the European 
Council, comprising member state and EU-level leaders. The European 
public is represented in the direct decision-making processes through 
the 751 directly elected members of the European Parliament, with 
national quotas of EU parliamentarians based on member state specific 
populations.   
There is, however, a never-ending discussion among EU researchers 
as to whether the EU regime should be considered as democratically 
legitimated or not (e.g. Beetham & Lord, 1998; Scharpf, 1999; Follesdal, 
2011). Some researchers even questions the necessity of democratic 
legitimacy for the EU regime (Majone, 1998; Moravscik, 2002). In 
                                                     
37 These are: European Parliament (EP), European Commission (EC), Council of the 
European Union (CEU), Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), European 
Central Bank (ECB), European Court of Auditors (ECA), European External Action 
Service (EEAS), European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), European 
Committee of the Regions (CoR), European Investment Bank (EIB), European 
Ombudsman and European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). 
38 Such as the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), European School of 
Administration, European Personnel Selection Office and the Publications Office.  
101 
 
 
theory, the aggregated levels of public support for any political regime 
reflect whether there is a voluntary acceptance by the ruled of the 
government of their rulers (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2003, p. 10). 
Therefore, sufficient levels of public support for a regime are needed in 
order to provide the regime with enough democratic legitimacy. The 
fact that the EU regime is perceived as democratically legitimate is not 
only important from a system persistence perspective, as “further 
integration in the European Union (EU) increasingly depends on public 
legitimacy” (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015, p. 239). The EU regime is 
considered, during its relatively short history, to have gained the 
necessary levels of democratic legitimacy through a shared European 
public understanding that the EU regime is the best one available to 
preserve the peace, security and prosperity within Europe (Kenealy et 
al., 2015, p. 239).  
Another crucial reason why national governments have been willing 
to transfer power to supranational European institutions is also because 
they hoped to receive gains that they would not otherwise receive 
(Tömmel, 2014, p. 21). As such, the authority of the EU regime has also 
been directly legitimised by the perceived positive benefits gained 
through an EU membership, providing the EU regime with what 
Scharpf (1999) refers to as output legitimacy. According to Schmidt 
(2015, p. 11), “output legitimacy is a performance criterion focused on 
policy effectiveness” and “output legitimacy describes acceptance of 
the coercive governing powers of political authorities so long as their 
exercise is seen to serve the common good of the polity and is 
constrained by the norms of the community”. The positive economic 
performances of the member states within the EU area have thereby 
also contributed to providing the EU regime with the sufficient levels 
of democratic legitimacy required to withstand pressure and proceed 
with the European integration project towards deeper cooperation 
(Ringlerova, 2015). After the start of the global recession in 2008, that is 
no longer the case.  
According to Easton (1965, p. 193), the regime places a set of 
constraints on the political interaction in a political system, and these 
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constraints can be divided into three different elements: values (goals 
and principles), norms and structure of authority (regime structure). 
The normative values in a regime function as an indicator of the kind 
of policies that can be implemented without “violating deep feelings of 
important segments of the community” (Easton, 1965, p. 193). The 
norms specify the kind of procedures that are to be accepted within the 
system of governance, or “operating rules and the rules of the game” 
(Easton, 1965, p. 200). The structure of authority refers to the 
“organizational concentration of power” determining how power is 
distributed and organised within the political institutions responsible 
for governing (Easton, 1965, p. 205). Easton argued that these three 
system elements both validate and limit political actions and therefore 
create the context for all political decision-making within a political 
system.  
Easton (1965, p. 211) further concludes that a minimal level of public 
support (impossible to empirically state what that minimal level is) for 
the regime is essential if a political system shall be able to persist during 
longer periods of increased pressure. In direct reference to Easton, but 
in the concrete context of analysing public attitudes towards the EU 
regime, Niedermayer and Westle (1995, p. 43) categorised the EU 
regime as constituting two main elements: its political philosophy and 
its institutional structure. Political philosophy refers to the values and 
norms connected to the internationalised governance in general, while 
the institutional structure refers to the power structure of the system of 
governance. The political values and norms of the EU regime are based 
on liberal democratic values, respect for human rights and a 
functioning free-market; criteria that also have to be fulfilled before any 
candidate country will be accepted as an EU member state.39 However 
Norris (1999), analysing public attitudes towards the EU regime, 
                                                     
39 As stated in article 1a. in the Lisbon Treaty: “The Union is founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail”. 
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identified three separate elements of the EU regime component that 
should be distinguished between within empirical studies: EU regime 
institutions, EU regime processes and EU regime principles.  
According to Norris, public attitudes towards the political 
institutions of the EU regime can be used to reflect the levels of public 
support for the institutional structures of European level authority. On 
the other hand, public attitudes towards the EU regime processes 
reflect the extent of public support for the performance of the policy 
implementation processes in practice. Furthermore, public attitudes 
towards the core principles of the EU regime reflect the extent of a 
wider public agreement regarding the core principles upon which the 
EU regime is founded, and hence also the most system important 
element of the EU regime. Norris’ division of the EU regime into three 
different system important elements of the EU regime component will 
be used in this study, and further elaborated on in the following 
sections. Starting with the least system important element of the EU 
regime, the EU regime institutions.  
EU regime institutions 
In this section, the EU regime institutions are presented as a system 
important element of the EU regime. Within this framework, the EU 
regime institutions refer to the current institutional structure of the EU 
regime. Public attitudes towards the EU regime institutions therefore 
resembles what has also been referred to as regime support 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Lubbers, 2008), and reflects a more diffuse 
kind of support than attitudes towards European integration policies 
(Harteveld et al., 2013, p. 551). However, first something needs to be 
noted regarding the different EU level political institutions and the 
multi-level governance structure within the EU regime institutions. The 
supranational European interests of the EU area are promoted by the 
European Commission (EC), whose 28 Commissioners are elected 
through the recommendations of member state governments and 
approved by the European Parliament (EP). The particular interests of 
the member states are defended and promoted in the Council of the 
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European Union. The steering and governing of the EU regime 
therefore functions through a multi-level institutional set-up, where the 
different institutional levels interact to implement all-enhancing 
European policies for the common good of the EU area, at least in 
theory. In reality, the EU level institutions could still be considered as 
“second-order” institutions in comparison to the national political 
institutions, then first and foremost the national parliaments that still 
hold veto over the most important legislations. However, most of the 
voting at the European level takes place through Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV). With every treaty, more policy areas have shifted from 
unanimity voting to QMV, thereby increasing the supranational 
character of the EU regime and the decision-making powers of the more 
supranational EU level institutions. Nevertheless, in certain policy 
areas that are considered of vital importance nationally, there is still a 
demand for unanimity for implementation.40  
According to Norris (1999, p. 88), there are two alternatives on how 
to interpret declining levels of public support for the EU regime 
institutions within member states, although with completely different 
implications. First of all, the erosion of public support for the EU regime 
institutions might transfer upwards on the EU support continuum and 
over time start to undermine public support for the processes and 
principle of the EU regime. This would then, over time, have system 
threatening consequences for the future of the EU as a political system. 
The other, more positive, interpretation would indicate that an 
increasingly sceptical European public should signal the growth of a 
more critical European public, which feels that the EU regime 
institutions should become more transparent and democratised in line 
with more liberal democratic ideals. Such a development might also 
ultimately strengthen the democratic legitimacy of EU governance if it 
would be accompanied by increased democratic input in the EU regime 
institutions.  
                                                     
40 In matters regarding, for example, enlargement of the Union, taxation, the common 
foreign- and security policies, citizenship issues, certain institutional issues and the 
financing of the Union.  
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Furthermore, Easton (1965) argued that the levels of the more 
specific kind public support are primarily based on public evaluations 
of the outputs and benefits from the regime, and as such, public 
evaluations of the EU regime are theoretically connected to the concept 
of political trust. There is a common understanding within the 
literature that political trust is critical for legitimising the authority of 
regimes, because trust is assumed to link ordinary citizens to the 
political institutions that are created to represent them, thereby 
enhancing both the legitimacy and effectiveness of these institutions 
(Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 30). Moreover, according to Heinrich (2016, p. 
73), analysing trust in the EU enables researchers “to better understand 
how the wider public relates to the EU and how this reflects on the 
integration project as a whole”. Sufficient levels of political trust in the 
regime are therefore perceived to be both the glue that keeps the 
political system together, while simultaneously making the political 
system work (van der Meer, 2010, p. 76).  
Without sufficient levels of trust in the political institutions of the 
regime, it is more or less impossible for the political authorities to 
implement policies through the political institutions and make the 
necessary “hard decisions” for the common good of the political 
community (Hetherington, 1998, p. 791). Trust in the political 
institutions therefore “entails the belief that it (the political institution) 
will not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that is harmful to 
our interests or the nation’s” (Zmerli, Newton & Montero, 2007, p. 41). 
A minimal level of trust in the political institutions of the regime is also 
considered necessary within any kind of political system, because 
sustaining low levels of trust in the regime institutions will ultimately 
challenge the stability within any political system (Dogan, 1994, p. 309; 
Hetherington, 2005, p. 15). Trust in the political institutions could 
therefore, according to Zmerli et al. (2007, p. 41), be referred to as a 
middle-range indicator of public support. Follesdal (2011, p. 206) also 
suggests that sufficient levels of trust in the EU regime institutions are 
essential, because without trustworthy and well-functioning EU 
regime institutions, it becomes easier for Eurosceptics to increase the 
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levels of public scepticism and opposition towards the EU within the 
member states. As Arnold, Eliyahu and Zapryanova (2012, p. 33) also 
suggested, “trust in governing bodies of the EU helps build legitimacy 
for the process of European integration and decreases concern about a 
deficit of democracy”.  
Therefore, trust in the EU regime institutions is in this study 
considered “a central concern in the process of European integration” 
(Kaltenthaler, Anderson & Miller, 2010, p. 1262). If the levels of trust in 
the EU regime institutions are high or increasing, then this indicates 
that the general public participating in the European political 
community are satisfied with the workings of the EU regime, providing 
what Scharpf (1999; 2013) referred to as output-legitimacy for the EU 
regime. However, when the levels of trust in the EU regime institutions 
are low or declining, then this indicates that the general public are 
turning increasingly dissatisfied with the functioning and performance 
of the EU regime institutions, which might transfer to opposition, over 
time, towards the existence of the EU. This kind of orientation towards 
the EU is commonly referred to as a hard form of Euroscepticism 
(Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, p. 224). The levels of trust in the EU regime 
institutions within a member state could therefore be used as an 
indication of how the EU regime institutions’ current performance are 
being evaluated within a member state (Harteveld et al., 2013, p. 544). 
This is primarily because “explicit measures of institutional trust have 
been a key concern in quantifying public support for the EU 
institutions, with public trust in EU institutions and their ability to 
produce certain outcomes seen as important cornerstones of popular 
support for the EU in general” (Heinrich, 2016, pp. 73–74). In the 
following section, the focus shifts to another separate element of the EU 
regime component, EU regime processes.   
EU regime processes 
In this section, the EU regime processes are presented as a separate 
element of the EU regime component. De Wilde (2011, p. 560) and 
Hobolt (2012, p. 100) have argued that the politicisation of European 
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integration has meant that the importance of decision-making 
processes within the EU regime, in terms of being considered as 
democratically legitimate, has also increased. Scharpf (2010, p. 158) also 
argues that the EU regime now increasingly relies on sufficient levels 
of public support for EU regime processes, so that the output from the 
EU regime can be considered as being democratically legitimate. 
Hence, according to Norris (1999), public support towards EU regime 
processes reflects public attitudes towards how policy-processes 
function within the EU regime. Norris therefore argues that it is directly 
related to public attitudes on how democracy works at the EU regime 
level. Public attitudes towards the EU regime processes are further 
perceived to be of vital system importance, because if there is a growing 
dissatisfaction with the EU regime’s processes within a member state, 
then there is an overwhelming possibility that this type of public 
dissatisfaction will also start to affect public attitudes towards the most 
system important element of the EU regime, i.e. the EU regime 
principles. This is mainly because the EU regime’s authority has been 
mainly legitimised by the perceived outputs and benefits for the 
European public provided through EU membership for the member 
states (Scharpf, 1999).  
According to Norris (2011, p. 44), public attitudes towards the 
regime processes within a country are reflected by “judgments about 
the workings of the regime, including satisfaction with the democratic 
performance of governments, and approval of decision-making 
processes, public policies, and policy outcomes within each nation-
state”. As the EU regime has been more democratised over time, 
following an increase in the decision-making powers of the European 
Parliament (EP), public attitudes towards the democratic performance 
of the EU regime have also grown in importance as a result. The 
member state levels of public support for the democratic part of the EU 
regime’s processes are usually measured by public attitudes measuring 
the levels of public satisfaction with the democratic performance of the 
EU regime (Norris, 1999). There is also an on-going, mainly academic, 
debate regarding the so-called “democratic deficit” within the EU 
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regime’s governance structure. The main argument being that national 
decision-making powers have been transferred to the EU level without 
corresponding democratic control also being established at the EU 
regime level (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). There are also those who argue 
that this does not constitute a problem and that it would be unnecessary 
for the EU regime to become more democratic. Therefore, it has also 
been suggested that the EU regime is already as democratic as it needs 
to be to fulfil its political function (Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002). With 
regard to this discussion, Schmitter (2003, p. 79) also suggests that “the 
notion of a “democratic deficit” is largely the creation of academics and 
intellectuals”. However, if the EU regime should be granted to take on 
even more decision-making powers from the member states in the 
future, the result of such a strategy would most likely contribute to 
increased public demands for more direct public participation and 
insights into the decision-making processes of the EU regime itself. 
In this thesis, the country levels of public support for EU regime 
processes are considered as being connected to a general performance 
evaluation of how the EU regime is currently functioning. However, 
the focus is on the democratic aspect of the functioning of the EU 
regime, as it is argued that the levels of trust in the EU regime 
institutions reflect the member state levels of public attitudes towards 
the more general political performance of the EU regime. As the EU has 
developed into a more state-like political system, the need of public 
support for democratically legitimising this development has also 
increased. Hence, the country levels of public attitudes towards both 
types of EU regime performance will be accounted for in this study. In 
the following section, the focus shifts to the final separate element of 
the EU regime component, EU regime principles.  
EU regime principles 
In this section, the EU regime principles are presented as the most 
system important element of the EU regime component, towards which 
the country levels of public attitudes are directed. The levels of public 
support are reflected by member state levels of public support for the 
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underlying values that constitute the foundation of the EU regime 
(Norris, 1999, p. 75). As the EU regime is guided by liberal democratic 
principles and values, public attitudes towards the EU regime 
principles constitute a deeper and more affective kind of support 
towards the EU for what it has contributed to within the EU area. 
Sufficient levels of public support for this element of the EU regime 
component are therefore more important in terms of the long-term 
system persistence capabilities of the EU than public attitudes towards 
the EU regime institutions and processes. As public opposition towards 
different kinds of policies is constitutive of a democratic process 
(Norris, 2011), public opposition towards the underlying principles of 
a regime directly questions the democratic legitimacy of a political 
regime (Easton, 1965). As public attitudes towards the EU regime 
institutions and processes in this study are used as a reflection of the 
more specific kind of support for the EU regime, public attitudes 
towards the underlying EU regime principles more directly reflect the 
more diffuse kind of support for the EU regime.  
According to Norris (2011, pp. 26–28), the adherence to normative 
regime values and principles reflects the extent of public beliefs about 
the legitimacy of the constitutional arrangements and formal and 
informal rules upon which a regime is founded. Dalton (2014, p. 87) 
also emphasised the importance of shared values within a political 
community, because “values identify what people think are – or should 
be – the goals of society and the political system. Shared values help 
define the norms of a political and social system, while the clash 
between alternative values creates a basis for competition over public 
policies to reflect these different values”. Lipset (1959, pp. 86–87) also 
suggested that the public “will regard a political system as legitimate 
or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their 
primary values”. The founding fathers of the EU also acknowledged 
the need of mutually accepted European values for a general 
acceptance of European integration to emerge over time within the 
European political community. Since the 1950’s, the EU member states 
have therefore also institutionalised what is commonly regarded as 
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liberal European values within the guiding EU treaties. As such, the 
European political community should also be considered as a value-
based political community, as it has enabled what Easton (1965) 
referred to as the authoritative allocations of values within a political 
community. Signs that the promotion and acceptance of mutual liberal 
European values have been considered a necessity for the EU’s 
functioning and long-term system persistence capabilities can also be 
found in the first (§ 1) and second (§ 2) paragraphs of the Lisbon Treaty:  
 
1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-
being of its peoples. 
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security 
and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free 
movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, 
asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of 
crime. 
Within the context of European integration prospects, Haas (1958, p. 
6) argued that “if group conflict is one central characteristic of political 
community, so is the existence of a commonly accepted body of belief”. 
Haas further argued that a widespread public attachment to European 
values was the only really unifying factor for the part of the European 
public in favour of a more integrated Europe. The promotion and 
adaption of shared European values has therefore been crucial for the, 
in many regards, successful development of the EU (Kaina, Karolewski 
& Kuhn, 2016, p. 4).  
According to Lehning (2001, p. 25), the perception of shared 
European values should also generate a sense of European political 
community, and thereby also provide the European public with a sense 
of European solidarity necessary for the long-term persistence of the 
EU. Also, shared European values seem to be a significant source for 
the development of a European identity (Kleiner & Bucker, 2016, p. 
211). Also as Dalton (2014, p. 87) argued, “shared values help define the 
norms of a political and social system, while the clash between 
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alternative values creates a basis for competition over public policies to 
reflect these different values”. However, for the ordinary European, the 
importance of shared values might not be as important as researchers 
believe, because as Huntington (1996, p. 192) noted “many more people 
in the world are concerned with sports than with human rights”. 
Shared European values are one thing, and in general Europeans have 
been in favour of democracy as a system of governance (Norris, 2011), 
but adherence to democratic values is not the same as adherence to 
European solidarity nor European unification. However, as a value-
based Union, the EU regime’s legitimacy is challenged when its 
underlying values are being questioned. As De Wilde (2011, p. 565) also 
suggests, the politicisation of European integration could “function as 
a centrifugal mechanism, stressing unbridgeable differences between 
the interests, norms and values of the peoples of Europe, ultimately 
jeopardizing the stability of the EU polity”.  
Country levels of public support for the EU regime principles could 
also be perceived as being reflected by public attitudes towards EU 
membership, as EU membership also forces hesitant countries to accept 
these principles as binding; at least in theory. The country levels of 
public support towards the EU regime principles could hence be 
argued to reflect the most system important kind of public attitudes 
towards the EU regime, following Niedermayer and Westle (1995) and 
Norris (1999). If the country levels of public support for the EU regime 
principles declines and stabilizes at low levels within a member state 
for a longer period of time, EU membership will sooner or later become 
more openly questioned within that member state. As there are only 28 
member states within the EU, the EU regime could be argued to stand 
on an unstable foundation, as it does not take many countries starting 
to question the benefits provided by EU membership for the purpose 
and existence of the EU to also be questioned. This is especially 
apparent if there would be a public majority in a number of member 
states expressing a concrete desire to leave the EU. As Nicholson and 
Reynolds (1967, p. 26) also argued, the “lower the level of accepted 
norms and values within a society, the smaller the likelihood of 
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agreement on demands”. In this section, the most important separate 
element of the EU regime from a system persistence perspective has 
been presented, and with this the final element of the EU regime 
component.  
Summary 
The theoretical assumption for the relationship between these separate 
elements is that the country levels of public support towards the EU 
regime institutions are the least important element from a system 
persistence perspective. This is because the European public can be 
critical towards the EU regime institutions without directly questioning 
EU membership. However, longer periods of public dissatisfaction 
with the EU regime institutions will also affect public attitudes towards 
the EU regime processes, over time, and, in the end, also public 
attitudes towards the EU regime principles. In the following section, 
the final component of the EU as a political system is presented, i.e. the 
European political community. According to system support theory, 
this system component is also the most important for the persistence 
capabilities of a political system in the long-term perspective. In the 
following section, it will also be argued that public attitudes towards 
the European political community reflect the most diffuse kind of 
support, which is considered essential for the EU to withstand longer 
periods of system stress.  
3.2.3 The European political community 
We have made Europe, now we have to make Europeans. 
Massimo d’Azeglio, Italian statesman41 
In this section, the European political community is presented as a 
system component of the EU as a political system, towards which 
public attitudes are directed. As EU membership has also rendered the 
member states into becoming part of a shared European political 
                                                     
41 Quoted in Cederman (2001, p. 139).  
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community, the system support theory suggests that public evaluations 
of the political community should also be accounted for. The theoretical 
assumption is that public attitudes towards the European political 
community can function as a reserve of public support that the EU can 
rely on during longer periods of system pressure. The country levels of 
public support for the European political community are therefore 
assumed to reflect the extent of the more diffuse kind of support for the 
EU within the EU area. Therefore, if the EU is to withstand inevitable 
future system crises, there is a need for a reserve of the most diffuse 
kind of support. In this section, it is further argued that the European 
political community component should be divided into two separate 
elements, one reflecting the mutual identification, e.g. European 
identification, within the political community aspect and the other 
reflecting the sense of belonging to that political community, e.g. EU 
attachment. After a short introduction, this section will focus on these 
two kinds of public attitudes, both, however, reflecting the most diffuse 
kind of support. 
The main reason for the academic interest in public orientations 
towards a political community is because it has become widely 
assumed that a political regime can function effectively only within 
political communities where antagonism within the population is not 
too great (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p. 26). According to Scheuer 
(1999, p. 25), this is because a demos is first created when the members 
of the political community actually start to perceive themselves as 
being members of that political community. Also as Laffan (1996, p. 95) 
has suggested, public attitudes towards political communities are 
therefore not just based on rational calculations, but on deeper held 
sentiments related to mutual identification and attachment. Therefore, 
Wessels (2007, p. 303) also argues that public “orientations toward the 
political community have a special position in the hierarchy of political 
objects. They are the first-order level of support; the necessary basis for 
any political system”. According to Wessels, public attitudes towards 
the political community are important for the persistence capabilities 
of a political system in two specific ways. First of all, any political 
114 
 
 
system is embedded within one or many political communities, and 
because political communities contain an element of membership and 
identification that goes beyond any formal role as a citizen.  
Easton (1965, p. 177) defined a political community as an “aspect of 
a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of 
persons bound together by a political division of labor”. Important for 
the perspective of a European political community, Easton (1965, p. 
177) further noted that “the members of a political system who are 
participating in a common political community may well have different 
cultures and traditions or they may be entirely separate nationalities”. 
However, Easton (1965, p. 179) also suggested that in order to avoid 
any uncertainty regarding who is and who is not a part of the political 
community, each political system should develop its own criteria 
regarding membership. These criteria could be based on, for instance, 
territorial presence, legal definitions, blood, subjection, kinship or 
shared values. In reference to an international political community, 
Niedermayer and Westle (1995, p. 41), in reference to Easton, defined 
an international political community as “that aspect of international 
governance which consists of its members seen as a group of countries 
and their peoples, bound together by a political division of labour”.  
According to Huntington (1996, p. 20), cultural identities are “what 
is most important to most people” and the most important distinction 
between people, according to him, is not political, ideological or 
economical, but cultural. Huntington further argued that economic 
integration, in the end, also depends on cultural commonalities 
between the members cooperating, because commonalities between 
countries breeds trust. That was also suggested by Deutsch (1953), who 
argued that the “similarity balance,” expressed through religion, 
ethnicity or language, usually functions as the glue that keeps countries 
together. One of the most common arguments against European 
integration is also that perceived cultural differences between the 
member states constitute an obstacle for further enlargement and any 
deepening of the EU area (Hobolt, 2014). Also, as suggested by Piris 
(2010, p. 4), “if a union composed of between six and fifteen Member 
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States that were relatively homogeneous in their economic 
development had not been able to become a federal State, then a greater 
number of Member States, with a lesser degree of homogeneity, would 
make it impossible”. That is why it is always crucial for emerging states 
to try and create a common history, memories and myths that can help 
to foster some form of collective identities over time (Deutsch, 1953; 
Smith, 1992, p. 75). That is also perceived to be a significant obstacle for 
the EU, because in a European context, not many similarities can be 
found in a shared history of European countries (Offe, 2003, p. 439). 
McCormick (2014, p. 24) still argued that there is much that unites the 
histories of the European countries, but the problem is that there is even 
more that divides them. Another problem for the EU is mainly that the 
shared history of Europe does not work in favour for European 
integration, because it is a history of centuries of warfare between the 
member states. In the Berlin declaration from 2007, adopted to celebrate 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaty, the notion of a shared 
European history was also emphasised: “With European unification, a 
dream of earlier generations has become a reality. Our history reminds 
us that we must protect this for the good of future generations” (quoted 
in Piris, 2010, p. 29).  
Membership in the European political community is based on 
territorial presence, as citizenship in one of the 28 member states 
simultaneously also provides the individual with an EU citizenship. 
That also guarantees equal rights within the whole European political 
community for its members (Welge, 2015, p. 59).42 The European 
political community post-Lisbon Treaty should therefore be considered 
as a civil and not as an ethnic political community (Kohler-Koch, 2011, 
p. 107). Viewed from the outside world, the EU is also often considered 
as constituting a European political community based on common 
values, democracy, security and wealth (Kaina et al., 2016, p. 4), created 
                                                     
42 European citizenship was established in the Maastricht Treaty, although the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) modified the Maastricht Treaty clause so that it included the 
phrase “citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national 
citizenship” (Weiler, 1997, p. 495).  
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through the rejection of fascism (Keating, 2004, p. 370). This resembles 
what Anderson (1991) referred to as an “imagined community”. 
However, as Kaina and Kuhn (2016, p. 221) argue, “in large collectives 
with millions of members, however, group members must assume that 
their anonymous fellows share precious commonalities. Accordingly, 
people’s sense of belonging together and their belief of sharing a 
common fate cannot derive from certainties in terms of individual 
experiences with most of the other group members. In lieu of 
knowledge, presumptions of closeness, similarity and commonality 
among the members of the collectivity justify the imagination of a 
community”. This argument is also supported by Risse (2005, p. 297) 
who argues that “an imagined community becomes real in people’s 
lives when they increasingly share cultural values, a perceived 
common fate, increased salience, and boundedness. The EU is certainly 
very real for Europe’s political, economic and social elites”. In modern 
history, political communities have mostly been formed as a direct 
consequence of nation-building projects (Scheuer, 1999, p. 25), but it is 
also clear that the EU has been in the business of community building 
during the last four decades to create and nurture the more diffuse 
support for the European political community. According to De Vries 
(2018, p. 43), diffuse support is often taken for granted in nation states, 
but with regard to the European political community, diffuse support 
is considered to be more fragile. 
The European political community consists of the participating 
member states of the EU regime, including the over 500 million EU 
citizens participating in this shared political structure of supranational 
governance (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 244; Niedermayer & Westle, 
1995, p. 41). Easton (1965, p. 117) suggested that “a group of persons 
who are drawn together by the fact that they participate in a common 
structure and set of processes” constitutes a political community, which 
is undoubtedly the case with the area over which the EU has 
jurisdiction. Over time, the EU has therefore established a national 
anthem (Beethoven’s Ode to Joy), a flag, citizenship and a passport, a 
capital (Brussels) and at least tried to establish a European constitution. 
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As Polyakova and Fligstein (2016, p. 61) noted “these symbols of 
belonging are usually associated with nation states, not economic 
associations”. Why then the need of creating an artificial identity for an 
“imagined community” (Anderson, 1991), and does it even make sense 
to use concepts such as citizenship and identity beyond the borders of 
the nation state (Lehning, 2001, p. 239)? Even though Easton argued 
that the broader the inclusiveness of a political community, the lower 
the degree of political cohesion and integration is needed, the system 
importance of the more diffuse kind of support for the European 
political community has been argued for some time. For instance, 
Laffan (1996, p. 95) noted that “the importance of the affective 
dimension of integration will be accentuated if the Union moves to a 
single European currency and a European system of central banks”. 
Also, Kaina (2006, p. 116) argues that the more the EU regime develops, 
“the more its durability will depend on an extensive reservoir of 
citizen’s diffuse support”.  
The European political community is an artificial construction, but 
some also argue that all modern states are “imagined communities” 
(Laffan, 1996, p. 96). Nevertheless, as the EU has transformed itself into 
a more state-like political system, it has also become more dependent 
on the most diffuse kind of support (Kaina, 2006). Easton (1965, pp. 
325–327) argued that the most effective way for a political regime to 
create public support for the political community was by promoting 
some kind of “sense of political community” or “mutual political 
identification” within the political community. Easton (1965, p. 332) 
describes the sense of political community as the existence of a “we-
feeling” among a group of people, not just as a group but as “a political 
entity that works together and will likely share a common political fate 
and destiny”. Easton (1965, p. 325) further suggested that “where their 
sense of community is high, we can say that they are putting in 
considerable support for the political community. Where it is low, the 
level of support deteriorates accordingly”. Easton (1965, p. 176) also 
argued that “underlying the functioning of all systems, there must be 
some cohesive cement – a sense of feeling of community amongst the 
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members. Unless such identity emerges, the political system itself may 
never take shape or if it does, it may not survive”.  
The diffuse kind of support is therefore considered to be based on a 
history of specific support, and it has been argued that “successful 
political and economic development generates a reservoir of goodwill 
(diffuse support) that can be used to cover up minor or temporal 
setbacks in the system’s ability to produce outputs” (Linde & Ekman, 
2003, p. 406). Nevertheless, as Easton (1965, p. 312) stated, “if the feeling 
were to prevail that the regime itself militated against the public 
interest, in time continued acceptance of the regime as right and proper 
could not be taken for granted”. That is mainly because a “decline of 
support at the regime level, if it persists for a long enough period, 
readily spills over into the community and adversely affects attachment 
to it” (Easton, 1965, p. 321). Therefore, it is possible to argue that longer 
periods of declining levels of specific support should also, over time, 
start affecting the more diffuse kind of support for the European 
political community. As Easton suggested, there are, however, two 
ways for a political regime to create diffuse support, through 
promoting a sense of political community and mutual political 
identification. These two concepts are presented more thoroughly in 
the following sections in relation to the European political community 
as a system component.  
Mutual European identification 
EU citizenship for all citizens within the EU area holding a national 
passport from a member state has been introduced through EU law, 
legally defining a community of Europeans sharing the same status 
irrespective of nationality (Welge, 2015, p. 59).43 However, legal status 
as an EU citizen does not directly transform into diffuse support. 
Nevertheless, many studies have suggested that identity 
considerations have become a crucial factor when forming EU attitudes 
                                                     
43 “Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality 
of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship” (§ 20:1 in the Treaty of Lisbon). 
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(Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Kuhn, 2015). An 
identity, in the social sense, is an affective state of belonging to a social 
group and is assumed to generate social preferences through emotional 
evaluations (Luedtke, 2005, p. 87). The extent of mutual identification 
within a political community should therefore be regarded as a 
reflection of whether there exists a shared sense of “we-feeling” within 
a political community (Kaina, 2006, p. 118). However, Cram (2012, p. 
71) noted that mutual identification “was not a precondition for the 
emergence of political regimes,” but it was, however, used to support 
the development and maintenance of political regimes. In an 
increasingly globalised world, citizens already have multiple identities 
(Smith, 1992, p. 59), but already Guetzkow (1955, p. 54) argued that 
there are two routes for identities to emerge, a process that he referred 
to as the “spreading of loyalty”. The first is that the new object of loyalty 
can substitute for the old object or a quasi-identity may be established 
between the old and the new object, which is a condition often achieved 
through overlapping symbolisation of the loyalty objects.  
When a new state is created, a new political system of governing is 
simultaneously created, and all new regimes have been aware of the 
need to create a new mass political identity for the community to 
withstand internal and external pressure (Bruter, 2003, p. 1149). 
Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 21) also suggested that “as a product of 
social or political action, “identity” is invoked to highlight the 
processual, interactive development of the kind of collective self-
understanding, solidarity, or “groupness” that can make collective 
action possible”. While Scharpf (1997, p. 20) argued that the success “of 
the majority rule to create legitimacy depends itself on a pre-existing 
sense of community – of common history or common destiny, and of 
common identity – which cannot be created by mere fiat”. Scharpf 
(2012, pp. 15–16) also suggested, in reference to the EU, that “in the 
absence of a strong collective identity, the peoples of the 27 member 
states do not constitute a political community that could legitimate a 
regime of Europe-wide majority rule on politically salient issues”. 
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According to Lehning (2001, p. 240), a “European identity is the 
disposition of different nationals to consider themselves, their 
compatriots and their foreign fellow-Europeans as equal members of 
the European community”. Lehning (2001, p. 278) further argued that 
“it is reasonable to suppose that a union based merely on a modus 
vivendi – one in which pan-national identification, tolerance and 
solidarity do not develop – will remain inherently unstable”. However, 
identities are not exclusive and EU citizens can still identify with both 
the European and their respective national political communities 
without having to choose some primary identification (Citrin & Sides, 
2004; Risse, 2005, p. 295). Nevertheless, exclusive national identities are 
often used to motivate and mobilise the public against European 
integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2004).  
However, this scenario has been anticipated and prepared for by the 
EU, and since the 1970’s the EU has tried to counter the possibility of 
the EU’s raison d’etre being questioned during crises by increasing the 
EU’s input legitimacy (from the people) through creating a European 
demos. Börzel and Risse (2010) and Caporaso and Kim (2009, p. 24) 
have also suggested that having a European identity does not force 
people to choose between Europe and their nation states, and that 
identification with Europe should be more regarded as an identification 
with civil liberties, rule of law and democracy, e.g. EU principles. It is 
also important, as argued by both Lehning (2001, p. 262) and Mitchell 
(2014, p. 606), to acknowledge the fact that the European public already 
had, prior to the emergence of the EU, multiple identities 
simultaneously, ranging from villages, cities, regions or nations. 
Therefore, a European identity would theoretically only add another 
object with which to identify, and develop affective sentiments towards 
over time. The understanding that the EU needs to create a mass 
European identity for the emergence and persistence of a well-
functioning European political community is something that has been 
acknowledged for a long time within the EU’s institutional apparatus 
and has also been actively promoted by the EU since the 1970’s 
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(Kolvraa, 2012, p. 747). 44 As described by Kolvraa (2012, p. 752): 
“Already in 1973, a “Document on European identity” had been issued 
by the Council (Bulletin of the European Communities 12; 118–127, 
1973). And it was soon followed by the Tindemans report containing a 
number of suggestions as to how the Community might win the favour 
of the by now seemingly disenchanted populations, thereby reinforcing 
its somewhat waning legitimacy”. This process has been conducted 
through the promotion of different kinds of symbols for the purpose of 
making the EU a part of everyday life, which in theory would, over 
time, increase the extent of European identification. The argument is 
that this would make the European public more acceptable towards 
European integration policies, and that is why the EU, in addition to an 
economic project, is also partly perceived to be a political project of 
identity construction (Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016, p. 61).  
In short, a widespread mutual European identification should 
gradually contribute to the emergence of a sense of European political 
community within the EU area (Kaina & Karolewski, 2013). Kleiner and 
Bucker (2016, p. 211) also suggested that when “understood as a social 
identity with consequences for people’s political behavior in the EU, 
European identity means identification with the EU’s political 
community”. This suggests that European citizens recognise that they 
are members of a larger collective of Europeans and that they assign 
both meaning and emotional value to this group membership (Mitchell, 
2015, p. 331). Mutual European identification has also been argued by 
Lehning (2001, p. 273) to be a “necessary precondition to generate some 
sense of solidarity to stimulate positive integration,” and Fligstein et al. 
(2012, p. 120) also suggested that the lack of widespread European 
identification within the EU area has prevented national governments 
from implementing European integration policies that have gone too 
far against public opinion. Another argument for the need of mutual 
                                                     
44 The “Copenhagen Declaration on the European identity 1973” officially and formally 
introduced the concept of a European identity into the European community context. 
According to the declaration, a European identity was characterised by adherence to 
principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and respect for 
human rights (Obradovic, 1996, pp. 210–211).  
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European identification is that without the emergence of a shared mass 
European identity, European citizens will lack the necessary will to 
sacrifice some of the national advantages for the good of the European 
Union (Armingeon & Baccaro, 2012, p. 275), thereby also decreasing the 
legitimacy of the EU during crises (Scharpf, 2012, p. 15). These types of 
arguments also go back to the pan-European movements of the 1930’s, 
when already Mitrany (1930, p. 472) suggested that in order to 
“integrate these divided nations into a new Continental nationalism, 
two elements are needed above all: first a sense of common outer 
danger, and then a sense of inner community”.  
In this thesis, European identification is interpreted as constituting 
a form of diffuse support for the European political community in the 
“Eastonian” sense of the concept (Kaina, 2006). However, the 
emergence of widespread levels of European identification should, 
according to Huyst (2008, p. 288), not be interpreted as something that 
directly transfers into democratic legitimacy for the EU, but more as a 
component that may contribute to the strengthening of the EU’s long-
term legitimacy, which will contribute to strengthening the EU’s 
system persistence capabilities. Research has also suggested that 
stronger national identification, combined with weak European 
identification, is connected to higher levels of Eurosceptic sentiments 
(Carey, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Kuhn, 2015). The main difference 
between the national and European “mutual kinds of identification” is 
that the European identification is still considered to be of the more 
evaluative nature (Schild, 2001, p. 349), while an individual’s 
identification with the particular nation state over time has become 
more affective. This is because, as Deutsch (1953, p. 7) argued, “no 
person can be born at more than one spot on the map,” and national 
identities are still the primary identities for most EU citizens.  
Therefore, according to Bruter (2003, p. 1155), a European identity 
should best be understood as an “individual’s perceptions that fellow 
Europeans are closer to them than non-Europeans”. In the context of 
diffuse support, this implies that the emergence of widespread 
European identification might not transfer into diffuse support for the 
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political system of the EU, in the way that national identities are 
perceived to do for nation states. Still, many have argued that it is the 
diffuse kind of support that the EU as a political system will be 
dependent on during crises, and that a shared sense of European 
community is a necessary condition for a more diffuse kind of support 
to emerge over time (Schild, 2001; Bruter, 2003; Risse, 2005; Kaina, 2006; 
Kaina & Karolewski, 2013).   
Habermas and Derrida (2003, p. 293) suggested that only the 
awareness of a shared political fate and prospect of a common future 
can halt minorities from the obstruction of majority will. Implying that 
the citizens of one European nation must regard the citizens of another 
European nation as “one of us” for European integration to succeed 
over time. Throughout history, national identities are something that 
has been created after the institutionalisation of a state as a way of 
increasing the identification with the newly created political entity 
(Bruter, 2003, p. 1149), which is also something crucial to take into 
consideration regarding the emergence of a shared European identity 
(Habermas, 2001, p. 15). Polyakova and Fligstein (2016, p. 64) suggested 
that “since the majority of people who live in Europe have 
predominantly a national identity, it should not be surprising that 
many European political issues end up being framed to national as 
opposed to European wide interests. This means that as issues 
confronting Europeans are discussed within national media, they are 
more likely to be filtered through national debates and self-images as 
European ones”.  
Also, Huntington (2004, p. 25) noted that “in order to know what 
“our” interests are “we” have first to know who “we” are”. Who “we” 
are from the perspective of Europeans has long been a widely discussed 
topic, and what “Europe” and “European” signify is therefore always 
dependent on the context or topic (Roose, 2016, p. 45). As illustrated in 
Figure 4 (see page 124), it is relatively clear, however, that the general 
public within all of the 28 member states differ extensively between EU 
citizens and non-EU citizens when it comes to immigration, which at 
least seems to point to the fact that “we” as Europeans are starting to 
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come to an understanding of “who we are not”.45 This should be 
perceived as an important pre-condition for the emergence of mutual 
identification within the European political community (Bruter, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 4. Public attitudes towards EU and non-EU immigration 2014–2017. 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys 2014–2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.46 
Schild (2001, p. 335) also suggested that deeper European 
integration, if it is to be accepted as democratically legitimate by the 
European public, is dependent on a sense of mutual European 
identification within the EU. This is mainly because output-
legitimisation becomes increasingly difficult to achieve with each 
                                                     
45 See Appendix Table 17 page 326 for overview of member state values.  
46 Eurobarometer survey question: “Please tell me whether each of the following 
statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from 
other EU member states (Black line) / Immigration of people from outside the EU (Grey 
line)”. Chart shows respondents answering “Very positive” or “Fairly positive”. 
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round of further deepening and widening of European integration, 
without also a deeper degree of input-legitimisation provided by the 
more diffuse kind of support. He argues that there are primarily two 
main reasons for this:  
“- The frequent use of the majority rule in the Council of Ministers. 
If the populations of member states are to accept the fact that their 
national government is more and more often overruled on specific 
topics, there must be a minimum sense of European identity in the 
populations of the member states. If the European polity is to be 
accepted by citizens as legitimate, then the national frame of 
reference should not be the only one to which citizens refer when 
they evaluate the costs and benefits of European policies. 
- The second reason why European identification is important is 
the distributive character of some European policies, especially the 
most expansive ones – agricultural, regional and cohesion. It is no 
easy task for politicians to legitimize distributive policies mobilizing 
important financial resources without any reference to feelings of 
solidarity with citizens of poorer regions in other European member 
states. This kind of solidarity implies a certain sense of community 
or of common destiny”.  
EU citizens who identify to some extent as Europeans have also been 
empirically shown to be more in favour of both democracy and cultural 
diversity, and generally supporting liberal values (Polyakova & 
Fligstein, 2016, p. 62). Mitchell (2016, pp. 179–180) has also established 
an empirical connection between a European identity and EU positive 
attitudes. She concluded “that in the EU as in other political systems, a 
sense of we-feeling and community identification is an important 
source of sustenance for the political system during times of crisis: 
European identity has a highly significant association with EU support, 
even when controlling for material variables”. Through this 
connection, Mitchell argues that it should be considered a valid 
assumption that increasing European identification will contribute to 
higher levels of public support for further European integration. 
Verhaegen (2018) has further shown that Europeans with a stronger 
European identity were also more likely to support more financial 
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solidarity with member states in economic crises. While Diez Medrano 
(2012) and Fligstein (2008) have shown that citizens identifying as 
Europeans will support European integration policies to a greater 
extent that citizens holding exclusively national identities. Kuhn and 
Stoeckel (2014, p. 637) also suggested that “exclusive nationalists are 
less likely to endorse European economic governance”.  
Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014, p. 638) argued that in order to “endorse 
European economic governance, one has to at least weakly identify 
with Europe. This suggests that the elusive concept of “European 
identity” does have behavioural consequences in daily life”. EU citizens 
identifying solely with their nation states have also been shown to be 
significantly more likely to oppose specific economic policies such as 
the TTIP, Eurobonds and financial transaction taxes (Kanthak & Spies, 
2017). Luedtke (2005) also showed that exclusive national identification 
was the strongest individual predictor for opposing EU control of 
immigration policies within EU-15. Karp and Bowler (2006) have 
shown European identification to correlate with generally supportive 
attitudes towards both the deepening and widening of the EU area. 
Marks and Hooghe (2004) also suggested that identity is a stronger 
predictor for support for European integration than economic 
rationality, while Wessels (2007, p. 288) showed that a European 
identification serves as a buffer against Eurosceptic sentiments. 
Wessels (2007, p. 289) explicitly argued that “considering identity is in 
line with the conception of political support proposed by Easton 
(1965)”. Carey (2002, p. 391) argued that national identities are related 
to “an individual’s intensity of positive attachment to his/her nation,” 
and this widely shared perception is also why European identification 
has become widely used as a sign of positive attachment towards the 
EU, in particular, and European integration policies in general.  
After this extensive discussion regarding the system importance of 
mutual identification within a political community, the focus now 
shifts to the other important kind of attitudes towards the European 
political community for the long-term system persistence capabilities 
of the EU as a political system. This is what Easton referred to as the 
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sense of belonging within a political community, and what will here be 
referred to as EU attachment. 
EU attachment 
In this section, EU attachment is presented as a separate element 
reflecting the “sense of community” within the EU area, and it is also 
the most system important element, for the future system persistence 
capabilities of the EU, included in this study. The theoretical 
assumption is that longer periods of mutual European identification 
should also, over time, transform into higher levels of EU attachment, 
hence these two forms of diffuse support are considered to be mutually 
related. The system importance of community attachment was 
considered vital by Easton (1957, p. 391), who suggested that “if the 
members of a political system are deeply attached to a system or its 
ideals, the likelihood of their participating in either domestic or foreign 
politics in such a way as to undermine the system is reduced by a large 
factor. Presumably, even in the face of considerable provocation, 
ingrained supportive feelings of loyalty may be expected to prevail”. 
As Easton described, the diffuse support therefore makes people less 
inclined to work against the political system. However, Easton (1965, p. 
321) further suggested that a “decline of support at the regime level, if 
it persists for a long enough period, readily spills over into the 
community and adversely affects attachment to it”. Wessel (2007, p. 
290) used similar argumentation and argues that continued scepticism 
towards the EU regime will develop into diffuse scepticism directed 
towards the European political community. As the EU has become an 
increasingly more political union, it is therefore assumed that the 
healthy functioning and long-term viability of the EU will depend on 
the European public developing a shared sense of European political 
community (Klingemann & Weldon, 2013, p. 457).  
Schmitt and Thomassen (1999) perceived the sense of political 
community as a durable form of democratic legitimacy, and as a 
presumption for the development of higher levels of the more diffuse 
kind of support among EU citizens towards European integration 
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policies. This kind of more affective public sentiment could also be 
referred to as “system affect” (Almond & Verba, 1963). The system 
importance of widespread emergence of a shared “sense of 
community” among the members participating in a political 
community was emphasised by Easton, and he also argued (1965, p. 
176) that there must be some cohesiveness for any political system to 
develop to begin with. Easton (1965, p. 184) also suggested that these 
kinds of “feelings of community will indicate the extent to which the 
members support the continuation of the existing division of political 
labor, that is, of the existing political community”. The existence of a 
European political community does not require that all Europeans are 
aware of its existence, but the more strongly such a sense of European 
political community is developed within the EU area, the greater the 
EU’s stress-reducing capabilities should develop as a result (Scheuer, 
1999, p. 29). Börzel and Risse (2018, p. 102) also argue that the Eurocrisis 
turned into a community crisis, as the different nationalities within the 
European political community started to question “how much 
solidarity members of the community owe to each other under which 
conditions”. That seems to indicate that the European public’s EU 
attachment is not yet sufficiently developed within the European 
political community to not be affected during crises. Hence, as 
European identification was considered to be of the more evaluative 
kind than national identities (Schild, 2001), also EU attachment should 
be considered to be of a more evaluative kind than what should be 
preferable with regard to diffuse support for the EU as a political 
system.  
With the EU facing inevitable periods of turmoil, the members of the 
European political community will continuously be asked to make 
more and more sacrifices for the common European good, which will 
require “widespread trust and recognition of commonalities, if not 
affection, across 27 states and diverse peoples” (Caporaso & Kim, 2009, 
p. 20). A shared collective European identity and a general public sense 
of belonging to the European political community should therefore 
theoretically function as two types of affective sentiments “that holds a 
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political system together and serves as a precondition for its endurance 
for the long term” (Oshri, Sheafer & Shenhav, 2015, p. 2). In this section, 
the European political community has been described as the most 
important system component of the EU as a political system. Public 
attitudes directed towards the European political community are 
therefore considered to be reflecting the most diffuse kind of public 
attitudes, and diffuse support is considered of vital importance for the 
long-term system persistence capabilities of the EU as a political 
system. According to the literature, there are two types of public 
attitudes that should be deemed important for the European political 
community, one type related to the extent of mutual European 
identification within the European political community, and the other 
related to the public sense of belonging to that European political 
community, i.e. EU attachment. These two types of public attitudes are 
used in this thesis to reflect the country levels of the most diffuse kind 
of public support for the European political community within the 
member states of the EU. The following section provides a summary of 
the main arguments presented in this chapter, before focusing on the 
contextual level determinants of EU support.  
Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the usefulness of the theoretical guidelines provided by 
the system support theory has been discussed. The main guidelines are 
that a political system needs to be divided into different system 
components, towards which public attitudes are primarily directed; 
and also that there are two different but interrelated kinds of support; 
specific and diffuse. The specific kind of support is determined by the 
perceived benefits provided by a system component, while the diffuse 
kind of support is determined by deeper held affective sentiments 
towards a system component for what it represents, not for what it 
does. Thus, levels of specific support are expected to decline during 
periods of system pressure, while diffuse support is expected to remain 
stable over time. Longer periods of high levels of specific support 
should, over time, also transform into more diffuse support, while 
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longer periods of declining levels of specific support should also, over 
time, start to affect diffuse support. Diffuse support is not, however, 
easily affected, and hence it is diffuse support that holds the political 
system together, even though specific support declines. In this 
theoretical framework, these two basic concepts are considered to be 
functioning on a support continuum, ranging from the most specific to 
the most diffuse kind of support.  
The second part of this chapter has identified the main system 
important components of the EU as a political system. It has been 
argued in this chapter that it is of importance both for the future 
development and for the long-term system persistence capabilities of 
the EU as a political system, how the European public relates to these 
system components. How the European public relates to these 
components will in the empirical part of this study be measured by the 
country levels of public attitudes towards them. The three main system 
components are, in order of system importance, European integration 
policies, the EU regime and the European political community. There 
are also three kinds of European integration policy that have been 
presented, which are related to, in order of system importance, the 
widening, deepening and securing of European integration. The EU 
regime, as a system component, was also further divided into three 
separate elements, in order of system importance, the EU regime 
institutions, the EU regime processes and the EU regime principles. The 
final system component identified was the European political 
community, which was further divided into two separate elements; 
mutual identification and EU attachment.   
As Kaina (2016, p. 250) argues, one should not confuse public 
attitudes towards the EU with the European public’s will to belong 
together with other EU citizens. Still, one cannot either ignore Easton’s 
guidelines that continuous disappointment with the EU will 
undoubtedly also affect the will of the European public to participate 
in a common European political community. In Easton’s (1965, p. 312) 
words: “If the feeling were to prevail that the regime itself militated 
against the public interest, in time, continued acceptance of the regime 
131 
 
 
as right and proper could not be taken for granted”. However, it is 
crucial to acknowledge that the general European public “might like 
the policies, but disapprove of the system that produces them, and vice 
versa” (De Vries, 2018, p. 206). Wood and Quassier (2008, p. 2) have 
therefore argued that the main objective of the EU is to generate 
identification with and high levels of trust in the EU, which they 
assume will, in turn, encourage solidarity and cooperation amongst the 
member state political elites and the general public. This has become 
increasingly important, over time, as the EU has been taking in new 
member states. Trusting the EU on the individual level has also been 
shown by Kleiner and Bucker (2016, p. 212) to have a statistically 
significant effect on the levels of European identification, and their 
results show that trusting the EU regime institutions positively 
influences European identification. Hence, EU positive attitudes 
towards one element of the EU as a political system should also be 
connected to EU positive attitudes towards the other elements.  
Within empirical studies, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
different elements of the EU as a political system, as it makes it possible 
to also distinguish between the different types of public support. 
Hence, it should be more alarming from a system persistence 
perspective when the more diffuse kind of support starts to decline 
than when specific support declines. The effects of contextual level 
determinants are also expected to differentiate between the different 
types of public support, as negative economic performance might 
predict higher levels of support for some European integration policy, 
while simultaneously predicting lower levels of support for some 
element of the EU regime. In short, EU support is a multifaceted 
phenomenon, and this needs to be accounted for in empirical studies. 
Following Easton’s guidelines, the contextual-level factors used for 
explaining the variations in public support are assumed to be either 
related to the intra- (internal) or the extra (external)-societal 
environments of the member states. As such, contextual-level factors 
related to these two main categories will be presented in the following 
chapter.   
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4. Explanations for EU support 
When making up their minds about politics, citizens tap into the political 
information available to them.  
De Vries, 2013, p. 444 
After identifying the main system important elements of the EU from a 
system perspective, towards which public attitudes are directed, this 
chapter will focus on the main findings from the literature regarding 
how the country-level variations in public support for these elements 
have been explained. Country-level variations in public support have 
been shown to be derived from national contextual-level factors, i.e. 
factors related to either the internal- or external environments of the 
member states. Internal and external contextual-level factors hence 
constitute the two main categories from which the variations in public 
support are assumed to be derived. Hence, “contextual variables are 
those variables that make up the environment of the core subject” 
(Pennings et al., 1999, p. 46). The categorisations of the contextual-level 
factors are derived from Easton’s differentiation between two types of 
environments of importance for attitude formations. As previously 
noted, according to Easton, changing levels of public attitudes are 
either primarily derived from the intra- (internal) or the extra 
(external)-societal environments. According to Easton (1965, p. 22), the 
intra-societal environment is related to events and structures within the 
same political community, such as economic, cultural and social 
structures and developments. The extra-societal environment, on the 
other hand, relates to those events and structures outside the same 
political community.  
When the political system is under pressure, caused by declining 
levels of public support, the reason behind it can be traced to events 
within these two environments, as these two environments, according 
to Easton, constitute a political systems total environment. Each of the 
two main categories will further include two different types of national 
contextual-level factors in order to account for the multidimensionality 
of EU attitudes. Internal factors are divided into economic 
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performance, reflecting the macroeconomic character, and democratic 
culture, reflecting the institutional character of the countries. External 
factors are divided into external pressure, reflecting the demographic 
character, and EU-relation, reflecting the character of the relation 
between the country and the EU. Before focusing on the contextual-
level factors, this chapter starts with a general discussion regarding the 
varying country levels of EU support.  
Much of the literature regarding EU attitudes has focused on three 
different approaches for understanding variations in EU attitudes: 
utilitarian, identity and cue-taking approaches. Utilitarian 
considerations are based on a cost-benefit analysis, and hence support 
towards an object is given when it is perceived that the object of support 
provides more benefits than costs (Gabel, 1998). Hence, the kind of 
support derived from utilitarian considerations results in the more 
specific kind of support. Identity considerations have also become more 
important as the EU develops, and identity considerations have been 
shown to influence EU attitudes (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2004). Hence, 
the relationship between these two approaches resembles the 
relationship that Easton described between the specific and diffuse 
kinds of support. These two approaches focus on the interplay between 
utilitarian and identity considerations for forming EU attitudes, but the 
main interest in this study is the underlying contextual-level factors 
affecting the country-level variations in specific and diffuse support. 
Therefore, the cue-taking approach provides the necessary guidelines 
for identifying the proxies that the public uses as reference points when 
forming their EU attitudes. The causal logic of this is straightforward, 
as the national contexts are assumed to contain the necessary 
information for individuals about the most important issues, which in 
turn will affect the basis from which the general public within the EU 
area form their EU attitudes (Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010, p. 1042). 
By identifying these national level proxies, it will become possible to 
empirically explain both the within and between countries variations 
in public support for the different system important elements of the EU, 
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and the respective effects of different national contextual-level factors 
on public support.   
As the European public is generally expected to have more pressing 
issues to worry about than politics, the European public is prone to use 
proxies or “cues” when asked to evaluate political issues. This is simply 
because most people do not have enough knowledge, interest or time 
to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the current political 
situation or development when asked by survey conductors. This is 
especially the case when the European public is asked to respond to 
survey questions about the EU or European integration policies, of 
which the European public has limited knowledge, understanding or 
interest (Anderson, 1998). The EU and European integration are 
therefore issues where the national structures, processes and politics 
have been shown to be of crucial importance as a benchmark from 
which the EU attitudes are formed (Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002, p. 586; 
Armingeon & Ceka, 2014, p. 104). Hence, “the cues that appear most 
relevant to European integration arise in member states” (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2005, p. 425). Similar to Eichenberg and Dalton (1993; 2007), the 
main research interest hence lies in identifying the contextual-level 
factors explaining the variations in EU attitudes at the macro-level. The 
theoretical assumption is that public attitudes towards the different 
system components of the EU “presumably varies as a function of 
factors that are felt at the national level” (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, 
pp. 509–510), and different kinds of national contextual-level factors 
thereby influence public attitudes towards the EU in different 
directions (Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010, p. 1031).  
According to De Vries (2018, p. 204), “public opinion represents a 
kaleidoscope that closely reflects the national conditions in which 
people find themselves. In other words, people’s attitudes toward the 
EU are framed by the national circumstances in which people live and 
their evaluations of these conditions”. De Vries further suggests that 
both support and scepticism are relational concepts linked to 
evaluations of events at the national level, and that they are both 
multidimensional concepts that directly relate to evaluations of these 
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events. This is something that De Vries refers to as the benchmark 
theory of European integration, and the theory’s essence is that the 
public relies on benchmarks, or proxies, to compensate for the 
information shortfalls about the EU and European integration. This is 
also a theory that closely resembles the “cue-taking” theory previously 
mentioned. De Vries (2018, p. 37), furthermore, argues that the general 
public uses the country levels to form expectations about how well their 
country would manage if the country were to leave the EU. De Vries 
(2018, p. 37), hence, argues that “people are expected only to be willing 
to take this risk when they perceive the benefits of the alternative state 
to be greater than the status quo of membership, even if slightly so”.  
However, it is crucial at this point to note that public attitudes 
towards all system components, and elements, of the EU are not 
associated to the same national contextual-level factors across the EU 
area, and that the relationship is determined by the national contexts 
(Otjes & Katsanidou, 2017, pp. 314–315). Hence, as this study has 
identified eight system important elements of the EU as a political 
system, these are perceived to be linked to different explanatory factors. 
This was also suggested by Vasilopoulou (2013, p. 3), who explicitly 
suggested that “public opinion on integration does not follow national, 
cultural or geographical patterns. We cannot say with certainty that 
specific cultures or nation-states are more likely to oppose the EU than 
others”. However, as Norris (2011, p. 46) argues, public attitudes “need 
to be compared in a wide range of social and political contexts,” and 
most researchers include a large set of explanatory contextual-level 
variables when conducting statistical analyses. 
The national level is therefore the natural place for researchers to 
start when trying to explain country-level variations in public support 
(Gabel & Palmer, 1995, p. 3; Munoz, Torcal & Bonet, 2011, p. 553). 
Logically then, one of the most commonly asked questions for 
researchers interested in these kinds of questions is: which are the 
national contextual-level factors that could be used as proxies by the 
European public when they are asked to form opinions about the EU? 
Therefore, in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture regarding 
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the national contextual-level determinants of public support, the 
following subchapters will present what is known regarding the 
explanatory effects of these national contextual-level factors, starting 
with the internal factors category.  
4.1 Internal factors  
This subchapter will focus on the two types of internal factors that have 
been suggested in the literature to explain country-level variations in 
public support for the different system important elements of the EU. 
The perception that EU attitudes are not stable, and instead prone to 
fluctuate over time, have become well established within the EU 
literature (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; 
2007). Based on that perception, Haas (1976, p. 204) argued that the 
future of the EU will ultimately depend of the EU’s ability to improve 
all kinds of public services, and Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016, p. 3) 
further suggested that the EU is not likely to perish as long as these key 
functions are considered to be fulfilled by the European public. 
However, according to Hobolt (2012, p. 89), “the quality of national 
institutions functions as a benchmark for public evaluations of EU 
institutions,” and the importance of national characteristics as central 
factors for explaining public support is something that has become 
apparent over time. Deflem and Pampel (1996, p. 138) argued that this 
is true both regarding positive and negative public orientations 
towards the EU. Hence, the variations in public support for the EU 
within the EU area are largely expected to be independent of what the 
EU actually produces or provides. This causal relationship between 
internal national contextual-level characteristics and public support has 
been well described by Kritzinger (2003, pp. 236–237): 
“The findings show that the nation-state is the main actor in 
increasing or decreasing support for the EU: it determines the factors 
that lead to attitudinal changes. In other words, the domestic level 
constrains evaluations of the EU because attitudes are developed in 
the national cultural context. National political and economic 
behavior both seem to be the reason why citizens support for 
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integration is flexible over time. We can argue that support for the 
EU depends strongly on the performance of the nation-state. Citizens 
do not yet distinguish between the two levels and do not assess the 
performance of the European and national level separately. This 
means that national factors condition assessments of the European 
factor and citizens therefore do not form them autonomously. 
Citizens are not yet fully aware of the new political system and they 
lack knowledge regarding the EU. Thus, the integration process has 
not resulted in independent assessment and citizens still use national 
proxies when expressing attitudes towards the EU. Because these 
attitudes are not founded on stable and unconditioned ground, they 
are more likely to be exposed to change”. 
Within the EU literature there have been two broad groups of 
national contextual-level factors that have been widely used for 
explaining the variations in public support. The focus will now shift to 
these two groups, starting with the economic performance and 
characteristics of the member states.  
4.1.1 Economic performance 
This section will focus on the causal relationship between economic 
performance and EU attitudes. Already Easton (1965, p. 275) suggested 
that “if the danger signals go up and it is recognized that discontent 
with the regime or community is increasing, the first, easiest, and most 
direct response which may be taken to cope with the situation is to 
make some effort to improve the adequacy of the outputs,” and 
economic performance indicators have been used to understand the 
variations in public support ever since. Since Easton, it has therefore 
been “widely acknowledged that system outputs – also commonly 
referred to as system performance – are key to understanding why 
public support for the political system fluctuates” (Anderson & 
Tverdova, 2003, p. 92). The so-called performance hypothesis explains 
variations in public support for the EU within countries as something 
first and foremost determined by national economic performance. This 
hypothesis has been the dominant approach for understanding 
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country-level variations in EU attitudes (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; 
Gabel & Whitten, 1997; Duch & Taylor, 1997; Garry & Tilley, 2009). This 
has especially become apparent after the Eurocrisis, which has been 
shown to have had a strong negative impact on EU attitudes 
(Armingeon & Ceka, 2014; Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014).  
However, the causal direction of this relationship has also been 
argued to vary within the EU area based on national level 
characteristics. According to Kritzinger (2003) and Munoz et al. (2011), 
EU attitudes are expected to be formed either through the congruence 
or the compensation model, originating from the widespread 
assumption that the European public lacks the necessary knowledge 
about the working and functioning of the EU to form opinions. The 
congruence model, or the equal assessments model (Kritzinger, 2003), 
emphasises that public attitudes towards national politics will spill 
over to the EU level, and therefore domestic economic performance is 
used as a proxy when evaluating the EU, creating congruence in public 
attitudes across the multi-level political spectrum. This has been 
especially argued with regard to trust in the EU and trust in the national 
level parliaments, as “most Europeans either trust both their national 
government and the EU or neither of them” (Armingeon & Ceka, 2014, 
p. 99). The compensation model, or the different assessments model 
(Kritzinger, 2003), emphasises the notion that the European public are 
likelier to form more negative attitudes towards the EU the better their 
opinions are about national level politics, or more positive attitudes 
towards the EU the worse their opinions are of their national level 
politics.  
Sánchez-Cuenca (2000, p. 169) therefore suggested that “the worse 
citizens opinions of national institutions and the better their opinion of 
supranational ones, the stronger their support for European 
integration”. Basically, there seems to be an agreement within the 
literature that the perceived and/or actual performance of national level 
politics are in some way used as a proxy for forming EU attitudes 
(Anderson, 1998). Nevertheless, the direction and effect of this 
relationship should be expected to vary across the EU area, and also 
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between the different system components and elements of the EU. In 
the following section, the relationship between economic performance 
and public attitudes towards European integration policies is 
discussed.  
European integration policies 
A prevalent argument has been that the perceived costs of transferring 
decision-making powers to the EU should be lower within “bad 
performing” member states, and therefore public support for different 
types of European integration policies should presumably be higher the 
worse the performance of the country (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000). This 
argument has also been supported by empirical studies that have 
shown that the country levels of public support towards European 
integration in general was significantly higher, and more stable, within 
the so-called post-communist countries prior to the start of the global 
recession in 2008 (Harteveld et al., 2013). Looking at policy-specific 
support, attitudes towards a common European defence policy have 
earlier been argued to be related to general support for European 
integration policies (Gabel & Anderson, 2002). This explains why 
contextual-level factors that have been used to explain public support 
for other elements of the EU also “should go a considerable way toward 
explaining support for or opposition to common policies in defence and 
foreign affairs” (Schoen 2008, p. 7). Also, Carubba and Singh (2004, p. 
229) have shown that “the more an individual is supportive of EU 
membership, the more likely that individual is to support forming an 
EU common defense”.  
Another integration policy where national economic performances 
have been shown to have an impact are regarding public attitudes 
towards the proposal of a future enlargement of the EU area (Karp & 
Bowler, 2006; Hobolt, 2014). Karp and Bowler (2006, p. 372) showed 
that “voters use assessments of EU institutions and their performance 
to shape evaluations of more specific policies and developments,” such 
as attitudes towards EU enlargement. They also showed that the 
population within poorer member states were more negative towards 
further enlargements, which they suggested could be because “voters, 
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attuned to the benefits of EU subsidy, now understand they may lose 
something of value via enlargement” (2006, p. 386). Hobolt (2014, p. 
678) further showed that citizens living in member states experiencing 
economic growth were more likely to support deeper integration but 
not further enlargements, and that the national contextual-level 
“factors that shape attitudes towards deepening and widening are 
conditioned by the national economic and political context”.   
Before the start of the global recession in 2008, the single European 
currency was perceived to be a remarkable success based on the 
superior performance of the eurozone members in comparison to the 
non-eurozone EU member states during the period of 2000–2008 (Wood 
& Quaisser, 2008, p. 31). This however changed after the start of the 
Eurocrisis, when the single European currency instead was blamed for 
much of the economic hardships that fell upon the eurozone countries. 
Prior to the start of the Eurocrisis, Banducci et al. (2003) suggested that 
the public in countries that were performing economically worse were 
prone to be more positive towards the single European currency than 
the public from economically better performing countries. In a more 
recent study, Banducci, Karp and Loedel (2009) showed that 
individuals already living within the eurozone, with a positive 
assessment of their national economy, were far more likely to support 
the single European currency than those who were pessimistic about 
their national economy. Banducci et al. (2009) also showed that 
indicators measuring national economic performance were closely 
connected to the member state levels of public support for the single 
European currency within the eurozone. However, within the non-
eurozone countries they found little evidence that national economic 
performance had any effect on public support for the single European 
currency. They also noted that there are significant cross-country 
variations, largely derived from the distinction between eurozone and 
non-eurozone countries. Furthermore, they also suggested that 
“citizens who express their support for the euro thus provide the basis 
of support for the larger EU project,” and that “when the currency is 
strong and general EU support is high, there will be a considerable 
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support for the common currency” (2009, pp. 577–78). Hobolt and 
Wratil (2015) reached similar conclusions after they showed that public 
support for the single European currency remained stable within the 
eurozone, while it declined within non-eurozone countries, during the 
period of 2005–2013.  
To summarise, public support for European integration policies 
related to the widening of the EU area through EU enlargement and the 
deepening of the EU area through more European integration within 
defence policies seems to be generally related to the economic 
developments within the countries. On the other hand, the relationship 
does not seem to be as clear with regard to public support for the single 
European currency. In the following section, the focus now shifts to the 
effects of economic developments on public support for the EU regime 
elements.  
The EU regime 
Scharpf (1999) has argued that the EU has been politically legitimised 
through the economic benefits provided through European integration 
policies. The positive economic benefits provided through EU 
membership were therefore assumed to provide the EU with what 
Scharpf refers to as “output-legitimacy”. Because the EU has still not 
been able to create the more diffuse kind of input-based legitimacy, 
both the short- and long-term system persistence capabilities of the EU 
are therefore, at least to some extent, determined by the economic 
performances within the countries. The main argument goes that if the 
quality of life is visibly improving within a country, and things are 
turning to the better without having to sacrifice more than some aspects 
of the national sovereignty through the transferring of decision-making 
powers to Brussels, there are presumably no rational reasons to be 
sceptical, or even hostile, towards the EU. However, when the 
economic situations within countries are getting noticeably worse, 
simultaneously as the country is obliged to send money to other EU 
countries, it becomes more challenging to stay positive towards the EU. 
As Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016, p. 3) therefore also argue, “the EU is 
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not likely to break as long as it successfully fulfills key functions for the 
Union’s economy and society as a whole, but it can and will break if it 
does not”.  
The basic assumption within studies related to explaining EU 
attitudes has therefore been that positive economic performances 
within countries creates higher levels of public support for the national 
level politics, which will transfer into higher levels of support for the 
EU regime (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996; Anderson, 1998). This is 
primarily because the EU regime has been, and is still by many, 
perceived as a vehicle to advance both individual and national 
economic interests. The empirical relationship between national 
economic performance and trust in the EU regime institutions (Roth et 
al., 2011) and satisfaction with EU democracy (Karp & Bowler, 2005) 
has also been firmly established within the EU area. The primary selling 
point of European integration has also historically been the economy, 
framed within the fact that EU membership will contribute to 
widespread economic prosperity for all member states through access 
to the common European market (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996, p. 
177). Hence, the country levels of public support for the EU regime 
elements are generally expected to increase during favourable 
economic periods, and decline during economic downturns. 
During the first decades of the European Economic Community 
(EEC), Inglehart and Rabier (1978, p. 40) also noted that there was a 
remarkable growth in public support towards the EEC, which led them 
to the conclusion that “public evaluations of membership in the 
community seem linked with economic growth or decline”. This 
statement was derived from the significant economic performances 
within the EEC during that period. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007, p. 
134) also noted that the OPEC oil shocks of 1974 seemed to have had a 
negative effect on public support for European unification, and that 
public support again started to increase as the economies within the EU 
area started to grow again during the 1980’s. The relationship between 
economic performance and country levels of public support for the EU 
has also been established in two studies by Eichenberg and Dalton 
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(1993; 2007), covering the period of 1973–1988 and the period of 1973–
2004. However, they focused on two specific periods when the EU area 
consisted of half the number of member states than it does post-2004, 
and they only focused on one type of EU attitude related to EU 
membership.   
Especially after the start of the global recession in 2008, many studies 
have shown that the European public has become more critical towards 
the EU as a result of declining country levels of economic performance 
(Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter, 2011; Armingeon & Ceka, 2014; Braun 
& Tausendpfund, 2014; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Many of these studies 
have focused on the declining levels of trust in the EU regime 
institutions, as trust is generally considered as a performance-based 
indicator. Since 2008, the levels of trust in the EU regime institutions 
have declined significantly in many of the member states that were also 
the most severely negatively affected by the global recession (Dotti Sani 
& Magistro, 2016, p. 3), such as Greece, Spain and Italy. Harteveld et al. 
(2013) have also shown that trust in the national political institutions is 
the strongest predictor for trust in the EU regime institutions, and they 
concluded that the European public seem to trust or distrust the EU 
regime institutions for reasons largely unrelated to the actual workings 
of these institutions. Armingeon and Ceka (2014, p. 104) have also 
argued that if trust in the EU regime institutions is declining in a 
specific member state, it will more likely be because of the policies of 
the national government and developments in the national economy 
than the actual performance or behaviour of the EU regime institutions. 
This is further supporting the argument that country levels of trust in 
the EU regime institutions are largely a reflection of how the national 
political institutions are perceived to be performing (Anderson, 1998). 
As Kaina (2006, p. 117) has argued, “trust replaces knowledge”. 
 The most pessimistic scholars have even compared the 
development in the levels of trust in the EU regime after 2008 with the 
development in Weimar-Germany during the 1920’s (van Erkel & van 
der Meer, 2016, p. 177). However, Torcal (2014) argues that the 
declining levels of trust in the EU regime institutions after 2008 cannot 
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be solely attributed to the global recession. Torcal argues the decline 
could also be traced to an increased understanding that the EU regime 
is unresponsive to the demands of the European public. The 
determinants of the decline may be unclear, but most do agree that 
declining levels of trust in the EU regime institutions should at least 
constitute reasons for concern (Harteveld et al., 2013, p. 543).  
Some researchers have therefore also connected the success of 
Eurosceptic political parties within the EU area to economic 
developments within these countries (Serricchio, Tsakatika & Quaglia, 
2013). As has been previously suggested, this is presumably because 
the European public “see sacrifices and advantages only in relation to 
the national level and they do not consider the European level” 
(Kritzinger, 2003, p. 237). Indicators of national economic performance 
should explain much of the country-level variations of public support 
for the EU regime, but “national contexts may change, or the character 
of integration varies which, in turn, may alter the criteria that publics 
use even within countries” (Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010, p. 1042). 
Presumably then, the effects on the levels of public support for the EU 
regime are also altered by other national contextual-level factors. To 
summarise, the country-level variations in public support for all three 
elements of the EU regime should, to a large extent, be explained by 
indicators related to the economic performance of the countries. In the 
following section, the focus is on the relationship between economic 
performance and public support for the European political community. 
The European political community 
According to the theoretical guidelines provided by Easton, longer 
periods of declining levels of the specific kind of support will also have 
an effect on the more diffuse kind of support over time. For the context 
of country levels of public support for the European political 
community, this can be translated as longer periods of declining public 
support for the EU regime, based on the negative economic 
performances within the member states, which might presumably also 
contribute to lower levels of mutual European identification and EU 
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attachment within the EU area. This is a difficult causal assumption to 
make at the EU level, as the diffuse kind of support should not be easily 
affected by short-term developments. However, there is no time-limit 
for how long the European public should be able to tolerate declining 
country levels of economic performance without it also starting to affect 
the more diffuse kind of support directed towards the European 
political community. This is especially so with regard to diffuse support 
for the European political community that is, so to say, still under 
construction and of a more evaluative nature than the national levels of 
diffuse support.  
As such, it is difficult to empirically explain the country-level 
variations in something as abstract as public attitudes towards the 
European political community based on the economic performances of 
the member states. However, there have been a few studies looking at 
the relationship between national economic performance and diffuse 
support for the European political community. Polyakova and Fligstein 
(2016, p. 78), for instance, found evidence of a direct effect of the global 
recession on the levels of European identification. They explicitly 
showed that individuals “in countries worst hit by the crisis were most 
likely to become nationalists”. Still, their analytical timeframe was 
limited to survey data from the period of 2007–2009, and the more long-
term effects of the economic crises on the levels of European 
identification have, to this author’s knowledge, not been analysed 
empirically. 
Summary  
The economic performance of countries should have affected public 
support for all of the three system important components constituting 
the political system of the EU. However, the effects of economic 
performance are altered by other types of national contextual-level 
factors. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015, p. 122) therefore argues that no long-
term solutions for the problems facing the EU can work without basic 
economic progress within the countries, and if the EU as a political 
instrument fails to deliver what has been promised to the European 
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public, not even the traditionally EU-positive political elites can save 
the EU. However, it is not as clear how much economic performance 
factors are able to explain the cross-country variations in public 
support. The cross-country effects of economic performance variables 
should also vary based on the other kinds of national contextual-level 
indicators, as well as on the system element of the EU that is being 
evaluated by the European public. The economic performance of the 
countries will be measured in this thesis by two types of 
macroeconomic performance indicators, one related to the short-term 
and the other related to the long-term performance. National 
unemployment rates will be used to reflect the short-term performance, 
as unemployment rates are directly related to the short-term 
developments within the national economies, or “economic hardships” 
(Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, pp. 512–513). National debt rates will be 
used as an indication of long-term developments, as higher levels of 
debt indicate that there has been a negative development for a longer 
period of time. These two performance indicators have been shown to 
explain variations in public support, especially towards the EU regime 
elements (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996; Kritzinger, 2003; Karp & 
Bowler, 2006; Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010; Roth et al., 2011; 
Serrichio et al., 2013). In the following section, the focus shifts to the 
other category of internal contextual-level factors that have been used 
to explain country-level variations in public support for the EU. This 
broad category of indicators has been labelled democratic culture.  
4.1.2 Democratic culture 
In this section, two types of internal contextual-level factors, related to 
the broader group of indicators connected to the democratic cultures of 
the member states, will be presented. This relates to another crucial 
aspect of the performance hypotheses of public support, besides the 
economic performance, connected to the institutional quality across the 
EU area. As De Vries (2018, p. 40) argued, “people consider non-
economic benefits as well,” and the economic performance cannot 
simply explain all of the variations in public support for all system 
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important elements of the EU. Especially during the 1990’s, there was 
much speculation that European integration would, for instance, 
contribute to higher levels of economic inequality within the EU area, 
an assumption that was also empirically confirmed by Beckfield (2006) 
in a study compromising 13 of the pre-2004 member states (Finland and 
Portugal excluded). Hence, higher levels of economic inequality within 
countries might presumably not be something affecting EU attitudes in 
a more positive direction, and Simpson and Loveless (2017) have also, 
furthermore, shown that individual level concerns with economic 
inequality contribute to lower levels of public support for deeper 
European integration.  
It is therefore to be expected that the institutional quality and other 
cultural characteristics of a country also provides “citizens with cues on 
how to think about and act upon various societal phenomena” (Baur, 
Green & Helbling, 2016, p. 4). In particular for the cross-country 
analyses within the empirical part of this study, it is crucial to include 
also other types of contextual-level performance factors in order to 
obtain a more comprehensive understanding of why the levels of 
public support vary between countries. Also as Sánchez-Cuenca (2000, 
p. 159) argued, the “national differences in attitudes towards Europe 
fundamentally depend on a variety of features of the state and the 
domestic political system”. In the following sections the focus is on the 
effects of institutional quality on public support, starting with 
European integration policies.  
European integration policies 
The causal relationship between national level institutional 
performance and country-level variations in public support for 
European integration policies is not something that has been studied 
more extensively. Nevertheless, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000, p. 148) argued 
that “the worse the political system works at home and the better at the 
supranational level, the smaller the risk involved in transferring 
national sovereignty to a supranational body”. Based on that logic, the 
country levels of public support for European integration in general 
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should be higher within countries with worse performing political 
institutions. Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) also showed that higher levels of 
corruption within a member state directly increase public support for 
European unification (which Sanchez-Cuenca used as a dependent 
variable). Sanchez-Cuenca further also showed that the more a country 
spends on welfare services, the lower the levels of public support are 
for deeper European integration. Arnold et al. (2012, p. 32) reached 
similar conclusions, and they further suggested that within countries 
with higher levels of institutional corruption, it is perceived by the 
public that the costs of ceding sovereignty to supranational entities 
through European integration are lower than in countries with well-
functioning political institutions. 
The EU regime 
Country levels of public support for the EU regime are also presumably 
affected by the institutional performance, and the quality of the 
national political institutions have been shown to be of significance 
when explaining country-level variations. According to Rohrschneider 
(2002, p. 472), this is because the public “evaluations of the EU are 
indirectly shaped by the quality of national institutions,” and they 
further argued that this is because citizens judge new institutions with 
their experience of the ones that are being, so to say, replaced. Munoz 
et al. (2011, p. 566) also suggested that “transparency in the working of 
national institutions sets a standard against which the EU institutions 
are compared”. Hence, higher the levels of institutional quality within 
a country, the higher the levels of trust in the national political 
institutions. However, lower the levels of institutional quality within a 
country might also, according to the compensation argument, be 
connected to higher levels of trust in EU regime institutions (Sanchez-
Cuenca, 2000). Hence, the levels of institutional corruption within a 
member state, mostly measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) provided by Transparency International, have been regularly 
included as an explanatory contextual-level factor in many models 
seeking to explain cross-country variations in public support for the EU 
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regime elements (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Munoz et al., 2011; Serricchio 
et al., 2013; van Erkel & van der Meer, 2016). Obydenkova and Arpino 
(2018) have shown that prior to the great recession of 2008, the 
compensation theory could largely be confirmed. Their analysis 
showed that the general public within countries with higher levels of 
corruption were more likely to have a better opinion of the EU. 
However, during the period after the start of the global recession until 
2013, this relationship disappeared. Hence, Obrydenkova and Arpino 
(2018, p. 608) reached the conclusion that “after the start of the crisis, 
people in these countries transferred the effect of national corruption to 
the supranational level”.  
Nevertheless, Munoz et al. (2011) found no empirical evidence for 
the claim that coming from a country with a stronger welfare system 
was connected to lower levels of support for the EU. Although, they 
did find evidence for the claim that living in a corrupt country fosters 
trust in the EU regime institutions, supporting Rohrschneider’s (2002) 
claim. Interestingly, Arnold et al. (2012) presented results indicating the 
contrary, namely that the public from member states with stronger 
welfare systems were more likely to trust the EU regime institutions. 
Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010), however, showed that welfare 
spending within countries did not have an effect on how the democratic 
performance of the EU regime was perceived by the European public, 
which in this thesis relates to public support for the EU regime 
processes. Simpson and Loveless (2017, p. 1079) also showed that “as 
government effectiveness increases across countries, the mean level of 
support for the EU and its expansion decrease”. It has also been 
considered important to consider the political heritage of countries 
when explaining the cross-country variations in public support, 
especially regarding whether a country has a post-communist political 
heritage or not.  
It has been widely argued that there are significant differences 
between these two halves of the EU area, in terms of public attitudes 
towards the EU regime elements (Ilonzski, 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2015). Harteveld et al. (2013, p. 560), for instance, showed that the levels 
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of trust in the EU regime institutions were higher and more stable 
within post-communist countries, arguably because the EU 
membership, at least before the start of the global recession in 2008, has 
been perceived as providing an economic shelter. Historical factors 
might also help to explain why higher levels of public support for the 
EU do not develop to begin with, as perhaps is most clearly shown in 
the case of the United Kingdom, with its history as a global power. 
Furthermore, Hobolt (2012) also showed that the quality of national 
political institutions explains much of the cross-country variations in 
public support for the EU regime processes, measured by satisfaction 
with EU democracy. Hence, it is important to also account for 
differences in institutional quality within the EU area when analysing 
cross-country variations in public support for the EU regime. 
The European political community 
The causal relationship between public attitudes towards the European 
political community and the institutional performances of countries 
has, to this author’s knowledge, not been more extensively analysed. 
However, Scharpf (1997, p. 20) suggested that the “we-feeling” 
between Europeans is presumably also influenced by the historical 
contexts of the countries, and hence presumably the historical contexts 
not only affect how the European public orient themselves towards 
European integration policies and the EU regime, but also how the 
European public orient towards the European political community. The 
national framing of European integration is therefore considered to be 
heavily influenced by the country-specific histories, and the emergence 
of a “we-feeling” is also perceived to be derived from shared 
experiences (Marks et al., 2002). Oshri et al. (2015) also showed that the 
more democratic a country is (using Freedom House ratings), the 
higher are the levels of public support for democratic values within a 
country. Therefore, as a value-based European political community, 
public support for the European political community should arguably 
be higher within countries with higher levels of institutional quality. 
Even though not much has been written regarding the connection 
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between institutional quality, reflecting the democratic culture, and 
variations within and between countries in public support for the 
European political community, this is an interesting relationship to 
analyse empirically. 
Summary  
National contextual-level factors related to the institutional 
performance and quality of countries should be accounted for when 
explaining the cross-country variations in public support, and this 
especially towards European integration policies and the EU regime 
elements. The institutional performance and quality will for this 
purpose be measured by two indicators related to this broad group, one 
reflecting the institutional quality, corruption levels, and the other 
reflecting the institutional performance of countries, levels of income 
inequality. This section has presented the main findings from the 
literature regarding the relationship between internal contextual-level 
factors and country-level variations in public support for different 
system elements of the EU. This overview has shown that most of the 
research has focused on explaining public attitudes towards the EU 
regime elements, and most of the research seems to have reached the 
conclusion that the economy matters. Nevertheless, with regard to 
public attitudes towards specific European integration policies and 
towards the European political community, the connection is not as 
straightforward. Also, national contextual-level characteristics related 
to the institutional performance of countries should explain more of the 
cross-country variations with regard to public support for European 
integration policies and the European political community than 
towards the EU regime elements. This chapter continues in the 
following subchapter with the national contextual-level factors related 
to the external environment of countries, divided into two groups of 
contextual-level factors; external pressure and EU-relation.  
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4.2 External factors  
This subchapter will focus on national contextual-level factors outside 
of the internal environments of the member states, hence the category 
is argued to constitute, in a wider sense, external factors. This category, 
hence, includes two groups of contextual-level factors considered to, in 
an Eastonian sense, cause stress on the member states from the outside. 
According to Easton (1965, p. 22), the extra-societal environment 
includes systems outside the given national level political community 
itself, such as international political, economic or cultural systems. 
However, in reference to the multi-level political structure of the EU, it 
is quite challenging to define what constitutes internal and external 
factors affecting EU attitudes within the countries’ total environments. 
Nevertheless, broadly defined as a category of external factors, the two 
groups within this category try to capture the effects of the changing 
demographics within the EU area, specifically caused by immigration, 
as well as the separate EU-relation of the countries. These two groups 
could be considered as constituting external factors in the wider sense 
that they include factors that are affecting the levels of public support 
from outside the national political communities. In the following 
section, the focus will be on the relationship between demographic 
developments and public support. 
4.2.1 External pressure 
In this section, the focus will be on two types of external level factors 
related to the demographic transformations occurring within the EU 
area. These factors relate to a crucial aspect of the changing 
compositions of the national level political communities within the 
greater European political community through the process of 
immigration. First and foremost it should be noted that immigration 
has been an EU-level concern since the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 1951. However, during that period, intra-
EU immigration and migration were confined to nationals from six 
countries within a regional European labour market (Caviedes, 2016, p. 
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553).47 Since then, the EU has grown and now the common European 
labour market includes 28 countries (before Brexit). Especially during 
the previous two decades, the EU area has significantly changed 
demographically. This is mainly attributed to the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the conflicts in the Middle East and increased levels of 
globalisation (Kentman-Cin & Erisen, 2017, p. 4). This development has 
increased the pressure on the EU area in terms of social cohesion. 
Therefore, it has become more accepted that “European integration is 
connected to the issue of immigration” (Otjes & Katsanidou, 2017, p. 
305).  
During the height of the migration crisis in 2015, immigration issues 
became the main political topic within many countries. This related to 
the fact that EU membership also enables the free movement of people 
within the EU area, which makes it possible for non-EU immigrants to 
travel more or less freely within the EU area once they are inside. 
During the most severe parts of the migration crisis, the system 
persistence capabilities of the EU were severely challenged as a result 
of the freedom of movement for people principle, constituting one of 
the EU’s four freedoms set out in the Treaty of Rome 1957. This 
contributed to the solidarity within the EU area becoming openly 
questioned, as some countries (Germany, Sweden) were forced to take 
the main share of the burden during the crisis, while other countries 
simply refused to participate in shared EU efforts of solving the crisis 
(Hungary, Poland). To provide a clearer understanding regarding the 
effects of the migration crisis in 2015, Figure 5 (see page 154) presents 
data regarding the development with regard to the total number of 
refugees seeking asylum within the EU during the period of 2008–2017.  
                                                     
47 The Coal and Steel Treaty of 1951 also forbade discrimination against coal and steel 
workers who were nationals of the other member states, setting the general guidelines 
of free movement that were subsequently adopted by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 
(Caviedes, 2016, p. 556).  
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Figure 5. Asylum and first-time asylum applicants, annual aggregated EU-
28 data. Source: Eurostat. 
Since the beginning of the 2000’s, Europe has witnessed a large 
amount of high-profile terrorist attacks (Madrid 2004, London 2005 and 
Paris 2015). This has also contributed to an increased public awareness 
that an attack on one of the member states increases the perceived 
threat levels also within the other members of the EU, because of the 
free movement within the EU area. This has presumably led to a 
growing sense of insecurity within the EU area, which especially 
political parties on the radical right have been able to capitalise on 
during elections. However, already during the mid-1990’s, Laffan 
(1996, p. 82) noted that “there has been a resurgence of political 
nationalism in some European states because of the growing salience 
of immigration”. Anti-immigration sentiments have also been shown 
to function as a key factor when explaining EU attitudes, as the EU, 
over time, has become publicly perceived as a vehicle for sparking 
immigration (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005). The logic for this 
connection is that when immigrants are perceived as a threat, EU 
attitudes become more negative, since the EU is connected to the open 
border policies that enable the immigrants to move to one’s country. 
Immigration attitudes therefore play a significant role in shaping 
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attitudes towards European integration (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 
2005; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Toshkov & Kortenska, 2015). Moreover, 
Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) also showed that there is an empirical 
connection between voting for radical right-wing parties and 
Eurosceptic attitudes at the individual level. According to Kentman-
Cin and Erisen (2017, p. 20), the empirical connection between anti-
immigrant sentiments and Euroscepticism has now become firmly 
established within the literature. Therefore, as Luedtke (2005, p. 84) has 
argued, “immigration is a crucial political issue in 21st century Europe”. 
However, according to Kentman-Cin and Erisen (2017, p. 4), over 12 
per cent of the EU-27’s (excluding Croatia) total population aged 
between 24 and 54 are first-generation immigrants, while another 5 per 
cent are second-generation immigrants with at least one parent who is 
not an EU citizen. Nevertheless, there are significant variations within 
the EU area regarding the percentage of immigrants within the 
respective populations.   
Much of the literature related to this topic has focused on the 
attitudinal connection between EU and immigration attitudes, or the 
connection between immigration attitudes and radical right-wing 
voting (Werts, Scheepers & Lubbers, 2012; Baur et al., 2016). The 
connection between supporting a radical right-wing party and 
Eurosceptic attitudes is derived from seeing the EU as a threat to the 
national sovereignty, cultural heritage and cultural homogeneity 
within countries, as well as something encouraging globalisation and 
multiculturalism (Vasilopoulou, 2018, p. 125). Furthermore, Werts et al. 
(2012, p. 3) suggest that this might be explained by the ethnic 
competition theory, which holds that “ethnic groups sharing similar 
economic interests are in competition for scarce resources, which 
induces perceived ethnic threat and intergroup antagonistic attitudes”. 
In their study, Werts et al. also found empirical support for that 
argument, showing that the higher a country’s immigration rate, the 
more likely the public in that country were to vote for a radical right 
party.  
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McLaren (2002, p. 564) also noted in her study that “attitudes toward 
the European Union tend to be based in great part on a general hostility 
toward other cultures”. Highly educated individuals are, however, less 
likely to see immigration as a threat (Fietkau & Hansen, 2017). 
Nevertheless, as the issue of immigration is a relatively new 
perspective within the EU support literature, not much has been 
written regarding the connection between actual immigration rates and 
public support for the different system important components of the 
EU. It is, however, also crucial to distinguish between the two types of 
demographic developments under discussion, since there are two 
different issues involved; one related to general immigration and the 
other to refugees.  
European integration policies 
Unfortunately, to this author’s knowledge, not much have been written 
with regard to the connection between public support for European 
integration policies and immigration rates. This is probably because the 
costs and benefits provided by European integration policies have not 
been expected to be altered by immigration rates. Nevertheless, there is 
one concrete European integration policy that immigration levels might 
presumably have an effect on, namely the country levels of public 
support for future EU enlargement. This is based on the assumption 
that within countries with higher levels of immigration rates, more 
enlargements might be expected to increase the amount of immigration 
to such an extent that it becomes unsustainable. McLaren (2007) argued 
that the more immigrants there are in a country, the more opportunities 
the public will have to observe cultural differences, suggesting that 
higher levels of immigrants might, over time, contribute to higher 
levels of opposition towards further EU enlargement. Therefore, one 
could expect the levels of public support for future EU enlargements to 
be lower in countries with a higher proportion of immigration, and also 
that the levels of support for enlargement would decline as the number 
of immigrants increase. 
157 
 
 
The EU regime  
According to Otjes and Katsanidou (2017, p. 304), “the EU is perceived 
as the reason for the influx of immigrants as it is a common labour 
market and this limits the ability of Member States to regulate 
immigration in their country”. They also showed in their study that in 
so-called net-immigration countries, the citizens who are negative 
towards immigration are more likely to become Eurosceptic then 
citizens with the same anti-immigration attitudes from countries with 
lower levels of immigration. Citizens who feel threatened by 
immigrants are also more likely to oppose further European integration 
and to evaluate the EU regime elements more negatively (De Vreese & 
Boomgaarden, 2005; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Toshkov & Kortenska, 
2015). However, members of minority groups (including immigrants) 
have themselves been shown to be more likely to have positive 
attitudes towards the EU than the general public within countries 
(Dowley & Silver, 2011). Nevertheless, not much is known about the 
empirical connection between actual country levels of immigration and 
variations in public support for the EU regime elements, as most of the 
literature seems to have focused on establishing the relationship 
between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes.  
The European political community 
Similar to European integration policies, not much has been written 
regarding the connection between immigration levels and public 
support for the European political community. Therefore, immigration 
levels are not expected to be of empirical importance for explaining 
country-level variations in the most diffuse kind of public support. 
However, higher levels of immigration might possibly, over time, be 
connected to higher levels of EU attachment, as the influx of 
immigrants contributes to more multi-cultural societies that changes 
the traditional compositions of national communities. Social 
communication theories have for long emphasised that contacts 
between nationalities should increase the feelings of participating in a 
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shared political community (Mitchell, 2014, p. 615), through a so-called 
socialisation process (Inglehart, 1967). The effect might also be the 
complete opposite, presumably depending on the prevailing public 
attitudes towards immigrants within the countries, as well as on the 
types of immigrants (asylum-seekers, refugees, labour immigrants 
etc.).   
Summary 
The connection between national levels of immigration rates and public 
support for the different system important components of the EU is still 
quite clearly something understudied. This makes it even more 
important to also consider the demographic developments within the 
EU area when explaining country levels of public support, as 
immigration has become one of the most widely discussed political 
topics within Europe, and this especially during the last decade. 
Kentman-Cin and Erisen (2017, p. 19), furthermore, noted that the 
“academic disinterest is surprising since it is widely reported that the 
EU is experiencing the biggest refugee crisis since the World War II”. 
As this is a quite uncharted territory within the EU literature, this thesis 
will try to make a small contribution for filling that gap. The country 
levels reflecting the external pressure will be measured by two 
indicators, one accounting for general immigration and the other 
accounting for explicit refugee immigration. In the following section, 
the focus will be on a relationship that has been more thoroughly 
studied, namely the EU-relation of the countries. 
4.2.2 EU-relation 
In this section, the focus will be on the bilateral relationships between 
the EU and the member states. The relationship between the member 
states and the EU should have become more important as the EU has 
become more influential, hence “its policies have become increasingly 
more likely to affect the everyday lives of its citizens” (Karp & Bowler, 
2006, p. 372). Therefore, country levels of public support have also been 
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shown to be explained by contextual-level factors related to the specific 
relationship between the member state and the EU regime (Hix & 
Hoyland, 2011; Armingeon & Ceka, 2014). First of all, it should 
however be noted that the last two decades have changed the 
composition of the EU area significantly, as the number of member 
states have more than been doubled since the Maastricht Treaty. In 
Table 4, a timeline for this enlargement process is presented. 
Table 4. EU enlargement timeline. 
 
According to the socialisation hypothesis, the European public 
should, over time, become more accustomed to the thought of being 
part of a greater European political structure. Hence, the general public 
within the member states should, over time, become socialised into 
Europeans, indirectly providing the EU with the more diffuse kind of 
support. Hence, the timespan of a member state’s EU membership, in 
years, is regularly included in studies (Karp & Bowler, 2006; Braun & 
Year of accession Country
1952
Belgium, The Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy, West 
Germany
1973 Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom
1981 Greece
1986 Spain, Portugal
1990 East Germany
1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden
2004
Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia
2007 Bulgaria, Romania
2013 Croatia
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Tausendpfund, 2014). However, the socialisation process should 
presumably not happen overnight, and as has been proven by Brexit, 
the success of the socialisation process is determined by other national 
contextual-level factors. As there are also 13 member states that have 
not been EU members for more than 15 years, the socialisation process 
is difficult to test within these cases. There are, however, other aspects 
related to the connection between the EU-relation and EU attitudes, 
within and between the member states, which can be both empirically 
measured and statistically tested.  
The country levels of public support for the EU have for long been 
expected to be higher within so-called net recipient countries 
(Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996; Hooghe & 
Marks, 2005; Munoz et al., 2011). These are the countries that receive 
more funds from the EU-budget than they contribute, hence receiving 
direct economic benefits through EU membership. Another important 
element of the EU-relation is whether the country is one of the core-
members of the EU area or not. The core-members, being the countries 
that are deeper integrated within the eurozone, to date comprise 19 
countries. There is also an agreement within the literature that the 
creation of the eurozone has contributed to a multi-speed Europe, 
where the extent of European integration differ within the EU area. 
These two aspects of the EU-relation are important to account for in this 
type of study, as much of the country variations in public support 
within the literature have been traced to these factors. In the following 
sections the focus is on the effects of the EU-relation on public support.  
European integration policies 
As noted, much of the research focus with regard to the EU-relation has 
been related to the economic relationship between the member states 
and the EU. Karp and Bowler (2006, p. 382), for instance, showed that 
the public in net contributing member states were less likely to favour 
European integration policies intended to deepen European 
integration, but more likely to favour more EU enlargements. This is 
based on utilitarian considerations derived from the thinking that 
161 
 
 
taking in more member states might lessen the economic burden for the 
net contributors. This, however, seems to have changed over time, as 
Hobolt (2014), for instance, showed that the public within net 
contributing member states seem to have become more likely to 
support deeper integration but oppose further enlargements. This 
development is seen especially within the eurozone countries, which 
constitute the “EU-core”. Banducci et al. (2009) also showed that levels 
of public support for the single European currency were much higher 
within countries that were actually using the euro as a currency, albeit 
this was prior to the start of the global recession in 2008. Nevertheless, 
Hobolt and Wratil (2015) more recently presented similar results when 
they showed that the levels of public support for the single European 
currency remained stable within the eurozone area, while support 
declined within the non-eurozone countries during the period of 2005–
2013. 
The EU regime  
Whether a member state is a net recipient or a contributor to the EU 
budget is also often included as an explanatory contextual-level factor 
in studies explaining variations in the levels of public support for the 
EU regime. Earlier findings suggests that the European public within 
net recipient member states should be more supportive of the EU 
because of the direct economic benefits provided by their membership, 
supporting the so-called utilitarian approach for explaining EU 
attitudes (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; 
Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010; Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014; Armingeon & 
Ceka, 2014). Bringer and Jolly (2005, p. 177) also established this 
connection empirically in a study and suggested that “citizens seems to 
recognize when their countries are benefiting economically from 
Europe, resulting in more positive feelings towards Brussels”. 
According to Baute et al. (2018, p. 3), concerns about the national 
financial contributions to the EU budget have become more prevalent 
within net contributing member states over time. These concerns are 
also likely to increase as the second largest net contributor to the EU 
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budget, the United Kingdom, is leaving the EU. It has also been shown 
that the public within the eurozone countries were more supportive of 
EU membership than the public within non-eurozone countries prior 
to the global recession (Karp & Bowler, 2006).48 Hobolt (2014) also 
further showed that “these divisions between eurozone insiders and 
outsiders and creditor and debtor states are also reflected in public 
attitudes towards the future of European integration”.   
The political influence within the EU regime institutions is also a 
factor that has been assumed to have gained in importance over time, 
especially as an effect of the EU enlargement processes during the 
2000’s (Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010). Especially the number of 
votes in the Council of the European Union has been proposed as an 
indicator to capture the institutional powers of a country within the EU 
machinery (Arnold et al., 2012; Hobolt, 2014, p. 673). The assumption is 
basically that if a country is able to “punch above its weight” and have 
a disproportionately high influence, it could result in higher levels of 
public support for the EU. Another contextual-level factor that over 
time has become almost forgotten within comparative studies of public 
support for the EU is the extent of intra-EU trade (Eichenberg & Dalton, 
1993; 2007; McLaren, 2004; Belot & Guinaudeau, 2017), reflecting 
whether the country has a trade surplus within the EU area or not. It is, 
however, not within the scope of this thesis to also account for these 
two factors, and as there is presumably only a small proportion of the 
European public that actually knows about the kind of institutional 
power their country has in the Council of the European Union or 
whether the country exports more than it imports to other EU member 
states.  
The European political community 
Not much has, to this author’s knowledge, been written regarding the 
relationship between the EU-relation and public support for the 
                                                     
48 The eurozone consists of the following 19 member states: Austria, Belgium, Republic 
of Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  
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European political community. Nevertheless, Polyakova and Fligstein 
(2016) showed that the public living inside the eurozone are more likely 
to identify as Europeans, hence providing some evidence to the 
argument of a socialisation process taking place within the eurozone. It 
is also possible to argue that the public within countries that are net 
contributors to the EU budget should also develop higher levels of 
public support for the European political community, as they are 
actually directly paying to be a part of it. In this way, they should 
perhaps become more affectively involved with the European political 
community.  
Chapter summary 
This section provides an overview regarding the main arguments 
presented in this chapter. The main purpose with the chapter was to 
present the main findings from the literature regarding how the 
varying country levels of public support for the three main system 
components of the EU has been explained. Through this literature 
review, it was possible to identify the four groups of national 
contextual-level factors that should be accounted for within the 
statistical part of this study. To summarise, the internal factors category 
includes two groups of factors related to the economic performance and 
the democratic culture of the member states, both groups being related 
to the performance of the countries. The external factors category 
includes two groups of factors related to the external pressure and the 
EU-relation of the member states. External pressure relates to 
demographic development, and the bilateral EU-relation directly 
relates to the relationship between the EU and the member states. The 
main argument for including this many national contextual-level 
factors is to show that the country-level variations towards the different 
system elements of the EU are, presumably, not explained by the same 
types of factors. This also needs to be accounted for in this thesis, as it 
constitutes one of the main contributions with this study. Hence, as 
Peters (1998, p. 109) suggested, researchers “should look at a variety of 
explanations in order to gain that more complete explanation”.  
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One of the main arguments presented in this chapter is that different 
types of EU attitudes are differently affected by the same national 
contextual-level factors. Indicating that one type of contextual 
development might predict higher levels of public support for one type 
of system element, while simultaneously predicting lower levels of 
support for another system element. What has become apparent 
through this literature review, however, is that the country-level 
variations towards all system elements of the EU should be somehow 
connected to the economic performances of the countries. The 
economic performances thereby seem to function as a national proxy 
from which all other types of EU evaluations are, to a varied extent, 
derived. The factors related to the democratic culture of the countries 
should, based on this overview, also explain some of the variations 
regarding public support for European integration policies, this 
especially between countries. The effects of external pressure factors 
related to immigration are more difficult to project, and hence their 
importance for explaining country-level variations might be limited. 
The EU-relation of countries should be important for explaining 
country-level variations towards the EU regime elements, as countries 
that benefit economically have been shown to be more supportive of 
EU membership.  
The following chapter will present the comparative research method 
and design of the study, hence shifting focus to the more empirical 
section that will guide the remaining part of this thesis.  
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5. Research method 
To be sure, one may engage in comparative work for any number of 
reasons; but the reason is control.  
Sartori, 1991, p. 244 
This chapter will focus and be structured around the comparative 
research method and design guiding the empirical part of the thesis. 
The chapter begins with a discussion regarding the comparative 
research design, presenting why a comparative design is deemed 
appropriate. The second part of the chapter presents and discusses the 
dependent variables used to measure EU attitudes and the survey data 
that will be used within the statistical analyses in order to compare 
member state levels of public support for the separate system elements 
of the EU. The third part of this chapter presents and discusses the 
independent variables and the contextual-level data that will be used 
within the statistical analyses to discover what makes it possible to 
connect contextual-level developments to country-level variations in 
public support. In the final part of the chapter, the statistical method is 
presented, from which the results for this thesis have been derived. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion regarding the strengths and 
weaknesses of this kind of research design, as well as a summary of the 
main arguments presented in the chapter.  
5.1 Research design 
In this subchapter, the focus is on the comparative research design 
guiding this thesis. The main research purpose of the thesis is to explain 
the country-level variations in public support for the EU from a system 
perspective, focusing on both the variations within and between the 
member states of the EU. The research design has been created based 
on the notion that it matters what the European public think about 
different system components of the EU that have been identified for 
this explicit research purpose. However, as Grande and Hutter (2016, 
p. 18) and Schimmelfennig (2010, p. 220) have suggested, the EU area 
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should still be considered a community of communities more than a 
community of individuals. Nugent (2016, p. 433) also argued that “like 
all federal and federal-like systems, the EU must retain the confidence 
of its constituent units (the member states)… It is a voluntary 
organisation, so retaining the confidence of members is vital. If member 
states were to feel their needs and preferences were not being 
reasonably accommodated within decision-making settings, they could 
become highly disruptive members and could even come to question 
the value of membership”. Following the logic that public opinion 
within a country should reflect a country’s stance on the different 
system elements of the EU, it is deemed empirically sufficient to focus 
on the aggregated country levels of public support.  
It has also been suggested that EU attitudes are not associated with 
the same issues across the EU area (Otjes & Katsanidou, 2017), but by 
including a wide range of potential national contextual-level proxies 
(or cues) it should be possible to identify similarities within the EU area. 
The empirical assumption is that it is possible within this kind of 
research design to obtain empirically-based results regarding the 
development and persistence capabilities of the EU from a system 
perspective through this kind of macro-level approach. The purpose of 
this is to provide answers to the three guiding research questions of this 
thesis: (1) how have the member state levels of public support for the 
different system components of the EU as a political system developed 
over time? (2) To what extent can contextual-level factors explain the 
variations within countries in public support for the different system 
components of the EU as a political system? (3) To what extent can 
contextual-level factors explain the variations between countries in 
public support for the different system components of the EU as a 
political system? Since comparative approaches involve the 
development of theories to explain variations within a group of 
countries that are similar (Peters, 2013), it is also possible to use, test 
and develop theories regarding political systems through this kind of 
research design (Denk, 2002, p. 19).  
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As the research purpose with this thesis includes both a cross-
sectional (between countries) and a longitudinal (within countries over 
time) research question, a comparative research design is the only 
adequate approach. According to Ragin (1987, p. 6), comparative 
knowledge “provides the key to understanding, explaining and 
interpreting,” hence, most comparative research focuses on macro-level 
phenomena, which are most usually defined at the country levels 
(Pennings et al., 1999, p. 49). As the general research aim of this thesis 
is to be able to generalise the findings in a system persistence and 
system development perspective, the sole focus of the empirical part of 
this thesis will also be on aggregated country-level data. However, as 
Peters (1998, p. 80) argued, “if comparative analysis is to be at all 
meaningful, then we must be sure that the same terms mean the same 
things in the different contexts within which the research is 
conducted”. Therefore, all measures used in this study are collected on 
the same basis and therefore directly comparable (Newton & van Deth, 
2016, p. 383).  
A country is, however, not a homogenous unit and there are 
significant variations within countries, both regarding public attitudes 
and contextual-level characteristics and developments that will not be 
controlled for in this thesis. Hence, when generalising a country as 
being generally supportive towards a system component of the EU, the 
statement is not necessarily valid for all parts of that country. As an 
example, there are significant differences regarding EU attitudes 
between the former West Germany and East Germany, as the general 
public in the former East Germany are significantly more negative 
towards the EU than the general public in the former West Germany.49 
Therefore, although there are significant regional cleavages within the 
countries that should be acknowledged and controlled for if possible, 
they do not fit into the scope of this thesis, and remain as areas for 
future research to consider. Furthermore, as Lijphart (1975) noted, the 
“traveling dilemma” of concepts is also an important aspect to consider 
                                                     
49 Within the Eurobarometer survey data, they also still differ between respondents 
from the former West Germany and the former East Germany.  
168 
 
 
within the comparative design of this thesis. However, as all of the 28 
member states share similar kinds of political, social and economic 
systems, there are no significant restrictions in the use of independent 
variables. Hence, the national contextual-level data regarding the 28 
cases should be both reliable and valid for macro-level comparisons.   
As the main research interest lies in explaining the variations in 
public support within the EU area, it is also natural to include all of the 
current 28 member states of the EU within the empirical part of this 
study. These 28 countries together constitute the main units of 
observation, and the aggregated member state levels of public support 
for the different system elements of the EU within these 28 countries 
constitute the units of analysis. There was also a possibility of including 
a number of non-EU countries within this study, however the main 
research puzzle would then have to be changed. Hence, the focus is 
only on explaining the current, not including possible future, member 
state levels of public support. Therefore, the selection criteria is that the 
country in question needs to have been a member state of the EU during 
the period of 2004–2017. This is also due to data availability, as there is 
survey data available for all of the 28 countries from 2004 and onwards 
(this includes also Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia that became member 
states of the EU later than 2004). It is also crucial to include the post-
2004 member states in this study, as it is insufficient to study country 
levels of public support for the EU and exclude almost half of the 
current member states. However, if the empirical part of this study 
would have been limited to include only the EU 15 member states, a 
slightly longer longitudinal perspective would have been possible. 
Hence, an even more longitudinal approach is sacrificed for the sake of 
the possibility of widening the number of member states included in 
the study, thereby making the results presented in this thesis more 
relevant for the current status of the EU.  
Another important aspect that needs to be accounted for are the 
effects of economic crises (the global recession 2008, the Eurocrisis 2010) 
on public support, because of the significant effects these crises have 
been shown to have had on public support for some of the system 
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elements of the EU (Roth et al., 2011; Armingeon & Ceka, 2014). 
Therefore, 2004 constitutes a valid starting point for this study’s 
analytical part. If the study had been limited to survey data from one 
point in time, there would have been a possibility to dwell deeper into 
that specific point in time, but that would also have limited the 
empirical part to a cross-national analysis of public support. However, 
by including longitudinal data, it becomes possible to also account for 
the differences within countries over time. Furthermore, it will also be 
possible to test whether the relationships between variables are more 
significant within countries than across countries. According to Blatter 
and Blumes (2008) definition, this study should resemble a co-
vibrational approach, because it could be expected that this covariance 
should be visible over time and space. As previously mentioned, 
comparative approaches also involve the development of theories to 
explain variations within a group of countries that are similar (Peters, 
2013), and this study could be broadly defined as a theory-developing 
study. In the following subchapter, the dependent variables are 
presented more thoroughly.  
5.2 Dependent variables 
Even if one knows the countries of interest, “the question remains of 
how to translate it into proper terms for empirical research” (Pennings 
et al., 1999, p. 43). In this subchapter, the theoretical guidelines from the 
literature are operationalised to enable the measurement of member 
state levels of public support for the system components of importance 
for the system persistence and development capabilities of the EU. As 
the country levels of a wide range of EU attitudes function as a 
measurement of public support for the EU within the EU area in this 
study, from a system perspective, it is apparent that a wide set of 
indicators is needed to measure the different kinds of public support 
(Weatherford, 1992, p. 149).50 Furthermore, many attempts to adapt 
                                                     
50 Democratic legitimacy in this context is defined as the idea that the existing political 
system of the EU is correct according to the European public, derived from Schmitt and 
Thomassen (1999, p. 9).  
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Easton’s systems support theory have been conducted by scholars 
interested in public attitudes towards different aspects of the EU. 
However, Lubbers (2008) suggested that empirical studies of system 
support should account, at least, for difference between attitudes 
towards political, utilitarian and identity dimensions, and a number of 
studies have also shown that the European public is conflicted when 
asked to evaluate different system elements of the EU (Stoeckel, 2012; 
De Vries, 2013; De Vries & Steenbergen, 2013). Basically because the 
European public might be rejecting some aspects, while simultaneously 
approving other aspects of the EU (Hobolt, 2014, p. 678; De Vries, 2018, 
p. 40).  
On the other hand, Boomgaarden et al. (2011) identified five 
dimensions of EU attitudes. (1) The first dimension represents 
emotional responses, representing the feelings of fear and threat by the 
EU. (2) The second refers to the sense of mutual European identification 
within the EU. (3) The third relates to the performance and the 
democratic and financial function of the EU regime institutions. (4) The 
fourth relates to general support for and benefit evaluations of the EU. 
(5) The fifth refers to strengthening of the EU through further European 
integration. Their study showed that these five attitudinal dimensions 
were related, while simultaneously reflecting attitudes towards distinct 
dimensions of the EU. However, they also argued that public 
evaluations of these dimensions were not of equal importance. One 
clear limitation with their study was that it only included a sample from 
the Netherlands, but the existence of different attitudinal dimensions 
also within the rest of Europe has also been confirmed more recently 
by De Vreese, Azrout and Boomgaarden (2018). At the individual level, 
attitudes reflecting support, or opposition, towards different elements 
of the EU are therefore rarely absolute (Taggart, 1998, p. 365), and this 
should become even more apparent at the macro-level. As many 
scholars therefore argue, it is crucial to clearly distinguish in a system 
support study between the different system elements of the EU that are 
important from a system persistence perspective, towards which public 
attitudes reflecting public support are primarily directed, as well as the 
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two different types of public support; specific and diffuse. This is in 
order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding and picture of 
the varying levels of EU attitudes, which are of importance from both 
a system persistence and development perspective (Niedermayer & 
Westle, 1995; Norris, 1999; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Hobolt & Brouard, 
2011; De Wilde & Trenz, 2012).  
In Easton’s (1965) original framework, he identified three system 
components towards which public attitudes are primarily directed: the 
political authorities, the regime and the political community. Norris 
(2011), based on Easton, developed this further into constituting five 
evaluable system important elements within a political system of 
system importance for the long-term system persistence capabilities of 
the political system: 1) political community, 2) regime principles, 3) 
regime processes, 4) regime institutions and 5) political authorities. 
Thereby choosing to divide Easton’s regime component further into 
three separate elements towards which public attitudes are primarily 
directed. Norris (2011, p. 23) argued that the regime constitutes the 
overarching constitutional arrangements, reflecting both formal and 
informal aspects of the regime, and a system support model should be 
able to account for these differences. The political community 
constitutes the most important element within system support theory 
and public attitudes directed towards the political community reflect 
the most diffuse kind of support, usually measured by indicators of a 
shared sense of belonging to, and identification with, the political 
community (Kaina, 2006, p. 118). For reasons earlier discussed within 
this study, the political authorities are not included as a system 
important element within this study’s operational framework. Instead 
three types of European integration policies have been included, as well 
as two kinds of attitudes directed towards the European political 
community. How the theoretical guidelines from the system support 
theory have been adapted in order to analyse the EU from a system 
perspective in this thesis are summarised in Figure 6 (see page 172).  
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Figure 6. Conceptualisation of the EU as a political system into three main 
system components (adapted model to the EU context by the author from 
Norris (2011) original conceptualisation).    
Following Norris’ interpretation of the system support concept as 
something that should be perceived as ranging on the support 
continuum from the most specific to the most diffuse element of a 
political system, the different system elements of the EU are here 
categorised according to the same logic. To recap, the specific kind of 
support is perceived as being the result of more rational evaluations of 
concrete interests and cost-benefit analyses, while the diffuse kind of 
support is based on more affective judgements (Niedermayer & Westle, 
1995, p. 48). Simultaneously, this support continuum should also be 
perceived as ranging from the least important (most specific) to the 
most important (most diffuse) system element of the EU from a system 
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perspective. This categorisation should not be regarded as something 
absolute, but perceived more as a way of approaching the unique 
character of the EU, from a system perspective, empirically, while 
simultaneously making it possible to relate the findings to a larger 
system persistence and development perspective of a supranational 
political system. The three main system important components, 
European integration policies, the EU regime and the European 
political community, have been thoroughly discussed in chapter three, 
as has the respective evaluable elements of these main system 
components. However, this categorisation presented in Figure 6 needs 
to be more thoroughly presented.  
Following Niedermayer and Westle (1995), European integration 
policies have been included as a main system component within the 
conceptual framework of this thesis. Within this study, the system 
component of European integration policies includes public attitudes 
towards the widening, deepening and securing of European integration 
policies, elements directly related to the development of the EU and 
indirectly also related to the system persistence capabilities of the EU. 
The least important element of the European integration policies 
component, and also according to the whole conceptualisation of the 
EU as a political system, relates to the widening of the EU area. The 
second element relates to the deepening of European integration within 
specific policy areas. The third element relates to the securing of 
already implemented, or continuing, European integration within a 
policy-area. The main argument for dividing the European integration 
policies component into three separate elements is because there are 
presumably different contextual-level mechanisms determining the 
variations in public attitudes towards these three elements. Hence, the 
underlying reasons for the public supporting a specific policy issue 
related to European integration varies across member states. This is 
because a proposed policy that might provide more benefits to some, 
might simultaneously provide more costs to the public within other 
member states. As such, public attitudes towards this element are not 
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based on affective consideration, but more directly determined by cost-
benefit analyses, indicating the more specific kind of support.  
What the European public think about these European integration 
policies, however, is important from a system development perspective 
also in the short term, as the public can indirectly force the elected 
national-level politicians to approve or oppose European integration 
policies. From a system persistence perspective, public attitudes 
towards European integration policies mainly matter for the long-term 
perspective, as declining levels of public support for European 
integration policies should also start affecting the levels of public 
support for the EU regime over time. In the empirical part of this study, 
public support for the widening of the EU area will be measured by 
indicators reflecting attitudes towards future enlargement (Hobolt, 
2014), public support for the deepening will be measured by indicators 
reflecting attitudes towards a common European defence policy 
(Schoen, 2008) and public support for the securing will be measured by 
attitudes towards the single European currency (Banducci et al., 2009; 
Hobolt & Wratil, 2015; Roth et al., 2016).  
The EU regime component, following Norris (1999; 2011), has been 
further divided into three directly EU regime related elements: the EU 
regime institutions, EU regime processes and EU regime principles. Hence, 
public attitudes related to these system elements are used to measure 
the levels of public support for the EU regime. Starting with the EU 
regime institutions, Norris and others (Armingeon & Ceka, 2014) have 
argued that public support can be measured by the levels of trust in the 
EU regime institutions. Hence, the levels of public support are 
measured by indicators reflecting the levels of trust in the specific 
political institutions responsible for governing within the EU regime. 
The European public does not tend to differentiate widely between the 
different political institutions of the EU regime, indicating that if the 
levels of trust towards the European Parliament (EP) are at a high level, 
it is very likely that the levels of trust in the European Commission (EC) 
and the European Central Bank (ECB) are at a similar level. This largely 
creates congruence in the levels of trust between the different EU 
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regime institutions. Here, it is worth noting that the EP is the only 
political organ at the supranational level in the world with directly-
elected national representatives. However, for a long time elections to 
the European Parliament have been perceived as second-order 
elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) and turnout during elections has been 
in, almost, constant decline since 1979. Nevertheless, the EP is the 
political institution at the EU regime level that the European public has 
a direct say in, as they are able to choose the composition of it. Hence, 
it is of vital importance that the EP is perceived as being democratically 
legitimate as a political institution. Member state levels of trust in the 
EP will therefore be used as a reflection of public attitudes towards the 
EU regime institutions (Roth et al., 2011; Munoz et al., 2011; Serricchio 
et al., 2013; Dotti Sani & Magistro, 2016).   
The levels of public support for the EU regime processes are 
measured by indicators reflecting public satisfaction with the processes 
of governing within the EU regime (Rohrschneider, 2002; Hobolt, 2012; 
De Vries, 2018). Public support for the regime processes relates to 
evaluations of how democracy works at the European level, even 
though Norris (1999, p. 75) also noted that it is not an “ideal 
performance indicator”. Still, Norris proposed that questions regarding 
the functioning of EU democracy could be used to measure public 
attitudes towards the regime processes at the European level. In 
addition, the levels of public support for the EU regime principles are 
measured by indicators reflecting public attitudes towards the 
principles upon which the EU regime has been built. Norris (1999) has 
also suggested, in a study regarding public support for the EU regime, 
that public support for the EU regime principles could be measured by 
public attitudes towards European unification, EU membership and 
European co-operation, because these values lie at the core of the 
European integration project. Therefore, the levels of public support for 
the EU regime principles are reflected by public attitudes towards the 
basic guiding principles of European integration, such as adherence to 
the “four freedoms” on which the EU was founded as well as more 
direct public support for EU membership that has made these freedoms 
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possible.51 Public support for the EU regime principles also reflects the 
most diffuse kind of support for the EU regime, as sufficient levels of 
public support for the EU regime principles should be considered 
essential from a system persistence perspective. Public support for the 
EU regime principles will therefore be measured by the country levels 
of support for their country’s EU membership (Anderson, 1998; Garry 
& Tilley, 2009; Arnold et al., 2012).  
The European political community is defined as the geographical area 
over which the EU regime has jurisdiction, hence encompassing the 
geographical jurisdiction of all of the current 28 member states of the 
EU regime. Public attitudes related to this system component are, 
theoretically, used to measure the levels of public support for it, 
operationalised through indicators of mutual European identification 
and EU attachment (Börzel & Risse, 2018; Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016). 
These indicators are operationalised to reflect public attitudes towards 
both the territorial and affective aspects of the European political 
community (Niedermayer & Westle, 1995). The levels of public support 
for the European political community are the most difficult to 
empirically measure, as it could be regarded as quite misleading to 
translate the member state levels of European identification, for 
example, directly as corresponding to the member state levels of public 
support for the European political community. Nevertheless, according 
to system support theory, mutual identification within the political 
community created by the regime should function as a reserve of public 
support that the regime is able to rely on during periods of system 
pressure (Easton, 1965). Identity considerations have also been shown 
within the EU literature to alter EU attitudes and could, hence, be 
regarded as constituting something resembling the most diffuse kind 
of support for a European political community (Carey, 2002; Hooghe & 
Marks, 2004). Therefore, at least theoretically, from a long-term system 
persistence perspective, public attitudes towards the European political 
community constitute the most important kind of support, as they are 
                                                     
51 This relates to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour within the EU 
area.  
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the most direct indicators of diffuse support for the EU from a system 
perspective. Hence, public attitudes towards the European political 
community reflect the most important kinds of public support for the 
EU from a long-term system persistence perspective (Wessels, 2007).  
In the Eastonian sense (1975, p. 444), the levels of public support for 
the European political community should be expected to remain 
relatively stable within the member states. However, longer periods of 
dissatisfaction with European integration policies and the EU regime 
system elements should, over time, also start to affect the levels of 
public support for the European political community. On the other 
hand, according to socialisation theory, the European public should 
also, over time, become increasingly socialised into identifying with 
Europe (Inglehart, 1967). In the broadest terms of system support 
theory, the theoretical assumption is that higher country levels of 
mutual European identification and EU attachment within the 
European political community should provide the EU, as a political 
system, with enough input-legitimacy so that the EU will be able to 
withstand future crises (Scharpf, 1999).  
Longer periods of high levels of public support for European 
integration policies and the EU regime elements should therefore, over 
time, also transfer into higher levels of mutual European identification 
and EU attachment within the European political community. 
Therefore, as Schmitt and Thomassen (1999, p. 261) argued, “successful 
EU policies might in turn be expected to strengthen feelings of 
identification with Europe”. High levels of public support towards the 
European political community should thereby provide the EU with a 
reservoir of public support that the EU can rely on during longer 
periods of system stress, without the EU’s legitimacy being questioned. 
After identifying the main elements of system importance for the EU 
from a system perspective, it is also necessary to identify the more 
concrete attitudinal indicators in the survey data that could be used to 
reflect member state levels of public support for these different system 
elements before starting to focus on the member state levels and 
variations in public support.  
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Even though this thesis focuses on national contextual-level factors 
relation to EU attitudes, something more needs to be said about the 
comprehensive research on individual-level determinants of EU 
attitudes. This is especially important since much of the research has 
had a tendency to mix individual level, contextual level as well as EU-
related factors within empirical analyses, leading to mixed results 
depending on the operationalisation of the concept of public support 
for the EU. As previously mentioned, three broad theories have been 
used to explain why individuals develop certain types of attitudes 
towards the EU: the utilitarian, affective and cue-taking/proxy 
approaches. Within similar studies, the specific/utilitarian and 
diffuse/affective concepts have been used almost synonymously 
(Niedermayer & Westle, 1995), and as Boomgaarden et al. (2011, p. 244) 
also noted, there is an “evident overlap” between the terms of specific 
and utilitarian support and the terms of diffuse and affective support. 
The utilitarian approach explains individual attitudes towards the EU 
based on an individual cost-benefit analysis, largely based on economic 
rationality and utilitarian considerations, which has functioned over 
time as the primarily explanation as to why an individual chooses to 
exhibit positive or negative attitudes towards the EU (Hobolt, 2014, p. 
666). The utilitarian approach is theoretically related to what Easton 
referred to as specific support, which is the kind of support that varies, 
with individual demands being fulfilled and where the fulfilment of 
demands functions as a quid pro quo for support (Easton, 1965, p. 268).  
Hence, it has also been argued that individuals who assess their 
individual economic conditions more positively are more likely to 
support the EU (Dotti Sani & Magistro, 2016, p. 4). The argument goes 
that those who are to benefit personally from their countries’ EU 
membership are more positive towards the EU based on economic 
rational thinking (Gabel, 1998). This is because citizens at the individual 
level are not expected to support the EU and/or European integration 
without perceived personal gains, even though the nation as a whole 
would presumably be expected to benefit from more European 
integration (Gabel & Palmer, 1995, p. 13; Garry & Tilley, 2009, p. 362). 
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Those who are usually perceived to benefit the most from European 
integration are the highly skilled and educated, who can take 
advantage of the free movement of labour and the open market 
provided by their countries’ EU membership (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; 
Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug & Kuhn, 2013). The so-called 
“winners of globalisation” have therefore been shown to traditionally 
also vote for political parties with a pro-EU agenda (Polyakova & 
Fligstein, 2016, p. 64; Hobolt & De Vries, 2016b, p. 3). Hobolt (2016) also 
suggests that the divide between the winners and losers of globalisation 
were one of the drivers for the voter choice during the Brexit 
referendum, while Goodwin and Heath (2016) have shown that public 
support for Brexit was stronger in areas with a lower-skilled and less-
educated population.  
As Hooghe and Marks (2004, p. 416) further noted, European 
“citizens who feel confident about the economic future – personally and 
for their country – are likely to regard European integration in a 
positive light, while those who are fearful will lean towards 
Euroscepticism”. The so-called “losers of globalisation,” those that are 
more likely to lose their jobs when their factory closes or moves to 
another country, and do not have enough education and/or are too low-
skilled to take advantage of the opportunities provided by a common 
European market, have been shown to be more negative towards the 
EU. The argument goes that low-educated citizens cannot benefit from 
the opportunities created through European integration to the same 
extent, and they are also generally more dependent on national welfare 
services (Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014, p. 628). The low-educated are therefore 
naturally more likely to also develop Eurosceptic attitudes and have 
been shown to be more likely to also cast a vote for a more Eurosceptic 
political party during national elections (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010; 
Werts et al., 2012). Eurosceptic attitudes at the individual level have 
also been shown to correlate with lower levels of trust in national 
political institutions (Roth et al., 2011), higher levels of scepticism 
towards immigrants (Azrout, van Spanje & De Vreese, 2010; Baur et al., 
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2016; Bakker & De Vreese, 2016) and more negative feelings towards 
minorities (McLaren, 2002).   
However, as the EU has evolved over time into a more state-like 
political entity, indicators of the more diffuse kind of support for the 
EU have also become more emphasised within studies (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2008; Polyakova, 2016). The affective/identity approach states 
that individual-level attitudes towards the EU are also derived from 
individual level considerations related to an evaluation of the nation 
state, attachment to Europe and perceptions of people from other 
countries and cultures (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). The assumption 
derived from the literature is therefore that individuals identifying as 
Europeans are more likely to support European integration than those 
who identify only as their national group (Citrin & Sides, 2004; Hooghe 
& Marks, 2004; Serricchio et al., 2013; Mitchell, 2014). There is also 
evidence that there is a strong connection at the individual level 
between positive attitudes towards the euro and identifying as a 
European (Mitchell, 2014), and the likelihood of a positive evaluation 
of the EU has also been proven to be closely connected to one’s 
individual human capital (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Anderson & Reichert, 
1995).  
Research focusing on the development of a shared European 
identity therefore explains individual support for the EU by focusing 
on identity-formation at the supranational European level, e.g. 
European identification. That is what Easton would refer to as the 
development of the more diffuse kind of support for the EU. The 
opposite, implying exclusive national identification, has also been 
shown to be a strong predictor of Eurosceptic attitudes on the 
individual level (Serricchio et al., 2013). The cue-taking approach 
explains individual-level attitudes towards the EU as directly related to 
contextual developments and circumstances, as individuals use 
contextual factors as a proxy for forming EU attitudes, of which they 
usually have limited knowledge (Anderson, 1998). National 
contextual-level factors have also been shown to explain more 
individual level variations in attitudes towards European integration 
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than individual-level factors (Brinegar & Jolly, 2005). In the following 
section the survey data used for obtaining comparable indicators of 
public support is presented.  
5.2.1 Data and categorisation 
In this section the survey data used to operationalise member state 
levels of public support for the EU are presented. There are two options 
for researchers interested in measuring and explaining variations in the 
member state levels of public support for the EU longitudinally, while 
lacking the capacity or resources to conduct a survey of their own. A 
researcher can either decide to use the survey data provided by the 
European Social Surveys (ESS) or use the survey data provided by 
Eurobarometer (EB). ESS has compiled survey data every two years 
from 2002 onwards, and includes a wide set of questions reflecting 
attitudes towards different elements of the EU. However, the countries 
included in the data have varied between the surveys, and so have the 
questions that have been included, making it difficult to use the ESS 
survey data for this kind of longitudinal research approach.  
On the other hand, the public opinion surveys provided by the EB 
are also conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission, 
and for researchers interested in public attitudes from a large sample of 
EU countries, the EB surveys have over time become more or less 
considered as “the only adequate data source” (Braun & 
Tausendpfund, 2014, p. 243). During the last four decades, the EB has 
therefore naturally become a key source within comparative studies 
related to EU attitudes (Cram, 2012, p. 73). The so-called Standard EB 
surveys have been conducted biannually, more or less regularly, since 
1973, and the sample of each survey includes 1000 respondents per 
member state, with the survey data gathered through face-to-face 
interviews.52  
                                                     
52 With a few exceptions, as the EB sample from Malta, Republic of Cyprus and 
Luxembourg only includes 500 respondents per survey, and the survey sample from 
the United Kingdom and Germany, on the other hand, includes 1500 respondents each.  
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The EB survey data is provided by the European Commission data 
archive, which is available for researchers through the GESIS – 
Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and the surveys are conducted and 
presented by the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
Communication. According to Hobolt and De Vries (2016a, p. 417), one 
“distinct advantage” with using Eurobarometer data is that it allows 
for both cross-country and longitudinal studies regarding both policy 
and regime support. In addition, it is possible to use attitudinal 
indicators of public support for the European political community for 
similar purposes. The natural choice for this study is therefore to utilise 
the EB data available for measuring and comparing member state levels 
of public support, in line with many of the studies conducted with a 
similar research purpose.  
However, many of the survey questions, as with the ESS, 
unfortunately change from survey to survey and EB has also been 
widely criticised for significant empirical shortcomings (Bruter, 2003; 
Cram, 2012; Mitchell, 2016). It is also important to consider that the 
implications of the survey questions have changed over time, as the EU 
has also developed extensively, when conducting longitudinal research 
(Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, p. 132). By using the survey data provided 
by EB, it nevertheless becomes empirically possible to produce a 
comprehensive picture regarding the member state level developments 
regarding public support towards elements within the three main 
system important components of the EU. However, as the EU in 2004 
transformed from including 15 to including 25 member states, survey 
data for the whole EU area is only available from 2004 onwards. Hence, 
2004 will constitute the point of departure for the empirical analyses as 
well as for the descriptive overview.53 During the period of 2004–2017, 
a total of 94 different EB surveys have been conducted, and of these 28 
have been so-called “Standard Eurobarometer” surveys, focusing on 
public attitudes towards different aspects of the EU. It is therefore 
primarily survey data from the “Standard Eurobarometer” surveys that 
                                                     
53 EB surveys from 2004 also include the member states joining later after 2004; Bulgaria 
(2007), Romania (2007) and Croatia (2013). 
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will be used within this study, although that has not been possible for 
all of the survey items of interest and, hence, also other EB surveys have 
been used to gather data for the empirical analyses.54 The research 
approach picks the survey data that is the most appropriate, and for 
this research approach, the EB surveys are basically the only possible 
survey data available, taking everything into consideration.55 In short, 
EB survey data will basically be used because “these constitute the only 
data source that allows for cross-national and longitudinal 
comparisons” (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016a, p. 416).56    
Since operationalising means the translation of theoretical concepts 
into travelling concepts (Pennings et al., 1999, p. 64), this study is 
therefore dependent on indicators of public support that have been 
included regularly over time, as well as across countries, in order to 
study the development of public support both longitudinally and cross-
sectionally. Based on the survey items that have been used by other 
researchers for similar purposes, as well as on the interpretation by this 
author, the most relevant survey items were chosen to be included 
within the statistical analyses. However, some of the survey items 
previously presented provided the respondents with the possibility of 
grading their answers (very positive, fairly positive etc.) while some 
items only gave the respondents the possibility of answering 
“for”/“against” or “tend to trust”/“tend not to trust” (although also 
including the possibility of answering don’t know). As some of the 
survey items included also a “neutral” option, a higher proportion of 
positive or negative answers could be expected within categories that 
do not provide the option of being neutral. As Niedermayer (1995, p. 
                                                     
54 Primarily in that sense that also other EB surveys have been included in order to 
measure public support for the EU regime principles and the European political 
community. Survey items reflecting EU attitudes have also been included sporadically 
within the so-called “Special Eurobarometer”-surveys (the surveys making up the rest 
of the total of 94 unique EB-surveys conducted during this period), and hence it is 
possible to obtain more time points for some of the public support indicators if also 
including these surveys when necessary. 
55 The ESS does not include samples from all EU member states in their surveys. 
56 The EB surveys have been conducted on behalf of the European Commission since 
1973. 
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56) argued, “we have to be very careful about comparing the answers 
to questions which vary in the way they treat neutral responses”. Also, 
according to Niedermayer (1995, p. 56), “the comparability of the 
answers to questions with and without a neutral option is improved” 
by removing the “neutral” and “do not know” answers. For this 
research approach, it is enough to know whether the respondents are 
more positive than negative, or vice-versa, towards the element that is 
being evaluated, and the empirical focus here will be on the aggregated 
national amount of positive responses (Inglehart & Rabier, 1978; 
Handley, 1981).57 Hence, to be able to compare public evaluations of the 
different system elements, all survey items have hence been recoded 
into dichotomous variables, indicating an “EU positive” option and an 
“EU negative” option, with the “don’t know” answers coded as 
“system missing”. Hence, using a Sartorian (1970) “either or” instead 
of the “more or less” logic. 
As Peters (2013, p. 33) noted, it is good to have a dependent variable 
that varies extensively, and the intention is to use and analyse a number 
of dependent variables within the empirical part of this study. Dogan 
(1994) stated that with few exceptions, country comparisons use 
national averages. Over time this has changed, however, thanks to 
analytical developments, but the basis for generalising national level 
results is still derived from analysing national averages. Hence, 
national averages will be used for comparing and explaining the levels 
of public support within and between the 28 EU member states. Hence, 
when a survey item has been included by the EB more than once during 
a year, a mean value based on the aggregated country-level values from 
these surveys have been computed. Van der Meer (2010, p. 518) further 
argued, that in order to understand changes in one country, it is 
important to place that country into a broader perspective, which 
primarily means that it is essentially important to identify comparable 
indicators that could be used to measure country levels of EU attitudes 
                                                     
57 Previously the concept of “net support” has also been used within similar studies, 
and the comparative number has been derived through subtracting the proportion of 
negative answers from the proportion of positive answers (Niedermayer, 1995).  
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within the EU area. In order to obtain the most longitudinal perspective 
possible, the following eight attitudinal variables will be included in 
the statistical analyses in order to measure public attitudes towards 
these eight system elements. The survey items included are 
summarised in Table 5.58 
Table 5. Dependent variables included in the statistical analyses. 
 
Summary 
This section has presented this study’s comparative research design 
and operational data for the dependent variable(s). One of the main 
arguments in this section has been that it is crucial to include a 
maximum number of countries in order to make larger statements 
                                                     
58 See Appendix Table 2 page 311 for summary and coding of the dependent variables. 
System elements Variables 
Times included in EB 
surveys, post 2004 (EU-28)
u
n
it
y
Attachment EU attachment 12  (2006, 2007, 2012-2017)                                                                                                                   
C
o
m
m Identification European identification           17 (2004, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2012-
2017)
Principles Support for country´s EU 
membership 
20  (2004-2017)
R
eg
im
e Processes Satisfaction with EU 
democracy                                                                                   
21 (2004-2007, 2009-2017)                                                         
Institutions Trust in the European 
Parliament                                         
28 (2004-2017)                                                                                                     
Securing Support for a common 
European single currency, the 
euro          
29 (2004-2017)           
P
o
li
ci
e s Deepening Support for a common 
European defence policy       
25  (2004-2017)         
Widening Support for future EU 
enlargement
27 (2004-2017)
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regarding development and system persistence capabilities of the EU, 
and hence all of the 28 member states are to be included within the 
empirical part of this thesis. This even though Romania (2007), Bulgaria 
(2007) and Croatia (2013) have not been members of the EU during this 
whole period. Furthermore, as there are a great number of important 
events that have occurred within the EU area during the period of 2004–
2017, including two major economic crises as well as a migration crisis, 
it is also crucial to analyse whether the empirical findings also hold 
over time. Hence, the longitudinal perspective is of vital relevance for 
the validity of the analytical results. As Dogan (1994) also suggested, 
single indicators of public attitudes are often misleading when 
measuring complex phenomena, and hence a wide range of attitudinal 
indicators have been included in order to account for the 
multidimensional character of the EU from a system perspective. In the 
following section, the independent variables, i.e. the national 
contextual-level factors, to be included in the analytical part are 
presented and categorised.  
5.3 Independent variables 
The national contextual-level factors used within the literature for 
explaining country-level variations in public support have been 
broadly divided into two main categories, consisting of internal and 
external factors. Internal factors are further categorised into two groups 
of contextual-level factors related to the a) economic performance and 
the b) democratic culture within the countries. Both groups including 
performance related factors. External factors, on the other hand, are 
further categorised into two groups of contextual-level factors related 
to c) the impact of changing demographics and immigration and d) the 
country-specific relations to the EU. What Lijphart (1975) called the 
“traveling dilemma” and Sartori (1991) “conceptual stretching,” 
implying that the same concepts might indicate different things in 
different settings, is also an aspect that has been considered when 
choosing which types of contextual-level factors to include within this 
study. However, as all of the 28 cases share similar kinds of political, 
187 
 
 
social and economic systems, characteristics of so-called liberal 
democracies, there are not any significant restrictions regarding the 
comparability of the independent variables. According to the literature 
overview in chapter four, there are a wide range of contextual-level 
factors that presumably could help explain, at least to some extent, 
country-level variations in public support for, all together, eight system 
elements of the EU.  
The general argument behind including these contextual-level 
factors as explanatory variables in the statistical model is based on the 
widespread assumption that EU citizens are not particularly well aware 
about what is going within the EU. As Anderson (1998, p. 574–575) 
argued, that “given the generally low levels of awareness about the EU 
among citizens of the member states, attitudes about the advantages 
and disadvantages of integration may essentially reflect other, more 
firmly held and extensively developed political beliefs that are the 
result of citizens’ experiences with domestic political reality”. Even 
though both the public interest and knowledge about the EU has grown 
as the EU has evolved, “public opinion is still characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty” (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016a, p. 416). Thereby, EU 
attitudes could still be expected to be affected and formed by national 
level developments, which the EU citizens should be more aware of.  
Therefore it is clear that different types of contextual-level factors are 
needed to explain different types of public support. Hence, the 
statistical effect of all these contextual-level factors on the separate 
indicators of public support will be tested stepwise in the statistical 
analyses presented in chapter six. The number of independent 
contextual-level variables have also been limited to obtain more robust 
results, as too many independent variables might lead to almost 
uninterpretable findings because of the presumed multicollinearity 
issues associated with including similar contextual-level factors in 
statistical models. This is especially a factor to consider within 
statistical models containing more analytical levels. Nevertheless, most 
studies include a number of contextual-level factors to control and 
account for the effects other contextual-level factors might have on the 
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main independent variable. For this purpose, all together, eight 
contextual-level factors have been chosen for the empirical part of this 
thesis. 
Starting with the category of internal level factors and indicators 
related to the macroeconomic performance of the countries, there have 
been a large number of indicators used within similar studies to 
measure the economic performance of countries. This is because there 
is a wide range of different measurements of economic performance 
available for researchers, and hence there is always a possibility of 
finding a connection that has not been established within the literature 
by, simply, changing the indicators. Nevertheless, there are a number 
of indicators that have become more or less regularly included within 
similar studies, although not in the same model, for reasons previously 
mentioned. The most usually included have been the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) annual growth rate59, GDP per capita60, annual 
unemployment rate61, annual inflation rate62 and annual national debt 
rate63. As such, there were many possible indicators that could have 
been used to measure the economic performance of the countries 
included. However, from a longitudinal perspective, many of these are 
similar in character, and for the purpose of narrowing it down, the most 
sufficient for this particular research approach were chosen to be 
included; the national debt level and the unemployment level. The 
                                                     
59 GDP growth rate has been included in studies by Karp and Bowler (2006), Hobolt 
(2014), Braun and Tausendpfund (2014), Lubbers and Scheepers (2010), Eichenberg and 
Dalton (1993; 2007), Roth et al. (2011), Harteveld et al. (2013), Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014), 
Gabel and Whitten (1997), Serrichio et al. (2013) and Dotti Sani and Magistro (2016). 
60 GDP per capita has been included in studies by Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996), 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), Polyakova and Fligstein (2016), Rohrschneider and Loveless 
(2010), Duch and Taylor (1997) and Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014). 
61 Unemployment rates have been included in studies by Eichenberg and Dalton (2007), 
Polyakova & Fligstein (2016), Lubbers and Scheepers (2010), Eichenberg and Dalton 
(1993, 2007), Roth et al. (2011), Duch and Taylor (1997), Gabel and Whitten (1997), 
Serrichio et al. (2013) and Dotti Sani and Magistro (2016). 
62 Inflation rates have been included in studies by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993; 2007), 
Lubbers and Scheepers (2010), Roth et al. (2011), Duch and Taylor (1997), Gabel and 
Whitten (1997) and Serrichio et al. (2013). 
63 National debt rates have been included in studies by Armingeon and Ceka (2014), 
Polyakova and Fligstein (2016) and Roth et al. (2011). 
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national debt level reflects the more long-term economic performance 
of a country, as does GDP per capita. The unemployment level relates 
more directly to the short-term economic performance of a country, as 
does GDP growth rates. Hence, the argument is that national debt and 
unemployment levels should function as sufficient contextual-level 
proxies for both the short- and long-term economic performance of the 
countries, which the public might use when they are asked to form their 
opinions about the EU.  
Regarding the democratic culture group, this includes indicators 
related to the institutional performance and characteristics of the 
countries. A wide range of contextual-level factors have been used 
within similar studies that could be categorised within this category, 
such as welfare spending64, corruption levels65, political freedom66, 
human development67, governance quality68 and economic inequality69. 
As was the case with the economic performance indicators, many of 
these are also similar in character, both longitudinally and cross-
sectionally, and for that purpose only two of these were chosen to be 
included in the empirical part of the thesis. These are corruption and 
economic inequality. Corruption levels are closely related both 
longitudinally and cross-sectionally to the governance quality, human 
development and political freedom measurements, as these broadly 
can be argued to constitute similar measurements of the same thing. 
Hence, if a country is becoming more corrupt over time, there is a large 
possibility that the country levels of political freedom, human 
                                                     
64 Welfare spending as a percentage of national budget has been included in studies by 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), Armingeon and Ceka (2013), Arnold et al. (2012), 
Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) and Brinegar and Jolly (2005). 
65 Corruption levels have been included in studies by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), 
Harteveld et al. (2013), Serrichio et al. (2013) and Arnold et al. (2012). 
66 Political freedom levels, measured by the Freedom House Index, have been included 
in a study by Karp and Bowler (2006).   
67 Human development levels, measured by the Human Development Index, have been 
included in a study by Mungiu-Pippidi (2015).  
68 Governance quality, measured by the World Bank’s Governance Effectiveness Index, 
has been included in a study by Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010). 
69 Economic equality, measured by the GINI index, has been included in a study by 
Simpson and Loveless (2017).  
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development and governance quality also decline. Country levels of 
institutional quality will also be measured by the levels of income 
inequality within countries, as after the economic crises there is a 
greater number of people that “feel themselves to be at a heightened 
risk of economic adversity owing to the rising inequality and economic 
problems in both their country and the EU” (Simpson & Loveless, 2017, 
p. 1069).  
Continuing with the external factors. The group labelled external 
pressure is perhaps the most difficult to operationalise in order to 
enable cross-sectional comparisons within the EU area, as the 
indicators included in this group have not been used very often within 
similar studies. In short, the mechanism that this group of factors tries 
to account for is how the demographic developments and 
characteristics are connected to the country-level variations in public 
support. The relevance of developments related to immigration should, 
especially in the post migration crisis era, become of vital concern, as 
the heavy influx of refugees since 2015 has been considered to have 
severely threatened the legitimacy of the EU (Otjes & Katsanidou, 
2017). Still, it is challenging to produce comparable measurements that 
are able to account for the statistical effects of immigration, as there are 
significant variations within the EU area regarding the number of 
refugees and asylum-seekers that are accepted.  
Therefore, the contextual-level factor related to the influx of refugees 
relates to non-EU immigration (Azrout et al., 2013; Kentman-Cin & 
Erisen, 2017). An issue that is likely to become even more important for 
the EU in the near future, considering the rise of nationalistic political 
parties during the last decade, parties which have gained a lot of their 
support from promoting anti-immigrant attitudes. However, as has 
also been shown, the European public differs between EU- and non-EU 
immigration, but there has also been a significant development 
regarding the size of the foreign population, including from other EU-
countries, residing within the countries during the period of 2004–2017 
that also needs to be accounted for. Hence, the size of the foreign 
population within the countries will also be controlled for as a 
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contextual-level factor (Werts et al., 2012; Otjes & Katsanidou, 2017). 
Therefore, the proportional amount of refugees and foreign population 
within the year-specific total populations within the countries will be 
included in the empirical analyses as reflecting the extent of external 
pressure on the countries. It is, however, acknowledged that it is 
extremely difficult to account for the impact of demographic changes 
on the levels of public support within this type of study. 
The final group relates to the relation between the countries and the 
EU. Over time, there have been a number of contextual-level factors 
included to account for this relationship within similar studies. Political 
influence within the EU regime institutions70, EU budget relation71, 
intra-EU trade balance72 and eurozone membership73 are all factors that 
have been included within similar studies. When searching contextual-
level factors that could be used as proxies for public attitudes, it is quite 
clear, however, that the EU budget relation, reflecting whether a 
country is a net recipient or net contributor to the EU budget, and the 
eurozone membership factor should be the two most relevant. 
Especially the EU budget factor should be very important, as it also 
reflects the difference between rich and poor countries within the EU 
area, as the rich countries are contributing more to the EU budget than 
they receive back. By using this in a longitudinal perspective, it is also 
possible to account for the longitudinal relative economic development 
of the countries, as some countries have started to pay proportionally 
more to the EU budget (Germany), while other countries have started 
to pay proportionally less over time (Hungary). On the other hand, the 
                                                     
70 Political influence within the EU regime institutions has been included in studies by 
Hobolt (2014), Arnold et al. (2012) and Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010).  
71 EU budget relation has been included in studies by Hobolt (2014), Stoeckel (2012), 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) and Kuhn and 
Stoeckel (2014). 
72 The intra-EU trade balance has been included in studies by Eichenberg and Dalton 
(1993; 2007), Belot and Guinaudeau (2017), McLaren (2004) and Gabel and Whitten 
(1997). 
73 The eurozone membership factor has been included in studies by Braun and 
Tausendpfund (2014), Karp and Bowler (2006), Polyakova and Fligstein (2016), Belot 
and Guinaudeau (2017), Lubbers and Scheepers (2010) and Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014). 
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eurozone membership factor reflects whether the country is a member 
of the EU-core or not, as the eurozone countries are considered to be 
deeper integrated than the non-eurozone EU member states. National 
contextual-level factors for this group that have been previously used 
within the literature, as intra-EU trade balance and political influence 
within the EU regime institutions, are factors that the public are not 
particularly aware of and should, hence, function as insufficient proxies 
for different types of public attitudes. Therefore, EU budget relation 
and eurozone membership will be included as contextual-level factors 
in the statistical part of this thesis. In the following section, the data 
used for operationalising the contextual-level factors are presented.   
5.3.1 Data and categorisation 
The main part of the contextual-level factors included in this study in 
order to explain the variations in public support within and between 
countries are derived from the same source, Eurostat. Eurostat is 
officially referred to as a Directorate-General of the European 
Commission, responsible for providing statistical information that 
enables EU-wide comparisons within a wide range of topics. Eurostat 
was officially founded for this specific purpose as far back as 1953 
(European Commission, 2018). Comparative data from Eurostat 
enables comparisons within and between countries related to all four 
groups of contextual-level factors. Some of the original Eurostat data 
have also been modified to enable more direct comparisons, especially 
data related to the measurements of country levels of foreign 
population, which have been modified to show the proportional 
amount of foreign population based on the total year specific 
population within the different countries.  
The data regarding the proportional amount of refugees were 
derived from The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the 
data were also modified to show the proportional number of refugees 
based on the total year specific population within the different 
countries. By this kind of approach, it becomes possible to account for 
the cross-sectional effects of longitudinal developments in the 
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proportional amount of foreigners- and refugees within the population. 
For comparative data regarding non-corruption levels, the Corruption 
Perceptions Index, annually updated and presented by Transparency 
International, provides comparative data for all of the EU member 
states for the period of 2004–2017. This index has also been widely used 
in similar studies (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Rothstein & Uslaner, 
2005; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Arnold et al., 2012; Harteveld et al., 2013; 
Serrichio et al., 2013). The index ranks countries in terms of the 
pervasiveness of corruption, with the estimates derived from expert 
assessments and opinion surveys. It should, however, be noted that this 
index have been widely criticized, although for the context of the EU 
area it should be considered as a valid measurement for corruption 
levels (Charron, 2016).74 The levels of economic inequality will be 
measured by the GINI index, which is widely used to measure the 
levels of income equality within countries. This index has also been 
used in similar studies related to EU attitudes (Simpson & Loveless, 
2017). 
In order to measure the EU budget relation, the member states 
operating budgetary balances are used, following Mattila (2006). These 
estimates are based on data from the European Commission that 
analyse the annual fiscal flows between the EU and its member states. 
Hence, the operating budgetary balance of each member state is 
calculated as the difference between the operating expenditure 
allocated to each member state and the national contribution of each 
member state. In short, this estimate reflects the difference between 
what a country receives from and pays into the EU budget. This 
estimate is also expected to vary significantly over time within 
countries based on the national economic developments. The 
contextual-level factors included in the empirical part are summarised 
in Table 6 (see page 194).75  
                                                     
74 See Anderson and Heywood (2009) for an extensive overview regarding the critique.  
75 See Appendix Table 1 page 310 for summary of the national level indicators and 
operationalisation.  
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Table 6. Contextual-level factors included in the statistical analyses.  
 
The empirical purpose with this thesis is to show how the contextual-
level similarities and differences within and between 28 countries are 
connected to the variations in the levels of public support towards eight 
system elements of the EU. Hence, the variations in public support 
should be statistically connected to variations at the contextual-level 
within the four main groups. However, it is also now time to start 
focusing on the country level characteristics and longitudinal 
developments to connect the empirical guidelines derived from the 
literature to the period of concern for this study, 2004–2017. Therefore, 
member state specific values with regard to the eight contextual-level 
factors are presented in Table 7 (see page 195).76 The table includes two 
indicator specific values, the mean value for the total period of 2004–
2017 as well as net change value, comparing the value of 2004 with the 
most recent value from 2017. In this overview, both the general country 
level developments and characteristics become more visible. The 
values presented in the table show that there are significant variations 
both between and within countries during this period, of which the 
                                                     
76 See Appendix Tables 4–10 on pages 313–319 for member state values 2004–2017. 
Category Contextual factor Source
Economic performance Debt Eurostat 2004-2017 
 f
ac
to
rs Unemployment Eurostat 2004-2017 
In
te
rn
al
 
Democratic culture Non-corruption The Corruption Perceptions Index, 
Transparency International 2004-2017 
Economic inequality The Gini Index, Eurostat 2004-2017 
External pressure Foreign population The United Nations Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) 2004-2017 
 f
ac
to
rs Refugees Eurostat 2004-2017 
E
x
te
rn
al
EU relation Eurozone membership 2004-2017 
EU budget relation Eurostat 2004-2017 
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developments within the countries most severely hit by the Eurocrisis 
(Greece, Spain and Italy) are perhaps the most interesting.  
 
Table 7. Net change in member state values for contextual-level factors 
between 2004 and 2017.77  
 
As this subchapter has shown, there are a large number of 
contextual-level factors to account for when trying to explain country-
level variations in public support. The main argument, however, is that 
                                                     
77 Gini index-values for a number of countries are missing for 2004 and 2017, and 
therefore the values for the closest year available are used as proxies here. These 
countries are Bulgaria (2006), Croatia (2010), Republic of Cyprus (2005), Czech Republic 
(2005), Germany (2005), Hungary (2005), Ireland (2016 values for 2017), Latvia (2005), 
Lithuania (2005), Malta (2005), Netherlands (2005), Poland (2005), Romania (2007), 
Slovakia (2005), Slovenia 2005) and the United Kingdom (2005 and 2016).    
Economic performance Democratic culture External pressure EU relation
Debt Unemployment Non-corruption Economic ineq. Foreign pop. Refugee pop. EU budget rela.
Country Change Mean Change Mean Change Mean Change Mean Change Mean Change Mean Change Mean
Austria 14 76 1 5 -9 78 2 27 6 11 1.27 1.08 -0.1 -0.2
Belgium 7 100 -1 8 0 74 0 26 4 10 0.19 0.38 0.02 -0.30
Bulgaria -11 21 -6 9 2 40 9 36 1 1 0.24 0.16 1.79 3.02
Croatia 38 61 -3 13 14 43 -2 31 0 1 -0.07 0.04 0.43 0.56
Republic of Cyprus 33 76 7 9 3 60 2 31 5 17 0.3 1.25 -0.22 0.19
Czech Republic 6 35 -5 6 15 49 -2 25 3 4 0.01 0.03 1.07 1.38
Denmark -8 39 0 6 -7 92 4 27 3 6 -0.54 0.54 -0.13 -0.28
Estonia 4 7 -4 9 11 66 -6 33 -3 16 0.03 0.01 0.52 2.54
Finland 19 49 0 8 -12 91 0 26 2 3 0.22 0.28 -0.08 -0.20
France 31 82 1 9 -1 71 1 30 1 6 0.28 0.40 -0.02 -0.26
Germany -1 71 -7 7 -1 80 3 30 2 9 0.53 0.91 -0.01 -0.35
Greece 76 145 11 17 5 42 0 34 -1 8 0.68 0.4 -0.06 2.31
Hungary 16 72 -2 8 -3 50 1 27 0 2 -0.01 0.11 2.42 2.87
Ireland 40 69 2 10 -1 75 -2 30 3 11 0.01 0.27 -1.26 0.36
Italy 32 116 3 9 2 46 0 32 5 6 0.55 0.17 -0.01 -0.23
Latvia 26 30 -3 12 18 49 -2 36 -8 17 0.04 0.01 0.26 2.65
Lithuania 21 30 -4 10 13 52 1 35 0 1 0.05 0.03 1.08 3.37
Luxembourg 16 17 1 5 -2 83 4 29 9 43 0.25 0.61 0.46 -0.20
Malta -21 65 -3 6 -12 58 1 28 9 6 1.62 1.54 0.07 1.07
Netherlands 7 57 0 5 -5 86 0 26 2 4 -0.31 0.62 0.19 -0.36
Poland 6 50 -14 10 25 51 -6 31 1 0 0.02 0.04 1.2 2.07
Portugal 64 100 2 11 0 63 -4 34 1 4 0.02 0.01 -0.79 1.64
Romania 16 28 -3 7 19 39 -5 35 0 0 0.02 0.01 1.36 1.95
Slovakia 10 43 -10 13 10 47 -3 25 1 1 -0.04 0.03 0.66 1.57
Slovenia 47 49 0 7 1 62 0 24 3 4 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.88
Spain 53 69 6 17 -14 63 3 34 3 10 0.1 0.03 -0.94 0.34
Sweden -8 42 -1 7 -8 90 5 26 3 6 1.8 1.64 0.05 -0.33
United Kingdom 49 68 0 6 -4 80 -3 32 4 7 -0.27 0.38 -0.08 -0.23
EU-28 21 60 -1 9 2 64 0 30 2 8 0.25 0.39 0.28 0.92
Eurozone 25 66 0 9 0 66 0 30 2 10 0.31 0.42 -0.02 0.78
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there are different types of contextual-level factors related to different 
types of public support. It is this complexity that the statistical model, 
presented in the following subchapter, will be able to account for.  
5.4 Statistical analysis 
                     He who knows only one country knows none. 
    Sartori, 1991, p. 245 
The following subchapter will present and discuss the analytical design 
and method used for the statistical part of this thesis, and also explain 
thoroughly how the analytical method has been adapted for the specific 
empirical purpose of this thesis. The subchapter will start with a 
general discussion regarding the purpose of the analytical design, 
which was to find a statistical model that is able to account for 
variations within and between countries within the same model over 
time. Thereafter, follows a more concrete presentation regarding the 
concept of multilevel modelling, which constitutes the statistical 
method used, and Linear Mixed Models (LMMs), which is the specific 
type of multilevel modelling used within this thesis. As Norris (2011, p. 
51) has noted, the “recent decades have witnessed a burgeoning array 
of approaches and indicators designed to evaluate the performance of 
the state and its core institutions,” and the statistical method used in 
this thesis has so far not been widely used within similar studies. 
According to De Vries (2018, p. 204), public attitudes “represents a 
kaleidoscope that closely reflects the national conditions in which 
people find themselves. In other words, people’s attitudes toward the 
EU are framed by the national circumstances in which people live and 
their evaluations of these conditions”. Identifying a statistical method 
that is able to account for and connect contextual-level factors with 
aggregated country levels of public support, both within and between 
countries over time, has therefore been the main requirement when 
choosing the statistical method. This method will be thoroughly 
presented in the next section.     
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5.4.1 The statistical method 
Pennings et al. (1999, p. 43) noted that “the question of what to compare 
leads to the matter of how to compare”. As the “what to compare” is 
the levels of public support within and between member states of the 
EU over time, the questions of “how to compare” in order to answer 
the two explanatory research questions of this thesis remains. That is 
therefore what this section will focus on. Two of the main research 
questions for this thesis are related to explaining the member state 
levels of public support for the different system components of the EU 
as a political system. More explicitly the two research questions are:  
- To what extent can contextual-level factors explain the 
variations within countries in public support for the different 
system components of the EU as a political system?  
- To what extent can contextual-level factors explain the 
variations between countries in public support for the different 
system components of the EU as a political system?   
Therefore, a statistical method that enables the accounting of both 
cross-sectional (between countries) and longitudinal (within countries) 
differences in public support were necessary. The basis for the 
analytical design was to identify a statistical method that makes it 
possible to statistically show whether, and to what extent, within and 
between-country variations in public support for the EU can be 
predicted by internal factors (economic performance, democratic 
culture) or external factors (external pressure, EU-relation). The basic 
guidelines for the analytical approach was, hence, to find a method that 
makes it possible to combine information about national contextual-
level developments with aggregated country levels of public support 
for eight different system elements of the EU over time, within 28 
separate countries. Based on this logic, each independent variable 
included in the model was created with the sole purpose of intercepting 
either the between or within-country effects on public support. 
As the analytical design includes multiple independent variables, 
multiple countries as well as a time-component, the natural choice is to 
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conduct regression analyses. The goal of a basic regression analysis is 
to provide a statistical estimation of how some y will change when 
some x varies and, according to Fairbrother (2013, p. 916), “multilevel 
models have the merit of providing accurate estimates of statistical 
uncertainty and significance and of allowing for a richer range of 
relationships to be explored”. Multilevel data structures exist when 
some unit of analysis can be considered a subset of other units, and 
there is data available for both levels (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002, p. 
218). A multilevel regression model could, hence, be regarded as a 
complex form of ordinary least squares (OLS)-regression, but is used to 
analyse the variance in an outcome of interest when the predictor 
variables are at different hierarchical levels (Woltman, Feldstein, 
MacKay & Rocchi, 2012). Multilevel models are appropriate when the 
research interest is connected to “the relationships of variables in data 
sets with some form of dependency introduced by a hierarchical 
design” (West, 2009, p. 208). Furthermore, by using a multilevel model, 
it is possible to analyse the statistical effect of a contextual factor that 
varies at multiple levels, such as unemployment levels, on public 
support. As argued by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, pp. 114–122), 
the estimated between countries effect may differ from the estimated 
within countries effect, and the effects on public support do not need 
to be the same for a particular explanatory variable. This technique 
therefore allows a direct investigation regarding the determinants for 
the varying levels of public support without assuming that the 
relationship is the same both within and between the 28 member states 
of the EU, which is of crucial importance for this analytical design. 
According to Fairbrother (2014, p. 125), using a multilevel model 
allows for both a between and within countries analysis, as “it provides 
a direct investigation of social change without assuming that the 
longitudinal relationship is the same as the cross-sectional one”. A 
multilevel model is therefore the most appropriate “for analyses of 
complex data structures where units are grouped, and a given unit’s 
expected value on the dependent variable depends on the group(s) to 
which it belongs” (Fairbrother & Martin, 2013, p. 353). Using pooled 
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time-series (within countries) that also acknowledges cross-sectional 
data (between countries), also makes it also possible to increase the 
number of observations (Plumper, Troeger & Manow, 2005, p. 329). 
According to Fairbrother, there has also been a discussion on how to 
adapt the multilevel modelling approach so that the model is able to 
distinguish between the cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships. 
However, according to Fairbrother (2014, p. 124), it should be 
manageable:  
“The technical requirement for distinguishing between cross-
sectional and longitudinal relationships is simple: calculating a 
mean, and subtracting that mean from the time-varying variable of 
interest xtj. The technique thus group mean-centers the covariate. 
Separate longitudinal and cross-sectional associations between xtj 
and y can be identified by calculating the mean of xtj across all 
relevant years for each country. The coefficient on the country mean 
𝑥j captures the effect on y of enduring cross-national differences in 
xtj. To capture the effect on y of variation over time within each 
country, 𝑥j can then be subtracted from xtj. The resulting longitudinal 
component xtjM (a country-year level variable) is group mean-
centered, and is orthogonal to 𝑥j, such that the two coefficients can 
be estimated separately”.78  
According to Fairbrother (2014, p. 125), the multilevel modelling 
method thereby allows for both a within and between countries 
analysis. That is also the main argument for using multilevel modelling 
for the statistical analyses.  
For the analytical purpose with this analytical design, this study 
uses the linear mixed model (LMM) method, which is a statistical method 
that makes it possible to incorporate multilevel hierarchies in the data 
(Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013, p. 133). According to Garson (2012, p. 
3), LMMs are able to “handle data where observations are not 
independent” and are also able to produce more robust results 
compared to the ordinary OLS-regressions. There are also other 
advantages using an LMM, the most important being perhaps that 
                                                     
78 xtj=country/years variable, y=dependent variable, 𝑥j=within countries variable.  
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missing data for a time-point, which is normal in longitudinal studies, 
does not constitute a problem as LMMs are able to accommodate also 
unbalanced data sets. Another important aspect is that LMMs allow the 
researcher to consider both time-invariant (mean) and time-varying 
(year-specific) covariates as predictors of a continuous dependent 
variable (West, 2009, pp. 208–209). Edwards, Muller, Wolfinger, Qaqish 
and Schabenberger (2008, p. 2) also argue that one of the main statistical 
advantages with using an LMM model is that the model not only 
specifies the mean structure, but also the time-varying structure in the 
data. This is also one of the main strengths with using this kind of two-
level model, as the independent variable includes two parts, one that is 
specific to the country level (mean) and does not vary over time, and 
one that represents the difference between occasions (variation from 
mean by year). These two taken together represent the total effect of an 
independent variable on the outcome of interest (Bell & Jones, 2015, p. 
137), in this case aggregated member state levels of public support for 
different system elements of the EU.  
Following Söderlund, Wass and Grofman (2011, pp. 100–101), the 
country based contextual-level factors are modelled as a combination 
of (1) their mean values across time for each member state and (2) year 
specific values for each member state and measurement of public 
support (the variable is therefore cluster-mean centred, i.e. the 
deviation from the member state mean).79 In the statistical models, the 
mean values account for the between countries variability, and the 
measurement-specific values account for within countries variability 
(or the public support measurement-specific deviation from the cluster 
mean). The model produces regression estimates that connect both the 
within and between countries variations in public support to the 
contextual-level factors included in the model. The rationale for 
including the cluster mean as a separate covariate is to more directly 
                                                     
79 A random intercepts model is a statistical model in which intercepts are allowed to 
vary, and therefore, the scores on the dependent variable for each individual 
observation are predicted by the intercept that varies across groups (Garson, 2012, pp. 
7–8). 
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analyse whether the between-member states and within-member states 
effects are different, which is necessary for this thesis.  
This hence constitutes a basic two-level multilevel model, where the 
level 1 and level 2 predictors (time-specific and group-mean centred 
values of the independent variables) are included as fixed effects to 
predict both the within and between-country variations in public 
support. The country-mean values represent the differences between 
countries, and functions as a predictor for explaining the between 
countries variations in public support. The country mean variables are 
created as described here: 
Country-mean = (Value 2004 + Value 2005… + Value 2017)/14 
The year-specific variable is cluster-mean centred, indicating the 
deviation from the mean value during the period of 2004–2017. To be 
more specific, this is conducted in order to distinguish between the 
relative within and between countries effects when analysing the data 
in the same model, and the national level variables are, hence, entered 
in two ways (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). The mean-deviated variables 
compare changes within a country over time, and are calculated for 
each time point during 2004–2017 as follows: 
Group-mean centred = (Mean value – Year specific value) 
This is a recommended approach when there are considerable 
between countries variations, and this kind of modelling allows the 
model to account for the different within and between countries effects 
(Snijders & Bosker, 2012; LaHuis, Hartman, Hakoyama & Clark, 2014). 
As this can be quite challenging to comprehend, the following section 
will present how the regression estimates that are used to indicate the 
within and between countries variations in public support have been 
derived through SPSS, strictly following the guidelines provided by 
West (2009).  
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SPSS 
The dependent variable for this statistical method constitutes the 
indicator of public support of interest, reflecting the year-specific level 
of public support in each member state during 2004–2017, in total 14 
time-points per member state for the main part of public support 
variables. Sixteen covariates were included in the model as explanatory 
variables: eight indicating the country mean of the independent 
variable, but also eight group-mean centred variables that reflect how 
the specific value varies from the mean value during the period of 
2004–2017. The country mean and group-mean centred values were 
then also added as fixed effects in the model. In order to obtain country-
specific values, a country ID was created so that SPSS could 
acknowledge the cross-country dimension of the data and this country-
ID was therefore included as subjects in the model. As the analytical 
purpose is also to analyse how the variations in the contextual-level 
variable predict the variations in member state levels of public support 
over time, the model also included the intercept and subject groupings 
based on ID-combinations (country-dimension) as random effects. The 
intercept was included because it is expected that each country has 
different intercepts that need to be accounted for in the model, and 
hence the country-ID was also added to the combinations window so 
that the model was able to also account for the differences between 
countries. As there was no need to place any restrictions on the random 
effects in this model, and to allow for the estimation of variance, the 
covariance type was set at unstructured.  
This indicates that the model includes a random effect associated 
with the intercept for each country, and as the covariance type was set 
at unstructured, the model allows for the estimation of the variance of 
the random effects (West, 2009, pp. 214–215). The model therefore 
constitutes a random intercept model, in which the intercepts are 
allowed to vary between groups (countries). SPSS then produced 
parameter estimates, which are used to indicate the predicted effects on 
the dependent variable within and between countries based on the 
variations in the contextual-level factor over time, with maximum 
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likelihood estimation (ML) as an estimator method. The ML method 
was used because it is able to handle unbalanced data and produces 
identical fixed effects estimates, while also being the most commonly 
used with longitudinal data (Shek & Ma, 2011, p. 58). The model hence 
produced sixteen parameter estimates, which function in the same way 
as normal linear regression coefficients.  
Within multilevel studies, the explained variance (R²) achieved by 
the model is also often accounted for, as the R² values provide valuable 
information regarding how much of the variation in the dependent 
variable is explained by the independent variables included in the 
model (Snijders & Bosker, 1994, p. 342). Within LMMs, the R² values 
are, however, not produced directly by the outputs in SPSS, as is the 
case with general OLS-regression outputs. Hence, the explained 
variance achieved by an LMM needs to be computed. Following the 
guidelines provided by LaHuis et al. (2014, pp. 434–436), so-called 
pseudo R² values were computed to indicate the explained variance on 
the outcome of the dependent variable(s) explained by the independent 
variables included in the models. The pseudo R² values obtained reflect 
how much of the variation can be explained on a scale from 0–1, with 
higher values indicating more of the variance explained by the model. 
According to LaHuis et al. (2014), it is possible to use these 
measurements for random intercept models. The formulas used to 
obtain the pseudo R² values are based on the logic that when predictors 
are added to the model, there should also be a reduction of the 
unexplained variance in the model. Hence, the formulas compare 
variance components from the different models. Following LaHuis et 
al. (2014), the coefficients for the within-country variance explained 
were obtained by comparing the residual variance (unexplained 
variance) component σ² from the full model (when contextual-level 
factors were added to the model) with the residual variance from the 
null model (without contextual-level factors included in the model). 
The within-country variance explained by the model could hence be 
calculated through the formula (see next page): 
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The coefficient for the between-country variance explained by the 
models were obtained by comparing the intercept component τ00 from 
the full model with the intercept component from the null model. The 
between-country variance explained by the models could hence be 
calculated through the formula: 
 
These measurements resemble what was recommended by Snijders 
and Bosker (1994, p. 342), namely to “treat proportional reductions in 
the estimated variance components as analogues of R² values”. 
According to LaHuis et al. (2014, p. 446), the measures for the within 
variance explained by the model usually show “accepted levels of bias, 
constituency, and efficiency across all conditions and models” while 
the between measurement used in this analysis is, according to them, 
“not an efficient estimator”. They therefore recommended using the 
within measurement of variance explained, while being careful with 
interpreting the results from the between measurement, as it does not 
always seem to produce a good reflection of the variance explained 
between groups. However, due to a lack of a better measurement 
option, the results for the between-countries variation explained will 
still be reported in the following chapter. Another negative aspect of 
using these measurements to explain variance in the model is related to 
the risk of producing negative values, either due to the way fixed effects 
and variance components are estimated or even as a result of model 
misspecification (LaHuis et al., 2014, pp. 435–437). Nevertheless, and 
even when taken this into account, these pseudo R² values still provide 
a useful summary of the magnitude of the effects, and “may be 
particularly useful in multilevel studies where unstandardized 
coefficients are reported often” (LaHuis et al., 2014, p. 446).   
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In short, the main argument for using this type of statistical analysis 
is that it is possible to obtain two types of regression estimates from the 
same multilevel model, one that indicates the between countries effect 
and one that indicates the within countries effect of a contextual-level 
factor on the member state levels of public support for different system 
components of the EU. However, to make the results more statistically 
robust for statistical analyses, it has also been argued here that it is 
necessary to also include all of the independent variables in the same 
analytical model. The pseudo R² values computed (through the 
author’s own calculations) should also provide valuable information 
regarding the usefulness of the contextual-level factors for explaining 
public support for the different system elements of the EU. By adapting 
this type of statistical method for the analytical purpose in this thesis, 
it was also possible to obtain comparable regression estimates that will 
constitute the main findings of this thesis. In the following chapter 
summary, the main arguments and guidelines derived from this 
chapter are presented. 
Chapter summary 
Before moving on to the results, a short reminder regarding the 
purpose of this thesis will be given. Within the literature, a wide range 
of contextual-level factors have been identified as probable predictors 
of the developments in public support, both within and between the 
EU member states. These contextual-level factors have been broadly 
categorised into two categories, constituting internal- (economic 
performance, democratic culture) and external factors (external 
pressure, EU-relation). Two contextual-level indicators related to each 
of these groups have been included as independent variables in the 
models, taking into account that the indicators should not be measuring 
similar developments. Within this study, national level aggregates of 
public support for eight different system elements of the EU are used 
to measure different kinds of public support. The data used to reflect 
country levels of public support consists of observations derived from 
survey respondents (Eurobarometer) from the 28 member states of the 
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EU area during the period of 2004–2017.80 In Figure 7, the general 
research design is broadly illustrated.  
 
Figure 7. Summary of research design. 
In order to capture the between and within-country effects in the 
same statistical model, two separate independent variables have been 
created for each contextual-level indicator. One country-mean variable 
in order to capture the between-country effects, and one group-mean 
centred, in order to capture the within-country effects. The analytical 
argument for using multilevel models is that it provides more 
statistically robust estimates, as the year specific observations are 
                                                     
80 There is also a methodological discussion regarding the number of countries required 
to reliably predict the country-level effects, and Bryan and Jenkins (2016, p. 19), for 
instance, suggest that 25 countries could be used as a minimum level for linear models 
and 30 countries for logit models. Hence, the 28 countries within this study should be 
sufficient for a linear model. 
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clustered within countries. In the following chapter, the focus will be 
on presenting the empirical results derived from this thesis, starting 
with the longitudinal trends in public support for the different system 
elements of the EU within each member state during the period of 
2004–2017. This is in order to more explicitly show that there are 1) 
significant variations between countries regarding the levels of public 
support for the different system elements of the EU, and that there are 
2) significant fluctuations in the levels of public support within the 
member states over time (especially since 2008).  
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6. Results 
Before we can embark on an analysis of the factors which affect support for 
integration, we must have an overview of the main trends in such support.  
Niedermayer, 1995, p. 54 
This subsequent chapter will present and focus on the empirical 
findings derived from this study. The chapter begins with a descriptive 
overview regarding the country-level trends in public support for 
elements related to the three main system components of the EU as a 
political system during the period of 2004–2017. As Eurobarometer (EB) 
started to include survey data from all of the current 28 member states 
in 2004 (EB 62), that is the year to serve as the natural starting point for 
this overview.81 The chapter begins by presenting descriptive data 
regarding country-level trends in public support for European 
integration policies, divided into public support for the widening (EU 
enlargement), deepening (common European defence) and securing 
(the single European currency) of European integration policies. 
Thereafter, data regarding trends in public support for the EU 
regime, divided into public support for the EU regime institutions 
(trust in the EP), EU regime processes (satisfaction with EU democracy) 
and EU regime principles (EU membership support) will be presented. 
The EU regime principles category will also include survey data 
regarding public support for the free movement of people within the 
EU area, as it reflects public support for the founding principles upon 
which the EU was founded. In the final descriptive section, data 
regarding public support for the European political community is 
presented, which is divided into two kinds of affective attitudes; 
European identification and EU attachment. After introducing the 
descriptive part of this chapter, the focuses shifts to the more analytical 
                                                     
81 With the EU enlargement in 2004, the Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became members of 
the EU. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria became members and in 2013 Croatia became 
the latest member state. However, all of the 13 new member states have been included 
regularly in the EB surveys from 2004 onwards.  
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part, and the results from the statistical analyses will be presented 
stepwise. In the final part of this chapter, the results will be discussed 
together with the analytical limitations. 
6.1 Trends in EU support 
Aggregated levels of public attitudes towards separate system 
elements of the EU are used in this study to measure the country levels 
of public support within the EU area. The concept of public attitudes 
could be widely defined as “anything people have in mind with respect 
to a specific object” (Niedermeyer & Westle, 1995, p. 44), but within this 
overview the focus will solely be on attitudinal indicators reflecting 
public support for the different system elements. One of Easton’s (1965, 
p. 161) main arguments was that it is possible to estimate varying 
degrees of public support for different components of a political 
system, and through that approach be able to make projections about 
the health and status of a political system as a whole. The general 
purpose with this subsequent subchapter is, however, twofold. First of 
all, this overview will show that there are significant variations 
between countries regarding the longitudinal trends in public support, 
and that there are also significant variations within countries regarding 
public support for the different system elements of the EU. Hence, for 
instance, public support towards the EU regime institutions within a 
country during this period might have declined significantly, while 
simultaneously increasing towards the EU regime principles. The 
figures presented, constituting the descriptive data, show the 
aggregated amount of “EU-positive” responses within a given country, 
based on survey data from EB during 2004–2017.82 Furthermore, there 
are also data included reflecting the EU-28 and Eurozone averages 
during this period. When there has been more than one survey data 
point available for a survey item (EB usually includes survey items 
twice a year, during the spring and autumn editions), the mean values 
                                                     
82 A full overview regarding the specific EB-surveys used within this thesis is included 
on pages 363–367. 
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for that year are presented. The subsequent section now begins by 
presenting data regarding the trends relating to public support for 
European integration policies.   
6.1.1 European integration policies 
As has been noted earlier, there are large amounts of survey items 
within the survey data that measure attitudes towards a wide range of 
European integration policies. Many of these survey items have also 
been included regularly by EB over time, making it possible to also 
make longitudinal assertions regarding the developments in public 
support. This provides researchers with comprehensive data material 
regarding comparable member state levels of public attitudes towards 
specific European integration policies within the EU area. Starting with 
public attitudes towards the prospect of a future expansion of the EU, 
measured by member state levels of public support for the prospect of 
future EU enlargements, it should be clearly stated that this survey item 
does not particularly state which countries any future EU enlargement 
would concern, and the survey item therefore reflects public attitudes 
towards the general prospect of further EU enlargement. As the EU in 
2018 proposed a timeline for when two aspiring candidate countries, 
Serbia and Montenegro, might be ready to become full member states 
of the EU (2025), the issue of EU enlargement will most likely develop 
into a hot topic in the near future. As late as during the mid-2000’s, even 
Turkey’s possible EU membership was also being discussed at the 
highest political levels in Europe. Specific member state levels of public 
support for EU enlargement are summarised in Figure 8 (see page 
211).83 
                                                     
83 See Appendix Table 11 page 320 for member state level values 2004–2017.  
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Figure 8. Public support for future EU enlargement 2004–2017. Source: 
Eurobarometer 2004–2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.84  
When comparing the member state levels of public support from 
2004 with the most recent data from 2017, there is a clear indication that 
public support for future EU enlargement seems to have declined 
within every single member state of the EU since 2004. The decline in 
levels of public support has been most notable in the Czech Republic 
with a 43-percentage point drop (36%), and in Bulgaria (63%) and Italy 
(44%) with a 31-percentage point drop. It should, however, be noted 
that Bulgaria was not even an EU member in 2004, and hence this 
question then indirectly also referred to EU enlargement to include 
Bulgaria. The lowest levels of public support for future EU 
enlargement, based on the most recent survey data, are found in the 
                                                     
84 EB survey question: “What is your opinion of each of the following statements? Please 
tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it? Further enlargement of 
the European Union to include other countries in future years”. Chart shows 
proportion responding “For”. 
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Netherlands (27%) and Austria (27%). Hence, only one in four in these 
two countries were in favour of EU enlargement. In 2017, there was 
only a majority in 13 of the member states still supportive of the future 
expansion of the EU area, and of those only Ireland (54%) and Spain 
(72%) are pre-2004 member states.  
Continuing this overview with public support for the future 
deepening of European integration, measured by public support for the 
prospect of a common European defence policy. This survey item has 
been included by EB since 1990 (EB 34), and the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) already included paragraphs regarding the future development 
of deeper European cooperation within defence- and foreign policies. 
After the 2017 election of President Emmanuel Macron in France, there 
were also initial discussions regarding the possibilities of more serious 
attempts at increasing EU co-operation within defence- and security 
issues, as President Macron had openly called for the creation of an EU-
army, as well as for a shared European defence budget.85 Member state 
levels of public support for a common European defence policy are 
summarised in Figure 9 (see page 213).86   
                                                     
85 This during a talk at the Paris-Sorbonne University on the 26th of September 2017 
(BBC).  
86 See Appendix Table 13 page 322 for member state levels of public support for a 
common European defence policy 2004–2017. 
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Figure 9. Public support for a common European defence policy 2004–2017. 
Source: Eurobarometer 2004–2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.87 
When comparing the levels of public support for the deepening of 
European integration in 2017 with 2007, the year that public support for 
a common European defence policy peaked within the EU area, public 
support has declined within a majority of the member states. The 
downward trend is most noticeably in Romania (78%) and the Czech 
Republic (74%), where public support has declined by 15-percentage 
points, and in Hungary (75%) by 12-percentage points. However, 
public support for this proposal has also increased, most noticeably in 
Sweden (66%) and in the United Kingdom (71%) by 7-percentage points 
during this period. Also, according to the most recent survey data, there 
                                                     
87 EB survey question: “What is your opinion of each of the following statements? Please 
tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it? A common defence 
policy among the Member States of the European Union towards other countries”. 
Chart shows proportion responding “For”. Survey item not included by EB during 
2009. 
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is a significant majority within every member state still in favour of 
creating a common European defence policy, or at least in favour of 
deeper defence cooperation depending on how this question is 
interpreted. The levels of public support being the lowest in Austria 
(61%) and the highest in Lithuania (93%). Looking at the general trends 
within all of the member states, public support for this policy proposal 
does not seem to fluctuate heavily over time, indicating that the 
perceived benefits with this European integration policy do not seem 
to have changed during this period, at least not to any larger extent.  
The final and most system important element of the European 
integration policies component, from a long-term system persistence 
perspective, relates to the securing of an already implemented 
European integration policy. Member state levels of public attitudes 
towards the securing of an already implemented European integration 
policy are measured by the levels of public support for the single 
European currency, the euro. The survey item used for measuring 
public support for the single European currency has been included 
sporadically by the EB (EB 34) since 1990, many years before it became 
a political reality. This is also perhaps the most widely discussed 
European integration policy during the last three decades, which has 
become especially apparent since the start of the Eurocrisis in 2010. In 
2019, 19 out of 28 member states had adopted the euro as a currency, 
the only exceptions being the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. 
Member state levels of public support for the single European currency 
are summarised in Figure 10 (see page 215).88 
                                                     
88 See Appendix Table 12 page 321 for member state levels of public support for the 
single European currency 2004–2017. 
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Figure 10. Public support for a single European currency 2004–2017. Source: 
Eurobarometer 2004-2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.89 
Public support for the single European currency peaked within the 
EU area in 2004, when the mean value of public support within EU-28 
was 71 per cent. However, based on the most recent data from 2017, 
public support was still as high as 67 per cent. There are, however, 
significant cross-country variations within the EU area regarding the 
levels of public support. When comparing 2004 with 2017, the levels of 
public support were, for instance, 43 percentage points lower in the 
Czech Republic (22%), 40 percentage points lower in Bulgaria (44%) 
and 35 percentage points lower in Poland (36%). However, during the 
same period, public support for the single European currency has 
increased by 33 percentage points in Malta (85%), by 29 percentage 
points in Estonia (29%) and by 16 percentage points in Latvia (83%). 
                                                     
89 EB survey question: “What is your opinion of each of the following statements? Please 
tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it? A European Monetary 
Union with one single currency, the euro”. Chart shows proportion responding “For”. 
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The differences in public support for the single European currency 
between eurozone and non-eurozone countries should, hence, largely 
be explained by the eurozone membership factor, as the levels of public 
support are significantly higher within the countries that are actually 
using the single European currency. It should also be noted that the 
nine most negative member states towards the single European 
currency, based on the member state levels of public support, are all 
non-eurozone countries. When looking at the more supportive member 
states, over 75 per cent of the public supports the single European 
currency in 14 out of 28 member states, ranging from 76 per cent in 
France to 89 per cent in Ireland. Only within seven of the non-eurozone 
countries is there a majority of the population not supporting the single 
European currency, based on the country levels of public support from 
2017.  
From observing the longitudinal trends regarding the developments 
in public support for these three elements of the European integration 
policies component, it is possible to make a few initial general remarks. 
In countries such as Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and the Czech 
Republic, there is an apparent declining trend in public support for 
European integration policies since 2004, as the levels of public support 
have declined towards all of the three European integration policies 
within these countries, and in most cases the decline is also significant. 
However, when only focusing on public support for future EU 
enlargement, it is possible to argue that there has been an EU-wide 
general decline in public support. Regarding public support for a 
common European defence policy, there are more varied cross-country 
developments. Moreover, public support for the single European 
currency seems to be determined by whether the member state is a 
member of the eurozone or not, as public support for the single 
European currency within the eurozone seems to have remained stable, 
and also increased, in many of the member states over time. The 
development has, however, been quite the opposite within the member 
states outside of the eurozone. This overview, however, exemplifies 
why European integration policy issues should be treated 
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independently within empirical analyses, as there are significant 
variations within and between member states regarding the levels of 
public support towards these three elements. In the following section, 
the member state levels of public support for the three system elements 
of the EU regime component are presented.   
6.1.2 The EU regime 
In the subsequent section, member state level developments in public 
support for the three elements of the EU regime component will be 
presented, starting with public support for the EU regime institutions. 
Public attitudes towards the EU regime institutions are measured by 
member state levels of trust in the European Parliament (EP), and since 
1999 a survey question measuring trust in the EP has been included by 
EB (EB 51). Delhey and Newton (2004, p. 4) noted that “there are good 
reasons for interpreting trust not so much as an individual property 
that people “have” or “carry around” with them, but as something 
based on how people evaluate the society they live in”. Country levels 
of trust in the EU regime institutions are also the best indicators of how 
the EU regime institutions have been, and are, being evaluated by the 
European public. Nevertheless, trust in the national parliament has 
been shown to be the best individual level factor explaining trust in the 
EP (Munoz et al., 2011) and this might to some extent indicate that the 
country levels of trust in the EP are a reflection on how the 
performances of national political institutions are being evaluated by 
the European public. Hence, the same contextual-level factors affecting 
public evaluations of the national parliament are also, at least 
indirectly, connected to public evaluations of the EP. From a system 
persistence perspective, there is also no way of knowing with certainty 
whether the stability of the EU is indeed threatened by declining levels 
of trust in the EU regime institutions, which is also true regarding the 
effect of declining trust in the national political institutions (Marien & 
Hooghe, 2011, p. 268). 
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The European Parliament (EP) is the only directly-elected political 
organ at the supranational European level, as well as the, still, only 
directly-elected supranational political organ in the world. Even 
though it is, at least theoretically, not as important what the general 
European public think about the EP as what they think about their 
national parliaments, the levels of trust in the EP do signalise what the 
European public think about the performance of the EP. Prior to the 
start of the global recession in 2008, the country levels of trust in the EU 
regime institutions were, however, largely perceived as a non-issue 
among scholars. This was mainly because the country levels of trust in 
the political institutions of the EU regime were significantly higher than 
trust in the national political institutions in most of the member states, 
and this especially within the post-communist states (Harteveld et al., 
2013). Nevertheless, Harteveld et al. (2013, p. 544) have also argued that 
the aggregated member state levels of trust in the EU regime 
institutions could be regarded as a reflection of public support towards 
the functioning of the institutional structure within the EU regime. The 
relatively high levels of trust in the EU regime institutions prior to the 
global recession should, according to Scharpf (2013), be due to the EU 
regime enjoying a certain amount of output-oriented legitimacy during 
that period. Output-oriented legitimacy is, according to Schmidt (2015, 
p. 11), also a “performance criterion focused on policy effectiveness,” 
and in the period of 2000–2008, the eurozone countries were 
performing economically better than the non-eurozone EU member 
states (Wood & Quaisser, 2008, p. 31). During this period of time, this 
could then be used as an argument for the advantages of being deeper 
integrated. That argument has, however, seemingly disappeared since 
the start of the Eurocrisis in 2010.  
Survey data regarding country levels of trust in the political 
institutions of the EU regime have been collected by EB since 1999, 
although longitudinal survey data measuring trust is only available 
regarding levels of trust in the European Parliament (EP), the European 
Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB). However, EB 
has also sporadically collected survey data regarding trust in other EU 
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regime institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, the 
European Committee of Regions, the Council of the European Union, 
the European Council, the European Ombudsman and the Economic 
and Social Committee of the European Union. In reality, the European 
public do not tend to differentiate much in their evaluations of the 
different EU regime institutions and the longitudinal trends regarding 
country levels of trust in, for instance, the EP and the EC are almost 
identical within countries. Therefore, researchers often tend to create 
trust indexes, including some of the EU regime institutions, when 
conducting empirical analyses (Arnold et al., 2012). Within this thesis, 
however, the focus is solely on trust in the EP as an indicator of public 
support for the EU regime institutions, as it is deemed sufficient 
enough for this empirical approach. The EP is, furthermore, the only 
directly-elected political chamber within the EU regime. Member state 
levels of trust in the EP are summarised in Figure 11 (see page 220).90 
 
                                                     
90 See Appendix Table 14 page 323 for member state levels of trust in the EP 2004–2017. 
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Figure 11. Trust in the European Parliament 2004–2017. Source: 
Eurobarometer surveys 2004–2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.91 
Trust in the EP peaked within the EU area in 2004, when the mean 
value of trust was over 74 per cent. Still, in 2008 country levels of trust 
in the EP within the EU area were 71 per cent. That was, however, prior 
to the start of the global recession. When comparing the country levels 
of trust in the EP from 2004 with the most recent from 2017, the member 
state levels of trust in the EP have declined in almost every member 
state. The only exceptions being Sweden and Finland, where the levels 
of trust have increased slightly. The levels of trust in the EP during this 
period have declined by 47 percentage points in Greece (30%), 39 
percentage points in Slovenia (41%) and 33 percentage points in both 
Spain (43%) and the Republic of Cyprus (46%). However, there is still a 
                                                     
91 EB survey question: “I would like to ask you a question on how much trust you have 
in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend 
to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Parliament”. Chart shows proportion 
responding “Tend to trust”. 
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majority within a majority of the member states that tends to trust the 
EP, and the levels of trust are highest in Lithuania (74%), Malta (74%), 
Luxembourg (70%) and Sweden (70%). There has also been a significant 
shift in most countries since 2014, when the levels of trust in the EP 
reached their lowest point with a mean value of trust at 52 per cent 
within the EU area. Since then, the levels of trust have increased in 21 
out of 28 member states, most noticeably by 17 percentage points in 
Spain (43%), 16 percentage points in Portugal (56%) and 13 percentage 
points in Ireland (62%). However, when comparing the levels of trust 
in 2007, prior to the start of the global recession, with the levels in 2017, 
the levels of trust are only higher in four countries in 2017 (Finland, 
United Kingdom, Croatia and Sweden).  
The second element of the EU regime component relates to 
democratic processes within the EU regime. Member state levels of 
public attitudes towards this element of the EU regime component have 
been measured by the survey data through the member state levels of 
satisfaction with the EU’s democratic performance since 1993 (EB 39). 
It is argued in this study that process evaluations reflect public attitudes 
towards the functioning and performance of the EU regime, and 
Boomgaarden et al. (2011), for instance, argue that performance, as a 
subcategory of specific/utilitarian/output-based support, largely relates 
to what Norris (2011) referred to as public attitudes towards the 
“regime processes”. Country levels of public satisfaction with EU 
democracy could thereby be directly used to measure public support 
for the performance processes of the EU regime (Linde & Ekman, 2003; 
Karp & Bowler, 2006), and Rohrschneider (2002) went as far as to 
suggest that satisfaction with EU democracy also shapes public 
attitudes towards European integration in general, and this especially 
within well-functioning national political systems. According to Hobolt 
(2012, p. 100), “public evaluations of democratic processes are 
increasingly important to the integration process,” and hence the 
country levels of public satisfaction with EU democracy could be 
argued to reflect public attitudes towards the democratic principles of 
the EU regime, as well as towards how the democratic processes 
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function in practice. Norris (1999, p. 75), however, argued that the 
emphasis on “how democracy works” indicates that it reflects public 
evaluations of the regime processes. It has also been widely argued 
that, at the individual level, satisfaction with EU democracy is closely 
related to satisfaction with the way democracy works at the national 
regime level (Hobolt, 2012, p. 89), as is the case with trust in the EU 
regime’s political institutions and trust in the national regime’s political 
institutions. Both Rohrschneider (2002) and Hobolt (2012) have also 
shown that the European public take cues from the national level when 
forming an opinion about the EU’s democratic performance, and that 
there appears to be a positive relationship between democracy 
satisfaction at the two levels. Armingeon and Guthmann (2014, p. 17) 
also noted that public satisfaction with democratic performance at the 
national level varies with perceived outcomes of governmental 
policies, and hence public satisfaction at the EU level is also here used 
as a performance-related indicator of public support for the EU regime. 
Member state levels of satisfaction with EU democracy are summarised 
in Figure 12 (see page 223).92 
 
                                                     
92 See Appendix Table 15 page 324 for member state levels of satisfaction with EU 
democracy 2004–2017. 
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Figure 12. Satisfaction with EU democracy 2004–2017. Source: 
Eurobarometer 2004–2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.93   
Country levels of satisfaction with EU democracy peaked within the 
EU area in 2006, when the mean value of satisfaction with EU 
democracy was 64 per cent, 1 percentage point higher than in 2004. Still, 
in 2009 the mean value of satisfaction within the EU area was 62 per 
cent.94 Four years later in 2013, however, country levels of satisfaction 
with EU democracy had declined to 52 per cent within the EU area. 
Based on the most recent survey data from 2017, the mean value of 
satisfaction within the EU area was 58 per cent. When comparing the 
country levels in 2004 with 2017, public satisfaction with EU democracy 
was higher in 2017 in only nine countries, most noticeably by 15 
                                                     
93 EB survey question: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European 
Community? Would you say you are...?” Chart shows proportion responding “Very 
satisfied” or “Fairly satisfied”.  
94 It should be noted that the survey item was unfortunately not included in any EB 
survey during 2008. 
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percentage points in Portugal (64%), 11 percentage points in Finland 
(60%) and 7 percentage points in Sweden (55%). On the other hand, 
during this same period public satisfaction with EU democracy 
declined by 37 percentage points in Greece (27%), 26 percentage points 
in Slovenia (48%) and 22 percentage points in Spain (50%). 
Nevertheless, when comparing 2017 with the lowest levels of public 
satisfaction with EU democracy in 2013, public satisfaction was higher 
in 2017 in all except three member states (Poland, Hungary and the 
Netherlands).  
What is most notable here is Portugal, where public satisfaction had 
increased by 46 percentage points during this period, but also in the 
Republic of Cyprus and in Ireland the levels had increased by 19 
percentage points. Also, country levels of public satisfaction with EU 
democracy were at over 50 percentage points in 21 out of 28 member 
states in 2017. In general, there has been an apparent decline in public 
support for the EU regime processes since the start of the global 
recession in 2008. However, the decline has not been as significant as 
with the country levels of trust in the EU regime institutions. There are, 
however, undeniable similarities between public attitudes towards 
these two elements, because the countries in which the levels of public 
support have declined the most towards the EU regime processes are 
mostly the same countries where trust in the EU regime institutions has 
also declined. This should also have been expected, as public attitudes 
towards both of these elements of the EU regime have been used to 
reflect how the EU regime is deemed to be performing according to the 
European public.  
The final element of the EU regime component in this study is 
referred to as the EU regime principles, which is the most important 
element from a system persistence perspective. According to Norris 
(1999, p. 75), public support for the basic principles of the EU regime 
are commonly measured by public attitudes towards European 
unification, EU membership and European co-operation “since these 
values lie at the heart of the European project”. Country levels of public 
support for the EU regime principles have been measured by EB 
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through the “EU membership”-question since the start of EB surveys in 
1973. This survey item has also been by far the most widely used to 
operationalise and measure public support for the EU within the 
extensive EU literature. However, the survey item is slightly 
problematic, because the object of the question is the respondent’s own 
country instead of the EU (Niedermayer, 1995, p. 54). There has also 
been a discussion on whether the question should be used to measure 
specific support (Rabier & Reif, 1987) or diffuse support (Handley, 
1981; Niedermayer, 1995).  
However, within this thesis, this survey item is used to measure 
public attitudes towards the principles of the EU regime, following 
Norris, and is further treated as constituting the most system important 
attitudinal indicator of public support for the EU regime. As the 
question has been regularly included by EB since 1973, it is also the 
most interesting survey item when looking at longitudinal trends in 
public support for the EU regime. However, for some strange reason, 
EB has not included the question in their “Standard Eurobarometer 
Surveys” since 2010, but has instead chosen to include it only within 
so-called “Special Eurobarometer Surveys,” which focus on different 
specific topics and are conducted a few times a year. Member state 
levels of public support for EU membership are summarised in Figure 
13 (see page 226).95 
 
 
                                                     
95 See Appendix Table 16 page 325 for member state levels of public support for EU 
membership 2004–2017. 
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Figure 13. Public support for own country’s EU membership 2004–2017. 
Source: Eurobarometer 2004–2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.96  
It has been suggested within the literature that public support for 
EU membership in Europe might possibly have peaked in 1992, right 
before the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Citrin & Sides, 2004, p. 
47). Be that as it may, it is not within the scope of this thesis to answer 
that question, but during the period of concern for this thesis, public 
support for the EU membership peaked in 2004 during the same year 
as the EU area increased from 15 to 25 member states over a night. Then 
the mean value of public support for the EU membership within the EU 
area reached 58 per cent.97 In 2011 public support for EU membership 
fell to its lowest levels, when the country levels of public support had 
                                                     
96 EB survey question: “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY’S) 
membership in the European Union (in earlier versions referring to the European 
community) is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?” Chart shows 
proportion responding “A good thing”. 
97 This survey item was not included in Croatia during 2004–2012, and not in Bulgaria 
and Romania during 2004–2006.  
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declined to 48 per cent.  
When comparing the country levels of public support in 2004 with 
2017, the levels of public support have increased in 17 out of 25 
countries. This occurred most significantly by 20 percentage points in 
both Germany (81%) and Sweden (68%) and by 18 percentage points in 
Malta (66%). However, simultaneously the levels of public support 
have declined by 27 percentage points in Greece (36%), 21 percentage 
points in Italy (38%) and with 14 percentage points in the Czech 
Republic (31%). In 2017, there was also a majority supporting EU 
membership in all except eight countries, the highest being in 
Luxembourg (85%), Ireland (82%) and Germany (81%). On the other 
hand, only 31 per cent of the population in the Czech Republic, 36 per 
cent in Greece and 38 per cent in Italy expressed support for EU 
membership in 2017.  
The survey item measuring public support for each respective 
country’s EU membership constitutes a more diffuse kind of support 
for the EU regime than public support for the EU regime institutions 
and the EU regime processes. However, it does not directly reflect or 
measure public attitudes towards the more underlying principles of the 
EU regime in the direct meaning of the concept of EU regime principles, 
as the guiding principles of the EU regime relate to the four freedoms 
established in the Treaty of Rome (1957). These are the freedom of 
movement within the EU area for labour, capital, goods and services. It 
is, however, not possible to use survey data provided by EB, nor any 
other data source, to measure public support for these EU regime 
principles for any longer period. However, since 2014, EB has 
sporadically included five survey items that can be used to 
descriptively show that the country levels of public support for these 
freedoms are also at a high level within the EU area.  
Since 2015, the EB has included a survey item measuring public 
attitudes towards the free movement of people within the EU area, 
which arguably comes closest to something resembling public attitudes 
towards the EU regime’s guiding principles as they are more broadly 
defined in this thesis. Member state levels of public support for the 
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proposal of the free movement of people within the EU area are 
summarised in Figure 14.98 
 
Figure 14. Public support for the free movement of people 2015–2017. Source: 
Eurobarometer 2015–2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.99 
Even though the survey question is framed as a proposal, as it is 
included within a battery of questions of other EU related proposals, it 
nevertheless reflects public support for something that has been 
implemented within the EU area since the 1950’s. However, the 
proposal of free movement of people within the EU area does have, 
according to the latest survey data in 2017, overwhelming levels of 
public support within every member state of the EU; the mean value of 
                                                     
98 See Appendix Table 20 page 329 for member state values of public support for the 
free movement within the EU area 2015–2017. 
99 EB survey question: “What is your opinion on each of the following statements? 
Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. The free 
movement of EU citizens who can live, work, study and do business anywhere in the 
EU”. Chart shows proportion responding “For”. 
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public support within the EU area being as high as 87 per cent in 2017. 
There are, however also clear cross-country differences, as the country 
levels of public support range from 98 per cent in Estonia and 97 per 
cent in both Latvia and Lithuania to 74 per cent in Austria and 75 per 
cent in Denmark. Hence, irrespective of how this data is interpreted, it 
indicates that the open borders policy within the EU area does have 
considerable support within the EU area. Since 2014, EB has also 
included a survey item regarding whether respondents think it is a 
good thing that EU citizens can live and work abroad within the EU 
area. This survey item has probably become included by the 
Eurobarometer in order to account for the pressure put on the internal 
cohesion within the EU area during and after the great recession and 
the Eurocrisis. Furthermore, this survey item could also be considered 
to reflect public support for the underlying principles of the EU, as the 
free movement of people within the European political community is 
perhaps the most essential freedom ingrained within the EU treaties. 
The member state levels of public support for the right to work and live 
freely within the EU area are summarised in Figure 15 (see page 230).100   
 
 
                                                     
100 See Appendix Table 18 page 327 for member state levels of public support for the 
right to live and work abroad within the EU area 2015–2017. 
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Figure 15. Public support for the EU right to live and work abroad 2014–2017. 
Source Eurobarometer 2014–2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.101 
Also, according to this survey item, there is a majority within all of 
the member states that thinks it a good thing that people can live and 
work anywhere within the EU area. According to the survey data from 
2017, public support for the EU right to work abroad was 76 per cent 
within the EU area, and towards the EU right to live abroad 78 per cent. 
There are, however, also here significant cross-country variations 
regarding both of these survey items. Country levels of public support 
for the EU right to live abroad in 2017 ranged from 91 per cent in 
Luxembourg and 90 per cent in Spain to 59 per cent in Italy and 63 per 
cent in Austria. Regarding country levels of public support for the EU 
right to work abroad in 2017, the percentages ranged from 92 per cent 
                                                     
101 EB survey question: “For each of the following statements, please tell me if you think 
that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good or a bad thing. The right for EU 
citizens to live abroad / The right for EU citizens to work abroad”. Chart shows 
proportion responding “A good thing”. Black=Live abroad, Grey=Work abroad. 
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in Luxembourg to 59 per cent in Italy. Even though there are some 
significant cross-country variations in the levels of public support for 
these fundamental EU rights, there is, however, an overwhelming 
majority in favour of these EU regime principles within all member 
states.  
Since 2015, EB surveys have also included a similar question asking 
what the European public thinks about the right for EU citizens to live 
and work in one’s own country. This reflects a similar kind of attitude 
as the previous question, however it is slightly different in character as 
it reflects the public willingness to allow other, non-national, EU 
citizens the same opportunities in one’s own country, which 
presumably could be considered as demanding more solidarity 
towards other EU citizens. The member state levels of public support 
for the EU right to live and work in the respondent’s own country are 
summarised in Figure 16 (see page 232).102 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
102 See Appendix Table 19 page 328 for member state levels of public support for the EU 
right to live and work in one’s own country 2015–2017. 
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Figure 16. Public support for the EU right to live and work in own country 
2015–2017. Source Eurobarometer 2015–2017 downloaded from Gesis 
ZACAT.103 
The survey data suggest that there are similarities here in relation to 
public support for the right to live and work abroad within the EU area, 
namely that there is also a widespread majority in all of the member 
states in favour of the right of EU citizens to live and work in one’s own 
country. According to the latest survey data from 2017, a mean value of 
73 per cent supports the EU right to live in one’s own country and there 
is also a 73 per cent support for the EU right to work in one’s own 
country. There are also hear clear cross-country variations in the levels 
of public support. While 89 per cent in Spain and 87 per cent in both 
                                                     
103 EB survey question: “For each of the following statements, please tell me if you think 
that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither a good or a bad thing. The right for EU 
citizens to live in our country / The right for EU citizens to work in our country”. Chart 
shows proportion responding “A good thing”. Black=Live in our country, Grey=Work 
in our country. 
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Luxembourg and Ireland support the EU right to live in one’s own 
country, the corresponding levels are only 52 per cent in Italy and 54 
per cent in Croatia. A similar pattern emerges when looking at country 
levels of public support for the EU right to live in one’s own country, 
as the country levels of public support range from 90 per cent in 
Luxembourg and Spain to 52 per cent in Italy and 53 per cent in Croatia. 
There is, however, a majority within all countries within the EU area 
expressing public support also for these basic EU rights.  
In sum, it is interesting to note that public attitudes towards these 
three elements of the EU regime seem internally connected. Even 
though this was, to some extent, to be expected based on the literature. 
In this respect, Italy, Greece and the Czech Republic can be taken as the 
prime-examples of member states where the levels of public support 
have declined significantly towards all three system elements of the EU 
regime. However, it also becomes clear that the economic performance 
of the countries cannot explain all of the decline. The Czech Republic, 
for instance, has performed extremely well economically during this 
period.104 More on that later. This overview regarding public support 
for the EU regime elements also broadly shows that member state levels 
of public support for the EU regime institutions, processes and 
principles broadly follows the same longitudinal pattern. In the 
following section, the focus will be on the most important system 
component of the EU as a political system, i.e. the European political 
community, based on the guidelines provided by the system support 
theory. 
6.1.3 The European political community 
Member state levels of public attitudes towards the European political 
community are indicators of the more diffuse kind of support for the 
EU, which is measured in this section by member state levels of 
European identification and EU attachment. Country levels of public 
attitudes towards these two elements of the European political 
                                                     
104 According to Eurostat, the Czech Republic had, as an example, the lowest 
unemployment rates within the EU area in 2016 at 4 per cent.  
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community should thereby theoretically not be as easily affected by 
how the EU regime institutions and processes are evaluated, and even 
less by how the specific European integration policies are perceived by 
the European public. According to Kaina and Karolewski (2013, p. 26), 
the “relevance of a European collective identity has become more 
important as the supranational system of governance has developed, 
the problems of defining collective identity commonly hamper 
systemic inquiry on this subject”. The idea of a collective identity 
within a political community is intimately linked with the concept of 
citizenship (Scheuer, 1999, p. 25) and, according to Duchesne and 
Frognier (1995, p. 193), “the dream of the Community’s founding 
fathers was, ultimately, to see the emergence of a European identity”. 
Nevertheless, Duchesne and Frognier argued that it does not mean that 
this new European identity should directly replace the prevailing 
national identities, but that the European identity should, at least over 
time, become strong enough for Europe to develop as a real political 
entity. This kind of argumentation is, however, difficult to validate 
empirically.  
An important step in this direction is the implementation of 
European citizenship into EU-law, first in the Maastricht Treaty and 
further established in the Lisbon Treaty. As history has shown that the 
emergence of mutual identification within political communities takes 
time (Scheuer, 1999, p. 27), it does, however, constitute a crucial 
milestone in this process of creating a “European people”. However, as 
Berg (2007, p. 28) has argued, “a person can have a general European 
attachment without wanting either deeper or wider European 
integration; as well, it is theoretically plausible that a person might not 
feel European, but still support European integration for purely 
functional or self-interested reasons”. Nevertheless, as also Kaina (2006, 
p. 128) argues, a “strong collective identity directly contributes to the 
endurance of political systems, since we-feelings of the community’s 
members encourage their “readiness or ability to continue working 
together to solve their political problems”. It is thus, again, necessary 
to clearly state that these two attitudinal indicators do not directly 
235 
 
 
transfer into public support for the EU regime, or anything vaguely 
defined as “the EU”.  
There is, however, no “perfect indicator” to measure public attitudes 
towards the European political community, but the most widely used 
attitude used to operationalise European identification is to use the so-
called “Moreno-question”.105 The question has been included by EB 
occasionally since 1992, and has been widely criticised and even called 
“seriously unusable” by some researchers (Bruter, 2008, p. 281).106 
While acknowledging this critique, the survey item does provide the 
most longitudinal data regarding the extent of European identification 
within the member states of the EU, and will hence also be used within 
this study. As with the other survey items, the answers to this survey 
item have also been dichotomised to imply either solely identification 
with one’s own nation state or some identification as a European, 
following Polyakova and Fligsteins (2016) operationalisation of the 
survey item. The member states levels of European identification are 
summarised in Figure 17 (see page 236).107 
 
                                                     
105 EB survey question: “In the future do you see yourself as a) Nationality (only), b) 
Nationality and European, c) European and nationality, d) European only or e) Don’t 
know.  
106 Even though, this survey item has been used by, among others: Schild (2001), Carey 
(2002), Citrin and Sides (2004), Hooghe and Marks (2005), Fligstein (2008), Caporaso 
and Kim (2009), Risse (2010), Wilson (2011), Kuhn (2012), Mitchell (2016) and Polyakova 
and Fligstein (2016).  
107 See Appendix Table 21 page 330 for member state levels of European identification 
2004–2017. 
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Figure 17. European identification 2004–2017. Source: Eurobarometer 2004–
2017 downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.108  
Country levels of European identification within the EU area peaked 
in 2017, with 61 per cent to some extent identifying as Europeans within 
the EU area. Comparing the country levels in 2017 with the levels in 
2004, the levels of European identification have increased within 19 of 
28 countries. This has occurred most significantly by 31 percentage 
points in Hungary (70%), 21 percentage points in Luxembourg (85%) 
and 19 percentage points in Portugal (66%). However, the levels of 
European identification have simultaneously declined by 19 
percentage points in the Republic of Cyprus (51%), 10 percentage 
points in Romania (53%) and by 9 percentage points in Italy (59%). 
When comparing the country levels of European identification during 
                                                     
108 EB survey question: “In the near future, do you see yourself as…? (Nationality) only, 
(Nationality) and European, European and /Nationality), European only or None”. 
Chart shows pooled proportion responding either “Nationality and European”, 
“European and Nationality” or “European only”. 
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the midst of the economic crises of 2010 with 2017, the levels of 
European identification in 2017 were higher in all member states except 
two (the Republic of Cyprus and Greece). It should also be pointed out 
that during this period, the levels of European identification increased 
by 23 percentage points in the United Kingdom and in the Czech 
Republic and by 22 percentage points in Ireland. According to the 
survey data from 2017, there was a majority in all member states, except 
Greece, that identified, to some extent, as European. The highest 
country levels being in Luxembourg (85%) and Spain (78%).  
Public attitudes towards the other element of the European political 
community are measured by the country levels of EU attachment, 
reflecting the most affective sense of belonging towards a political 
community. This survey item was first included by EB in 1991 (EB 36), 
and has since then, unfortunately, only sporadically been included in 
EB surveys.109 That is also probably one of the reasons why this survey 
item has not been more regularly included in similar studies. The 
member state levels of EU attachment are summarised in Figure 18 (see 
page 238).110 
 
                                                     
109 The second time it was included was in 2002 (EB 56.3& 58.1) and then again in 2006 
(EB 65.2). Since 2012 it has, however, been included yearly within EB surveys.  
110 See Appendix Table 22 page 331 for member state levels of EU attachment 2006–
2017. 
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Figure 18. EU attachment 2006–2017. Source: Eurobarometer 2006–2017 
downloaded from Gesis ZACAT.111 
Country levels of EU attachment peaked within the EU area in 2017, 
when 54 per cent expressed some level of EU attachment. The survey 
item was not included by EB in 2004 and 2005, but when comparing the 
country levels of 2006 with 2017, one can notice that the levels of EU 
attachment have increased in 20 out of 28 countries. Most significantly 
by 25 percentage points in Latvia (70%) and 19 percentage points in 
both Estonia (48%) and Germany (69%). However, the country levels of 
EU attachment have simultaneously declined by 21 percentage points 
in Italy (47%) and 12 percentage points in the Czech Republic (37%). 
According to the survey data from 2017, there was also a majority in 
the majority of member states that felt some EU attachment. The 
                                                     
111 EB survey question: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town 
or village, to their region, to their country or to the European Union. Please tell me how 
attached you feel to: The European Union”. Chart shows proportion responding “Very 
attached” or “Fairly attached”. 
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highest levels of EU attachment being in Luxembourg (80%), Latvia 
(70%) and Germany (69%). On the other hand, in Greece (34%), the 
Czech Republic (37%) and the Republic of Cyprus (37%), only about a 
third of the public felt attached to the EU. There appear to be significant 
cross-country variations within the EU area also regarding the most 
diffuse kind of support for the European political community.  
Even though the country levels of the most diffuse kind of support 
for the EU generally seem to have recovered to, and even surpassed, 
the levels before the start of the global recession, there are also more 
concerning signals within some member states from a system 
persistence perspective. This is especially the case within countries 
where the diffuse kind of support has declined. According to system 
support theory, indicators reflecting the more diffuse kind of support 
are not supposed to fluctuate heavily over time. However, longer 
periods of declining levels of specific support should, over time, also 
transform into declining diffuse support. On the other hand, longer 
periods of increasing specific support should also, over time, transform 
into higher levels of diffuse support for the EU. Within some member 
states, it is possible, based on this overview, to argue that the declining 
levels of public support for the EU regime also seem to have affected 
public attitudes towards the European political community negatively 
(Greece, the Czech Republic). While, on the other hand, the reverse 
could be said of some member states, where public support for the EU 
regime might be connected to increased levels of diffuse support for the 
European political Community (Finland). However, this descriptive 
overview does not tell anything behind the underlying reasons for 
these developments. How these developmental variations can be 
explained will be further presented in the subsequent subchapter. In 
the following section, the general conclusions derived from this section 
are first summarised, before shifting focus to the more analytical part 
of this thesis, starting in the subsequent subchapter. 
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Summary 
This subchapter has provided an extensive overview regarding the 
member state levels of public support for different system elements of 
the EU. This overview has shown that there are significant variations 
within and between countries in public support over time, and also that 
there are significant variations between the different indicators of 
public support. Hobolt (2017, p. 224) argued that the Eurocrisis “has 
had consequences not only for the economic governance in Europe, but 
perhaps more fundamentally for the European Union’s political 
settlement and popular legitimacy. It presented the European Union 
(EU) with a fundamental challenge: on the one hand, the crisis led to 
greater public contestation of and opposition to the EU, and on the 
other hand, the Union has become ever more reliant on public support 
for its continued legitimacy”. It is difficult not to agree with Hobolt, 
when comparing the levels of public support prior to the start of the 
global recession and the Eurocrisis with the levels of public support 
during the following years, that the crises increased public opposition 
towards the EU. This was found especially within the countries most 
severely affected by the crises. However, the levels of public support 
for the most system important elements of the EU (EU membership, 
European identification, EU attachment) remained quite stable during 
this period within many countries. That is also in itself an interesting 
finding.  
Starting with public support for the European integration policies 
component, public support for the widening of the EU has declined 
within all 28 member states during the period of 2004–2017. Public 
support for the deepening of European integration has declined in 21 
member states, although not within most member states as much as 
public support for expansion has declined. Public support for the 
securing of European integration has declined within 18 member states, 
however most significantly within those countries that are not 
members of the eurozone. In general, there seems to have been a decline 
in public support for European integration during this period. With 
regard to public support for the EU regime component, public support 
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for the EU regime institutions has declined within 26 member states, 
Sweden and Finland being the only exceptions. Public support for the 
EU regime processes has declined within 17 member states, although 
not as significantly in comparison with public support for the EU 
regime institutions. Public support for the EU regime principles, 
measured by public attitudes towards EU membership, has declined in 
14 member states. However, looking at the country levels of public 
support for the free movement policy within the EU area, there still 
appears to be a considerable majority within most member states 
supporting one of the basic freedoms provided by the EU. In general, 
there seems to have been a decline in public support for the EU regime 
during this period.  
With regard to public support for the European political 
community, the levels of European identification have declined within 
ten member states, but based on the total levels within the EU area, the 
levels of European identification have increased during this period. 
There is also a similar development with regard to EU attachment, as 
the levels of EU attachment have increased within 21 countries during 
this period. In general, there seems to have been a slight increase in 
public support for the European political community during this 
period. An overview of this is presented in Table 8 (see page 242).  
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Table 8. Net change in member state levels of public support between 2004 
and 2017. 
 
 
The longitudinal trends in public support towards the different 
system components of the EU as a political system differ significantly 
within the EU area. This is apparent both between countries and 
through indicators of public support. However, as Peters (2013, p. 33) 
Policies Regime Community Total: 
Wide. Deep. Secu. Inst. Proc. Prin. Iden. Atta. Net decline
Country \ variable Enl. Def. Euro EP Dem. Mem. Ide. Att.* Total: 
Austria -7 -9 -8 -14 -3 3 -3 3 6 / 8
Belgium -14 -9 -8 -14 -10 -10 -1 -1 8 / 8
Bulgaria -31 -8 -40 -18 -4 -1 -7 -3 8 / 8
Croatia -17 -13 -21 -12 3 -6 -1 4 5 / 8
Republic of Cyprus -24 -6 4 -33 -20 -12 -19 9 6 / 8
Czech Republic -43 -15 -43 -32 -8 -14 15 -12 7 / 8
Denmark -17 -1 -22 -1 3 6 4 4 4 / 8
Estonia -27 -3 29 -13 -3 16 1 19 4 / 8
Finland -17 5 -1 1 11 10 8 13 2 / 8
France -15 -3 -4 -23 -4 -3 -8 7 7 / 8
Germany -9 -2 12 -2 0 20 8 19 3 / 8
Greece -22 -12 4 -47 -37 -27 -1 -1 7 / 8
Hungary -9 -15 -11 -24 -10 1 31 -5 6 / 8
Ireland -13 0 -1 -25 -10 1 7 6 4 / 8
Italy -31 -13 -4 -27 -8 -21 -9 -21 8 / 8
Latvia -25 -3 16 -15 6 3 1 25 3 / 8
Lithuania -20 -1 -9 -13 -1 -5 6 16 6 / 8
Luxembourg -13 3 2 -8 -4 0 21 13 3 / 8
Malta -6 5 33 -7 -1 18 7 17 3 / 8
Netherlands -26 -3 6 -9 -1 3 2 11 4 / 8
Poland -21 -7 -35 -16 1 17 10 4 4 / 8
Portugal -15 -3 11 -22 15 -2 19 7 4 / 8
Romania -23 -19 -23 -32 -14 -19 -10 -10 8 / 8
Slovakia -28 -10 14 -31 4 -6 0 14 4 / 8
Slovenia -24 -10 -4 -39 -26 -6 2 -8 7 / 8
Spain -8 4 11 -33 -22 -10 16 8 4 / 8
Sweden -9 8 -22 7 7 20 11 12 2 / 8
United Kingdom -9 2 -3 -8 -4 8 8 6 4 / 8
EU-28 -19 -5 -4 -18 -5 -1 4 6 6 / 8
Eurozone -18 -4 5 -19 -6 -2 3 8 5 / 8
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argued, it is good to have a dependent variable that varies extensively. 
Based on this overview, it is possible to argue that public support for 
both the European integration policies and the EU regime have 
declined within the EU area during this period, while, on the other 
hand, public support for the European political community has 
increased. Still, there is an overwhelming majority within all member 
states in support of the underlying founding principles of the EU, 
illustrated by the levels of public support for the free movement of 
people within the EU area, as well as the levels of public support for 
the right to work and live within the EU area. Hence, the European 
public still seem to support the concrete benefits that EU membership 
enables. There are, however, four countries where the levels of public 
support for all eight elements have declined during this period; 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy and Romania. However, in most countries 
there are more mixed developments. The underlying reasons behind 
these developments have also been widely discussed within the 
literature. Tömmel (2014, p. 335) and McCormick (2014, p. 218), for 
instance, argue that these developments are derived from the notion 
that a larger amount of the European public has started to perceive the 
EU as the source of problems instead of the solution. However, it has 
already been the common procedure of national-level politicians to 
blame the implementation of unpopular decisions on Brussels (Marks 
et al., 1996, p. 150; Obradovic, 1996, p. 202). Therefore, that argument 
does not tell the whole story about the declining levels of public 
support. 
Even though many EU scholars connect the declining levels of 
public support to the economic downturns caused by the global 
recession in 2008, and the Eurocrisis in 2010, some have also argued 
that public support for the EU regime has been in almost constant 
decline since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Hix, 2005; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Kaina, 2006; Mair, 2007). The Maastricht Treaty 
has therefore also been argued to constitute “a turning point in the 
study of public opinion towards European integration” (De Vries, 2018, 
p. 35). This long-term development in public support has also been 
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labelled by Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) as the “post-Maastricht 
blues”. Hence, the development with the declining levels of public 
support during the period of 2004–2017 could be just a continuation, or 
acceleration, of something constituting a longer trend. That assumption 
cannot, however, be confirmed by the findings presented in this thesis. 
6.2 Explaining EU support  
In this subchapter, the results from the statistical analyses are 
presented. As the results contain a great amount of important 
information, the results will be presented stepwise in a number of 
tables, each focusing on a specific system component of the EU. In the 
following section, the regression estimates for the three indicators of 
public support for the European integration policies (widening, 
deepening & securing) system component are presented. Thereafter, 
the regression estimates for the three indicators of public support for 
the EU regime (institutions, processes and principles) system 
component are presented. Finally, the regression estimates for the two 
indicators of public support for the European political community 
(identification & attachment) system component are presented. In 
order to highlight the main findings, the first part of this subchapter 
concludes with a summary section focusing on the main initial 
statistical findings. In the final part of this chapter, the more general 
findings derived from the statistical analyses and the methodological 
limitations with this study are presented and discussed.  
6.2.1 Determinants of support for integration policies 
The focus of this section is on presenting the regression estimates 
derived from the statistical analyses for explaining the within and 
between countries variations in public support for three different types 
of European integration policies. Based on the conceptualisation of the 
EU from a system perspective, public support for the European 
integration policies component is the least important component from 
a system persistence perspective. However, from the perspective of the 
future development of the EU, public attitudes towards this system 
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component are highly relevant as they signal in which direction the EU 
can develop without risking severe opposition from the European 
public. The theoretical assumption is that longer periods of declining 
levels of public support for European integration policies will, over 
time, also transform into declining levels of public support for the EU 
regime. Public support for European integration policies are also used 
to reflect the most specific kind of support, as public attitudes towards 
European integration policies are expected to fluctuate within countries 
when the perceived benefits of a European integration policy decline. 
The public in countries that should benefit more from a European 
integration policy are also expected to be more supportive of that 
policy.  
Three indicators regarding public support for European integration 
policies were included in the statistical analyses, each reflecting public 
attitudes towards different European integration policies. Public 
support for future EU enlargement reflects public support for the 
proposal of further expanding the EU area to include more member 
states in the future. Public support for a common European defence 
policy reflects public support for the proposal of deepening European 
integration within a specific and important policy-area. Public support 
for the single European currency reflects public support for the 
securing of an already implemented European integration policy. The 
three following tables presented include values reflecting the 
regression estimates, standard errors, variance components and 
explained variance achieved by the multilevel models. All regression 
estimates presented are unstandardised. The results from the statistical 
analyses explaining the country-level variations in public support for 
the three European integration policies are presented in Table 9 (see 
page 246).   
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Table 9. Explaining public support for European integration policies. 
 
European integration policies
Future EU 
enlargement
Common 
European 
defence
Single European 
currency
Between-country effects
Economic performance
Debt -0.19* (0.07) -0.13* (0.06) -0.21** (0.07)
Unemployment 1.27 (0.65) -0.03 (0.49) -0.48 (0.61)
Democratic culture
Non-corruption -0.52** (0.15) -0.41*** (0.11) -0.31* (0.14)
Economic inequality 0.19 (0.53) -0.01 (0.40) -0.91 (0.50)
External pressure
Foreign population -0.47* (0.22) 0.20 (0.17) -0.11 (0.21)
Refugees 6.05 (3.93) -1.27 (2.94) -4.02 (3.70)
EU-relation
Eurozone membership -5.33 (4.88) 8.48* (3.64) 37.64*** (4.59)
EU budget net reciever 0.77 (2.11) 0.37 (1.57) 1.44 (2.00)
Within-country effects
Economic performance
Debt -0.31*** (0.03) -0.15*** (0.02) -0.13*** (0.03)
Unemployment 0.26 (0.13) 0.23** (0.08) 0.45** (0.16)
Democratic culture
Non-corruption -0.21** (0.08) -0.13** (0.05) -0.26** (0.10)
Economic inequality -0.24 (0.22) -0.16 (0.14) -0.88*** (0.27)
External pressure
Foreign population -1.78*** (0.23) -0.41** (0.14) -1.48*** (0.29)
Refugees 1.09 (1.13) 0.34 (0.68) 1.05 (1.39)
EU-relation
Eurozone membership -7.34*** (1.30) 1.16 (0.79) 17.90*** (1.60)
EU budget net reciever -2.26*** (0.44) -1.56*** (0.27) -3.97*** (0.53)
Random effects
Residual (Null model) 69.32*** (5.42) 16.31*** (1.33) 71.02*** (5.55)
Residual (Full model) 27.37*** (2.14) 9.68*** (0.79) 41.13*** (3.22)
Intercept (Null model) 228.04*** (62.04) 79.71*** (21.66) 214.87*** (58.87)
Intercept (Full model) 57.04*** (15.83) 32.18*** (8.81) 49.15*** (14.35)
Pseudo R-squares
Between 0.75 0.60 0.77
Within 0.61 0.41 0.42
Countries 28 28 28
Observations 355 330 355
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Starting with public support for future EU enlargement, which 
reflects country levels of public support for the future expansion of the 
EU area. The question of further EU enlargement to include more 
member states is regularly on the EU agenda, and there are signs that 
the EU, in the near future, is preparing to grant EU membership to more 
countries from the Balkans, as has been discussed in the previous 
chapter. It should, first and foremost, be emphasised at this point that 
public support for future EU enlargement has declined significantly 
within all of the 28 member states during the period of 2004–2017.112 
Looking at the results presented in Table 9, five of the contextual-level 
factors were statistically connected (statistically significant) to the 
within countries variations in public support, debt, non-corruption, 
foreign population, eurozone membership and EU budget net receiver. 
These findings suggest that higher levels of debt, lower levels of 
corruption, higher proportion of foreign population, being a eurozone 
member state and paying proportionally less to the EU budget all 
predict lower levels of public support for future EU enlargement within 
countries over time. Regarding the statistical connection between 
countries, only three contextual-level factors were statistically 
connected to the variations in public support, debt, non-corruption and 
foreign population. These findings suggest that higher levels of debt, 
lower levels of corruption and a higher proportion of foreign 
population predict lower levels of public support for future 
enlargement between countries. According to the pseudo R² values, 
this multilevel model was able to explain 75 per cent of the between 
countries and 61 per cent of the within countries variations in public 
support for future EU enlargement.   
The second element of the European integration policies component 
is public support for a common European defence policy, reflecting 
country levels of public support for the deepening of European 
integration. This is a European integration policy that has been partially 
integrated within the EU machinery since the Maastricht Treaty, but 
has still not been further developed in practice. The general trends in 
                                                     
112 See Figure 8 page 211 for summary. 
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public support for this proposal during the period of 2004–2017 have 
been quite stable within the EU area, as there have been no significant 
fluctuations in member state levels of public support. According to the 
most recent data from 2017, there was also a majority in support of a 
common European defence policy within most member states.113 
According to the results presented in Table 9, five of the contextual-
level factors were statistically connected to the within countries 
variations in public support for a common European defence policy, 
debt, unemployment, non-corruption, foreign population and EU 
budget net receiver. These results suggest that higher levels of national 
debt, lower levels of unemployment, lower levels of corruption, higher 
proportional levels of foreign population and paying proportionally 
less to the EU budget predict lower levels of public support for a 
common European defence policy within member states over time. 
Regarding the variations between countries, debt, non-corruption and 
the eurozone membership factor were all statistically connected to the 
variations. These results suggest that public support for a common 
European defence policy is lower in member states with higher levels 
of debt and with lower levels of corruption, but higher in countries that 
are eurozone countries. With the contextual-level factors included in 
this multilevel model, 60 per cent of the between countries variations 
and 41 per cent of the within countries variations of the variations in 
public support for a common European defence policy were explained, 
according to the pseudo R² values.  
The third European integration policy is public support for a single 
European currency, reflecting member state levels of public support for 
the securing of an already implemented European integration policy. 
With regard to public support for the single European currency, it has 
been shown in the previous subchapter that there is a clear divide 
between the non-eurozone countries and the eurozone countries with 
regard to public support for the single European currency.114 According 
to the results presented in Table 9, seven of the eight contextual-level 
                                                     
113 See Figure 9 page 213 for summary.  
114 See Figure 10 page 215 for summary.  
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factors included were statistically connected to the within countries 
variations in public support. The results therefore suggest that higher 
levels of debt, economic inequality, foreign population and paying 
proportionally less to the EU budget predict lower levels of public 
support, while higher levels of unemployment, lower levels of 
corruption and being a eurozone country predict higher levels of public 
support within countries over time. Regarding the variations between 
countries, higher levels of debt and lower levels of corruption predict 
lower levels of public support, while the eurozone membership factor 
predicts higher levels of public support, suggesting that the levels of 
public support are higher in countries that are actually using the single 
European currency, have lower levels of debt and are more corrupt. 
With the multilevel model, 77 per cent of the between countries 
variations and 42 per cent of the within countries variations in public 
support for the single European currency were explained, according to 
the pseudo R² values.  
Based on the main findings presented in Table 9, it is possible to 
draw some general conclusions regarding the effect of contextual-level 
determinants on the variations in public support for the three different 
kinds of European integration policies, within and between countries. 
Starting with the between countries variations in public support, debt 
and corruption levels were statistically significant predictors in all 
cases. The results therefore clearly suggest that the general public in 
countries with higher levels of corruption are more likely to support 
European integration policies, while countries with higher levels of 
debt are more likely to be less supportive of European integration 
policies. With regard to between countries variations in public support 
for the single European currency, it is also worth noting how important 
the eurozone membership factor clearly seems to be. The public is 
generally more positive towards the single European currency within 
countries that are actually using the euro. Regarding the within 
countries variations in public support for European integration 
policies, four of the contextual-level factors were statistically significant 
for explaining the variations for all three European integration policies. 
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The results therefore suggest that higher levels of debt, higher levels of 
foreign population, paying proportionally less to the EU budget and 
lower levels of corruption are statistically connected to lower levels of 
public support for each of these three European integration policies 
over time. However, it is also important to point out that during 2004–
2017, most of the member states have accumulated higher levels of 
debt, and many of the post-2004 member states have, during this 
period, also started to pay proportionally more to the EU budget as 
their economies have grown proportionally more than the EU-15 
member states. It should also be noted that the proportional amount of 
foreign population has also grown in a majority of member states 
during this period, while there have been more mixed developments 
regarding the corruption level developments. In the following section, 
the determinants of public support for the EU regime will be presented 
and discussed. 
6.2.2 Determinants of support for the regime 
The focus of this section is on explaining the variations in public 
support for the three elements of the EU regime component. Three 
indicators reflecting public support for the EU regime were included in 
the statistical analyses, each reflecting public support for different 
elements of the EU regime. Trust in the European Parliament (EP) 
reflects public support for the EU regime institutions, satisfaction with 
EU democracy reflects public support for the EU regime processes, 
while public support for EU membership reflects public support for the 
EU regime principles. As member state levels of public support for 
these three elements of the EU regime have earlier been argued to be 
internally connected, it was also not to be expected that the statistical 
effects of the contextual-level factors would vary significantly between 
these three indicators of public support. The results from the statistical 
analyses explaining country-level variations in public support for the 
EU regime are presented in Table 10 (see page 251), according to the 
same guidelines as in the previous section.  
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Table 10. Explaining public support for the EU regime. 
 
 
EU regime
Trust in the 
European 
Parliament
Satisfaction with 
EU democracy
EU membership 
support
Between-country effects
Economic performance
Debt -0.16* (0.07) -0.14* (0.06) -0.18 (0.09)
Unemployment -0.26 (0.60) -0.22 (0.56) 0.49 (0.81)
Democratic culture
Non-corruption -0.10 (0.14) -0.15 (0.13) 0.17 (0.18)
Economic inequality -0.30 (0.50) 0.15 (0.46) 0.41 (0.67)
External pressure
Foreign population -0.09 (0.21) 0.20 (0.19) -0.01 (0.28)
Refugees 4.38 (3.64) -0.40 (3.40) -1.09 (4.91)
EU-relation
Eurozone membership 6.42 (4.51) -4.17 (4.22) 9.07 (6.09)
EU budget net reciever 2.91 (1.96) -0.42 (1.83) -1.44 (2.63)
Within-country effects
Economic performance
Debt -0.45*** (0.03) -0.23*** (0.03) -0.05* (0.02)
Unemployment -0.30* (0.13) -0.89*** (0.14) -0.98*** (0.13)
Democratic culture
Non-corruption -0.21** (0.08) -0.06 (0.09) -0.01 (0.08)
Economic inequality -0.49* (0.22) -0.26 (0.24) 0.40 (0.22)
External pressure
Foreign population -1.08*** (0.23) -0.62* (0.25) -0.16 (0.23)
Refugees 0.20 (1.12) 0.11 (1.20) 3.89*** (1.11)
EU-relation
Eurozone membership -4.64*** (1.29) -2.88* (1.43) 1.58 (1.28)
EU budget net reciever -1.93*** (0.43) -0.48 (0.47) -1.20** (0.43)
Random effects
Residual (Null model) 105.23*** (8.22) 67.61*** (5.50) 42.77*** (3.34)
Residual (Full model) 26.72*** (2.09) 30.15*** (2.45) 26.29*** (2.06)
Intercept (Null model) 73.63*** (21.92) 78.69*** (22.54) 129.80*** (35.57)
Intercept (Full model) 48.65*** (13.63) 41.79*** (11.85) 90.31*** (24.69)
Pseudo R-squares
Between 0.34 0.47 0.30
Within 0.75 0.55 0.39
Countries 28 28 28
Observations 355 330 355
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Starting with the results explaining the variations in member state 
levels of trust in the EP. This is considered as the least system important 
element of the EU regime component, based on the conceptual 
framework of this thesis. It should first of all be noted that the levels of 
trust in the EP have declined significantly within most of the member 
states during 2004–2017.115 Hence, it was not surprising that two of the 
contextual-level factors that were statistically connected to the within 
countries variations in public support were the two most directly 
performance-related factors, debt and unemployment. However, also 
corruption, economic inequality, foreign population, eurozone 
membership and EU budget balance were statistically connected to the 
variations. The results therefore suggest that higher levels of debt, 
unemployment, economic inequality, foreign population and paying 
proportionally less to the EU budget, as well as lower levels of 
corruption and being a eurozone country, are all connected to lower 
levels of trust in the EP within countries over time. Regarding the 
between countries variations, only debt levels were statistically 
connected to trust in the EP, suggesting that higher levels of debt 
predict lower levels of trust in the EP between countries. With the 
multilevel model, it was possible to explain 34 per cent of the between 
countries and 58 per cent of within countries variations in the member 
state levels of trust in the EP, according to the pseudo R² values.  
Continuing with satisfaction with EU democracy, which is here used 
to measure member state levels of public support for the EU regime 
processes. According to the conceptual framework of this thesis, public 
attitudes towards the EU regime processes also reflect public support 
for a more system important element of the EU regime than for the EU 
regime institutions. The general trend in public support within the EU 
area during this period has been similar to the trend regarding member 
state levels of trust in the EP, as might have been expected by the 
literature.116 Hence, it was not surprising that four of the same 
contextual-level factors were also statistically connected to the within 
                                                     
115 See Figure 11 page 220 for summary.  
116 See Figure 12 page 223 for summary.   
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countries variations regarding satisfaction with EU democracy, debt, 
unemployment, foreign population and eurozone membership. This 
suggests that higher levels of debt, unemployment, foreign population 
and being a eurozone member state all predict lower levels of trust in 
the EP within countries over time. Also, debt levels were the only 
contextual-level factor statistically connected to the between countries 
variations, as was also the case regarding trust in the EP. With the 
multilevel model, 47 per cent of the between countries and 55 per cent 
of the within countries variations in member state levels of satisfaction 
with EU democracy were explained, according to the pseudo R² values. 
The results here were similar to the results with regard to member state 
levels of trust in the EP, and hence these results suggest that country-
level variations in trust in the EP and satisfaction with EU democracy 
are largely explained by the same contextual-level factors.    
Concluding the EU regime section with the variations in public 
support for EU membership, which are used in this thesis to measure 
and reflect member state levels of public support for the EU regime 
principles. According to the conceptual framework of this thesis, public 
attitudes towards the EU regime principles are the most important 
element of the EU regime component when seen from a system 
persistence perspective. The general trends in public support within the 
EU area during 2004–2017 have been similar to that of member state 
levels of trust in the EP and satisfaction with EU democracy, with 
public support for EU membership also declining within many 
member states, although in most cases not to the same extent. Hence, 
the declining trends are not as clear, with significant variations between 
countries regarding the developments.117 Based on the results, four of 
the contextual-level factors were statistically connected to the within 
countries variations in public support for EU membership, debt, 
unemployment, refugees and EU budget balance. The results therefore 
suggest that higher levels of debt and unemployment, and paying 
proportionally less to the EU budget predict lower levels of public 
support for EU membership over time. However, there also seems to 
                                                     
117 See Figure 13 at page 226 for summary. 
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be a statistical connection between a higher number of refugees and 
higher levels of public support over time, which is quite surprising. 
Also, none of the contextual-level factors included were statistically 
connected to the between countries variations in public support. With 
the multilevel model it was possible to explain 30 per cent of the 
between countries and 39 per cent of the within countries variations in 
public support for EU membership, according to the pseudo R² values. 
With regard to the within countries variations in public support, these 
results were similar to the findings related to within countries 
variations in public support for the EU regime institutions and EU 
regime processes.  
Based on the main findings presented in Table 10, it is possible to 
draw some general conclusions regarding the contextual-level 
determinants of public support for the EU regime, within and between 
countries. As was expected, varying levels of economic performance 
within member states predict most of the within countries variations in 
public support for all of these three elements of the EU regime 
component, as all of the six regression estimates derived from the 
statistical analyses were statistically connected to the levels of both debt 
and unemployment. Higher levels of debt and higher levels of 
unemployment within a country over time hence predict lower levels 
of public support for the EU regime institutions, EU regime processes 
and EU regime principles; in short, therefore also for the whole EU 
regime. It is however also worth noting that there are significant 
differences between the country levels of public support for these three 
elements of the EU regime. It is also interesting to note how the 
eurozone membership factor is a statistically significant predictor for 
the within countries variations, regarding both public support for the 
EU regime institutions and the EU regime processes, but not with 
regard to EU regime principles. This suggests that as the kind of 
support becomes more diffuse, it is not as easily affected by short-term 
developments, as suggested by system support theory. In the following 
section, the determinants of public support for the European political 
community will be presented and discussed. 
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6.2.3 Determinants of support for the community 
The focus of this section is on the variations in public support for the 
two elements of the European political community component, 
measured by member state levels of European identification and EU 
attachment. Public support for the European political community 
reflects the most diffuse kind of support for a political system, and 
hence also the most important system component of the EU, seen from 
a system persistence perspective. According to the system support 
theory, diffuse support reflects deeper held feelings of loyalty, 
identification and attachment towards a system component for what it 
is, not because of what it does. Therefore, the diffuse support should 
also remain more stable over time. With regard to diffuse support for 
the European political community, however, the country levels of 
diffuse support are quite challenging to measure empirically, as the EU 
as a political system is still not strictly comparable with the political 
systems of the member states. This has been extensively discussed in 
chapter three.  
Nevertheless, within the conceptual framework of this thesis, the 
member state levels of European identification are used to measure the 
extent to which citizens perceive themselves to be participating in a 
shared European political community, while country levels of EU 
attachment measures the more affective kind of emotional attachment 
with the European political community created by the EU. 
Theoretically, and empirically, these two indicators of public support 
towards the European political community are closely related. As 
indicators of diffuse support are not expected to vary based on short-
term developments, both the between and within countries variations 
were expected to be more difficult to statistically predict with 
contextual-level factors than was the case with the member state 
variations in public support for the European integration policies and 
the EU regime. The results from the statistical analyses for explaining 
the country-level variations in public support for the European political 
community are presented in Table 11 (see page 256), according to the 
same guidelines as the tables in the two previous sections.  
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Table 11. Explaining public support for the European political community. 
 
European political community
European 
identification
Attachment to 
the EU
Between-country effects
Economic performance
Debt -0.08 (0.06) -0.04 (0.08)
Unemployment 0.54 (0.54) -0.44 (0.72)
Democratic culture
Non-corruption -0.25 (0.12) -0.25 (0.16)
Economic inequality -0.85 (0.44) -0.12 (0.59)
External pressure
Foreign population 0.21 (0.19) 0.41 (0.25)
Refugees 2.78 (3.26) -4.24 (4.36)
EU-relation
Eurozone membership 5.50 (4.04) 1.62 (5.40)
EU budget net reciever -3.64* (1.75) -1.50 (2.33)
Within-country effects
Economic performance
Debt 0.06* (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Unemployment -0.59*** (0.13) -0.47** (0.17)
Democratic culture
Non-corruption -0.04 (0.08) -0.05 (0.10)
Economic inequality 0.48* (0.24) 0.08 (0.29)
External pressure
Foreign population 0.15 (0.17) -0.44 (0.31)
Refugees 2.22* (1.08) 3.47* (1.34)
EU-relation
Eurozone membership -0.37 (1.40) 8.27*** (1.63)
EU budget net reciever 0.56 (0.44) -1.04 (0.53)
Random effects
Residual (Null model) 24.93*** (2.22) 34.69*** (3.39)
Residual (Full model) 21.90*** (1.95) 26.00*** (2.54)
Intercept (Null model) 72.46*** (20.06) 89.44*** (25.00)
Intercept (Full model) 38.53*** (10.92) 69.63*** (19.43)
Pseudo R-squares
Between 0.47 0.22
Within 0.12 0.25
Countries 28 28
Observations 280 237
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Starting with European identification, it should first of all be 
acknowledged here that the member state levels of European 
identification have not changed significantly within most of the 
member states during 2004–2017. However, there are significant 
variations between countries in the levels of European identification.118 
Based on the results presented in Table 11, four of the contextual-level 
factors were statistically connected to the within countries variations in 
European identification, debt, unemployment, economic inequality 
and refugees. This suggests that higher levels of unemployment predict 
lower levels of European identification, while higher levels of debt, 
economic inequality and refugees, on the other hand, predict higher 
levels of European identification within countries. With regard to the 
between countries variations, only the EU budget balance factor was 
statistically connected to the country levels of European identification. 
This suggests that the levels of European identification are lower in the 
countries that receive proportionally more from the EU budget. It is 
also important to point out that there appears to be a clear East-West 
divide with regard to EU budget contributions, as most of the pre-2004 
member states are net contributors to the EU budget. These countries 
have also been EU member states for a longer period, and hence 
perhaps become socialised into identifying as Europeans, as some have 
suggested (Karp & Bowler, 2006). With the multilevel model it was 
possible to explain 47 per cent of the between countries and 12 per cent 
of the within countries variations in member state levels of European 
identification, according to the pseudo R² values. 
Concluding this section with the results for explaining the variations 
in member state levels of EU attachment. It is important to 
acknowledge that although the general developments with regard to 
the member state levels of EU attachment have been similar to that of 
European identification, there is data missing for a significant number 
of time points for the member state levels of EU attachment (data for 
2004, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012 are missing).119 Therefore the 
                                                     
118 See Figure 17 page 236 for summary. 
119 See Figure 18 page 238 for summary.  
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amount of observations, on which the analysis was conducted, were 
smaller in comparison to European identification, making strict 
comparisons between these two indicators empirically challenging. 
Taking the data limitations into consideration, it was still necessary to 
include this indicator of diffuse support in the analysis, as the levels of 
EU attachment do reflect another kind of diffuse support than the levels 
of European identification, as EU attachment is of the more directly 
system affective kind of support.  
Based on the results presented in Table 11, three of the contextual-
level factors were statistically connected to the within countries 
variations in the levels of EU attachment, unemployment, refugees and 
eurozone membership. Hence, the results suggest that higher levels of 
unemployment predict lower levels of EU attachment, while on the 
other hand, a higher level of refugees and being a eurozone member 
are predictors for higher levels of EU attachment within countries. 
Surprisingly, none of the contextual-level factors included were 
statistically connected to the variations between countries, which 
suggests that the more diffuse an element becomes, the more 
statistically challenging it is to explain variations in public support 
between countries. With the multilevel model, 22 per cent of the 
between countries and 25 per cent of the within countries variations in 
member state levels of EU attachment were explained, according to the 
pseudo R² values.  
Based on the main findings presented in Table 11, it is possible to 
draw some general conclusions regarding how contextual-level factors 
are connected to the within and between countries variations in public 
support for the European political community. As was expected by the 
literature, many of the contextual-level factors that were statistically 
connected to the variations in public support for the European 
integration policies and the EU regime, both within and between 
countries, had not statistical effect on public support for the European 
political community. The only two contextual-level factors that 
produced statistically significant regression estimates for explaining 
the within countries variations in levels of European identification and 
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EU attachment were unemployment and refugee levels. Hence, these 
results clearly suggest that higher unemployment levels predict lower 
levels of public support, while a higher proportional number of 
refugees predicts higher levels of public support, for the European 
political community within countries over time. As expected, the 
analyses were not able to produce statistically significant regression 
estimates that could explain why public support for the European 
political community varies between countries. However, being a net 
recipient of the EU budget predicts lower levels of European 
identification between countries. Another interesting finding is that 
higher levels of debt predict higher levels of European identification, 
while higher levels of debt seem to predict lower levels of EU 
attachment within countries (although not statistically significant). This 
finding also illustrates why it was important to include more than one 
indicator for measuring public support for the European political 
community in the statistical analyses. In the following section, the main 
findings from the statistical analyses are summarised.  
Summary  
The results from the statistical analyses suggest that the contextual-
level factors included in the multilevel analyses were more adequate 
for explaining the variations within than between countries. These 
results also clearly suggest that it is more difficult to statistically predict 
the within-country variations in the more diffuse kind of support than 
to the more specific kind of support for the European integration 
policies and the EU regime, at least when including these types of 
contextual-level factors in the statistical analyses. These results also 
clearly suggest that there are clear empirical advantages from dividing 
the EU as a political system into different system elements, towards 
which the indicators of public support are directed, as there are 
different contextual-level factors that explain different kinds of public 
support. The results also clearly show that the effect of the contextual-
level determinants on member state levels of public support differs 
between the system elements. As the presentation of the results from 
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the statistical analyses shows, there is a large amount of information 
that needs to be acknowledged when trying to generalise the findings 
into the larger context of system development and persistence 
capabilities of the EU from a system perspective. The following 
subchapter will discuss the results more extensively.  
6.3 Results discussion 
This subchapter will discuss the findings derived from the previous 
two subchapters and relate these findings to the larger research 
purpose of this thesis. This subchapter will start with an overview 
regarding the developments in public support from a broad 
perspective in order to answer the first research question of this thesis.  
1. How have the member state levels of public support for the 
different system components of the EU as a political system 
developed over time?  
6.3.1 General trend in EU support 
In the subsequent section, the results from the descriptive part of this 
thesis are summarised in three tables. These tables include information 
regarding how the levels of public support changed between 2004–
2010, 2011–2017 and 2004–2017 towards European integration policies, 
the EU regime and the European political community. The reason for 
presenting the data divided into two separate periods is because these 
two periods largely represent two different eras, pre- and post-
Eurocrisis. As will also become apparent, there is a valid argument for 
also presenting these two periods separately.120 Also, as the country 
levels of public support have already been presented and analysed,121 
the data presented in the tables are summarised to reflect five group-
based values reflecting the change in percentage points during the 
periods within these groups. Hence, the net change in percentage 
                                                     
120 The period of 2004–2010 ends with the value from 2010, and the period of 2011–2017 
starts with the value from 2011. Hence these two periods constitute two different eras.  
121 See Appendix Tables 11–22 on pages 320–321 for member state level values.  
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points between 2004-2010, 2011-2017 as well as 2004-2017 will be 
presented in the tables. In the tables, the EU-28 mean value includes all 
of the current 28 member states (hence including the United Kingdom, 
as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia). The EU-15 mean value 
includes all of the West-European countries that were members of the 
EU prior to the great EU-enlargement of 2004. The EU-13 mean value 
includes all of the member states that have become EU member states 
after 2004 (including Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia). The eurozone 
mean value includes the 19 member states participating in the 
eurozone122 and the non-eurozone mean value includes the 9 member 
states not participating in the Eurozone to date.123  
European integration policies 
In this section, the focus is on the three indicators used to measure 
country levels of public support for the European integration policies 
component. These three indicators are related to the most specific kind 
of support for the EU. Public attitudes towards European integration 
policies are therefore expected to be determined and affected by the 
perceived benefits for the public provided by the suggested and/or 
implemented European integration polices. According to the 
theoretical framework, the European integration policies component is 
the least important system component from a system persistence 
perspective, while still remaining important in terms of the future 
development and direction of the EU. This is basically because the EU 
is still being built stepwise through the implementation of a wide range 
of European integration policies. However, what the European public 
think of these European integration policies also matters from the 
perspective of the system persistence capabilities of the EU as a political 
system as well, as continuing public dissatisfaction with European 
                                                     
122 Austria, Belgium, Republic of Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain. 
123 United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia. 
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integration policies should also, over time, have a negative effect on the 
levels of public support for the EU regime and the European political 
community. Public support for three kinds of European integration 
policy has been included in this thesis, referred to as the widening 
(future EU enlargement), deepening (common European defence) and 
securing (the single European currency) of European integration. With 
regard to the system importance of these three European integration 
policies, there is also a suggested hierarchy. The developments in 
public support for the three European integration policies are 
summarised in Table 12.   
Table 12. Public support for European integration policies 2004–2017. 
 
 
According to the conceptual framework of this thesis, the least 
system important European integration policy is related to the 
System element Change Change Change Mean
Widening
(Future EU enlargement) 2004-2010 2011-2017 2004-2017 2017
EU-28 -13 -1 -18 49
EU-15 -13 1 -15 41
EU-13 -12 -3 -22 59
Eurozone -14 -2 -18 46
Non-Eurozone -10 -8 -19 55
Deepening
(Common European defence) 2004-2010 2011-2017 2004-2017 2017
EU-28 -3 -1 -5 80
EU-15 -4 2 -2 78
EU-13 -1 -5 -8 83
Eurozone -2 -1 -4 82
Non-Eurozone -3 -4 -8 75
Securing
(Single European currency) 2004-2010 2011-2017 2004-2017 2017
EU-28 -5 4 -4 67
EU-15 -4 5 -1 69
EU-13 -5 3 -7 64
Eurozone -2 9 5 79
Non-Eurozone -11 -7 -25 40
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widening of the EU area, measured by the extent to which the public 
supports the prospect of a future EU enlargement. This is because what 
the public think about the prospect of further enlargement of the EU 
area does not say much in terms of the system persistence capabilities 
of the EU as it is. However, as has been shown, there are a large number 
of EU candidate countries that are waiting to be accepted into the EU 
(Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia etc.). Accepting more 
countries as member states without public approval could definitely 
result in more negative sentiments towards other system elements of 
the EU; mainly because new member states directly change the 
composition of the European political community (Ross, 2008; 
Hoeglinger, 2016). The levels of public support for future EU 
enlargement have declined significantly within all groups during 2004–
2017, but the most significant decline took place during the period of 
2004–2010. However, when looking solely at the period of 2011–2017, 
the levels of public support for future EU enlargement have actually 
increased within the EU-15 group. In general, there is a clear division 
between the EU-15 and EU-13 groups regarding public support for 
future EU enlargement, as the EU-13 group is much more positive 
towards the prospect of EU enlargement.  
There is also an interesting difference between the eurozone and 
non-eurozone groups, as the non-eurozone group is significantly more 
positive towards EU enlargement. This could, however, also be 
explained by the fact that only three of the countries in the EU-15 group 
are part of the non-eurozone group (Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the survey item 
used to measure public support for the widening of the EU area only 
reflects public support for future EU enlargement in general, and not 
with regard to specific countries. There are, however, good reasons to 
believe that a significant majority of the European public would be 
supportive of Iceland, Norway or Switzerland joining the EU, for 
example, as they would become net contributors to the EU budget. 
However, there might be more public hesitation regarding the prospect 
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of future enlargement when it relates to Turkey, North Macedonia or 
Serbia joining, as they would become net recipients of the EU budget.  
What has been argued to constitute the second most system 
important European integration policy is related to the deepening of 
European integration within a specific policy area, in this thesis related 
to the prospect of a common European defence policy. However, it 
would be extremely difficult for the EU regime to attempt to go through 
with deeper European integration within a policy area, particularly one 
resulting in the transference of more national-level decision-making 
powers to the EU level, without public approval, especially within 
high-profile policy areas. If this transference of decision-making 
powers would be performed without public support from the member 
states, it could further increase the notion of a democratic deficit within 
the EU-machinery (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). Public support for the 
deepening of European integration is measured through the country 
levels of public support for a common European defence policy, and 
the trend is similar with regard to public support for the deepening of 
the EU as it was towards expansion.  
The levels of public support for a common European defence policy 
have declined within all groups during the period of 2004–2017. 
However, the decline has not been as severe as the decline in public 
support for future EU enlargement. Again, looking solely at the period 
of 2011–2017, public support for a common European defence policy 
has actually increased within the EU-15 group, while the decline in 
public support continued during this period within the other groups. 
The higher levels of public support within the EU-15 group are 
probably connected to the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian 
Crimean peninsula in 2014, and perhaps also to the relatively large 
number of terrorist attacks within the EU-15 group during this 
period.124 Even though there has been a small negative trend in public 
support, there is still widespread public support for this European 
integration policy within each group, ranging from 75 per cent support 
                                                     
124 The overwhelming number of terrorist attacks within the EU area during 2011–2017 
took place in countries within the EU-15 group.   
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within the non-eurozone group to 83 per cent support within the EU-
13 group. Hence, at least with regard to this specific European 
integration policy, there is a clear majority of support for the further 
deepening of European integration within the EU area.  
The most system important European integration policy from a 
system persistence perspective is public support for the single 
European currency, the euro. Since this extremely ambitious 
integration policy has already led to the creation of a multi-speed EU, 
with core eurozone- and outer non-eurozone countries, it could become 
extremely difficult to continue using the single European currency 
without sufficient levels of public support. If one wants to be dystopian, 
one should remember what Angela Merkel noted in 2011, namely that 
“if the euro fails, Europe fails”. Especially after the Eurocrisis (2010), 
the faith of the single European currency cannot be studied without 
considering the kind of effect it will have on the EU as a political system 
as a whole. The third and final European integration policy, hence, 
relates to what in this thesis has been referred to as the securing of an 
already implemented European integration policy, measured here 
through the levels of public support for the single European currency.  
The trend with regard to public support for the single European 
currency differs quite extensively from the other two European 
integration policies, as the levels of public support for the single 
European currency have actually increased during 2004–2017 within 
the Eurozone group. Here it also becomes apparent why this period 
needed to be divided into two periods, as during 2004–2010 public 
support declined within each group, while public support increased 
again during the period of 2011–2017 within four groups. Especially 
with regard to the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone group, there is here 
an apparent difference in public support, as public support has 
declined by 25 percentage points within the non-eurozone group, 
simultaneously as public support increased by 5 percentage points 
within the eurozone group during the period 2004–2017. Roth et al. 
(2016, p. 956) argued that “the fact that the euro – a centerpiece of 
European integration – still finds support during the crisis should be 
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viewed as a necessary condition for its survival. The future will show 
if this support is sufficient to guarantee its existence”. The findings 
presented here broadly support that argument, at least with regard to 
the eurozone. Nevertheless, what Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, p. 41) 
argued almost five decades ago still seems true to date:  
“As a matter of fact we can make only very general statements about 
the relationship between the support indicators and political action 
– the kinds of statements which flow from the notion of “permissive 
consensus”. Positive indicators simply suggest to us that policy 
makers can probably move in an integrative direction without 
significant opposition, since this permissive consensus would tend 
to reduce the chances that opposing elites could mount an effective 
counterattack. Conversely, significant opposition and persistent 
social cleavage do not necessarily mean that integrative steps cannot 
be taken, but rather that the opportunities for blocking them are 
greater”.  
Taking that into account, the country levels of public support for 
different types of European integration policies will still tell us 
something about both the public attitudes and preferences towards 
these policies, simultaneously as it might have an impact on the 
willingness of the political authorities at member state levels to proceed 
with the European integration project in general. As political 
authorities are prone to making “cost/benefit”-calculations when both 
suggesting and implementing political policies, they are surely taking 
into account the extent of public opposition that they would be likely 
to face if pursuing a specific European integration path. The example 
previously used regarding the stalled TTIP-negotiations in 2016 clearly 
showed the direct effect public opposition towards a policy proposal 
can have (De Ville & Siles-Brugge, 2017). In short, there are clear 
variations over time with regard to public support for these three 
system elements of the European integration policies component. 
Public support for a common European defence policy has remained 
high within all groups, while public support for future enlargements of 
the EU area, on the other hand, has declined significantly within all 
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groups during the period of 2004–2017. The most striking finding, 
however, is what has happened with public support for the single 
European currency, and there is a clear difference in the levels of public 
support between countries that are actually using the euro as a 
currency and countries that do not. In the following section, the focus 
is on the more system important component of the EU, the EU regime.  
EU regime  
In this section, the focus is on the three indicators used to measure 
member state levels of public support for the EU regime component, 
divided into the three elements constituting the EU regime institutions, 
the EU regime processes and the EU regime principles. These three 
indicators are placed in the middle of the system support continuum 
presented in the conceptual framework, and public support for this 
system component is, hence, neither completely specific nor completely 
diffuse in character. The EU regime also constitutes what is normally 
referred to when speaking of “the EU”. In this thesis, the EU regime 
more concretely refers to the institutional framework that has been 
created at the supranational European level with the purpose of 
implementing European integration policies and, hence, according to 
the system support theory, also constitutes a European political 
community over which the EU regime has a political mandate. 
Therefore, without the EU regime, there is no European political 
community. Based on Norris’ (1999) conceptualisation of the EU from 
a political regime perspective, the EU regime in this thesis has been 
further divided into three different system elements of system 
importance, towards which the indicators of public support are 
primarily directed. As with the European integration policies, these 
three elements are not, theoretically, of equal importance when seen 
from a system persistence perspective and should, hence, be seen as 
ranging on a continuum ranging from the least (institutions) to the most 
(principles) system important element. As public support for the EU 
regime principles is suggested to reflect the most diffuse kind of 
support for the EU regime, it is therefore expected to remain quite 
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stable over time, while public support for the EU regime institutions 
reflects the most specific kind of support for the EU regime, and is 
hence expected to fluctuate more heavily based on the contextual-level 
developments. Survey data regarding the developments in public 
support for these three system elements of the EU regime component 
are summarised in Table 13. 
Table 13. Public support for the EU regime 2004–2017. 
 
 
Starting with public support for the EU regime institutions, 
measured by the levels of trust in the European Parliament (EP). 
According to the political trust literature, a minimal level of trust in the 
political institutions of the regime is of crucial importance within any 
kind of political system. This is because sustaining low levels of trust in 
the regime institutions will ultimately start challenging the stability of 
the political system as a whole (Dogan, 1994, p. 309; Hetherington, 2005, 
System element Change Change Change Mean
Institutions
(Trust in the EP) 2004-2010 2011-2017 2004-2017 2017
EU-28 -12 0 -18 56
EU-15 -13 3 -15 56
EU-13 -13 -3 -22 57
Eurozone -14 0 -20 56
Non-Eurozone -9 -2 -16 56
Processes
(Satisfaction with EU dem.) 2004-2010 2011-2017 2004-2017 2017
EU-28 -3 4 -5 58
EU-15 -4 5 -5 55
EU-13 -1 2 -5 61
Eurozone -5 6 -6 57
Non-Eurozone 1 0 -3 60
Principles
(EU membership support) 2004-2010 2011-2017 2004-2017 2017
EU-28 -8 10 0 58
EU-15 -9 10 0 62
EU-13 -7 10 1 53
Eurozone -11 10 -2 59
Non-Eurozone -2 8 4 54
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p. 15). Trust in the EU regime institutions should therefore be regarded 
as reflecting how the EU’s regimes current performance is evaluated by 
the European public (Harteveld et al., 2013, p. 544). In short, the levels 
of trust in the EP have declined significantly within all groups during 
the period of 2004–2017. The most significant declines in the levels of 
trust in the EP were during the period 2004–2010, but since 2011 the 
levels of trust in the EP have remained quite stable, and actually 
increased within the EU-15 group. It is also quite interesting that there 
are no significant differences between the groups regarding the levels 
of trust in the EP in 2017. However, one apparent finding is that the 
levels of trust have declined more significantly within the EU-13 group 
than within the EU-15 group.  
As the EU regime has been more democratised over time, following 
increased decision-making powers being transferred to the European 
Parliament (EP), public attitudes towards the democratic processes 
within the EU regime have also grown in importance. The levels of 
public support for the democratic part of the EU regime’s processes are 
usually measured by public attitudes measuring the levels of 
satisfaction with the democratic performance of the EU regime (Norris, 
1999). The development in public support for the EU regime processes 
is also similar to the development in public support for the EU regime 
institutions. In short, there has been a small decline in the country levels 
of satisfaction with EU democracy during the period of 2004–2017 
within all groups. However, during the period of 2011–2017, the 
country levels of satisfaction with EU democracy have actually 
remained stable, or even increased, within all groups. There are also no 
significant differences in the country levels of satisfaction with EU 
democracy between the groups, as there is a public majority expressing 
satisfaction with EU democracy within all groups in 2017.  
As the EU regime has been built based on liberal democratic 
principles and values, the public evaluation of EU regime principles 
reflects a deeper and more affective kind of support towards the 
underlying principles upon which the EU regime has been built over 
time. Public support for this system element of the EU regime 
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component is therefore more important in terms of the long-term 
system persistence capabilities of the EU than public support towards 
the EU regime institutions and processes. Public support for the EU 
regime principles are, following Norris (1999), measured by the 
country levels of public support for EU membership, the traditionally 
most widely-used survey item in studies measuring public support for 
the EU. Quite interestingly, the country levels of public support for EU 
membership have not changed significantly during the total period of 
2004–2017 within any of the groups. However, when looking at the two 
periods separately, it becomes apparent that the levels of public 
support for EU membership have been anything but stable. During the 
period of 2004–2010, the levels of public support declined within each 
group, but during 2011–2017 the levels of public support for EU 
membership returned to the levels of 2004. The levels of public support 
for EU membership in 2017 were highest within the EU-15 group (62%), 
while being lowest within the EU-13 group (53%). However, there was 
a public majority in support of EU membership within each group. In 
the previous subchapters, it was also described how the levels of public 
support for the underlying principles of the EU regime, related to the 
EU’s four freedoms, are still at a high level within all member states of 
the EU.  
The purpose with dividing the EU regime component into three 
separate evaluable system elements, towards which the indicators of 
public support are primarily directed, becomes clearer when 
presenting the findings in this context. The country levels of trust in the 
EP have decline significantly during the period of 2004–2017, while the 
decline has been less severe with regard to the country levels of 
satisfaction with EU democracy during this period. On the other hand, 
even though there was a significant decline in public support for EU 
membership during the period of 2004–2010, the levels of public 
support for EU membership have only declined within the eurozone-
group when looking at the total period of 2004–2017. Simultaneously, 
the levels of public support for EU membership have actually increased 
both within the EU-13 and the non-eurozone groups. Hence, it is 
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possible to argue that even though the more performance-related 
indicators, related to more specific kinds of support for the EU regime, 
have declined over time, the more diffuse kind of support for the EU 
regime seems to have returned to the pre-economic crises levels of 2004. 
In the following section, the focus is on the most system important 
component of the EU as a political system, the European political 
community.  
The European political community 
In this section, the focus is on the two indicators used to measure the 
country levels of public support for the European political community. 
These two indicators refer directly to the most diffuse kind of support 
for the EU from a system perspective. According to the system support 
theory, it is the diffuse kind of support that is the most important from 
a system persistence perspective over time. This is because it is the 
diffuse kind of support for the political system, in the form of affective 
sentiments towards and identification with the political community, 
which is supposed to hold a political system together during longer 
periods of system stress through crises. As the EU has been increasingly 
transformed into a more state-like political regime, it has also been 
argued that the EU as a political system has become more dependent 
on the most diffuse kind of support to withstand crises (Kaina, 2006). 
Hence, as Wessels (2007, p. 303) argues: “Orientations toward the 
political community have a special position in the hierarchy of political 
objects. They are the first-order level of support; the necessary basis for 
any political system. They encompass the political system in two ways: 
because the political system is embedded in the political community, 
and because they contain an element of self-ascription, membership, 
and identification going beyond the formal citizen role”. Survey data 
regarding the developments in public support for the European 
political community are summarised in Table 14 (see page 272). 
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Table 14. Public support for the European political community 2004–2017. 
 
 
Starting with the development in mutual European identification, 
measured by the country levels of European identification. An identity, 
in the social sense of the concept, is regarded as an affective state of 
belonging to a social group and is assumed to generate social 
preferences by emotional evaluations of social groups (Luedtke, 2005, 
p. 87). A mutual identification within a political community should 
therefore be regarded as an indicator of a shared sense of “we-feeling” 
within a political community (Kaina, 2006, p. 118), and hence at least 
function as a precondition for the development of diffuse support. In 
short, the levels of European identification have increased during the 
period 2004–2017 within all groups. However, during the period of 
2004–2010, the levels of European identification actually declined 
within all groups, while the levels have increased, on the other hand, 
during the period of 2011–2017. The levels of European identification 
are highest within the EU-15 group, and lowest within the EU-13 
group, while there are no significant variations between the eurozone 
and the non-eurozone groups. The primarily explanation as to why the 
levels of European identification are higher within the EU-15 group can 
System element Change Change Change Mean
Identification
(European identification) 2004-2010 2011-2017 2004-2017 2017
EU-28 -6 5 4 61
EU-15 -4 6 6 64
EU-13 -7 4 3 58
Eurozone -5 4 3 62
Non-Eurozone -9 10 6 60
Attachment
(EU attachment) 2006-2010 2013-2017 2006-2017 2017
EU-28 0 7 5 54
EU-15 1 10 6 55
EU-13 0 6 5 54
Eurozone 3 8 8 55
Non-Eurozone -4 6 0 52
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probably be traced to the notion that the EU-15 member states have 
been socialised into Europeans, as a result of their longer EU-
memberships (Karp & Bowler, 2006; Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014). 
The other indicator used to measure country levels of public support 
for the European political community are the levels of EU attachment. 
As diffuse support is theoretically based on deep sentiments of loyalty 
and “we-feelings” towards an object, it constitutes a more general 
attachment towards an object for what it is, not for what it does. The 
argument presented in this thesis is that longer periods of European 
identification should also transform into higher levels of EU 
attachment. It was also important to include two indicators of diffuse 
support, as especially the survey item used to measure country levels 
of European identification has been heavily criticised within the 
literature (Bruter, 2008, p. 281). Because of the limited availability of 
survey data, there are no directly comparable survey data presented 
regarding the trends in European identification and EU attachment. 
However, based on the survey data from the period of 2006–2017, the 
levels of EU attachment are higher in 2017 within all groups except one, 
the non-eurozone group. Especially in the eurozone group, the levels 
of EU attachment have increased significantly during this period, 
which suggests that using the euro also seems to have affected the 
levels of diffuse support. However, there is only a small margin 
between the eurozone and the non-eurozone groups when it comes to 
the levels of EU attachment in 2017. In the following section, the results 
from the statistical analyses are discussed in relation to the literature.  
6.3.2 Explaining the variations in EU support 
In this section, the results will be further discussed and presented, 
shifting the attention from the attitudinal indicators of public support 
to the contextual-level factors used to explain the variations in public 
support within and between countries in the statistical analyses. This is 
in order to provide answers to the two main research questions in this 
thesis, which are: 
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2. To what extent can contextual-level factors explain the 
variations within countries in public support for the different 
system components of the EU as a political system?  
 
3. To what extent can contextual-level factors explain the 
variations between countries in public support for the different 
system components of the EU as a political system?  
For practical reasons, the discussion in this section will focus on the 
regression estimates that turned out to be statistically connected to the 
variations in public support in the analyses, and also summarise these 
regression estimates in a more reader-friendly manner. In short, when 
focusing on only the regression estimates that turned out to be 
statistically significant, it becomes clearer that the theoretical guidelines 
derived from the system support theory largely also seems to hold firm 
with regard to explaining the variations in public support for the most 
system important elements of the EU. The statistically significant 
regression coefficients are presented in Table 15 (see page 275).  
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Table 15. Summary of statistically significant coefficients.  
 
Variations within countries  
The following discussion relates to the second research question, 
related to how contextual-level factors are able to explain the variations 
within countries in public support. The short answer to this question is, 
very well. A significant finding is that the results from the statistical 
analyses clearly suggests that the country levels of public support are 
affected by contextual-level developments. The results further suggest 
that there is a clear statistical connection between contextual-level 
developments and public support for all system elements of the EU. 
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Between-country effects
Economic performance
Debt -0.19 -0.13 -0.21 -0.16 -0.14 - - -
Unemployment - - - - - - - -
Democratic culture
Non-corruption -0.52 -0.41 -0.31 - - - - -
Economic inequality - - - - - - - -
External pressure
Foreign population -0.47 - - - - - - -
Refugees - - - - - - - -
EU-relation
Eurozone membership - 8.48 37.64 - - - - -
EU budget net reciever - - - - - - -3.64 -
Within-country effects
Economic performance
Debt -0.31 -0.15 -0.13 -0.45 -0.23 -0.05 0.06 -
Unemployment - 0.23 0.45 -0.30 -0.89 -0.98 -0.59 -0.47 
Democratic culture
Non-corruption -0.21 -0.13 -0.26 -0.21 - - - -
Economic inequality - - -0.88 -0.49 - - 0.48 -
External pressure
Foreign population -1.78 -0.41 -1.48 -1.08 -0.62 - -
Refugees - - - - - 3.89 2.22 3.47
EU-relation
Eurozone membership -7.34 - 17.90 -4.64 -2.88 - - 8.27
EU budget net reciever -2.26 -1.56 -3.97 -1.93 - -1.20 - -
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These findings broadly support the cue-taking argument with regard 
to public support for the EU, suggesting that public attitudes towards 
the EU are determined by contextual-level developments functioning 
as cues for forming opinions about the EU (Anderson, 1998). There are, 
however, some contextual-level developments that are more important 
than others, and the connection between contextual-level 
developments related to economic performance, democratic culture, 
external pressure and EU-relation, as well as within countries 
variations in public support, will now be presented stepwise, based on 
these four categories.  
Starting with the economic performances of the member states. The 
two contextual-level factors used to reflect the economic performances 
of the member states in the statistical analyses were debt and 
unemployment levels. What Inglehart and Rabier (1978, p. 40) argued 
for over 40 years ago in relation to the then European Community still 
seems true to date, namely that “public evaluations of membership in 
the community seem linked with economic growth or decline”. Since 
the start of the global recession in 2008, many studies have shown that 
the European public have become more hesitant towards the EU as a 
result of declining economic performance within many countries (Roth 
et al., 2011; Armingeon & Ceka, 2014; Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). A clear pattern also emerges when looking 
more extensively into the connection between economic performance 
and public support; when the economic performance declines, public 
support for most system elements of the EU follows. This is largely in 
accordance with earlier findings within the literature (Eichenberg & 
Dalton, 1993; 2007; Rohrschneider, 2002; Hobolt, 2012), and these 
results further confirm this relationship. The connection is, however, 
most clear regarding public support for the EU regime component, as 
higher levels of debt and unemployment were both statistically 
significant predictors for the declining levels of public support towards 
all three system elements of the EU regime. Hence, as suggested by 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2015, p. 122), no long-term solutions for the EU 
regime’s problems can be fixed without basic economic progress, and 
277 
 
 
that statement is further supported by these findings. When economic 
performance declines within countries, so do the levels of public 
support for the EU regime within the EU area. 
However, the connection is not as clear when looking at the within 
countries variations regarding public support for European integration 
policies. Even though higher levels of debt were a significant predictor 
for declining levels of public support for all three types of European 
integration policies, higher levels of unemployment were, on the other 
hand, a significant predictor for both higher levels of public support for 
a common European defence policy and the single European currency. 
According to Schoen (2008), public support for a common European 
defence policy is a European integration policy that should not be 
directly connected by general performance evaluations, and hence not 
connected to macro-level developments related to economic 
performance. These results although suggest that public support for 
something as abstract as a common European defence policy is also 
affected by economic developments. However, the results still give 
quite mixed messages regarding the causal effect. The connection 
between European identification and economic performance has been 
understudied within the literature, but Polyakova and Fligstein (2016) 
have shown that during the period of 2007–2009, the European public 
became more nationalistic in the countries most severely affected by the 
global recession. The results from the statistical analyses suggest that 
there is also a connection over a longer period of time, as higher levels 
of unemployment was statistically connected to lower levels of 
European identification and EU attachment within countries. On the 
other hand, higher levels of debt was statistically connected to higher 
levels of European identification, producing mixed results about the 
causal effect of economic developments on the diffuse kind of support.   
Continuing with the contextual-level factors measuring the 
institutional performance and quality of the member states, which were 
corruption and economic inequality developments. Based on the 
results, lower levels of corruption seem to be statistically connected to 
lower levels of public support for all three types of European 
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integration policy and trust in the EP within countries. On the other 
hand, higher levels of economic inequality predict lower levels of 
public support for the single European currency and lower levels of 
trust in the EP, while simultaneously predicting higher levels of 
European identification within countries. In short, the statistically 
significant regression estimates produced by the statistical analyses 
produce quite mixed signals regarding the connection between the 
institutional performance and variations in public support within 
countries. Nevertheless, these results broadly support what Sanchez-
Cuenca (2000) and Arnold et al. (2012) have suggested, namely that the 
costs of European integration policies are perceived as being lower 
when the levels of corruption are increasing.  
The two contextual-level factors used to reflect the external pressure 
on the member states were the proportional number of foreign 
population and refugees within the countries, related to the total 
population of the countries. With regard to the statistical connection 
between the external pressure developments and variations in public 
support within countries, the results suggest quite clearly that higher 
proportions of foreign populations predict lower levels of public 
support for both European integration policies and the EU regime. A 
higher proportion of a foreign population does not, however, seem to 
predict any variations in the most diffuse kind of support for the 
European political community. However, the other external pressure 
indicator, proportional number of refugees, appears, on the other hand, 
to be statistically connected to higher levels of diffuse support within 
countries. This is because it is statistically connected to higher levels of 
public support for EU membership, European identification and EU 
attachment. Social communication theories have suggested that 
contacts between cultures and nationalities should increase mutual 
acceptance of differences within political communities (Inglehart, 
1967), but it is difficult to connect social communication theories to 
these findings as it gives quite mixed signals regarding the causal effect 
of changing demographic compositions within countries.  
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Finally, the two contextual-level factors used to reflect the 
relationship between the EU and the member states were the EU 
budget net receiver and eurozone membership factors. Even though the 
eurozone membership factor is perceived as a dummy, the fact that a 
number of countries have become eurozone members during 2004–
2017 made it analytically possible to also include it as a changing 
contextual-level factor that varies over time in the multilevel model. 
First of all, being a eurozone member state predicts lower levels of 
public support for future EU enlargement, as well as lower levels of 
trust in the EP and satisfaction with EU democracy within countries 
over time. However, being a eurozone member state still predicts 
higher levels of public support for the single European currency. This 
supports earlier findings by Hobolt and Wratil (2015) that have shown 
how public support for the EU remained stable within the eurozone 
during the period of 2005–2013, simultaneously as public support 
declined within the non-eurozone countries.  
Declining levels of public support for all three European integration 
policies, as well as towards the EU regime institutions and principles, 
are connected to paying proportionally less to the EU budget. The 
results therefore seem to suggest that when countries starts to pay 
proportionally less to the EU budget, it has a negative effect on public 
support, which at first instance might seem surprising. However, as the 
factor reflects the EU-budget balance of the member states from a 
longitudinal perspective, paying proportionally less to the EU budget 
indicates that the national economy has been getting weaker during the 
period of 2004–2017. Hence, this causal relationship resembles that of 
the economic performance factors and could have been expected 
because “poor member states pay a smaller share of the costs and 
receive a larger share of the expenditure than richer EU members” 
(Mattila, 2006, p. 48). After this review regarding the statistical 
connection between national level developments and variations in 
public support within countries over time, the focus now shifts to the 
variations between countries.  
 
280 
 
 
Variations between countries  
Continuing this overview by answering the third guiding research 
question of this thesis. The short answer is, not particularly good. 
Nevertheless, the results from the statistical analyses seems to suggest 
that there are different contextual-level factors that are statistically 
connected to the variations in different kinds of public support. Starting 
with the two contextual-level factors related to economic performance, 
debt and unemployment. It was not expected that national debt levels 
would turn out to be a better predictor for cross-country variations in 
public support than unemployment levels. In fact, it was expected that 
the European public would be more aware of unemployment than debt 
levels, and therefore use unemployment levels more as a proxy for 
forming their EU attitudes.125 However, the results shows that there is 
a statistical connection between higher levels of national debt and 
lower levels of public support between countries, and this especially 
towards European integration policies and the EU regime institutions. 
This is supporting the suggestion that the countries most severely 
affected by the Eurocrisis are the same countries in which EU attitudes 
have become the most negative during the period after the Eurocrisis 
(Armingeon & Ceka, 2014; Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014). It is also 
interesting to note how the statistical effects of national debt do not 
hold for the indicators measuring the more diffuse kind of support. It 
is therefore possible to argue, based on these results, that the cross-
country variations in the more specific kind of support can be explained 
by long-term economic developments, while the more diffuse kind of 
                                                     
125 However, when the number of groups is small within a multilevel model, it becomes 
more difficult to statistically estimate the between-group variation (Gelman & Hill, 
2006, p. 275) and there is also an ongoing discussion regarding how many countries 
need to be included within a LMM study, with recommendations usually being around 
10–50. However, Bryan and Jenkins have concluded that at least 25 countries are 
needed, because otherwise “estimates of country-level fixed parameters are likely to be 
estimated imprecisely and this will not be adequately reflected in test statistics reported 
by commonly used software: users will conclude too often that a country effect exists 
when it does not” (2016, pp. 19–20). According to Gelman and Hill (2006, p. 276), even 
two observations per group is enough to fit a multilevel model. 
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support is not explained by economic developments, at least not during 
the short timeframe included in this study.  
Continuing with the contextual-level factors reflecting the 
democratic culture of the member states, corruption and economic 
inequality. The results suggest that these two indicators were not 
particularly good at explaining the cross-country variations in public 
support. However, lower levels of corruption were connected to lower 
levels of public support for all three European integration policies. 
Hence, supporting Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) argument that the costs of 
transferring decision-making powers to the EU level are perceived as 
being lower in more corrupt countries. Karp and Bowler (2006) also 
suggested that the public in poorer member states are more negative 
towards future EU enlargement, which they argued were related to the 
fact that the public in poorer member states would have more to lose 
with further enlargements than the public in richer member states. To 
some extent, these results could be argued to oppose Karp and Bowler’s 
argument, as these findings suggest that less corruption predicts lover 
levels of public support for the widening of the EU area between 
countries. Regarding the cross-country variations in public support for 
the EU regime and the European political community, the democratic 
culture indicators were not able to explain the variations, as none of the 
regression estimates obtained were also statistically significant. Of the 
two external pressure indicators, only foreign population levels were 
of any statistical relevance, as higher levels of foreign population seems 
to predict lower levels of public support for future EU enlargement 
between countries.  
The two EU-relation contextual-level factors were neither of any 
relevance for explaining the variations in public support for the EU 
regime. Nevertheless, being a eurozone member state predicts higher 
levels of public support for both a common European defence policy 
and the single European currency between member states. The levels 
of European identification were also lower in countries that are 
receiving more from the EU budget. Already Anderson and 
Kaltenthaler (1996) suggested that the longer a country had been a 
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member of the EU the more likely it was that the public would become 
socialised into “Europeans,” and hence it is not surprising that the 
levels of European identification are higher within the countries that 
also pay proportionally more to the EU budget, as these are, to a large 
extent, the same West-European countries. 
After presenting the results from the statistical analyses regarding 
the statistical connection between national contextual-level factors and 
public support, it should now be quite clear that the effects of the 
national contexts differ between the different types of public support. 
For instance, none of the eight contextual-level factors managed to 
produce statistically significant estimates for predicting the variations 
between countries regarding the levels of EU attachment. In short, these 
results do not contribute much to the literature related to explaining the 
variations in public support for the EU between countries, as many 
questions still remain unanswered based on these results. However, the 
results suggest that the multilevel model was better at predicting 
variations in public support for European integration policies, which 
indicates that the more system important the element of public support 
becomes, the more difficult it is to statistically predict variations within 
it. In short, it is statistically easier to predict the kind of countries that 
support the widening, deepening and securing of European integration 
than it is to predict the countries that have higher levels of European 
identification and EU attachment. In the following section, the 
analytical limitations of this study are further discussed.  
6.3.3 Analytical limitations 
To recap, the research purpose with the statistical part of this thesis has 
been to be try and statistically connect the variations in public support 
for eight separate system elements of the EU at two analytical levels, 
within and between countries, to the contextual-level characteristics 
and developments within 28 countries over a period of 14 years (2004–
2017). However, as Box and Draper suggested, “all models are wrong; 
the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be 
useful?” (1987, p. 4; quoted in Bell & Jones, 2015, p. 143). In relation to 
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the results presented in this chapter, that quote might perhaps be 
deemed highly relevant. First of all, through this kind of large picture 
research approach, some of the analytical depth might have been 
neglected to maximise the width of the analytical design. Also, by using 
the LMMs (Linear Mixed Models) as an analytical tool for explaining 
both the variations within and between countries, it is quite clear that 
there are limitations with the multilevel modelling method that need to 
be accounted for.  
Another more concrete limitation with the analytical part is related 
to the measurement and operationalisation of the indicators reflecting 
the contextual-levels of external pressure on the countries. The values 
calculated to reflect the proportional amount of foreigners and refugees 
within a country reflect the total period of 2004–2017, and are hence 
probably not able to pick up the effect that the migration crisis in 2015 
may have had on the variations in public support. Even though 
migration has been an issue within Europe for a longer period of time, 
and especially since the start of the Arab spring in 2011, the findings in 
this analyses do not show that there is a negative relationship between 
accepting a large number of refugees and public support for the EU at 
the macro-level. Which was to some extent expected based on the 
literature. However, if the analytical part would be limited to the period 
after 2011, the results might have been different. There are, hence, clear 
limitations with this kind of analytical approach, as by looking at the 
large picture regarding the relationship between contextual-level 
developments and country levels of public support, many important 
events are not directly accounted for in the model. As an example, 
variables reflecting the extent to which the countries were directly 
affected by events such as the Eurocrisis (2010) or the migration crisis 
(2015) have not been included in the analyses; events that most 
certainly should have affected the country levels of public support for 
some system elements of the EU.  
There is also a risk that the results from this thesis risk ecological 
fallacy (Peters, 2013), as the overarching approach has been to 
generalise macro-level findings to characterise the public living within 
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the countries. A country, however, is not a homogenous unit and there 
are significant within-country variations based on regional differences, 
for instance, that have not been controlled for in this thesis. Hence, 
when generalising a country as being generally supportive towards a 
concrete system element of the EU, the statement is perhaps only valid 
for respondents of specific socioeconomic characteristics or from 
particular regions within that country. Therefore, there are significant 
cleavages within the countries that should be acknowledged, but 
because it does not fit into the scope of this thesis, that is for future 
research to consider. There are also certainly other limitations with the 
results and analytical design in this thesis that have not been accounted 
for here, however the results seem to indicate that the research aim 
when using this type of analytical design has been fulfilled. In the 
following section, this chapter will be summarised before presenting 
the general conclusion derived from this thesis in the final chapter.  
Chapter summary 
One obvious statement that could be drawn from the analytical part of 
this study is that the variations in public support for all system 
elements of the EU are to some extent connected to contextual-level 
characteristics of, and developments within, the member states. An 
interesting finding from these analyses is, furthermore, that it is 
possible to explain with statistical methods, using these eight 
contextual-level factors, why country levels of public support vary both 
within and between countries in public support for all of the three main 
system components of the EU. The results therefore suggest that it is at 
the national contextual-level where researchers should focus when 
trying to identify the underlying reasons for the variations in public 
support, and not focus on what the EU is actually doing. On the other 
hand, it is not possible to empirically validate that assumption based 
on these analyses, as no indicator reflecting the actual workings of the 
EU was included in the multilevel models. However, as the EU is a 
multi-level political system that is basically governed on both 
supranational and national institutional levels, the actual workings of 
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the EU are almost impossible to measure and operationalise at the 
macro-level for comparative purposes. Also, based on the findings, it is 
possible to conclude that researchers should include a wide range of 
national contextual-level factors when trying to analyse both the within 
and between countries variations in public support, as well as account 
for the multidimensional character of the EU.   
Relating these findings to the larger context of system support 
theories, it is more interesting from a system persistence perspective to 
look at the kind of contextual-level developments that are connected to 
the variations within countries in public support. As expected from the 
literature, negative economic developments predict lower levels of 
public support for all system elements of the EU regime within 
countries. However, the results also suggest that declining levels of 
corruption also predict lower levels of public support within countries, 
and this especially with regard to European integration policies. Hence, 
there are differences also with regard to the kind of effect positive 
national-level societal developments have on the country levels of 
public support for a supranational political system such as the EU. It is 
also quite surprising that higher levels of the proportional number of 
refugees do not have any negative statistical effect on the country levels 
of public support for either European integration policies or the EU 
regime, as could perhaps have been expected. Instead, the results 
suggest that the most diffuse kind of support for the European political 
community is positively affected by higher proportional levels of 
refugees. On the other hand, a higher proportion of foreigners within a 
country predicts lower levels of public support for both European 
integration policies as well as the EU regime. This gives a quite mixed 
message for future researchers to consider. Looking at the larger 
picture, and even though this should not be considered to be a new 
finding, the results do suggest that the long-term system persistence 
capabilities of the EU as a political system will, to a large extent, be 
determined by the economic performances of the countries, and not by 
the number of refugees or foreigners that a country accepts.  
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7. Conclusions 
The time when the constitutionalization of international law was focused 
exclusively on the goal of pacification, which also marked the beginning of 
the development of the European Union, is long past.  
Habermas, 2012, p. xi 
This thesis has analysed the variations in country levels of public 
support for different system elements of the EU within and between 
countries over time in order to explain these variations. The country-
level variations in public support at these two analytical levels have, for 
the main part of the system elements, been successfully empirically 
connected to contextual-level determinants at the national level. After 
a brief summary regarding the research aim and the main concepts 
used in this thesis, this chapter summarises the main findings, 
discusses their implications and concludes what this study has 
contributed to the larger literature regarding the system persistence 
capabilities of the EU from a system perspective. 
In order to focus on the broad picture regarding the underlying 
factors determining both the future development and persistence 
capabilities of the EU from a system perspective, the EU as a political 
system was divided into three main system components of system 
relevance. These system components were derived from the theoretical 
and conceptual guidelines provided by Easton (1965), which had been 
successfully further adapted to the EU context by Niedermayer and 
Westle (1995) and Norris (1999). Through the categorisation of the EU 
into component parts, aggregated country levels of public attitudes 
were used to measure public support for European integration policies, 
the EU regime and the European political community. Nevertheless, as 
these three system components were still too abstract for empirical 
purposes, they were further divided into separate system elements 
towards which the public attitudes were primarily directed. Hence, the 
European integration policies component includes public attitudes 
towards the widening, deepening and securing of European 
integration. Public attitudes towards these European integration 
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policies are mainly of political concern for the future development of 
the EU, and in this study conceptualised as the most specific kind of 
support for the EU. Furthermore, the EU regime component includes 
public attitudes towards the EU regime institutions, the EU regime 
processes and the EU regime principles. The EU regime is what is 
usually referred to when speaking of “the EU”. Finally, the European 
political community component, the most abstract of these three 
components, was further divided into two system elements, European 
identification and EU attachment. Public attitudes towards this 
component are the most important for the long-term system persistence 
capabilities of the EU, as they reflect the most diffuse kind of support 
for the EU.  
In the first part of the thesis, it has been argued that in order to 
analyse the broad picture, with regard to the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU, it is important to look at country levels of public support for the 
different system elements of the EU. The empirical purpose to 
differentiate between the system elements towards which public 
attitudes are directed, and not only directly towards something 
singularly defined as “the EU,” was based on the understanding that 
the European public, over time, has clearly started to differentiate 
between the different aspects of the EU. Another crucial aspect from a 
system support perspective was that the country levels of public 
support for these different system elements was also not of equal 
importance. Country levels of public support towards European 
integration policies are a reflection of the most specific kind of support, 
and were hence expected to fluctuate with the perceived benefits of a 
European integration policy within countries. Country levels of public 
support for the EU regime are more related to the perceived 
performance of the EU regime, and therefore also expected to fluctuate 
according to the perceived performance of the EU regime within 
countries. Country levels of public support for the European political 
community, on the other hand, reflect the most diffuse kind of support, 
and are based on deeper-held loyalties towards the EU for what it 
represents, not for what it does. Hence, country levels of public support 
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for the European political community were expected to remain more 
stable within countries. However, according to the causal logic derived 
from Easton’s system support theory, longer periods of public 
dissatisfaction with the single European currency and the workings of 
the EU regime, for instance, might, over time, also transform into more 
negative public sentiments towards the European political community, 
which should also contribute to declining country levels of the diffuse 
kind of support.  
In accordance with the guidelines from the cue-taking theory 
(Anderson, 1998), the variations in public attitudes towards the EU 
were, to a varied extent, expected to be explained by contextual-level 
factors at the country levels. Therefore, in order to explain the country-
level variations in public support, a wide range of contextual-level 
factors were included in the study. The theoretical assumption was that 
the effect of contextual-level factors varies between the indicators of 
public support. The contextual-level factors were, furthermore, divided 
into two main categories, constituting either internal or external factors. 
These broad categories were further divided into four smaller groups, 
with the internal factors reflecting the economic performance and the 
democratic culture of the countries, and with the external factors 
reflecting the external pressure and the EU-relation of the countries. 
The empirical assumption behind this kind of research design was that 
the contextual-level developments related to these four groups should 
be able to explain most of the varying country levels of public support 
for the three main system components of the EU, both within and 
between countries. That empirical assumption was also broadly 
confirmed by the results from the statistical analyses.  
The thesis centred around three overarching research questions. The 
first one related to how the country levels of public support towards 
the EU had developed over time within the EU area. The country-
specific overviews during the period of 2004–2017 clearly showed that 
the country levels of public support for many system elements of the 
EU tended to fluctuate significantly within many countries. The 
overview also showed that the country levels of public support 
289 
 
 
fluctuated more significantly towards some system elements of the EU 
than towards others, as the fluctuations in public support were most 
apparent towards the European integration policies and EU-regime 
related elements. The other two research questions had a more 
explanatory ambition. The second research question centred on 
explaining to what extent the variations in public support within 
countries could be predicted by contextual factors. The third, and final, 
research question, on the other hand, centred on explaining whether 
these same contextual-level factors were also able to explain the 
variations in public support between countries. By using multilevel 
modelling, linear mixed models (LMMs) to be more specific, it was 
possible to obtain comparable regression estimates that could be used 
to statistically show to what extent the contextual-level factors were 
able to explain the variations in public support towards the different 
system elements of the EU, both within and between countries. In the 
following subchapter, the main findings presented in this thesis are 
discussed.  
7.1 Main findings 
The overarching research aim with this thesis has been to connect 
contextual-level factors to the trends and variations in the country 
levels of public support for the EU from a system perspective, within 
the EU area, over time. The results derived from the statistical analyses 
suggest that both within and between countries variations in EU 
attitudes are, but to a varied extent, explained by contextual-level 
factors during the period of 2004–2017. However, based on these 
results, it is not possible to make a valid prognosis regarding either the 
future development or the system persistence capabilities of the EU in 
terms of “if X then Y,” with X implying country level developments 
within the EU area and Y the kind of effect that development would be 
likely to have on the EU. However, especially since the global recession 
(2008), and the following Eurocrisis (2010), it has become apparent that 
no EU member state remains completely unaffected when one member 
state is, for instance, facing economic difficulties. Therefore, it has been 
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argued in this thesis that since the development within one country also 
affects the rest of the EU area, it is crucial to conduct a wider analysis 
regarding the possible effects that similar contextual-level 
developments might contribute to within the EU area. As an example, 
when the unemployment levels are increasing within countries, it is 
possible to argue that it is likely to have a negative effect on the levels 
of public support for the EU regime within these countries, based on 
the results presented in this thesis. Hence, also as Braun and 
Tausendpfund (2014, p. 243) suggested, when public support “depends 
on economic considerations, it represents a rather unstable foundation 
for the future of European integration”. 
In relation to the possibility of statistically connecting contextual-
level developments to the country-level variations in public support, 
the results have, however, been mixed. Some of the contextual-level 
factors included in the analyses turned out to not have any significant 
effect on predicting variations in public support, while others were 
most certainly important. However, when looking at the broad picture, 
the results suggest that it is empirically possible to predict how country 
levels of public support within and between countries for different 
system elements of the EU will be affected by different kinds of EU-
wide contextual-level developments. In relation to explaining the cross-
country variations in public support, the results from this study 
showed that it is more difficult to explain variations in the diffuse kind 
of support than it is regarding the more specific kind of support. 
However, because the statistical part of this study included only eight 
contextual-level factors, it omitted a large number of contextual-level 
indicators that could have proven to be of significance, such as public 
money spent on social welfare (Arnold et al., 2012). However, the 
contextual-level factors for the statistical analyses were chosen to avoid 
multicollinearity in the multilevel model, and the factors included 
should have been able to intercept most of the neglected contextual-
level factors that have been included by researchers conducting similar 
studies.  
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During the period of 2004–2017 there has been a significant decline 
in the country levels of public support, and this especially towards two 
system elements of the EU; the future widening of the EU area (EU 
enlargement) and the EU regime institutions (trust in the EP). There 
have been less significant declines in public support for the deepening 
of European integration (common European defence policy) and for the 
EU regime processes (satisfaction with EU democracy). There have 
been more mixed trends regarding public support for the securing of 
an already implemented European integration policy (single European 
currency) and for the EU regime principles (EU membership support). 
And finally, the most diffuse kind of support for the European political 
community has increased during this period. So, what to make of all 
these trends in country levels of public support for the EU?  
First of all, these trends indicate a great amount regarding the 
empirical usefulness of using system support theory as a conceptual 
tool for analysing country levels of public support for a supranational 
political system such as the EU. The more specific kind of support, 
which is based on short-term considerations as well as “cost/benefit” 
calculations, was expected to fluctuate if the perceived costs were 
higher than the likely benefits. This notion also holds firm with regard 
to public support for European integration policies and the EU regime 
institutions. However, when the indicators of public support become 
more diffuse, as with regard to EU regime processes, EU regime 
principles and the European political community, the levels of public 
support do not fluctuate as significantly, and the effects of the 
contextual-level developments have been considerably weaker. This 
was also expected by the system support theory. If one chooses to 
interpret Easton directly, the EU should, from a system persistence 
perspective, now be better prepared for future periods of system stress. 
This is since the country levels of public support for the European 
political community have generally increased within the EU area 
during this period. There are, however, worrying exceptions to that 
general trend. The fact that there are also apparent signs of increased 
public scepticism towards the workings of the EU regime, as well as 
292 
 
 
towards the widening and deepening of European integration, could 
also start to affect the country levels of public support for the European 
political community negatively over time. This, however, depending 
on how the EU proceeds with the prospect of further enlargement and 
deeper integration in the future. Nevertheless, these trends suggest that 
the European public has become less supportive of more European 
integration, but simultaneously that the European public has become 
more supportive of the European political community created by the 
EU regime. The fact that this development has seemingly occurred 
during a period in EU-history dominated by crises could also be 
considered an interesting finding.  
The importance of higher levels of the more diffuse kind of support, 
for the long-term stability of the EU, has been argued for some time. 
According to system support theory, sufficient levels of diffuse support 
are also what enable political systems to persist during periods of 
system stress, even though the members of the political community 
have not been satisfied with the performance of the political system. 
Easton (1965, p. 269) argued that:  
“Against the stimulation of specific support as a response related to 
the persistence of a system, we know from history that members of 
a system have proved able to tolerate long periods of frustration in 
the satisfaction of their wants without support falling below the 
minimal level and passing over the threshold into stress. Indeed, no 
regime or community could gain general acceptance and no set of 
authorities could expect to hold power if they had to depend 
exclusively or even largely on outputs to generate support as a return 
for specific and identifiable benefits. Other means of adaption to 
stress are necessary”. 
Hence, when looking at the country levels of public support for the 
European political community, the EU should be better prepared to 
endure the unavoidable future legitimacy crises caused by declining 
levels of public support for the EU. There is, however, no way of 
knowing whether the levels of diffuse support are stable enough for the 
EU to withstand the inevitable forthcoming crises. Nor is it possible to 
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know whether diffuse support in relation to a supranational political 
system actually functions in the same way as diffuse support 
theoretically does in relation to nation states. Also, as has been noted 
within some of the member states most heavily affected by the 
economic crises, the country levels of public support for the European 
political community can also decline during longer periods of system 
pressure. For instance, when comparing the country levels of European 
identification in 2004 with 2017, the levels of European identification 
have declined by 17 percentage points in the Republic of Cyprus, 11 
percentage points in Romania and 9 percentage points in Italy. This 
shows that community identification at the European level is still 
something that is under construction, and not as stable as would be 
preferable from an EU perspective. Even though the EU enjoys 
relatively high levels of diffuse support in the majority of the member 
states, it could be enough that two or three more member states choose 
to leave the EU, and that could quickly transform into a domino-effect. 
That kind of domino-effect could even, hypothetically, result in the 
complete dissolution of the EU over time. Hence, as a researcher, one 
should always take into account how the trees look, and not only focus 
on the forest at large, when it comes to predicting the future of the EU.  
Based on the findings presented in this thesis, we should now have 
a greater understanding regarding whether, and in what direction, 
contextual-level developments affect the EU’s ability to withstand 
future legitimacy crises caused by declining levels of public support. 
These findings are also related to what Mitchell (2014, p. 614) argues 
has become one of the core-questions within the EU-literature: “Given 
the increasing mobilisation of European citizens around European 
issues, it is reasonable to expect that the future of the EU will be 
determined, not only by elite bargains – as has largely been the case in 
the past – but also more than ever before by public opinion. It is, 
therefore, more important than ever to know not only what Europeans 
think about the European project, but what drives their preferences”. It 
is possible to argue that the findings presented in this thesis have 
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contributed to increasing our understanding regarding what the 
national level “drivers” of public opinion actually are.  
Furthermore, based on the main results from the statistical analyses, 
it is possible to conclude a number of things. In short, contextual-level 
factors related to economic performances can, to a large extent, explain 
the variations in public support for the EU within countries. When 
national economic performance declines, so does public support for 
most system elements of the EU. However, this statistical connection is 
most directly related to public support for the EU regime, especially 
towards the EU regime institutions and processes. The results also 
interestingly showed that when unemployment levels increase within 
countries, so do the levels of public support for a common European 
defence policy and the single European currency. In general, the 
findings largely support the cue-taking approach (Anderson, 1998), 
suggesting that the country levels of public support for the EU regime 
are largely determined by national level cues, i.e. the public use the 
events and circumstances within their own countries as proxies when 
forming their attitudes about the workings and functioning of the EU 
regime, and to some extent also about the European integration policies 
and the European political community. This was also to be expected, 
based on the extensive literature regarding the connection between 
economic developments and public support for the EU. Hence, these 
results confirm that it is crucial from the perspective of democratic 
legitimacy for the EU that the national economies are performing well.  
With regard to explaining the variations in public support between 
countries, there are more mixed results. Public support for both the 
widening, deepening and securing of European integration are higher 
within countries with more corruption, while public support for the 
deepening and securing are higher within eurozone countries. Public 
support for the EU regime institutions and processes are lower in 
countries with higher levels of national debt, while the levels of 
European identification are higher within countries that contribute 
proportionally more to the EU budget. In short, it is easier to 
statistically predict variations in public support for a more specific kind 
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of support than it is for a more diffuse kind of support, both within and 
between countries. An overview regarding the contextual-level factors 
that turned out to be statistically significant is presented in Table 16. 
Table 16. Summary of contextual-level factors statistically connected to the 
within and between countries variations in public support.  
 
In the following section, the main limitations are discussed together 
with suggestions regarding future research related to this topic. 
 
Public support indicator Within countries Between countries
European integration policies Contextual factor Contextual factor
Widening (Future EU enlargement) Debt, Non-corruption, Foreign 
population, Eurozone membership, 
EU budget net reciever
Debt, Non-corruption, Foreign 
population
Deepening (Common European 
defence)
Debt, Unemployment, Non-
corruption, Foreign population, EU 
budget net reciever
Debt, Non-corruption, Eurozone 
membership
Securing (Single European currency) Debt, Unemployment, Non-
corruption, Economic inequality, 
Foreign population, Eurozone 
membership, EU budget net reciever
Debt, Non-corruption, Eurozone 
membership
EU regime Contextual factor Contextual factor
Institutions (Trust in the EP) Debt, Unemployment, Non-
corruption, Economic inequality, 
Foreign population, Eurozone 
membership, EU budget net reciever
Debt
Processes (Satisfaction with EU 
democracy)
Debt, Unemployment, Foreign 
population, Eurozone membership
Debt
Principles (EU membership support) Debt, Unemployment, Refugees, EU 
budget net reciever
European political community Contextual factor Contextual factor
Identification with (European 
identification)
Debt, Unemployment, Economic 
inequality, Refugees
EU budget net reciever
Attachment to (EU attachment) Unemployment, Refugees, Eurozone 
membership
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7.2 Limitations and suggestions on future research  
Every study has its limitations, and this thesis is far from an exception 
in that regard. In this subchapter, the most apparent limitations are 
discussed, together with a few suggestions regarding future research. 
First of all, the longitudinal perspective of this thesis has been limited 
by the availability of survey data. This has been especially the case 
regarding the public support indicators used as dependent variables in 
the statistical analyses, as comparative survey data from all of the 
current 28 member states were only available from 2004 and onwards. 
Additionally, by focusing on the broadest possible perspective 
regarding country-level variations in public support for the EU, it could 
be quite problematic to generalise the findings presented in this thesis. 
Another obvious limitation is that the individual-level determinants of 
support have been ignored in the statistical part of this thesis, but as 
there is no lack of studies focusing on individual-level determinants of 
EU attitudes, it is quite challenging to contribute with anything of 
lasting empirical significance within that research area. Furthermore, 
and especially since the start of the global recession in 2008, there has 
been an explosion of studies trying to connect individual-level 
characteristics with different types of EU attitudes.  
Another critique that could be applied to this study is in relation to 
the applicability of using Easton’s system support theory as a 
conceptual tool for understanding the political importance of 
fluctuations and variations in public support for something as complex 
and abstract as the EU. After all, the EU is not governed as a liberal 
democracy, nor could it be considered a political federation or a 
European super-state. Therefore, the causal relationship between 
sufficient levels of public support and democratic legitimacy is not as 
straightforward within the EU context as it is within democratic 
political systems at the national levels. Also, as a European political 
system based on multilevel-governance at the EU and national levels 
(Kenealy et al., 2015, p. 233), it could perhaps have been valid to more 
directly account for what the public in the member states think about 
their own systems of governance, since negative sentiments towards 
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national level politics seem to create negative sentiments also towards 
EU level politics (Munoz et al., 2011; Armingeon & Ceka, 2014). This 
thesis has also shown that negative national level developments 
regarding economic performance are connected to lower levels of 
public support for most system elements of the EU, within countries. 
 However, as the EU is from a system perspective still under 
construction, in this thesis it has been argued that the EU constitutes a 
perfect case for applying the system support theory as an analytical 
tool, especially since the EU is something that countries can choose to 
withdraw from. Hence there is a real political possibility the EU could 
also actually be dissolved over time as a result of declining levels of 
public support within countries. This, especially, if the citizens are 
given a direct choice in an EU membership referendum. It is this 
political possibility that makes this kind of studies highly relevant. 
Moreover, the division of the concept of public support into two 
different kinds of support, specific and diffuse, is perhaps not as valid 
in the context of public support for the EU, since the European political 
community is still not the primary political community of concern for 
ordinary EU-citizens. Furthermore, even though much work has been 
conducted by the EU in terms of creating the more diffuse kind of 
support for the European political community, diffuse support towards 
the EU is far from being as stable as diffuse support for the nation states 
is. It is therefore debatable whether diffuse support for the EU would 
actually be able to save the EU during longer periods of dissatisfaction 
with the workings and functioning of the EU.  
Some minor reflections regarding the use of the survey data in this 
study are also necessary, starting with the problem of using the so-
called “Moreno-question” for measuring country levels of one of two 
types of the most diffuse support. The question relates to whether the 
respondents to some extent identify as Europeans, and hence not, 
strictly speaking, to being part of the EU as constituting a European 
political community. There is without a doubt, a difference between the 
EU as a political system and Europe as a continent, and hence there are 
significant shortcomings with using this survey item to measure 
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country levels of public support for the European political community 
created by the EU. This has also been acknowledged by Eurobarometer 
(EB), and since 2010 EB has started to include a survey item asking the 
respondents whether they perceive themselves as being citizens of the 
EU.126 Taking the apparent conceptual differences into consideration, 
the survey item was still used in the thesis to measure member state 
levels of mutual European identification, because it was the best 
available recurrent survey item included during the period of 2004–
2017.  
Also, there were some empirical shortcomings regarding the 
contextual-level data used, especially related to the two contextual-
level indicators used in the external pressure group. First of all, it 
should be noted that it was difficult to find EU-wide comparative data 
that was able to capture the changing demographic compositions 
within the member states caused by both increasing levels of 
immigration and the influx of refugees. Nevertheless, the purpose of 
including this group of indicators was to empirically capture the effect 
that changing demographics might have had on the variations in the 
country levels of public support. Also, using proportional data based 
on the proportion of “foreign population” and “refugees,” related to 
the year-specific total population of the country, was perhaps not the 
most optimal way of creating comparable values for the statistical 
analyses. Because of this, the statistical models were perhaps not 
directly able to pick up the statistical effects of immigration levels on 
country-level variations in public support for the EU within the EU 
area. Future studies should aspire to develop better indicators for this 
group of indicators, as this is a group of contextual-level factors that 
should be included within similar kinds of studies.  
Even though this has been an overarching study regarding the 
phenomenon of public support towards the EU at the country levels, 
                                                     
126The survey question is as follows: For each of the following statements, please tell me 
to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion: You feel you are a citizen of 
the EU? “Yes, definitely”, “Yes, to some extent”, “No, not really”, “No, definitely not” 
or “Don’t know”.  
299 
 
 
there are many possibilities to continue with this kind of “big picture” 
research. As already mentioned, individual level determinants of EU 
attitudes are already found in a crowded research-field, but there is still 
a lack of this similar kind of macro-level research regarding varying 
country levels of public support within the EU literature. That was also 
one of the main reasons for applying this kind of overarching research 
design, and arguably that is also the small contribution that this thesis 
can make towards filling a vacuum that still exists within the broader 
EU literature. Regarding the usefulness of adapting the system support 
theory for analysing country levels of public support for the EU, it 
would also be interesting, in the future, to conduct individual-level 
research regarding the causal connection between specific and diffuse 
support for the EU. According to Easton, longer periods of declining 
specific support should also start affecting the more diffuse kind of 
support over time. That causal relationship could also be directly tested 
with regard to specific and diffuse support for the different system 
elements of the EU. There is also a need of more research regarding the 
impact that immigration in general, and the migration crisis in 2015 in 
particular, might have had on EU attitudes over time. Even though the 
individual level connection between immigration- and EU-attitudes 
has been widely established (McLaren, 2002; Kentman-Cin & Erisen, 
2017), there is still room for more research within that research area, 
especially since immigrant-bashing seems to have become something 
of a trademark for Eurosceptic political parties on the political right.  
Another interesting future direction for similar research to pursue 
could be to focus more directly on the actual political implications and 
effects of individual-level attitudes towards the EU. As Hobolt and De 
Vries (2016a, p. 426) have also suggested, there is an apparent gap 
within the EU literature regarding whether public opinion shapes 
actual policy-making regarding European integration within the 
member states. Even though the empirical connection between having 
EU positive attitudes and, for example, voting for a pro-EU political 
party during national parliamentary elections have been studied 
(Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; 2010), there is still a need for more updated 
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and comparative studies regarding this connection across the EU area. 
As this thesis has focused on the variations in public support within 
and between countries, another future research direction would be to 
look more extensively at the actual real-life political consequences that 
changing political attitudes towards the EU as a political system might 
have contributed to. As an example, De Vries (2017) has recently 
studied the effects that the Brexit vote has had on the political policies 
of political parties within the rest of the EU area. The long-term effects 
of the Brexit vote are also something that is going to be increasingly 
studied within a wide range of topics for years to come. In short, the 
connection between EU attitudes and political decision-making has 
been briefly discussed in the introduction of this thesis, and the 
empirical connection between EU attitudes and political decision-
making within different political arenas should definitely be studied 
more extensively.  
Finally, it would be interesting to change the supranational political 
system of interest from the EU to, as an example, the United Nations 
(UN). This could be in order to analyse closer whether the contextual-
level developments only affect the country levels of public support for 
the EU, or if the developments also affect the levels of public support 
for other types of supranational political systems that these, or other, 
countries are participating in. Is there a general development of distrust 
in everything supranational, or is it only the EU specifically? 
Presumably the declining levels of public support for the EU are 
connected to a larger development towards increased scepticism 
towards anything restricting the maneuvering space of nation states. 
As the Eurobarometer surveys also regularly include survey items 
measuring the levels of trust in the UN, that kind of research would 
also be empirically possible, at least to some extent. In the following 
subchapter, the main implications and contributions of this study are 
presented.  
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7.3 Implications and contributions of the thesis 
At first sight, it seems highly unlikely that public opinion or political 
culture would have any relevance to the formation or maintenance of 
international regimes. 
Sinnott, 1995, p. 25 
This thesis has applied the system support theory as a conceptual tool 
for understanding the importance of public support for the EU from a 
system support perspective and demonstrated that the general 
theoretical guidelines provided by Easton are also applicable for 
analysing country levels of public support for a supranational political 
system such as the EU. However, what is the general contribution of 
this thesis to the broader EU literature? First and foremost, I would 
argue that the main empirical contribution of this thesis is that it has 
empirically identified and connected contextual-level developments to 
the country levels of public support for eight different system elements 
of the EU. Most importantly, the study has shown that the effects of 
contextual-level factors vary extensively between indicators of public 
support. In this way, the thesis constitutes an encompassing study 
regarding the connection between contextual-level developments and 
country characteristics and different kinds of EU attitudes. The width 
of this thesis is therefore in itself a significant contribution to the general 
EU literature, as this thesis clearly shows that there are different 
contextual-level factors that researchers should account for when 
explaining country-level variations in public attitudes towards 
European integration policies, the EU regime or the European political 
community.  
The thesis has also shown that indicators measuring the more 
specific kind of support fluctuate more than indicators measuring the 
more diffuse kind of support within countries, and that the 
fluctuations, although to a varied extent, can be predicted by national 
contextual-level developments. Finally, this thesis has also shown, in 
line with Anderson (1998), that there is a connection between 
contextual-level developments and country levels of public support for 
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all important system elements of the EU, but that the connection is more 
profound with regard to public support for European integration 
policies and the EU regime than it is in relation to the European political 
community.  
Even though this thesis is far from the first similar study to take 
inspiration from Easton, it could be argued to constitute one of the most 
extensive studies with regard to the concept of system support for the 
EU, at least since the start of the global recession in 2008, an event that 
changed the public perception of the EU for the foreseeable future. 
Moreover, by adapting Easton’s theoretical guidelines, for the purpose 
of the research aim of this thesis, for analysing system support for a 
supranational political system, the division of the EU into three system 
components, as well as into two types of public support, has been 
shown to be necessary for understanding the complexity of public 
support for a supranational European political system such as the EU. 
Because as Easton argued, sufficient levels of public support are what 
enable the existence and functioning of the political authorities, 
political institutions and political communities during periods of 
system stress.  
However, in this thesis it has been further argued that sufficient 
levels of public support are also of crucial importance for 
democratically legitimising the development, functioning and, in the 
end, also the existence of concrete European integration policies, the EU 
as a political regime, as well as the European political community 
created through the EU regime. What the European public think about 
one of these system components should also affect their perceptions of 
the other components over time. Hence, the country levels of public 
support for these system components within the 28 member states of 
the EU function as a summary indicator for the status of the EU from a 
system support perspective when seen from the perspective of the 
European public. As such, the main findings of this thesis constitute a 
good empirical starting point for researchers interested in the 
connection between contextual-level developments and country levels 
of public support for any system component of the EU.  
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The findings presented in this thesis might also possibly be used to 
better understand future political developments regarding European 
integration. As the thesis has further shown how within countries 
variations in the levels of public support for all system elements of the 
EU are largely connected to the economic performances of the 
countries, during future periods of negative economic developments, 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU will continue to be questioned. This 
especially as the country levels of diffuse support for the European 
political community are not on such a high level to function as “a 
reservoir of support” that the EU could rely upon during periods of 
system pressure. Hence, the EU’s future existence will most probably 
continue to become openly questioned during times of crisis. This 
constitutes an existential problem from a system persistence 
perspective, as without a sufficiently high amount of the diffuse kind 
of support, it might be next to impossible to implement the necessary 
political policies that are needed for the EU in order to counteract the 
inevitable future legitimacy crisis.  
Most likely then, when the next EU-wide crisis emerges, the EU’s 
future existence will once again become increasingly questioned, as it 
was during the heights of the Eurocrisis in 2010 and again during the 
migration crisis in 2015. This also suggests that it will be difficult for 
political leaders at the national levels to promote further European 
integration during periods of national disturbances. In short, before 
focusing on what is best for the EU, national political leaders should 
make sure that they have their own countries in order. Without internal 
stability at the country levels, instability will again spread to the EU 
level whenever EU-wide crises emerge, as EU attitudes cannot be 
argued to compensate for the negative performance of the member 
state, as has been previously suggested within the literature (Sanchez-
Cuenca, 2000; Kritzinger, 2003). The following, and final, subchapter 
presents the concluding remarks derived from this thesis. 
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7.4 Final remarks 
It is absurd to expect in the long run that you can maintain economic and 
monetary union without political union. 
Helmut Kohl, German statesman, 1991127 
In this thesis, sufficiently high country levels of public support for the 
EU have been considered as the political foundation for European 
integration (Gabel, 1998, p. 333). Finally, what is there to learn about 
the stability of the political foundations for European integration from 
this thesis? The short answer could be that country levels of public 
support for all the system important elements of the EU are in some 
way explained by the events and developments at the country levels, 
and hence it is at the national levels that researchers should focus when 
discussing the future of the EU. The major remaining question is how 
to relate these findings to the long-term development and persistence 
capabilities of the EU? This is an essential question, because even 
though the perceived Bolshevik danger that Count Coudenhove-
Kalergi (1931, p. 638) warned about destroyed itself, there is no lack of 
monsters left in Europe to destroy that could threaten the political 
stability achieved within the EU area.128 Nevertheless, it is impossible 
to make a valid empirically-based prediction regarding the future of 
the EU based on the results presented in this thesis, as there are events 
within, what Easton referred to as the political environment, that are 
impossible to account for empirically.  
According to Grande and Hutter (2016, p. 13), the very purpose of 
European integration was to establish a supranational authority, with 
autonomy from the member states, in order to restrict their sovereignty 
in policy areas of importance for peace and welfare in Europe. 
However, political developments in Europe, such as the outcome of the 
Brexit referendum in 2016, show that when given the opportunity, the 
                                                     
127 Helmut Kohl is a former German chancellor (1982–1998), quoted in Spolaore (2013, 
p. 135).  
128 In reference to the famous quote by John Quincy Adams (1821): “But she goes not 
abroad, in search of monsters to destroy”.  
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European public can choose to turn its back on the EU. Implicitly, that 
is also a public rejection of the European political community created 
by the process of European integration promoted and pursued through 
the EU regime. The most important aspect of the Brexit vote from a 
system persistence perspective is, however, that the decision sets a 
precedent for actually leaving (De Vries, 2017, p. 39). Hence, one of the 
main arguments of this thesis has been that public attitudes towards 
the EU actually matter for the future of the EU, and in the end for the 
future of Europe as we know it. Based on this thesis, however, there is 
no way of telling how the public would, for instance, vote in the 
remaining 27 member states if given the chance to decide whether their 
respective countries should remain a part of the EU, or follow the path 
chosen by the British public instead. Nevertheless, this thesis does 
provide some empirical basis for speculation and for making prognoses 
regarding the outcomes of future hypothetical EU membership 
referendums within the remaining EU-27 member states.  
The prevalent understanding among the political elites during the 
history of the EU has been, in spite of all of the EU’s apparent flaws, 
that an EU membership and a strong EU will benefit all of Europe in 
the end. That is also why an EU membership is still considered to be 
something worth aspiring for among many of the European countries 
that have still not been allowed to become EU members. This notion 
has also been shared by a majority of the European public, although 
post-Maastricht (1992) that has begun to change, something that has 
been described as the “post-Maastricht blues” (Eichenberg & Dalton, 
2007), which further accelerated after the start of the global recession in 
2008. During the EP-elections in 2014, one in four voted for a 
Eurosceptic party (De Vries, 2018), a number that is likely to have been 
even higher during the 2019 EP-elections. Furthermore, Easton 
identified cleavages and conflicts within a political system as the most 
significant sources of stress on a political system, and the success of 
political parties with an anti-EU agenda is a concrete sign that the EU 
already constitutes, and is likely to grow further as, a conflict issue 
within the EU area. Cleavages within the political community are also 
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perceived to be the most significant cause for the erosion of diffuse 
support, and if a political system does not have the capacity to cope 
with stress, it will eventually be destroyed (Miller, 1971, p. 202).  
To date, the end of the so-called “permissive consensus” (Lindberg 
& Scheingold, 1970) and the start of the so-called “constraining 
dissensus” (Hooghe & Marks, 2008) towards European integration 
have not constituted the end of this particular European integration 
project. However, there is no way of telling whether the “constraining 
dissensus” towards European integration in the near future could 
develop into more direct “active opposition” from the European public 
towards continuing supranational European political integration. 
Nevertheless, in 2019 that has not yet occurred, at least not on any 
larger scale. Instead, pro-EU forces have increasingly started to 
mobilise all over Europe (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 102). Still, as the spirit 
of the times seems to be publicly hostile towards what is vaguely 
defined as the political elites, it is not difficult to imagine a future when 
public hostility towards the largely pro-EU political elites within 
Europe will also transform into public hostility towards the single 
policy issue that the elite-sceptic part of the public actually seems able 
to agree on, namely that the EU is something bad.  
There is no telling what the future of Europe would look like without 
the EU. Perhaps everyday life would become better for all Europeans 
without the EU complicating things. If the EU were to suddenly cease 
to exist, perhaps something new and better would replace it instantly. 
That is, however, impossible to say. What we do know is that the EU 
has been continuously built for over 60 years, although it is still a 
political project under construction and far from finished. The building 
and governing processes within the EU area have also been anything 
but simple, as implementing EU-wide policies for an area constituting 
28 separate political entities is far from a simple political task. One of 
the main problems with the EU is perhaps that no one is certain 
regarding when the development and construction of the EU could be 
considered to be finished. Also, according to the so-called “bicycle-
theory,” the EU must keep moving forward, especially during crises, 
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for the EU not to collapse (Majone, 2016, p. 2). There is also no lack of 
frozen intra-European conflict that could appear again if the EU would 
suddenly start to dissolve, and there is no doubt that “the underlying 
motive behind European integration has always been peace” (Olsen & 
McCormick, 2016, p. 17). Looking from a global perspective, the 
unipolar world that has existed since the end of the Cold War, with the 
victory of liberal democracy, is also slowly but surely transforming into 
a bipolar (China), and over time also a multipolar (India), world. One 
should also remember that history has a habit of repeating itself, and 
the political developments currently taking place in countries such as 
Hungary, Italy and Poland could, and should, be taken as warrying 
signs of what is to come if the EU becomes even more questioned. 
Especially the developments of public support in Italy, the prospective 
third largest economy and the country with the second largest national 
debt within the EU area, constitute reasons for real concerns. However, 
according to the constitutional arrangements of Italy, it is unlikely that 
a referendum on EU membership could actually be arranged, but the 
outcome of such an election would be highly uncertain (De Vries, 2017, 
p. 43). As a result, the global order of international relations is also 
changing and liberal democracy, as the prevailing system of 
governance in Europe, is now being increasingly threatened from both 
outside and within. In the following years, Italy will most likely be the 
country to watch.  
Even though these are worrying signs for the EU, it should also be 
noted that the political decision-making powers of the EU have been 
increasing for every new EU treaty with the continuing transferring of 
more decision-making powers from the national to the EU arena (Mair, 
2007). This is probably in an effort to strengthen the EU’s capabilities to 
act on the global stage, as the 28 countries, independently, are not 
strong enough to have any global impact. Moreover, as a result of this 
process of transferring decision-making powers, some have started to 
argue that there exists something of a democratic deficit within the EU 
that can only be fixed with more democracy at the EU level (Follesdal 
& Hix, 2006), while others, on the other hand, argue that “the notion of 
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a “democratic deficit” is largely the creation of academics and 
intellectuals” (Schmitter, 2003, p. 79). Nevertheless, as Buchanan and 
Keohane (2006, p. 407) noted, “the perception of legitimacy matters, 
because, in a democratic era, multilateral institutions will only thrive if 
they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics”.  
I am not certain that more democracy at the EU level is the solution 
for the EU’s legitimacy problems, nor if there actually exists a 
democratic deficit at the EU level. There is, however, a real danger with 
democratising the governing of the EU too much, as the practical 
operations and functioning within the EU regime institutions will then 
become affected, to an even larger extent, by shifting national level 
public sentiments towards the EU. Democratising the supranational 
governance structure of the EU could, hence, also constitute a real 
existential threat to the EU, as this thesis has shown that the European 
public is prone to fluctuate significantly in their attitudes towards the 
EU regime, especially during times of national disturbances. On the 
other hand, without democratising the EU regime further, there is an 
even larger possibility that the public within more member states will 
be tempted to follow the Brits in “taking back control” during longer 
periods of increased dissatisfaction with the functioning and 
development of the EU.129 How this problem will be solved remains to 
be seen, it is, however, an issue over which it will be extremely 
challenging to reach a political consensus within the EU area.  
Finally, as the EU continues to be a work in progress, there is no 
telling what the final result will look like, if the EU ever develops that 
far. One should, however, remember that before the failed referendums 
on the European constitution in 2005, it was not that farfetched to 
believe that the EU was on the verge of becoming a federalised political 
union. However, there are not any longer many politicians that are 
openly calling for the creation of the United States of Europe. As Hobolt 
(2015, p. 238) also argues, the future of European integration will most 
likely be directly or indirectly determined by the European public, and 
therefore researchers and politicians alike should start focusing more 
                                                     
129 One of the slogans used by the Brexit campaigners in 2016.  
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on what public attitudes tell us about public preferences with regard to 
European integration. Furthermore, no matter what the future holds for 
the EU, I agree with Hobolt (2017, p. 40), that its direction will directly 
or indirectly be determined by the attitudes and preferences expressed 
by the European public but that declining levels of public support and 
the rise of Eurosceptic parties should not transform the EU in a short-
term perspective. As this thesis has shown, these attitudes and 
preferences towards the EU should be determined by contextual-level 
developments within the member states.  
Jean Monnet (1978, p. 46) famously argued that Europe would be 
built through crises, and with regard to the development of European 
integration, that statement has, at least to date, been proven to hold 
firm. Yet, it is far from impossible that Europe, as we know it, will 
sooner or later be torn down as a result from a crisis. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Summary of the contextual-level factors used.  
 
Category: Variable: Explanation / coding: Unit: Source:
Economic 
performance:
Unemployment The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons as a 
percentage of the labour force based on International Labour Office (ILO) 
definition. The labour force is the total number of people employed and 
unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who: - 
are without work during the reference week; - are available to start work 
within the next two weeks; - and have been actively seeking work in the 
past four weeks or had already found a job to start within the next three 
months. 
Annual ratio in percentage of workforce. Eurostat
Debt The ratio of government debt outstanding at the end of the year to gross 
domestic product at current market prices.
Annual ratio in percentage of national debt. Eurostat
Democratic 
culture:
Non-corruption A country´s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption 
on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Scale changed in 2012 
from 0-10 to 0-100, values before 2012 are hence written according to the 
newscale, hence a value of 9,1 was coded as 91 during 2004-2011.
(0) Highly corrupt                                                                                     
(100) Very clean 
Transparency 
International
Economic inequality The Gini coefficient is based on the comparison of cumulative proportions 
of the population against cumulative proportions of income they receive, 
and it ranges between 0 in the case of perfect equality and 100 in the case 
of perfect inequality.
(0) Perfect equality                                                                                      
(100) Perfect inequality
Eurostat
External 
pressure:
Refugees Refugees: Individuals granted complementary forms of protection or those 
enjoying temporary protection. The refugee population also includes 
people in a refugee-like situation. Asylum-seekers: Individuals who have 
sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have 
not yet been determined, irrespsective of when they may have lodged. 
Annual ratio of total refugees + asylum-seekers as a  
percentage of year specific total population.
The United 
Nations Refugee 
Agency 
(UNHCR)
Foreign population Percentage of population with foreign country passport or stateless status. Annual ratio of foreign-born  population as a percentage of 
year specific total population.
Eurostat
EU-relation: Eurozone 
membership 
Eight of the EU-28 member states have become Eurozone members during 
the period 2004-2017. In that way it was possible to also get variation from 
mean values from this variable within the analyses, which made it 
possible to compute both a "between" and a "within" estimate. 
EU budget net 
reciever
Here Eurostat specific numbers are used, reflecting the EU-budget balance 
based on EU-budget expenditures and revenues. The budget balance is 
calucated as the % of total GNI (Gross National Income) of the member 
state. Member states having a positive balance will be getting more back 
from the budget (Net-recipients), and member states having a negative 
balance will be contributing more than they are getting back (Net 
contributors). 
Largest mean contributor: Netherlands (-0.36 %)                  
Smallest mean contributor: Lithuania (3.47 %)                               
Indicating that the Netherlands have gotten on average 0.36 
% less on balance from the EU budget than they have 
contributed (mean balance hence -0.36), and that Lithuania 
have gotten 3.47 % more on balance from the EU budget than 
they have contributed (mean balance hence 3.47). 
Eurostat
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Table 2. Summary of Eurobarometer survey items used.   
 
 
Elements Period: Variables: Eurobarometer question: Original values: New values: Operationalisation:
The European 
Political 
Community
2006-2017 EU attachment
People may feel different degrees of attachment to 
their town or village, to their region, to their country 
or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to: 
The European Union
(1) Very attached                                                                                          
(2) Fairly attached                                                                                          
(3) Not very attached                                                                                                
(4) Not at all attached                                                                                                    
(5) Don´t know
1->1                                                    
2->1
3->0
4->0
5->missing
(1) EU attachment                                                                                            
(0) Low or no attachement
2004-2017 European identification In the near future do you see yourself as...?
(1) Nationality only                                                                                     
(2) Nationality and European                                                                          
(3) European and Nationality                                                                                            
(4) European only                                                                                                               
(5) None                                                                                                                                 
(6) Refusal                                                                                                                                                
(7) Dont know
1->0                                       
2->1                                        
3->1                                       
4->1                                                 
5->0                                         
6,7->missing
(1) European identification                                                
(0) No European identification             
EU regime 
principles
2014-2017
The right for EU citizens to 
live abroad
For each of the following statements, please tell me if 
you think that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither 
a good or a bad thing.
(1) A good thing                                                                                                                                                  
(2) A bad thing                                                                                                                                
(3) Neither good nor bad                                                                                                       
(4) Don´t know
1->1
2->0
3->0
4->missing
(1) A good thing                                                              
(0) Not a good thing
2014-2017
The right for EU citizens to 
work abroad
For each of the following statements, please tell me if 
you think that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither 
a good or a bad thing.
(1) A good thing                                                                                                                                                  
(2) A bad thing                                                                                                                                
(3) Neither good nor bad                                                                                                       
(4) Don´t know
1->1
2->0
3->0
4->missing
(1) A good thing                                                              
(0) Not a good thing
2014-2017
The right for EU citizens to 
live in our country
For each of the following statements, please tell me if 
you think that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither 
a good or a bad thing.
(1) A good thing                                                                                                                                                  
(2) A bad thing                                                                                                                                
(3) Neither good nor bad                                                                                                       
(4) Don´t know
1->1
2->0
3->0
4->missing
(1) A good thing                                                              
(0) Not a good thing
2014-2017
The right for EU citizens to 
work in our country
For each of the following statements, please tell me if 
you think that it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither 
a good or a bad thing.
(1) A good thing                                                                                                                                                  
(2) A bad thing                                                                                                                                
(3) Neither good nor bad                                                                                                       
(4) Don´t know
1->1
2->0
3->0
4->missing
(1) A good thing                                                              
(0) Not a good thing
2015-2017 Free movement of citizens
What is your opinion of each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, 
whether you are for it or against it? The free 
movement of EU citizens who can live, work, study 
and do business anywhere in the EU.
(1) For                                                                                                                                             
(2) Against                                                                                                                                                                  
(3) Don´t know
1->1
2->0                               
3->missing
(1) For                                                                                     
(0) Against
2014-2017 EU-immigration
Please tell me whether each of the following 
statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for 
you: Immigration of people from other EU member 
states.
(1) Very positive                                                                                                                       
(2) Fairly positive                                                                                                                               
(3) Fairly negative                                                                                                                            
(4) Very negative                                                                                                                                         
(5) Don´t know
1->1                                                    
2->1
3->0
4->0                                             
5->missing
 (1) Positive                                                                                             
(0) Negative                                                                                                                                                   
2004-2017 EU membership support
Generally speaking, do you think your country's 
membership to the EU is a...?
(1) A good thing                                           
(2) A bad thing                                                   
(3) Neither good nor bad                           
(4) Don´t know
1->1                                    
2->0                                
3->0                                     
4->missing                                                
(1) A good thing                                           
(0) Not a good thing
EU regime 
processes
2004-2017 EU democracy satisfaction
How about the way democracy works in the 
European Union?
(1) Very satisfied                                                                                                          
(2) Fairly satisfied                                                                                                                                       
(3) Not very satisfied                                                                                                                           
(4) Not at all satisfied                                                                                                              
(5) Don´t know
1->1
2->1
3->0
4->0
5->missing
(1) Satisfied                                                                                     
(0) Not satisfied
EU regime 
institutions
2004-2017
Trust in the European 
Parliament
I would like to ask you a question about how much 
trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to 
trust it or tend not to trust it? The European 
Parliament.
(1) Tend to trust                                                                                                                                 
(2) Tend not to trust                                                                                                           
(3) Don´t know
1->1
2->0                               
3->missing
(1) Tend to trust the EP                                                                             
(0) Tend not to trust the EP                       
Securing
2004-2017 Single European currency
What is your opinion of each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, 
whether you are for it or against it? A single 
European currency, the euro.
(1) For                                                                                                                                             
(2) Against                                                                                                                                                                  
(3) Don´t know
1->1
2->0                               
3->missing
(1) For                                                                                     
(0) Against
Deepening
2004-2017
Common European defence 
policy
What is your opinion of each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, 
whether you are for it or against it? A common 
defence and security policy among European Union 
member states.
(1) For                                                                                                                                             
(2) Against                                                                                                                                                                  
(3) Don´t know
1->1
2->0                               
3->missing
(1) For                                                                                  
(0) Against
Widening
2004-2017 Future enlargement
What is your opinion of each of the following 
statements? Please tell me for each statement, 
whether you are for it or against it? Further 
enlargement of the European Union to include other 
countries in future years.
(1) For                                                                                                                         
(2) Against                                                                                                                                  
(3) Don´t know
1->1
2->0                              
3->missing
(1) For                                                                                     
(0) Against
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Table 3. List of EU-related referendums (Qvortrup, 2016, p. 62; updated by 
author). 
 
 
 
 
Country Year Yes vote (%) Turnout (%) Issue
Norway 1972 47 79 EU Membership
Denmark 1972 63 90 EU Membership
France 1972 68 60 Approve applicants
Ireland 1972 81 83 EU Membership
United Kingdom 1975 67 64 Renegotiation
Greenland 1982 47 73 Leave the ECC
Denmark 1986 56 75 Single European Act
Ireland 1987 70 44 Single European Act
Denmark 1992 49 83 Maastricht Treaty
France 1992 51 69 Maastricht Treaty
Ireland 1992 69 44 Maastricht Treaty
Denmark 1993 56 86 Maastricht Treaty
Norway 1994 47 89 EU Membership
Sweden 1994 52 82 EU Membership
Finland 1994 56 70 EU Membership
Austria 1994 66 82 EU Membership
Denmark 1998 55 76 Amsterdam Treaty
Ireland 1998 62 56 Amsterdam Treaty
Denmark 2000 46 87 Single European currency
Ireland 2001 46 35 Nice Treaty
Ireland 2002 63 49 Nice Treaty
Malta 2003 53 90 EU Membership
Sweden 2003 55 82 Single European currency
Poland 2003 59 77 EU Membership
Slovenia 2003 60 90 EU Membership
Estonia 2003 67 64 EU Membership
Czech Republic 2003 77 55 EU Membership
Hungary 2003 84 46 EU Membership
Lithuania 2003 91 63 EU Membership
Romania 2003 91 55 EU Membership
Slovakia 2003 92 52 EU Membership
Latvia 2004 67 71 EU Membership
Netherlands 2005 38 63 European Constitution
France 2005 45 69 European Constitution
Luxembourg 2005 56 90 European Constitution
Spain 2005 77 42 European Constitution
Ireland 2008 47 53 Lisbon Treaty
Ireland 2009 67 59 Lisbon Treaty
Ireland 2012 60 39 Financial compact
Croatia 2012 66 43 EU Membership
Denmark 2014 62 55 Patent Court
Denmark 2015 42 75 Police co-operation
Greece 2015 43 62 Bailout
Netherlands 2016 36 32 EU-Ukraine trade-agreement
United Kingdom 2016 52 72 EU Membership
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Table 4. National debt rate of total GDP 2004–2017 (Eurostat).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 65 68 67 65 68 80 82 82 82 81 84 84 84 78 76
Belgium 97 95 91 87 93 100 100 103 104 106 107 106 106 103 100
Bulgaria 36 27 21 16 13 14 15 15 17 17 27 26 29 25 21
Croatia 40 41 39 38 40 49 58 65 71 82 86 85 83 78 61
Republic of Cyprus 64 63 59 54 45 54 56 66 80 103 108 108 107 98 76
Czech Republic 29 28 28 28 28 34 37 40 45 45 42 40 37 35 35
Denmark 44 37 32 27 33 40 43 46 45 44 44 40 38 36 39
Estonia 5 5 4 4 5 7 7 6 10 10 11 10 9 9 7
Finland 43 40 38 34 33 42 47 49 54 57 60 64 63 61 49
France 66 67 64 64 68 79 82 85 90 92 95 96 97 97 82
Germany 65 67 67 64 65 73 81 79 80 77 75 71 68 64 71
Greece 103 107 104 103 109 127 146 172 160 177 179 177 181 179 145
Hungary 58 60 64 65 71 77 80 80 78 76 75 75 74 74 72
Ireland 28 26 24 24 42 62 86 110 120 119 105 77 73 68 69
Italy 100 102 103 100 102 113 115 117 123 129 132 132 132 132 116
Latvia 14 11 10 8 18 36 47 43 41 39 41 37 41 40 30
Lithuania 19 18 17 16 15 28 36 37 40 39 41 43 40 40 30
Luxembourg 7 7 8 8 15 16 20 19 22 24 23 22 21 23 17
Malta 72 70 65 62 63 68 68 70 68 68 64 60 58 51 65
Netherlands 50 49 45 43 55 57 59 62 66 68 68 65 62 57 57
Poland 45 46 47 44 46 49 53 54 54 56 50 51 54 51 50
Portugal 62 67 69 68 72 84 96 111 126 129 131 129 130 126 100
Romania 19 16 12 13 13 23 30 34 37 38 39 38 38 35 28
Slovakia 41 34 31 30 29 36 41 44 52 55 54 52 52 51 43
Slovenia 27 26 26 23 22 35 38 47 54 70 80 83 79 74 49
Spain 45 42 39 36 40 53 60 70 86 96 100 99 99 98 69
Sweden 49 49 44 39 38 41 39 38 38 41 46 44 42 41 42
United Kingdom 39 40 41 42 50 64 76 81 85 86 87 88 88 88 68
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Table 5. Unemployment rate of total workforce 2004–2017 (Eurostat).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 5 6 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 5
Belgium 8 9 8 8 7 8 8 7 8 8 9 9 8 7 8
Bulgaria 12 10 9 7 6 7 10 11 12 13 11 9 8 6 9
Croatia 14 13 12 10 9 9 12 14 16 17 17 16 13 11 13
Republic of Cyprus 5 5 5 4 4 5 6 8 12 16 16 15 13 11 9
Czech Republic 8 8 7 5 4 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 4 3 6
Denmark 6 5 4 4 3 6 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 6 6
Estonia 10 8 6 5 6 14 17 12 10 9 7 6 7 6 9
Finland 9 8 8 7 6 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 8
France 9 9 9 8 7 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 9 9
Germany 11 11 10 9 7 8 7 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 7
Greece 11 10 9 8 8 10 13 18 25 28 27 25 24 22 17
Hungary 6 7 8 7 8 10 11 11 11 10 8 7 5 4 8
Ireland 5 4 5 5 7 13 15 15 16 14 12 10 8 7 10
Italy 8 8 7 6 7 8 8 8 11 12 13 12 12 11 9
Latvia 12 10 7 6 8 18 20 16 15 12 11 10 10 9 12
Lithuania 11 8 6 4 6 14 18 15 13 12 11 9 8 7 10
Luxembourg 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 6 6 5
Malta 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 4 6
Netherlands 5 6 5 4 4 4 5 5 6 7 7 7 6 5 5
Poland 19 18 14 10 7 8 10 10 10 10 9 8 6 5 10
Portugal 8 9 9 9 9 11 12 13 16 16 14 13 11 9 11
Romania 8 7 7 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 7
Slovakia 18 16 14 11 10 12 15 14 14 14 13 12 10 8 13
Slovenia 6 7 6 5 4 6 7 8 9 10 10 9 8 7 7
Spain 11 9 9 8 11 18 20 21 25 26 25 22 20 17 17
Sweden 7 8 7 6 6 8 9 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7
United Kingdom 5 5 5 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 5 4 6
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Table 6. Corruption Perceptions Index values 2004–2017 (Transparency 
International).130  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
130 Before 2012 Transparency International used the scale of 0–10 to measure corruption 
level, but from 2012 onwards they changed the scale to 0–100. Hence, values pre-2012 
were re-coded to fit the model. Therefore, pre-2012 values such as 9.1 are here coded as 
91.  
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 84 87 86 81 81 79 79 78 69 69 72 76 75 75 78
Belgium 75 74 73 71 73 71 71 75 75 75 76 77 77 75 74
Bulgaria 41 40 40 41 36 38 37 33 41 41 43 41 41 43 40
Croatia 35 34 34 41 44 41 41 40 46 48 48 51 49 49 43
Republic of Cyprus 54 57 56 53 64 66 63 63 66 63 63 61 55 57 60
Czech Republic 42 43 48 52 52 49 46 44 49 48 51 56 55 57 49
Denmark 95 95 95 94 93 93 93 94 90 91 92 91 90 88 92
Estonia 60 64 67 65 66 66 65 64 64 68 69 70 70 71 66
Finland 97 96 96 94 90 89 92 94 90 89 89 90 89 85 91
France 71 75 74 73 69 69 68 70 71 71 69 70 69 70 71
Germany 82 82 80 78 79 80 79 80 79 78 79 81 81 81 80
Greece 43 43 44 46 47 38 35 34 36 40 43 46 44 48 42
Hungary 48 50 52 53 51 51 47 46 55 54 54 51 48 45 50
Ireland 75 74 74 75 77 80 80 75 69 72 74 75 73 74 75
Italy 48 50 49 52 48 43 39 39 42 43 43 44 47 50 46
Latvia 40 42 47 48 50 45 43 42 49 53 55 56 57 58 49
Lithuania 46 48 48 48 46 49 50 48 54 57 58 59 59 59 52
Luxembourg 84 85 86 84 83 82 85 85 80 80 82 85 81 82 83
Malta 68 66 64 58 58 52 56 56 57 56 55 60 55 56 58
Netherlands 87 86 87 90 89 89 88 89 84 83 83 84 83 82 86
Poland 35 34 37 42 46 50 53 55 58 60 61 63 62 60 51
Portugal 63 65 66 65 61 58 60 61 63 62 63 64 62 63 63
Romania 29 30 31 37 38 38 37 36 44 43 43 46 48 48 39
Slovakia 40 43 47 49 50 45 43 40 46 47 50 51 51 50 47
Slovenia 60 61 64 66 67 66 64 59 61 57 58 60 61 61 62
Spain 71 70 68 67 65 61 61 62 65 59 60 58 58 57 63
Sweden 92 92 92 93 93 92 92 93 88 89 87 89 88 84 90
United Kingdom 86 86 86 84 77 77 76 78 74 76 78 81 81 82 80
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Table 7. Gini index values 2004–2017 (Eurostat).131  
 
 
                                                     
131 In the cases where values were missing for 2004, values from the closest previous 
year were used instead. These were: Bulgaria (2002), Czech Republic (2001), Germany 
(2001), Hungary (2000), Latvia (2000), Lithuania (2001), Netherlands (2002), Poland 
(2001), Romania (2002), Slovenia (2002), United Kingdom (2002). Last day of data-
collection 30.9.2018, member state values not included by Eurostat by then excluded 
from statistical analyses.  
Country 2004* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 26 26 25 26 28 28 28 27 28 27 28 27 27 28 27
Belgium 26 28 28 26 28 26 27 26 27 26 26 26 26 26 27
Bulgaria 26 - 31 35 36 33 33 35 34 35 35 37 38 40 35
Croatia - - - - - - 32 31 31 31 30 30 30 - 31
Republic of Cyprus - 29 29 30 29 30 30 29 31 32 35 34 32 31 31
Czech Republic 25 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Denmark 24 24 24 25 25 27 27 27 27 27 28 27 28 28 26
Estonia 37 34 33 33 31 31 31 32 33 33 36 35 33 32 33
Finland 26 26 26 26 26 26 25 26 26 25 26 25 25 25 26
France 28 28 27 27 30 30 30 31 31 30 29 29 29 - 29
Germany 25 26 27 30 30 29 29 29 28 30 31 30 30 29 29
Greece 33 33 34 34 33 33 33 34 34 34 35 34 34 33 34
Hungary 24 28 33 26 25 25 24 27 27 28 29 28 28 28 27
Ireland 32 32 32 31 30 29 31 30 31 31 31 30 30 - 31
Italy 33 33 32 32 31 32 32 33 32 33 32 32 33 33 32
Latvia 34 36 39 35 38 38 36 35 36 35 36 35 35 35 36
Lithuania 31 36 35 34 35 36 37 33 32 35 35 38 37 38 35
Luxembourg 27 27 28 27 28 29 28 27 28 30 29 29 31 - 28
Malta 30 27 27 26 28 27 29 27 27 28 28 28 29 28 28
Netherlands 27 27 26 28 28 27 26 26 25 25 26 27 27 27 27
Poland 30 36 33 32 32 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 30 29 31
Portugal 38 38 38 37 36 35 34 34 35 34 35 34 34 34 35
Romania 30 - - 38 36 35 34 34 34 35 35 37 35 33 35
Slovakia - 26 28 25 24 25 26 26 25 24 26 24 24 - 25
Slovenia 22 24 24 23 23 23 24 24 24 24 25 25 24 24 24
Spain 31 32 32 32 32 33 34 34 34 34 35 35 35 34 33
Sweden 23 23 24 23 25 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 28 - 25
United Kingdom 35 35 33 33 34 32 33 33 31 30 32 32 32 - 33
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Table 8. Foreign-born population and stateless population as percentage of 
total population 2004–2017 (Eurostat, author’s calculations).132  
 
 
 
                                                     
132 Calculations based on the year-specific total foreign-born population, and stateless 
population, within the country as a proportion of the total year-specific population of 
the country.  
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 9 9 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 12 13 13 15 15 11
Belgium 8 8 9 9 9 9 10 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 10
Bulgaria 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1
Republic of Cyprus 12 13 15 16 16 16 20 20 20 20 19 17 17 16 17
Czech Republic 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4
Denmark 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 6
Estonia 18 18 17 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 16
Finland 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3
France 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6
Germany 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 11 11 9
Greece 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 8 8
Hungary 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Ireland 9 9 10 12 13 13 13 12 12 12 11 11 12 12 11
Italy 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 6
Latvia 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 17 16 16 15 15 15 14 17
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 39 40 40 42 43 44 43 43 44 45 45 46 47 48 43
Malta 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 6 7 9 10 12 6
Netherlands 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Portugal 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Romania 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
Slovakia 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 4
Spain 7 8 9 10 11 12 12 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10
Sweden 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 6
United Kingdom 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 7
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Table 9. Refugees and asylum-seekers as percentage of total population 2004–
2017 (Eurostat, author’s calculations).133  
 
                                                     
133 Calculations based the year-specific total amount of refugees within the country as 
a proportion of the total amount of year-specific total population of the country. Data 
including: refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced peoples (IDPs), returnees, 
stateless persons and "others". 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 0.69 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.89 0.85 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.93 1.08 1.77 1.95 1.96 1.4
Belgium 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.39
Bulgaria 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.05 0.12 0.25 0.36 0.47 0.31 0.16
Croatia 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Republic of Cyprus 1.46 1.88 1.81 1.73 1.22 0.99 1.07 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.88 1.1 1.36 1.76 1.24
Czech Republic 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Denmark 1.23 0.83 0.68 0.5 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.39 0.53 0.7 0.69 0.49
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01
Finland 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.2 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.68 0.44 0.44 0.28
France 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.43 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.6 0.41
Germany 1.17 0.94 0.8 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.84 0.4 0.55 0.91 1.53 1.7 0.89
Greece 0.09 0.1 0.14 0.28 0.36 0.45 0.51 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.47 0.8 0.77 0.42
Hungary 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.42 0.08 0.07 0.11
Ireland 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.3 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.27
Italy 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.41 0.58 0.18
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01
Lithuania 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03
Luxembourg 0.35 0.4 0.48 0.58 0.65 0.75 0.79 0.89 0.79 0.36 0.43 0.66 0.74 0.6 0.62
Malta 0.42 0.52 0.65 0.95 1.36 1.89 1.79 2.03 2.16 2.56 1.46 1.74 1.96 2.04 1.62
Netherlands 0.95 0.81 0.7 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.59
Poland 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Romania 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
Slovakia 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Slovenia 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02
Spain 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.03
Sweden 1.13 1.01 1.08 1.13 1.1 1.08 1.08 1.11 1.22 1.48 2.06 3.35 3.18 2.93 1.67
United Kingdom 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.37
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Table 10. EU budget balance 2004–2017 (Eurostat).134 
 
 
                                                     
134 Values reflect the operating budgetary balance as percentage of Gross National 
Income (GNI). A negative budget balance indicate the country being a net contributor 
to the EU budget, as it pays proportionally more than it receives back.  
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria -0.15 -0.11 -0.11 -0.2 -0.12 -0.14 -0.23 -0.26 -0.34 -0.39 -0.38 -0.25 -0.28 -0.25 -0.23
Belgium -0.18 -0.19 -0.21 -0.25 -0.2 -0.48 -0.39 -0.36 -0.38 -0.39 -0.37 -0.33 -0.36 -0.16 -0.30
Bulgaria - - - 1.13 1.92 1.77 2.5 1.88 3.32 3.8 4.45 5.33 4.15 2.92 3.02
Croatia - - - - - - - - - 0.12 0.42 0.52 1.17 0.55 0.56
Republic of Cyprus 0.49 0.64 0.67 -0.06 -0.1 -0.1 0.06 0.03 -0.13 0.23 0.69 -0.13 0.12 0.27 0.19
Czech Republic 0.3 0.17 0.33 0.51 0.78 1.23 1.44 0.96 2.02 2.33 2.08 3.77 1.96 1.37 1.38
Denmark -0.11 -0.12 -0.22 -0.26 -0.22 -0.42 -0.25 -0.33 -0.44 -0.49 -0.32 -0.29 -0.22 -0.24 -0.28
Estonia 1.57 1.43 1.38 1.5 1.46 4.18 4.82 2.25 4.64 4.22 2.49 1.21 2.34 2.09 2.54
Finland -0.04 -0.05 -0.14 -0.09 -0.16 -0.3 -0.16 -0.33 -0.33 -0.3 -0.4 -0.23 -0.2 -0.12 -0.20
France -0.18 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.19 -0.3 -0.27 -0.3 -0.39 -0.39 -0.33 -0.25 -0.41 -0.2 -0.26
Germany -0.31 -0.26 -0.26 -0.29 -0.34 -0.25 -0.35 -0.33 -0.42 -0.48 -0.52 -0.46 -0.34 -0.32 -0.35
Greece 2.16 1.98 2.39 2.4 2.68 1.35 1.62 2.29 2.33 2.93 2.89 2.8 2.43 2.1 2.31
Hungary 0.24 0.69 1.29 1.7 1.11 3.05 2.95 4.62 3.47 5.08 5.64 4.38 3.3 2.66 2.87
Ireland 1.19 0.77 0.67 0.39 0.35 -0.03 0.58 0.27 0.47 0.19 0.02 0.19 0.08 -0.07 0.36
Italy -0.2 -0.15 -0.11 -0.12 -0.25 -0.32 -0.28 -0.36 -0.31 -0.24 -0.28 -0.16 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23
Latvia 1.72 1.94 1.52 2.23 1.69 2.49 3.7 3.62 4.33 3.46 3.35 3.12 2.01 1.98 2.65
Lithuania 2.06 2.3 2.48 2.84 2.67 5.44 4.94 4.55 4.69 4.45 4.38 1.51 3.09 3.14 3.37
Luxembourg -0.42 -0.33 -0.25 -0.48 -0.07 -0.42 -0.16 -0.27 -0.28 -0.24 0.27 -0.27 0.02 0.04 -0.20
Malta 0.93 1.82 1.95 0.5 0.5 0.15 0.84 1,00 1.03 1.21 2.35 0.37 1.27 1,00 1.07
Netherlands -0.38 -0.49 -0.44 -0.47 -0.43 0.02 -0.29 -0.34 -0.36 -0.42 -0.71 -0.54 -0.04 -0.19 -0.36
Poland 0.72 0.77 1.12 1.7 1.25 2.09 2.43 3.03 3.24 3.22 3.47 2.31 1.71 1.92 2.07
Portugal 2.08 1.52 1.42 1.46 1.57 1.27 1.51 1.73 3.06 2.63 1.88 0.56 0.95 1.29 1.64
Romania - - - 0.49 1.14 1.42 0.99 1.1 1.55 2.94 3.09 3.27 3.62 1.85 1.95
Slovakia 0.51 0.71 0.73 1.13 1.13 0.85 2.06 1.69 2.26 1.78 1.37 4.07 2.49 1.17 1.57
Slovenia 0.4 0.35 0.46 0.26 0.31 0.68 1.18 1.34 1.6 1.2 2.17 1.51 0.46 0.34 0.88
Spain 1,00 0.66 0.38 0.35 0.26 0.11 0.38 0.28 0.38 0.29 0.1 0.42 0.15 0.06 0.34
Sweden -0.34 -0.27 -0.25 -0.27 -0.4 -0.03 -0.32 -0.32 -0.44 -0.49 -0.52 -0.48 -0.2 -0.29 -0.33
United Kingdom -0.15 -0.08 -0.1 -0.19 -0.04 -0.11 -0.31 -0.3 -0.36 -0.43 -0.23 -0.46 -0.27 -0.23 -0.23
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Table 11. Public support for the future enlargement of the EU 2004–2017 
(Eurobarometer).  
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 34 34 33 28 28 29 25 21 23 21 27 24 24 27 27
Belgium 51 50 46 47 47 43 39 39 36 36 33 34 32 37 41
Bulgaria 94 90 88 80 87 74 79 72 71 67 68 65 60 63 76
Croatia 83 79 75 78 65 67 74 72 70 76 68 67 68 65 72
Republic of Cyprus 74 81 76 75 74 62 64 53 43 35 43 45 41 50 58
Czech Republic 79 72 66 69 66 59 56 46 43 47 47 36 33 36 54
Denmark 49 49 52 51 53 42 44 42 41 42 39 36 32 32 43
Estonia 73 65 64 62 71 59 65 48 52 56 56 50 42 47 58
Finland 45 44 39 41 43 40 33 27 26 28 31 27 29 28 34
France 43 34 33 33 32 33 31 28 26 23 24 27 29 28 30
Germany 39 36 31 34 32 32 26 21 22 22 25 25 26 29 28
Greece 69 71 65 54 55 46 49 48 46 45 45 47 43 47 52
Hungary 75 77 72 69 68 69 74 65 61 63 62 59 59 66 67
Ireland 66 67 60 54 52 51 42 34 45 45 46 49 47 54 51
Italy 75 68 58 57 50 50 50 46 40 37 41 40 38 44 50
Latvia 78 73 67 62 66 56 56 54 55 56 60 57 55 53 61
Lithuania 92 84 76 80 79 70 76 72 70 74 75 70 70 72 76
Luxembourg 41 35 32 27 31 35 35 32 27 31 26 25 28 28 31
Malta 77 74 77 76 75 74 72 70 62 67 73 71 68 71 72
Netherlands 54 49 46 51 49 46 40 34 35 30 34 35 30 27 40
Poland 88 85 84 85 83 80 80 78 73 74 75 68 65 67 77
Portugal 61 68 64 63 60 68 52 50 48 42 47 45 49 46 55
Romania 94 91 90 88 84 79 81 77 75 77 83 79 72 71 81
Slovakia 81 79 73 68 73 72 69 57 52 54 54 50 51 52 63
Slovenia 83 81 78 70 77 70 64 56 62 57 62 55 57 60 67
Spain 79 73 74 79 75 70 61 59 54 53 64 67 62 72 67
Sweden 49 53 55 57 58 53 54 49 46 49 54 47 39 41 50
United Kingdom 58 53 46 44 44 38 35 37 34 37 41 44 43 49 43
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Table 12. Public support for the single European currency 2004–2017 
(Eurobarometer).  
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 79 71 71 72 74 75 69 63 69 69 71 66 68 70 71
Belgium 89 84 84 84 83 82 80 81 74 76 78 80 79 81 81
Bulgaria 84 79 79 73 78 72 66 63 57 55 49 45 44 44 63
Croatia 69 66 66 72 75 67 73 70 61 62 58 59 57 49 65
Republic of Cyprus 62 54 50 51 63 67 62 57 52 48 54 53 58 67 57
Czech Republic 65 65 61 58 55 52 40 26 24 25 25 22 24 22 40
Denmark 55 52 55 55 54 55 46 36 31 34 34 34 32 33 43
Estonia 58 58 51 55 63 65 63 69 72 76 84 87 85 86 69
Finland 80 77 76 79 81 81 78 75 77 77 79 78 79 79 78
France 81 79 75 77 74 73 71 69 72 66 69 73 73 76 73
Germany 72 65 67 74 72 71 68 68 70 72 75 77 80 84 72
Greece 62 49 49 46 54 62 66 71 73 63 65 71 66 67 62
Hungary 69 73 73 70 71 71 74 62 52 57 56 55 55 58 64
Ireland 90 90 90 90 91 91 87 85 80 77 80 85 87 89 86
Italy 70 71 72 73 68 68 73 70 64 63 59 65 61 66 67
Latvia 66 61 53 53 55 56 58 51 40 51 69 80 83 83 61
Lithuania 77 63 54 55 59 58 57 52 47 44 51 73 67 68 59
Luxembourg 85 89 84 84 85 86 85 84 78 80 81 84 87 87 84
Malta 53 55 58 68 72 71 70 71 66 72 79 80 82 85 70
Netherlands 73 73 73 80 83 83 75 74 76 71 78 77 78 80 77
Poland 70 57 58 55 50 50 48 40 38 34 38 38 37 36 47
Portugal 69 68 62 70 61 66 61 59 61 56 56 68 74 80 65
Romania 87 86 82 83 82 83 78 74 69 65 71 72 63 64 76
Slovakia 72 69 65 66 71 91 89 82 80 80 79 83 82 86 78
Slovenia 91 83 84 90 92 89 85 83 84 80 82 83 86 87 86
Spain 71 66 67 72 70 68 67 68 64 59 65 70 72 82 69
Sweden 49 49 54 48 53 56 38 31 25 24 27 28 30 28 39
United Kingdom 33 31 32 29 29 29 20 19 15 18 21 21 22 30 25
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Table 13. Public support for a common European defence policy 2004–2017 
(Eurobarometer).  
 
 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 70 69 67 71 81 - 71 67 64 65 68 61 59 61 67
Belgium 93 92 89 90 90 - 87 87 86 85 85 85 86 84 87
Bulgaria 93 93 89 94 93 - 96 95 92 92 85 83 82 84 90
Croatia 87 82 80 82 82 - 83 81 81 86 82 80 80 74 82
Republic of Cyprus 92 95 95 96 95 - 92 91 88 84 89 85 82 85 90
Czech Republic 90 91 89 89 89 - 83 82 80 82 79 74 76 74 83
Denmark 72 72 73 75 77 - 71 70 68 69 73 73 71 72 72
Estonia 92 94 91 93 92 - 92 90 91 91 92 90 89 89 91
Finland 65 66 66 69 69 - 63 63 55 58 65 70 65 70 65
France 87 87 86 88 85 - 84 82 82 84 85 84 86 84 85
Germany 90 89 89 91 87 - 87 84 84 85 86 84 87 88 87
Greece 87 83 83 86 81 - 78 83 78 76 78 72 73 75 79
Hungary 90 91 90 87 87 - 87 82 77 78 72 72 76 75 82
Ireland 72 72 71 78 67 - 67 59 57 59 66 68 73 72 68
Italy 88 86 84 84 79 - 86 81 78 78 83 78 74 74 81
Latvia 93 95 92 93 91 - 91 89 87 91 91 91 91 90 91
Lithuania 94 93 93 94 93 - 95 92 91 92 94 94 94 93 93
Luxembourg 88 91 91 91 91 - 89 91 85 89 89 89 91 91 90
Malta 75 79 79 82 82 - 85 85 81 81 85 87 87 80 82
Netherlands 88 84 82 82 85 - 78 79 77 77 81 83 83 85 82
Poland 92 92 91 91 90 - 92 89 85 86 90 84 83 84 88
Portugal 83 84 81 88 77 - 81 81 77 74 78 78 80 81 80
Romania 96 92 92 93 91 - 90 88 89 89 88 86 79 78 89
Slovakia 93 90 89 91 92 - 93 91 89 89 83 83 82 83 88
Slovenia 94 92 87 91 91 - 88 83 83 82 85 82 85 84 87
Spain 87 86 87 90 89 - 89 90 86 84 87 88 87 91 88
Sweden 59 64 62 60 63 - 60 60 56 60 62 63 61 66 61
United Kingdom 69 68 66 64 65 - 54 61 58 63 67 68 68 71 65
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Table 14. Trust in the European Parliament 2004–2017 (Eurobarometer).  
 
 
 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 64 55 57 59 55 57 52 49 49 49 51 44 45 51 53
Belgium 74 68 69 72 70 67 65 65 61 60 55 57 57 60 64
Bulgaria 80 75 77 78 77 78 75 71 69 69 62 62 59 62 71
Croatia 66 58 55 50 49 45 48 45 46 51 50 60 54 55 52
Cyprus 79 76 79 72 77 68 61 61 45 29 37 35 39 46 57
Czech Republic 70 62 68 68 68 58 61 52 49 50 42 41 35 39 54
Denmark 67 64 69 75 69 70 73 67 69 66 64 67 60 66 67
Estonia 80 72 78 79 78 77 76 69 68 67 70 68 65 67 72
Finland 67 57 59 58 63 64 61 60 56 55 64 67 64 68 62
France 69 59 60 70 61 55 55 50 54 46 43 43 42 47 54
Germany 63 57 59 63 58 57 52 48 51 49 50 48 51 60 55
Greece 76 66 67 77 60 59 45 34 28 29 33 29 26 30 47
Hungary 82 77 79 72 69 65 74 62 59 63 58 61 55 58 67
Ireland 87 78 82 84 77 69 64 51 48 49 49 56 60 62 65
Italy 77 74 74 68 68 65 64 58 46 45 44 51 46 51 59
Latvia 70 68 65 65 57 51 53 47 53 51 53 54 54 55 57
Lithuania 87 76 79 81 78 70 73 64 68 66 71 73 70 74 74
Luxembourg 79 75 73 75 73 75 72 69 67 66 63 69 66 70 71
Malta 80 73 75 79 83 76 70 68 65 73 74 73 70 74 74
Netherlands 68 55 60 68 65 65 65 57 57 51 54 56 53 59 60
Poland 72 70 73 79 74 66 70 63 64 60 61 60 58 56 66
Portugal 78 77 73 76 74 73 62 52 46 35 41 47 48 56 60
Romania 95 86 83 89 84 77 70 69 63 57 64 69 60 62 73
Slovakia 80 73 76 77 76 76 78 65 59 57 47 49 47 48 65
Slovenia 80 70 75 73 71 52 53 48 48 40 42 39 36 41 55
Spain 77 64 68 77 77 61 53 43 28 24 26 33 37 43 51
Sweden 64 56 64 66 67 65 65 65 61 58 62 66 64 70 64
United Kingdom 48 39 37 33 35 29 29 25 26 26 30 33 37 40 33
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Table 15. Satisfaction with EU democracy 2004–2017 (Eurobarometer).  
 
 
 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 52 48 49 51 - 55 48 41 44 44 49 44 44 49 48
Belgium 73 67 68 69 - 63 64 62 62 63 63 63 58 63 64
Bulgaria 73 75 82 63 - 77 75 70 71 69 65 71 68 70 71
Croatia 51 50 55 51 - 49 57 51 58 66 57 54 55
Republic of Cyprus 70 72 72 64 - 73 61 59 48 30 35 32 38 49 54
Czech Republic 60 66 71 67 - 64 58 49 49 51 56 53 49 52 57
Denmark 67 63 69 68 - 71 69 70 68 66 69 69 67 70 68
Estonia 66 69 65 69 - 65 67 55 58 58 65 59 56 63 63
Finland 50 47 43 39 - 47 51 48 52 53 55 55 54 60 50
France 53 50 47 59 - 55 53 48 56 48 48 48 41 50 50
Germany 52 52 48 57 - 62 52 53 52 52 51 45 44 52 52
Greece 64 57 53 58 - 57 43 30 23 22 26 29 23 27 40
Hungary 64 62 69 64 - 57 62 56 52 58 52 54 50 53 58
Ireland 83 75 84 77 - 73 68 50 53 54 62 62 69 72 68
Italy 55 62 66 56 - 64 60 46 38 39 39 46 45 47 51
Latvia 65 68 70 72 - 61 68 60 69 67 69 68 70 71 68
Lithuania 74 69 68 67 - 61 62 59 64 65 71 72 70 73 67
Luxembourg 74 71 71 61 - 78 69 71 67 66 66 65 67 70 69
Malta 72 69 68 69 - 65 67 61 64 71 72 74 69 71 69
Netherlands 49 44 51 47 - 58 50 51 53 49 50 49 45 48 50
Poland 69 68 78 81 - 73 78 70 73 77 76 76 71 70 74
Portugal 49 58 49 55 - 55 38 27 25 17 31 40 51 64 43
Romania 77 84 81 69 - 73 69 66 57 58 65 73 64 63 69
Slovakia 48 56 51 55 - 64 60 48 48 45 44 47 49 52 51
Slovenia 74 72 71 66 - 54 58 51 52 44 49 48 47 48 56
Spain 72 70 76 82 - 67 63 49 40 33 32 42 41 50 55
Sweden 48 49 54 54 - 57 57 55 50 49 54 52 50 55 53
United Kingdom 54 55 53 46 - 53 52 41 42 42 47 49 48 49 49
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Table 16. Public support for EU membership 2004–2017 (Eurobarometer).  
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 41 35 37 37 37 42 36 37 32 42 42 40 38 44 39
Belgium 72 63 67 72 65 65 64 67 67 64 68 68 64 62 66
Bulgaria - - - 57 53 55 49 49 57 52 51 50 51 57 53
Croatia - - - - - - - - - 47 46 48 48 41 46
Republic of Cyprus 54 45 49 43 48 47 34 38 35 27 35 41 40 42 41
Czech Republic 45 46 51 45 46 39 30 31 24 30 39 34 33 31 37
Denmark 63 58 64 68 65 66 66 55 66 65 62 65 62 69 64
Estonia 53 46 54 64 60 61 52 47 52 55 69 62 63 68 58
Finland 46 40 38 42 44 51 43 45 50 50 49 54 56 56 47
France 57 50 49 56 49 50 45 46 57 51 48 54 50 54 51
Germany 61 57 59 67 64 63 52 57 72 69 74 72 72 81 66
Greece 63 56 54 57 46 53 44 37 46 34 33 45 30 36 45
Hungary 51 41 44 38 32 34 38 32 30 40 45 46 47 52 41
Ireland 81 78 79 78 74 74 69 67 58 68 71 73 76 82 73
Italy 59 56 57 53 43 51 50 44 40 42 46 43 38 38 47
Latvia 41 39 40 37 28 25 26 26 32 39 44 47 47 44 37
Lithuania 71 59 62 66 60 57 51 52 51 64 67 68 65 65 61
Luxembourg 85 82 75 80 74 79 71 75 81 74 82 84 83 85 79
Malta 48 43 47 54 53 51 44 42 51 64 62 62 59 66 53
Netherlands 75 74 73 78 78 75 70 69 72 64 66 72 72 78 72
Poland 52 55 60 70 65 60 63 54 50 54 66 63 63 69 60
Portugal 61 60 47 57 53 55 44 41 36 35 46 48 48 59 49
Romania - - - 72 69 69 57 59 62 57 71 65 52 52 62
Slovakia 55 50 58 60 57 66 59 52 43 48 47 47 54 49 53
Slovenia 55 47 56 57 56 49 40 38 43 42 40 44 45 49 47
Spain 75 70 71 74 68 70 63 58 53 49 61 60 59 64 64
Sweden 48 43 50 52 57 56 54 57 61 62 60 64 66 68 57
United Kingdom 41 38 40 39 34 31 31 27 34 34 41 49 49 50 38
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Table 17. Public support for EU and non-EU immigration 2014–2017 
(Eurobarometer).135  
 
                                                     
135 Parentheses indicate the month during which the sample was collected by 
Eurobarometer.  
EU immigration Non-EU immigration
Country 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 Mean 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 Mean
Austria 59 58 60 66 67 66 70 64 38 39 35 37 40 43 40 39
Belgium 50 48 59 56 59 64 63 57 30 31 33 37 37 48 45 37
Bulgaria 63 57 67 69 69 71 73 67 25 31 21 20 17 23 24 23
Croatia 69 69 70 72 71 70 64 69 56 50 45 48 45 49 45 48
Republic of Cyprus 42 38 44 41 46 48 50 44 23 22 27 21 22 26 27 24
Czech Republic 36 33 42 47 46 48 53 44 19 15 15 18 15 14 15 16
Denmark 72 68 66 64 67 73 72 69 44 37 31 30 30 29 29 33
Estonia 55 61 65 69 71 71 70 66 20 17 13 16 14 17 16 16
Finland 76 70 73 76 74 80 77 75 44 38 30 34 38 41 37 37
France 52 49 53 60 59 61 59 56 35 33 32 38 37 37 36 35
Germany 56 64 61 66 75 74 77 68 33 42 37 37 43 45 43 40
Greece 53 47 49 54 62 62 60 55 24 19 24 23 27 24 21 23
Hungary 47 48 51 56 61 64 69 56 29 24 16 15 17 17 21 20
Ireland 65 66 74 79 82 86 84 77 49 49 52 54 57 63 60 55
Italy 41 38 45 48 47 53 55 47 21 22 28 30 26 35 37 29
Latvia 33 38 50 47 48 53 53 46 17 16 10 11 13 13 13 13
Lithuania 59 58 71 73 73 75 77 69 32 22 18 23 23 29 35 26
Luxembourg 75 79 81 83 85 89 85 82 46 47 47 56 52 60 53 52
Malta 54 52 58 61 65 61 59 58 23 22 21 23 26 26 22 23
Netherlands 62 61 68 67 68 67 70 66 47 42 47 46 46 47 45 46
Poland 69 60 68 68 73 74 80 70 47 38 31 28 31 24 26 32
Portugal 67 67 66 69 72 77 82 71 51 45 47 47 50 56 55 50
Romania 69 65 57 56 62 57 60 61 55 58 37 30 38 35 37 41
Slovakia 42 39 46 46 56 53 51 48 20 16 10 12 16 14 18 15
Slovenia 57 62 62 64 69 65 70 64 33 38 21 29 28 28 31 30
Spain 71 69 73 76 76 78 77 74 53 52 59 56 58 60 64 58
Sweden 82 79 81 79 83 84 86 82 71 65 67 62 61 62 63 64
United Kingdom 45 50 54 52 63 66 67 57 40 42 42 44 53 57 56 48
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Table 18. Public support for the EU citizen right to live and work abroad 
2014–2017 (Eurobarometer).136  
 
                                                     
136 Parentheses indicate the month during which the sample was collected by 
Eurobarometer. 
EU right to live abroad EU right to work abroad
Country
2014 
(11)
2015 
(5)
2015 
(11)
2016 
(5)
2016 
(11)
2017 
(5)
2017 
(11) Mean
2014 
(11)
2015 
(5)
2015 
(11)
2016 
(5)
2016 
(11)
2017 
(5)
2017 
(11) Mean
Austria 65 61 61 65 60 63 63 62 65 59 62 64 61 62 63 62
Belgium 60 68 71 66 67 72 75 68 61 63 70 66 64 68 73 66
Bulgaria 86 84 82 83 81 83 81 83 85 86 84 84 84 84 82 84
Croatia 82 82 74 76 70 77 65 75 85 83 73 76 73 78 66 76
Republic of Cyprus 66 68 69 71 67 62 68 68 68 66 72 72 69 64 70 69
Czech Republic 74 75 67 71 65 67 70 70 79 79 72 76 66 73 73 74
Denmark 74 75 76 73 72 76 76 75 75 75 78 74 73 77 79 76
Estonia 84 84 83 81 83 82 80 82 88 88 87 86 86 86 84 86
Finland 78 81 77 82 80 83 82 80 80 84 82 87 86 85 85 84
France 71 75 77 77 74 74 74 75 71 74 79 78 76 74 73 75
Germany 78 85 79 79 86 85 83 82 78 86 81 81 86 85 84 83
Greece 76 69 75 72 71 75 71 73 76 68 72 72 72 74 70 72
Hungary 74 78 74 80 75 80 83 77 77 80 78 83 78 79 84 80
Ireland 77 80 82 84 85 86 88 83 80 81 83 86 87 88 87 84
Italy 67 68 62 60 61 59 59 62 70 69 65 63 62 59 59 64
Latvia 80 83 76 79 80 79 81 80 86 87 84 86 86 88 85 86
Lithuania 88 88 87 88 88 86 88 88 91 91 90 90 90 88 89 90
Luxembourg 86 90 89 90 92 92 91 90 82 89 90 90 93 94 92 90
Malta 75 79 71 75 75 73 68 74 72 79 71 75 74 73 68 73
Netherlands 73 75 73 74 75 74 75 74 71 74 78 76 78 75 76 75
Poland 83 79 78 76 77 74 82 78 85 80 80 79 80 81 84 81
Portugal 80 80 80 84 81 84 86 82 80 81 82 84 83 83 86 83
Romania 85 87 77 73 71 74 67 76 87 89 80 77 72 78 69 79
Slovakia 82 81 81 80 79 78 73 79 85 83 83 83 81 79 72 81
Slovenia 83 81 81 80 79 76 77 79 85 85 84 83 82 80 78 82
Spain 90 90 89 88 86 88 90 89 91 89 89 89 88 89 91 90
Sweden 78 79 76 76 78 79 79 78 85 87 90 86 87 88 90 87
United Kingdom 51 55 53 55 62 66 68 58 57 61 60 61 68 71 74 65
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Table 19. Public support for the EU citizen right to live and work in one’s 
own country 2015–2017 (Eurobarometer).137  
 
                                                     
137 Parentheses indicate the month during which the sample was collected by 
Eurobarometer. 
EU right to live in our country EU right to work in our country
Country
2015 
(11)
2016 
(5)
2016 
(11)
2017 
(5)
2017 
(11) Mean
2015 
(11)
2016 
(5)
2016 
(11)
2017 
(5)
2017 
(11) Mean
Austria 60 62 59 61 61 61 57 58 55 56 56 56
Belgium 66 64 63 69 69 66 64 61 61 66 68 64
Bulgaria 79 78 76 76 76 77 76 76 74 74 75 75
Croatia 68 68 64 67 54 64 65 66 62 65 53 62
Republic of Cyprus 64 61 58 57 62 61 60 55 59 54 62 58
Czech Republic 58 65 58 62 65 62 60 65 58 64 66 63
Denmark 74 71 70 75 76 73 76 73 73 76 78 75
Estonia 81 79 79 79 79 79 83 81 81 80 80 81
Finland 78 83 81 83 83 82 80 85 84 84 85 83
France 74 74 72 71 72 73 73 73 70 69 70 71
Germany 74 74 82 81 79 78 75 76 84 81 80 79
Greece 70 66 67 68 69 68 65 63 64 65 66 64
Hungary 67 70 67 72 77 70 65 70 65 72 77 70
Ireland 80 84 85 85 87 84 82 84 85 87 86 85
Italy 56 54 54 54 52 54 53 50 52 51 52 52
Latvia 71 75 77 74 78 75 73 76 79 76 79 76
Lithuania 82 84 84 80 83 83 83 83 85 81 83 83
Luxembourg 87 85 89 92 87 88 88 86 90 94 90 89
Malta 61 64 66 64 62 63 59 62 66 63 60 62
Netherlands 72 72 72 72 73 72 75 74 74 73 73 74
Poland 75 75 73 71 79 74 74 74 73 72 80 74
Portugal 79 83 79 83 85 82 78 83 79 81 85 81
Romania 73 71 65 69 62 68 73 71 65 69 62 68
Slovakia 75 73 74 72 69 73 75 72 73 70 67 71
Slovenia 76 74 72 71 69 72 76 73 72 70 69 72
Spain 87 86 85 86 89 87 86 86 85 87 90 87
Sweden 81 80 80 82 82 81 89 87 86 88 89 88
United Kingdom 52 53 60 64 67 59 58 59 66 69 73 65
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Table 20. Public support for the free movement of citizens 2015–2017 
(Eurobarometer).138  
 
                                                     
138 Parentheses indicate the month during which the sample was collected by 
Eurobarometer. 
Country
2015 
(11)
2016 
(5)
2016 
(11)
2017 
(5)
2017 
(11) Mean
Austria 69 75 68 75 74 72
Belgium 79 79 80 81 83 80
Bulgaria 94 94 94 93 93 94
Croatia 84 88 86 89 79 85
Republic of Cyprus 88 91 88 91 87 89
Czech Republic 80 87 84 83 86 84
Denmark 74 69 75 76 75 74
Estonia 97 95 97 96 98 97
Finland 86 90 89 89 87 88
France 81 86 83 81 80 82
Germany 90 89 93 93 92 91
Greece 87 84 85 88 88 86
Hungary 80 86 85 85 87 85
Ireland 87 89 93 91 90 90
Italy 79 76 79 76 77 77
Latvia 95 98 97 97 97 97
Lithuania 98 97 97 96 97 97
Luxembourg 92 90 97 95 93 94
Malta 86 90 91 92 89 90
Netherlands 83 79 85 84 84 83
Poland 82 83 89 86 89 86
Portugal 87 91 92 90 91 90
Romania 88 85 82 84 80 84
Slovakia 91 91 88 92 89 90
Slovenia 89 88 91 88 89 89
Spain 93 94 93 95 96 94
Sweden 86 86 88 90 88 87
United Kingdom 69 68 73 77 80 73
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Table 21. European identification 2004–2017 (Eurobarometer).  
 
 
 
 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria 61 54 - 55 - - 50 56 59 61 63 53 58 58 57
Belgium 71 67 - 70 - - 64 71 70 67 66 67 70 70 69
Bulgaria 58 55 - 54 - - 43 51 50 47 47 49 48 52 50
Croatia 64 67 - - - - - - 68 66 65 70 66 64 66
Republic of Cyprus 70 67 - 59 - - 59 59 60 50 47 42 49 51 56
Czech Republic 47 62 - 49 - - 39 43 48 52 56 56 55 62 52
Denmark 60 58 - 62 - - 56 57 59 58 63 63 62 64 60
Estonia 51 46 - 46 - - 48 49 47 49 59 55 53 51 50
Finland 45 49 - 48 - - 47 47 49 52 54 55 55 53 50
France 71 66 - 67 - - 56 62 64 61 63 63 65 63 64
Germany 63 64 - 69 - - 60 68 67 67 69 70 69 71 67
Greece 47 54 - 49 - - 47 44 53 50 49 50 47 46 49
Hungary 39 47 - 51 - - 52 48 51 54 56 64 65 70 54
Ireland 53 49 - 41 - - 38 39 39 39 51 54 56 60 47
Italy 68 64 - 48 - - 52 69 66 62 56 59 55 59 60
Latvia 50 51 - 42 - - 44 47 50 51 56 48 50 51 49
Lithuania 45 42 - 43 - - 37 46 42 52 49 52 48 51 46
Luxembourg 64 72 - 76 - - 76 78 81 77 80 83 86 85 78
Malta 62 67 - 65 - - 58 66 65 63 74 68 69 70 66
Netherlands 69 67 - 71 - - 63 66 68 65 69 72 73 71 69
Poland 54 57 - 52 - - 53 55 60 62 61 60 63 64 58
Portugal 46 51 - 48 - - 54 50 58 51 52 57 62 66 54
Romania 62 61 - 44 - - 41 51 54 49 57 58 53 53 53
Slovakia 60 59 - 54 - - 58 67 66 66 57 60 61 59 61
Slovenia 56 63 - 61 - - 43 60 58 55 58 58 54 58 57
Spain 61 60 - 64 - - 62 66 65 63 67 68 70 78 66
Sweden 54 57 - 55 - - 51 59 59 58 66 67 64 65 59
United Kingdom 43 35 - 39 - - 28 38 38 36 36 34 42 51 38
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Table 22. EU attachment 2006–2017 (Eurobarometer).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Austria - - 48 46 - - 55 - - 44 42 46 46 51 47
Belgium - - 60 66 - - 51 - - 61 54 60 56 59 59
Bulgaria - - 56 47 - - 57 - - 55 44 48 51 54 52
Croatia - - 42 32 - - - - - 46 42 51 42 45 42
Republic of Cyprus - - 28 29 - - 29 - - 23 27 29 29 37 29
Czech Republic - - 49 46 - - 42 - - 35 35 34 32 37 39
Denmark - - 49 45 - - 40 - - 45 49 51 47 53 47
Estonia - - 29 36 - - 35 - - 46 49 46 45 48 42
Finland - - 31 28 - - 33 - - 35 35 43 40 45 36
France - - 52 58 - - 56 - - 53 53 58 54 59 55
Germany - - 50 54 - - 56 - - 57 51 56 59 69 56
Greece - - 35 38 - - 44 - - 27 29 33 32 34 34
Hungary - - 65 56 - - 58 - - 52 51 59 60 60 56
Ireland - - 55 54 - - 55 - - 47 44 51 56 60 52
Italy - - 68 63 - - 75 - - 48 43 45 43 47 53
Latvia - - 45 49 - - 49 - - 58 64 65 69 70 58
Lithuania - - 35 39 - - 37 - - 43 43 52 52 51 43
Luxembourg - - 67 63 - - 71 - - 71 75 78 78 80 73
Malta - - 51 56 - - 52 - - 56 58 62 57 68 57
Netherlands - - 34 33 - - 33 - - 35 34 42 40 45 37
Poland - - 62 67 - - 66 - - 62 63 61 66 66 64
Portugal - - 47 53 - - 52 - - 40 43 48 49 54 48
Romania - - 67 62 - - 53 - - 51 60 62 56 57 58
Slovakia - - 42 48 - - 63 - - 52 52 48 47 56 51
Slovenia - - 59 52 - - 44 - - 41 40 47 49 52 48
Spain - - 57 58 - - 62 - - 48 47 55 60 65 55
Sweden - - 40 42 - - 38 - - 41 42 50 48 52 43
United Kingdom - - 39 32 - - 29 - - 31 37 44 47 45 37
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Svensk sammanfattning 
Ett tillräckligt högt politiskt stöd från medlemsländerna för den 
Europeiska Unionen (EU) är en förutsättning för att EU:s existens inte ska 
ifrågasättas. Med politiskt stöd från medlemsländerna avses i denna 
avhandling politiska attityder på aggregerad nivå inom medlemsländerna 
som indikerar ett positivt förhållningssätt gentemot EU. I denna 
avhandling har det politiska stödet för tre olika aspekter av EU, sett ur ett 
system perspektiv, analyserats. Detta med hänsyn till att den breda 
allmänheten har lärt sig att göra skillnad på olika aspekter av EU, vilket 
har gjort att attityderna gentemot dessa olika delar tenderar att variera. I 
och med att EU har utvecklats märkbart över tid, och är långt ifrån 
färdigställt, kommer allmänhetens attityder gentemot EU att ha både en 
direkt och indirekt påverkan på vilken riktning EU tar i framtiden och, för 
att dra argumentet till sin spets, även på EU:s framtida existens. 
Det att allmänhetens attityder inom EU-området anses ha direkta 
följder för EU:s utveckling är en uppfattning som har etablerats i takt 
med att EU har utvecklats i en allt mer överstatlig riktning. Detta är en 
utveckling som inte har välkomnats utav alla, med ökade framgångar 
för euroskeptiska partier som det tydligaste exemplet på ökad 
skepticism och motstånd gentemot utvecklingen. Därtill visade 
folkomröstningen om Storbritanniens medlemskap i EU med största 
tänkbara tydlighet att allmänheten inom specifika medlemsstater kan, 
om och när de får chansen, välja att vända EU ryggen.  
Detta har aktualiserat forskning kring hur attityder gentemot EU 
formas inom medlemsländerna, inte minst med tanke på att fler länder 
kan välja att följa britternas exempel. I takt med att allmänhetens 
attityder nu behöver beaktas har det blivit relevant att analysera ifall det 
finns sammanbindande faktorer på nationell nivå inom EU-området 
som kan tänkas förklara skillnader i attityder gentemot EU och vilka 
dessa faktorer isåfall är.  
Syftet med denna avhandling har varit att öka kunskapen om hur 
attityder gentemot EU påverkas utav nationella faktorer över tid. De 
övergripande frågeställningarna är: Hur har stödet inom 
medlemsländerna för olika aspekter av EU som ett politiskt system 
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utvecklats över tid? Till vilken utsträckning kan nationella faktorer 
förklara variationerna i stödet inom medlemsländerna för de olika 
aspekterna av EU som ett politiskt system? Till vilken utsträckning kan 
nationella faktorer förklarar variationerna i stödet mellan 
medlemsländerna för de olika aspekterna av EU som ett politiskt system? 
De former av politiskt stöd som denna avhandling empiriskt granskar är 
attityder riktade mot Europeisk integrations policy, EU som en politisk 
regim och det Europeiska politiska samhället.   
Denna monografi består av tre huvuddelar. I den första delen redogör 
jag för bakgrunden till studien och diskuterar centrala begrepp. I den 
andra delen redogör jag för den empiriska designen samt presenterar 
resultaten från analyserna. I den summerande avslutningsdelen redogör 
jag för avhandlingens bidrag, sammanfattar resultaten från analyserna och 
diskuterar begränsningar samt rekommendationer för framtida forskning.  
Det empiriska angreppssättet i avhandlingen är en kombination av 
olika metoder. För att besvara avhandlingens inledande frågeställning 
används deskriptiv statistisk för olika typer av EU attityder under 
tidsperioden 2004–2017. De två följande frågeställningarna, som har en 
mer förklarande ambition, besvaras med hjälp av att tillämpa 
flernivåregression för att etablera sambandet mellan EU attityder och 
nationella faktorer, under samma tidsperiod. Jag drar nytta av den 
statistiska metoden för att utreda det kausala sambandet mellan 
sammanlagt åtta olika nationella faktorer, indelade i grupper av 
ekonomiska, kulturella, demografiska och EU-relaterade faktorer, och 
variationer i politiskt stöd för EU både mellan och inom EU:s 
medlemsländer över tid.  
Resultaten visar att stödet för delar relaterade till Europeisk integration 
policy och EU som en politisk regim generellt kan anses ha sjunkit inom 
EU-området under denna tidsperiod. Däremot har stödet för det 
Europeiska politiska samhället hållits stabilt, och även till viss grad stigit 
inom denna tidsperiod. Variationerna i politiskt stöd inom 
medlemsländerna kan i stor grad förklaras av den ekonomiska 
utvecklingen inom medlemsländerna, medans skillnaderna mellan 
medlemsländerna inte direkt kan kopplas till en viss typ av nationella 
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faktorer. Resultaten var däremot starkt varierande beroende på vilken 
typ av EU attityder som avses. Detta signalerar att det är direkt 
missvisande att empiriskt angripa EU som ett singulärt objekt utan att 
beakta de olika delar som tillsammans utgör EU, sett som ett överstatligt 
europeiskt politiskt system.  
Vissa intressanta resultat kan särskilt lyftas fram. Till exempel finns 
det en stor skillnad mellan Euro och icke-Euro länder när det kommer 
till stöd för en gemensam Europeisk valuta. Inom de länder som 
verkligen använder Euron har stödet ökat över tid, medans det har 
sjunkit inom icke-Euro länder och dessa skillnader har dessutom blivit 
märkbart större efter Eurokrisen (2010–2012). Därtill inverkar en högre 
arbetslöshetsnivå och statsskuld negativt på stödet för 
Europaparlamentet, de demokratiska processerna inom EU samt på EU 
medlemskapet inom EU-området, över tid. Därmed tenderar EU 
attityder att vara starkt kopplade till den ekonomiska utvecklingen 
inom EU:s medlemsländer.  
Resultaten visar att allmänheten inom EU-området använder sig av 
nationella faktorer som ett riktmärke när de formar attityder gentemot 
EU. Dock varierar riktmärket beroende på vilken aspekt av EU som 
utvärderas. Resultaten visar också att skillnaderna mellan 
medlemsländer är mer komplicerade att förklara än inom. EU-området 
består av 28 separata medlemsländer, och det verkar inte finnas någon 
konkret nationell faktor som förmår förklara varför allmänheten inom 
vissa typer av EU-länder är mer kritiska till EU än andra.  
Det har inom EU litteraturen funnits ett behov av denna typ av 
övergripande forskningsansats kring hur olika typer av EU attityder 
hänger ihop med nationella faktorer. Avhandlingens huvudsakliga 
bidrag är därmed att den har bidragit med en bred analys av ett begrepp 
som ofta använts som någonting singulärt, åsikt om EU. Samtidigt ger 
avhandlingens empiriska bidrag grund för ytterligare forskning inom 
området.  
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